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LITERARY REMAINS

OF

THE LATE PROFESSOR

THEODORE GOLDSTÜCKER.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

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PREFACE.

THE Essays and Literary Remains of the late Professor Goldstücker, which are here presented to the public in a collected form, have been several years in type, awaiting their completion by the addition of a memoir of the author which had been promised by one of his oldest and most valued friends. Uninterrupted engagements, however, of a public and literary character having hitherto retarded the fulfilment of that promise, the publishers consider that the issue of these volumes ought no longer to be delayed, and they have therefore thought it right to substitute in the place of the memoir such a sketch, however inadequate, of the late Professor Goldstücker's life and

literary work as the printed and manuscript materials at their disposal have enabled them to furnish.

The present re-issue comprises such of his contributions to Quarterlies, Encyclopædias, and other serials as touch upon questions of Indian life, literature and antiquities, to the exclusion of all personal and controversial matter. It is hoped that these volumes may prove welcome to his personal friends and former pupils as a memorial of genial and instructive intercourse, and possibly to a wider circle of students as an exposition of the views and opinions concerning India and her place in classical antiquity held by one to whom was assigned by universal consent a foremost place amongst the Sanskrit scholars of his day.

A few references to more recent publications have occasionally been added with the view of affording later information upon the subjects to which the articles may relate.

In conclusion, the publishers express their grateful

acknowledgments for the courtesy which has been accorded them by the proprietors of serials in allowing the publication of original articles which, though written in most cases many years ago, could scarcely have been reprinted without their permission.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

Theodor Goldstücker was born of Jewish parents at Königsberg, in Prussia, on the 18th January 1821; and received his education (1829–36) at one of the grammar schools (*das Altstädtische Gymnasium*) of his native city, under the head-masters Struve and Ellendt, sen. At Michaelmas, 1836, he matriculated as a student in the University of Königsberg, and attended the lectures of Lobeck in classical philology, of Schubert in history, of Rosenkranz in philosophy, and of P. von Bohlen in Sanskrit. The natural bent of Goldstücker's mind for philological and philosophical inquiries received a powerful stimulus from the lectures of the two last-named professors, by which the whole course of his subsequent studies was determined.

After the Easter recess of 1838 he became a student at Bonn, where he joined the classes of Freytag in Arabic, and A. W. von Schlegel in general and Indian

literature, continuing at the same time the study of Sanskrit under Lassen. After spending another half-year as a student at Königsberg, he took, when only nineteen years old, his doctor's degree on the 2nd July 1840. In the spring of the following year he presented Professor Rosenkranz with the first-fruit of his Sanskrit studies, viz. a translation of the philosophical drama, "Prabodha-Chandrodaya," a kind of mediæval mystery which the Professor had only known from extracts. The latter was so gratified with this unsolicited response to an often expressed wish, that he asked the translator's consent to print his work. Goldstücker in his extreme modesty only accorded it on condition that his name should not be mentioned. The book appeared in the spring of 1842 (Königsberg, Th. Theile), accompanied with an introductory essay by the translator, and an interesting preface by the editor. In the summer of the previous year, Goldstücker, encouraged by Rosenkranz, addressed a letter to the King of Prussia, in which he solicited permission to lecture in his native university as a Privat-Docent. Though the letter was accompanied by a strong recommendation from Rosenkranz himself, the permission was refused in an official communication from Eichhorn, the Minister of Public Instruction, dated August 25, 1841, it may be presumed on confessional, or, more strictly speaking, on national grounds.

In August 1842 Goldstücker went to Paris, where Eugène Burnouf was gathering around him a cluster of young Sanskrit students. During his three years' resi-

dence there, which suffered only a temporary interruption by a short visit to London, he made the best of his opportunities to collect, with that indefatigable industry which characterised his whole life, materials for the various literary labours he had projected. Besides preparing a new and critical edition of the "Mahâbhârata," he devoted the best part of his time and energies to Hindû philosophy and Sanskrit grammar in all their minute details and intricacies, as well as to Vedic literature, and was never tired of copying and collating manuscripts of texts and commentaries. Burnouf, whose friendship Goldstücker enjoyed, kept up a vigorous literary intercourse with him, and frequently consulted him on Sanskrit technicalities while he was preparing for the press his great work on the Buddhism of Nepaul.

On his return from Paris, Goldstücker settled again at Königsberg in October 1845, and continued to stay there, with a short interruption, till the autumn of 1847, when he removed to Berlin. Independent of worldly cares, welcomed by many of the leading scholars, highly appreciated by Alexander von Humboldt, who expressed his obligation to his learning in the most flattering terms ("Kosmos," Sabine's translation, vol. ii. notes, p. x.), he was living and enjoying a scholar's life which would have completely satisfied his wants and aspirations, had not the political reaction which had set in in those days, run counter to his spirit of independence and his strong liberal and patriotic

convictions. In consequence of his known antipathies to the administrative principles then in vogue, he received an order to leave Berlin. This was, indeed, cancelled six weeks after, during which time Goldstücker resided at Potsdam; but he could not reconcile himself to the idea of returning permanently to his wonted spheres, and all the more gladly accepted an offer from Professor H. H. Wilson to prepare for the press a new edition of his Sanskrit dictionary, as this would involve a residence in London, and daily access to the literary treasures of the East India House. He was yearning after a renewal of his work at the fountain-heads of Indian lore, and thus eagerly embraced the golden opportunity of exploring to his heart's content the Sanskrit manuscripts of London and Oxford.

His residence in England dates from the summer of 1850, and although it was not at first his intention to protract it beyond the period of a few years, he soon became so engrossed with his work, position, and literary surroundings, that he abandoned all thought of leaving again the land of his adoption. Nay, he could with difficulty be brought to interrupt his studies for a few weeks' holiday in the summer, which he generally spent abroad.

Upon Professor Wilson's recommendation, he was appointed to the purely honorary post of Professor of Sanskrit in University College, in May 1852, and to the end of his life he gave up to the duties of this post the best part of his time and work with rare

disinterestedness and devotion, in many instances gratuitously proffering extra help where it was needed, and never refusing to lecture even to small classes. He took an equally active interest in the proceedings of the several learned bodies of which he was a member, more especially in those of the Philological Society, of which he was president at the time of his death, and of the East India Association, of which he was one of the vice-presidents.

Goldstücker was not frequently seen in society, though his presence was eagerly sought and highly prized; but his house in St. George's Square, Primrose Hill, was the resort not only of Oriental scholars of all countries, but of literary men in the widest sense, not to mention the large number of his personal friends who came to enjoy his stirring and genial conversation, or to consult him on private or literary matters of the most varied description. Moreover, there was scarcely a native of India visiting these shores who did not find his way to Goldstücker, sure of a hearty and sympathetic reception. In the words of the late Mr. J. Dickinson, "No other European appeared to understand them so well as Goldstücker; he seemed to have watched over their development from the infancy of their civilisation, and to have a parental affection for them. Whether he could help them or not, and he did help many of them, they knew they could place implicit confidence in him." To a man who was in the habit of placing his time so

readily at the service of others, and to whom literary work, and hard work too, was as much a necessary of life as the air he breathed, or as eating and drinking, it would have been impossible to accomplish the vast amount of work which he did accomplish had he not made it a practice to sit over his books and MSS. till the early morning hours, when he would retire for such brief rest as he had persuaded himself he needed. His constitution did not long withstand the strain of over-work; his life fell an easy prey to a cold which had developed into bronchitis, and he died on the 6th of March 1872, after only three days' illness. The news of his sudden death spread something like consternation among his numerous friends, but few of whom had even known of his illness, and was received with deep regret in wider circles. His funeral, which took place at Finchley, on the 12th March, was attended by a large number of his personal friends. It was as unostentatious as his whole life had been.

Goldstücker was of the most kindly and benevolent disposition, equally accessible to great and small, and ever ready to assist others out of the redundant stores of his vast and varied erudition.

His sympathetic nature had in his happy home at Königsberg, where his father carried on the business of a merchant, received all the fostering care that an affectionate and eminently sensible mother could bestow; and these happy domestic relations suffered no check or interruption, when in 1834, three years after his

father's death, his mother contracted a second marriage with the merchant M. W. Tobias. The tender family ties which united Goldstücker to his mother and step-brother were to him never-failing sources of the keenest enjoyment. Every year he would look forward with the most pleasurable anticipation to the brief summer holiday which he permitted himself to spend in their company, while for the rest of the year a genial correspondence had to make amends for the absence of personal intercourse. The loss of his mother, in August 1869, was the greatest sorrow that Goldstücker had ever experienced; how deeply he felt it was only known to his most intimate friends.

Goldstücker was not so thoroughly absorbed in his favourite studies as not to keep abreast of the march of modern discoveries in other departments of science, and maintain a keen interest in the burning political questions of the day. As above stated, he himself was a Liberal in politics, but he at no time belonged, as far as German politics were concerned, to the so-called National Liberal Party.

As a scholar of world-wide fame, who combined worldly wisdom with a profound and extensive knowledge of Sanskrit literature, he was, as might be expected, much sought after by political writers and statesmen, who came to solicit instruction and advice on matters touching the religious and political condition of the Hindûs. On all subjects connected with Hindû law he was considered the highest authority in this

country; and cases of special difficulty and intricacy were referred to him for his opinion by the Privy Council. In spite of all these incentives to self-assertion, which might have turned the brain of many less eminent men, Goldstücker maintained to the end of his life, along with his independence of character, that natural simplicity of manner, that perfect freedom from assumption and *hauteur*, which are among the finest qualities of the true scholar. In gathering knowledge, and in imparting knowledge to others, Goldstücker was the very type of conscientiousness. Indefatigable in copying and collating MSS., making *indices*, collecting and arranging materials for lectures, essays, or larger works, he seemed to take no account of the limits which time sets to human exertions and human plans. Stern and severe in the exercise of criticism as applied to his own work, and ever aiming at the greatest attainable perfection, both as to intrinsic excellence and outward form, he was as inexorable a critic of the labours of others in the domain of Sanskrit literature, and would censure in the bitterest terms any literary production which appeared to him to fall short of the standard of scholarship to which he himself was striving to attain. The extreme severity with which he exercised the critical lash in his work "Pâṇini: his Place in Sanskrit Literature," prefixed to his fac-simile edition of the "Mânava-Kalpa-sûtra" (London, 1861), brought him many enemies, and involved him in numbers of

literary feuds. The work is otherwise a monument of sound grammatical study, full of the most acute observations on the literary history of India, and marks an epoch in Sanskrit scholarship. The aim, traceable in all his works, at combining the greatest possible accuracy with the highest attainable completeness, is most conspicuous in his "Sanskrit-English Dictionary" (London, 1856–64), which in its progressive stages assumed such dimensions that it had to be stopped even before it had reached the end of the first letter of the alphabet. But in its four hundred and eighty pages so many valuable monographs are contained, that it will ever remain an indispensable book of reference on the special subjects of which they treat. The reasons which induced his executor to present the large collection of *Indices*, which form the basis of the "Sanskrit Lexicon," to the India Office, on condition that the chest containing them should not be opened till the year 1922, have been fully set forth in the "Academy" for May 15, 1872 (Vol. iii. No. 48). The more materials Goldstücker accumulated, sifted, and arranged for use in the various publications he had projected, the more fastidious he became in going to print, more especially as he worked with no view to literary fame, or to any other selfish advancement. Thus it is that what he published amounts to considerably less than what most other scholars with his brilliant intellect, his indefatigable industry, his vast erudition, and his splendid opportunities, would have accomplished.

In 1865 was issued the first fasciculus of a critical edition of the celebrated compendium of the Mîmânsâ philosophy, the "Jaiminîya-nyâya-mâlâ-vistara," by Mâdhavâchârya, the great commentator on the Vedas. Goldstücker had for twenty-five years collected materials for this edition and for the introduction to it, which was intended to have been published with the last fasciculus; but the edition remained unfinished at the time of his death, and has only recently been completed by Professor Cowell. For a yet longer period, Goldstücker had been engaged in the study of Pâṇini, the old Sanskrit grammarian, and of Patanjali's great commentary upon Pânini's Sûtras. No other Sanskrit scholar was so much at home in these abstruse grammatical works, and in the literature bearing upon them, as Goldstücker. He was constantly adding to his materials for a comprehensive work on them, and it was only as part of his general scheme that he obtained the sanction of the Indian Council to the publication, under his superintendence, of a photo-lithographed reproduction of several good manuscripts which had been brought to his notice, containing Patanjali's Mahâbhâshya, as well as Kaiyyaṭa's gloss, and Bhaṭṭojidîkshita's commentary on the latter. It took him several years of patient labour to carry those six ponderous quartos through the press; and he had finished all but two hundred pages when death carried him off.

While thus the world of letters has deeply to regret

that none of those great works on which he had laboured so long, and so assiduously, and so devotedly, and which would have contained the results of his studies, should ever have seen the light, it is in hardly a more fortunate position with regard to the papers which he read at the meetings of the Philological and Royal Asiatic Societies. In almost all cases, Goldstücker would reserve them for publication till he should have had an opportunity of working them out in greater detail, and so they remained unpublished. There is some hope, however, that his MS. Sanskrit grammar, which formed the basis of the first or elementary course of his lectures in University College, may not share the same fate, as it has been ascertained that a complete copy has been preserved by one of his former pupils, now in India.

Most of Goldstücker's minor contributions to Indian literature, which have been gathered together in the two volumes of "Remains" now issued, were intended for the general literary public. Though they are thus purposely popular in form, and divested of that learned *apparatus* with which their author could easily have furnished them, they are valuable as containing the sum of his opinions on many points of Hindu religion, philosophy, and literature, on which no other record of his views is known to exist. It is a subject for regret that he should not have been invited to join the staff of contributors to Chambers' Encyclopædia till the letter G was reached; otherwise, some

completeness, at least in this series of papers, would have been attained.

Goldstücker has set us a noble example of hard, honest, unselfish work in the service of Sanskrit scholarship; he should be judged by that work, by the influence for good he has exerted, and by the high standard of literary morality which he strove to establish, and up to which he endeavoured to live.

ARTICLE I.

THE VEDA.

KNIGHT'S ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA, s.v. (1860).

THE word *Veda* (from the Sanskrit radical *vid*, 'to know'—kindred with the Latin *vid-*, Greek *ιδ-*, Gothic *vait*) literally means 'knowing,' or 'knowledge'; but is emphatically used as the name of those ancient Sanskrit works which constitute the basis of Brahmanic belief, and are held by the Hindus to have been revealed to them by their deities. These works were originally three, namely, the *R'igveda*, the *Yajurveda*, and the *Sâmaveda*. At a more recent period a fourth Veda was added to them, but it never obtained that degree of sanctity which was allowed to its predecessors; it is not mentioned, for instance, in the ninth verse of the Purusha-sûkta of the R'igveda, which speaks of the R'ig-, Sâma-, and Yajur-veda; nor in the Chhândogya-Upanishad; nor even in the law-book of Manu; for though the latter refers on several occasions to the three Vedas, it speaks only once (xi. 33) of "the revelations of the Atharvângirasas," by this expression alluding to, but not naming by name, the Atharvaveda; and even the writers on the Mîmânsâ, a doctrine that has for its object to clear up doubtful passages and to reconcile discrepancies of Vaidik texts, are merely concerned in those of the three former Vedas, not in those of the Atharvaveda.

Each of these four Vedas consists of two distinct parts: a *Sanhitâ* or collection of *Mantras*, and a portion called *Brâhman'a*.

Mantra (from *man*, 'to think,' literally 'that by which thinking is effected') means a hymn or prayer. According to the definition given by Mâdhava-Sâyan'a, the celebrated commentator of the Vedas,—in his work on the Mîmânsâ, the Jaiminîya-nyâya-mâlâ-vistara, and in his introductions to the *R'igveda* and Âitareya-brâhman'a,—a *Mantra* is sometimes addressed to the divinity with a verb in the first person; sometimes it ends with the verb 'thou art,' or with the word 'thee:' now it mentions the performance of ritual acts, then it contains praises, invocations, injunctions, reflections, complaints, puts questions or returns answers, &c. (Colebrooke, 'Misc. Ess.' i p, 308; Müller, 'Ancient Sanskrit Literature,' p. 343; Goldstücker, 'Introduction to the Mânava Kalpa Sûtra, or Pân'ini,' p. 99.) The author of a *Mantra*, as we should say—or as the Hindu authorities state, the saint "by whom it was first spoken," the "seer" or "rememberer" of its text—in short the personage to whom the *Mantra* is supposed to have been revealed, is called its *R'ishi*. The deity to whom "the *R'ishi* seeking for the accomplishment of his objects, addresses his praise," is its *Devatâ* (Yâska's 'Nirukta,' vii. 1). But since there are *Mantras* which contain neither petition nor adoration, the subject of such *Mantras* is considered as the deity that is spoken of; for example, the praise of generosity is the *Devatâ* of many entire hymns addressed to princes from whom gifts were received by the author. (Colebr., 'Misc. Ess.' i. p. 22.)

A *Brâhman'a* (neuter,—not to be confounded with the masculine word, or the name of the sacerdotal caste),—from *brahman*,[1] prayer, is twofold; according to Mâdhava, it contains "either commandments or explanations;" in other words, it gives directions for the performance or

[1] Muir, 'Original Sanskrit Texts,' i², p. 240-65; Haug, 'Brahma und die Brahmanen,' (1871), p. 5 ff.

sacrificial acts, and explains the origin and object of the rite, by giving citations of hymns, illustrations and legendary narratives, also by speculations of a mystical and philosophical kind. The *Brâhman'a* portion of the Vedas is therefore the foundation of the Vaidik ritual, which became fully developed and systematised in the ritual works called the *Kalpa-Sûtras;* and it is also the source whence sprang those mystical and theosophical writings, the *A'ran'yakas* and *Upanishads*, which at a later period expanded into the orthodox *Vedânta* philosophy, and which are frequently referred to even by the other philosophical schools, though their orthodoxy is extremly doubtful and widely different from that of the Vedânta doctrine.

That there was originally but one text of each of the four Vedas is plausible enough. Tradition records that the son of Parâs'ara R'ishi, Kr'ishn'a Dwaipâyana, surnamed Vyâsa, "having compiled and arranged the scriptures, theogonies and mythological poems, taught the several Vedas to as many disciples, namely, the R'igveda to Paila, the Yajurveda to Vais'ampâyana, the Sâmaveda to Jaimini, and the Atharvaveda to Sumantu." (Colebr., 'Misc. Ess.' i. p. 14.; Wilson, Rigveda, I. p. xx.) But inasmuch as these saints taught the lessons they had learned to their pupils, who in their turn communicated their knowledge to their disciples, and so forth, it is obvious that great variations must have crept into the text; and we know as a fact, that gradually many schools or *Charan'as* arose, each giving preference to its own readings, and, as particularly in the case of the Yajurveda, to its own arrangement and distribution of the sacred text. Hence it came to pass, that each of these Vedas branched off into various *S'âkhâs* (branches), or as we might say, into various editions, which though in the main concurring in their contents, nevertheless contained verbal differences enough to account for the divisions of their respective schools. A work which treats of these schools, the *Charan'avyûha*,

enumerates several of them by name, and states that five, sixty-eight, a thousand, and nine were the respective numbers of the Charan'as of the *R'ig-*, *Yajur-*, *Sâma-*, and *Atharva-veda.* Very few only of these editions have come down to us, and the loss of the greatest part of them is the more to be deplored, as they would probably have enabled us to account for some (and important) differences in the verses common to some or all of these Vedas, and perhaps also for superstitions of later times, which are said to be founded on, but are not countenanced by, the text, as we possess it now, of the R'igveda-Sanhitâ.

If in order to gain an insight into the peculiar character of each of these Vedas, we consult the view entertained of it by the native writings, little aid will be afforded us by the mythological narrative of the S'atapatha-brâhman'a (xi. 5, 8, 1), and Manu's 'Law-book,' (i. 23), which tell us, in the same words, that (Brahmâ), "for the due performance of the sacrifice, drew out the threefold eternal Veda, the R'igveda from fire, the Yajurveda from air, and the Sâmaveda from the sun;" nor will our knowledge be more advanced by a passage from the Bhâgavata (iii. 12-37) and the Vishńu-Purâń'a, which inform us (i. cap. 5) that "Brahmâ created the R'igveda....from his eastern mouth, the Yajurveda .... from his southern, the Sâmaveda .... from his western, and the Atharvaveda....from his northern mouth." But of greater importance is evidently a statement of the Kaushîtaki-brâhman'a which while omitting to mention the Atharvaveda, calls the Yajur- and Sâma-veda "the attendants of the R'igveda" (Müller, 'Anc. Sansk. Lit.', p. 457). The real bearing of the latter words however, becomes clear from what Sâyan'a says in his introduction to the R'igveda. After having inferred from the ninth verse of the Purusha-sûkta, mentioned before (comp. Muir's 'Original Sanskrit Texts,' i. p. 6),[1] the precedence in rank of the R'igveda before the other Vedas, he

[1] 2 ed., p. 7 ff.

continues: "the Taittirîyas, or followers of the Black Yajurveda record that whatever sacrificial act is performed by means of the Sâma- and Yajur-veda is (comparatively) slender, whatever is done by means of the R'igveda is strong;" and .... "among the hymns found in the Yajurveda there are many R'igveda hymns, which are to be employed by the Adhwaryu priest: all the hymns of the Sâmaveda come from the R'igveda and even those who make use of the Atharvaveda read in their own Sanhitâ, to a considerable extent, the very hymns of the R'igveda" (Sâyan'a, in Müller's ed. of the 'R'igveda,' i. p. 2). It results from this statement, not only that the R'igveda was held to be prior in rank to the other Vedas, but that it was considered to be older than they, and that the hymns of the Sâmaveda were entirely, and those of the two other Vedas to a considerable degree, extracted from the R'igveda-Sanhitâ. And this information of the celebrated commentator is fully borne out by a comparison of the hymns of the four Vedas. For, though Professor Benfey has shown, in his edition of the Sâmaveda (p. xix), that seventy-one verses of the latter are not met with in the present text of the R'igveda, and that many readings of this Veda differ from those of the Sâmaveda, it does not follow "that the recension of the R'igveda-Sanhitâ took place at a later period than that of the Sâmaveda," nor "that the R'igveda verses occurring in the Sâmaveda are older than those of the present R'igveda text" (Professor Weber, in his 'Akademische Vorlesungen,' p. 9. 62); but, as Professor Müller justly observes ('Anc. Sansk. Lit.' p. 475), that this difference "may possibly be accounted for by the fact, that we do not possess all the S'âkhâs of the R'igveda."

The true nature, however, of this relation between the R'igveda and the other Vedas, appears from the purposes which they were made to serve, purposes, which, according to the concurrent statement of all native authors, are of a ritual or sacrificial character.

A Vaidik sacrifice is a piece of machinery of a very complicated kind, A knowledge of it is imparted to a class of writings, the Kalpa works, which will be treated of hereafter. Good care was taken by their authors, or the authorities whence their contents are derived, that no man who intended to perform a regular sacrifice (a *yajamâna*), could satisfy his religious want—which was always connected with some worldly desire, such as the birth of a son, increase of cattle, attainment of military renown, conquest, and the like—without the assistance of one or more priests, who as a matter of course always belonged to the Brâhman'a caste. There were sacrifices which lasted one day, others which went on from two to eleven days, others which took up as many as a hundred days. Accordingly, to perform some sacrifices one *R'itwij*, or priest, sufficed; or, to complete others, four, five, or six priests were necessary; their fullest complement, however, is the number of sixteen, for a seventeenth R'itwij—the *Sadasya*, or superintendent—is not admitted by all authorities; and the assistants of the priests—the slayer, the butcher, the ladle-holder, the choristers, &c.—are not counted amongst the R'itwijs or real priests.

This full contingent of priests is enumerated by As'walâyana (S'rauta Sûtra, iv. 1) in the following way. First comes the *Hotr'i*, who has under him three men (*purusha*), the Maitrâvarun'a, Achchhâvâka, and Grâvastut; secondly, the *Adhwaryu*, with the Pratiprasthâtr'i, Neshtr'i, and Unnetr'i; thirdly, the *Brahman*, with the Brâhman'âchchhansin, Agnîdhra (or, Agnîdh), and Potr'i; lastly, the *Udgâtr'i*, with the Prastotr'i, Pratihartr'i, and Subrahman'ya (comp. Müller, 'Anc. Sansk. Lit.,' pp. 468, 469, where, by a mistake, some of the *purushas* of the *Brahman* and the *Udgâtr'i* have changed their places). The same class arrangement, though sometimes in a different order, occurs likewise in other authorities (for example, Kâtyâyana S'r. S. vii., 1, 6; Mâdhava's

Jaiminiyanyây., iii. 7, 17; see also the note to p. 209, in Wilson's second volume of his translation of the R'igveda).

Now, of these R'itwijs, the Kalpa works enjoin that the Adhwaryu has to perform his duties with the Yajurveda, the Udgâtr'i with the Sâmaveda, the Hotr'i with the R'igveda, and that the Brahman "has to set right any deficiency that may have occurred in the religious acts of the three former priests; he must, therefore, be acquainted with all the three Vedas—the Rig-, Yajur-, and Sâma-veda" ('Mâdhava's Jaiminîyanyây,' iii. 7, 17; vi. 3, 14; Müller, 'Anc. Sansk. Lit.,' p. 469, ff.) It may be added, moreover, that the Adhwaryu had to mutter, inaudibly, the verses of the Yajurveda, that the Udgâtr'i had to chant those of the Sâmaveda—probably in the same manner as the Pentateuch is intoned up to this day by the officiating Jews in their synagogues—and that the Hotr'i had to recite in a loud voice the verses of the R'igveda.

It follows, therefore, that each of these Vedas had its distinct ceremonial; but that no ceremonial was assigned to, and that no distinct priest or class of priests had to use, the hymns of the Atharvaveda. "The Atharvaveda," says Madhusûdana, "is not used for the sacrifice; it only teaches how to appease, to bless, to curse, &c." "Its songs," as Professor Müller observes ('Anc. Sansk. Lit.' p. 447), "formed probably, an additional part of the sacrifice from a very early time. They were chiefly intended to counteract the influence of any untoward event that might happen during the sacrifice. They also contained imprecations and blessings, and various formulas, such as popular superstition would be sure to sanction at all times and in all countries." And the same scholar infers that it was probably part of the office of the Brahman priest, also, to know and to apply these songs, whenever their effect was supposed to be required for remedying any mistake committed by the other three classes of priests. At all events, it is certain that the Atharvaveda is not comprised among the sacrificial

Vedas, and that its later date may be safely concluded from its not being mentioned in those works which regulate the ancient rites, even if such posteriority were not recognisable from the language of those of its hymns which do not occur in the other Vedas.

By comparing, however, the contents of the three sacrificial Vedas with the ritual precepts of the Kalpa works, we may ascertain another important fact. All the verses of the Yajurveda and all the verses of the Sâmaveda are used in one sacrificial act or another. Such, however, is not the case with the verses of the R'igveda. Many of the latter, indeed, are likewise indispensable for sacrificial purposes, as we are taught by the ritual books connected with this Veda; yet a good number remain, which stand quite aloof from any ceremony. This class bears purely a poetical or mystical character; and it may be fairly inferred that even the strong tendency of later ages to impress an entirely sacrificial stamp on each of these Vedas, broke down before the natural and poetical power that had evidently called forth these songs, as it could not incorporate them amongst the liturgic hymns. We may quote, for instance, a hymn from the tenth Mańd'ala of the R'igveda (from Colebrooke's 'Misc. Ess.,' i. p. 33), as an illustration of those which belong to the mystical poetry of this Veda. It runs thus. "Then there was no entity nor nonentity; no world, nor sky, nor aught above it; nothing anywhere in the happiness of any one, involving or involved; nor water deep and dangerous. Death was not; nor then was immortality; nor distinction of day or night. But THAT breathed without affiation, single with (*Swadhá*) her who is within him. Other than him, nothing existed (which) since (has been). Darkness there was; (for) this universe was enveloped with darkness, and was undistinguishable (like fluids mixed in) waters; but that mass, which was covered by the husk, was (at length) produced by the power of contemplation. First, desire was formed in his mind,

and that became the original productive seed; which the wise, recognising it by the intellect in their hearts, distinguish, in non-entity, as the bond of entity. Did the luminous ray of these (creative acts) expand in the middle? or above? or below? That productive seed at once became providence (or sentient souls) and matter (or the elements): she, who is sustained within himself, was inferior; and he, who heeds, was superior. Who knows exactly, and who shall in this world declare, whence and why this creation took place? The gods are subsequent to the production of this world; then who can know whence it proceeded?. or whence this varied world arose? or whether it uphold itself or not? He who in the highest heaven is the ruler of this universe, does indeed know; but not another can possess this knowledge."

An instance of another kind of R'igveda hymns, which cannot have served any sacrificial purpose, is given by Professor Müller in his excellent work on 'Ancient Sanskrit Literature' (p. 495).[1] It bears a satirical character, inasmuch as it ridicules the elaborate ceremonial of the Brahmans, and is rendered by him thus: "After lying prostrate for a year, like Brahmans performing a vow, the frogs have emitted their voice, roused by the showers of heaven. When the heavenly waters fell upon them, as upon a dry fish lying in a pond, the music of the frogs comes together like the lowing of cows with their calves. When at the approach of the rainy season, the rain has wetted them as they were longing and thirsting, one goes to the other while he talks, like a son to his father, saying, 'akkhala!' (*βρεκεκέξ κοάξκοάξ*). One of them embraces the other, when they revel in the shower of water; and the brown frog jumping after he has been ducked, joins his speech with the green one. As one of them repeats the speech of the other,

[1] Muir, Anc. Sanskrit Texts, v. 435 ff. Haug, 'Brahma und die Brahmanen,' p. 40 ff.

like a pupil and his teacher, every limb of them is, as it were, in growth, when they converse eloquently on the surface of the water. One of them is Cow-noise, the other Goat-noise; one is Brown, the other Green; they are different though they bear the same name, and modulate their voices in many ways as they speak. Like Brahmans at the Soma sacrifice of Atirâtra, sitting round a full pond, and talking, you, O frogs, celebrate this day of the year when the rainy season begins. These Brahmans with their Soma have had their say, performing the annual rite. These Adhwaryus, sweating whilst they carry the hot pots, pop out like hermits. They have always observed the order of the gods as they are to be worshipped in the twelvemonth; these men do not neglect their season; the frogs who had been like hot pots themselves, are now released when the rainy season of the year sets in. Cow-noise gave, Goat-noise gave, the Brown gave, and the Green gave us treasures. The frogs, who give us hundreds of cows, lengthen our life in the rich autumn." In another hymn of the last Mańḍala a gambler laments over his evil passion, which beguiles him into sin. All these and similar hymns are evidently of quite a different character than those which praise the power of the elementary gods, and could find their place in sacrificial acts.

But there is further evidence to show that the collection of the R'igveda cannot have borne originally a ritual stamp. When songs are intended only for liturgic purposes, they are sure to be arranged in conformity with the ritual acts to which they apply; when, on the contrary, they flow from the poetical or pious longings of the soul, they may, in the course of time, be used at, and adapted for, religious rites, but they will never submit to that systematic arrangement which is inseparable from the class of liturgic songs. Now, such a systematic arrangement characterises the collection of the Yajurveda and Sâmaveda hymns; it is foreign to the R'igveda-Sanhitâ.

With the exception of the last book, which is of a mystical nature, all the other books of the whole Yajurveda contain verses which are classified according to the special sacrifices at the performing of which they were muttered. The Sanhitâ of the Sâmaveda consists of verses which had to be intoned especially at the moon-plant sacrifice. The arrangement of the R'igveda hymns, however, is quite of a different kind. It resisted the order of a finished ceremonial. The R'igveda hymns are not distributed with reference to sacrificial acts; they are partly arranged according to the divinities to whom they are addressed, and partly according to their authors, the R'ishis, who made them known. They must therefore have preceded the completion of that ceremonial, which is the indispensable condition of the Sâmaveda- and Yajurveda-Sanhitâs.

Having established the general character of the four Vedas, we shall now give a brief outline of their special features and of the principal works which owe them their origin.

The Rig-, or the first and principal, Veda, we possess only in the recension of the S'âkhala school. Its Sanhitâ, or collection of hymns, is arranged on two methods. The one has merely regard to the material bulk; the other seems to be based on the authorship of the Mantras. Both, however, run parallel with one another, without differing in the order of the hymns which constitute the Sanhitâ. According to the first method, the Sanhitâ is divided into eight *Ashṭ'akas* or eighths, each of which is again subdivided into *Adhyâyas* or lectures, an Adhyâya consisting of a number of *Vargas* or sections, and a Varga of a number of *R'ich* or verses, usually five. According to the second method, the Sanhitâ is divided into ten *Man'd'alas* or circles, subdivided into eighty-five Anuvâkas or lessons, which consist of one thousand and seventeen (or, with eleven additional hymns, of one thousand and twenty-eight) *Sûktas* or hymns, these again containing

ten thousand five hundred and eighty and a half *R'ich* or verses. The first eight of these Man'd'alas begin with hymns addressed to *Agni*, which are followed by hymns addressed to *Indra*. After the latter come generally hymns addressed to the *Vis'we Devâs*, or the gods collectively, and then those which are devoted to other divinities. The ninth Man'd'ala is entirely addressed to the Soma-plant, and is especially connected, therefore, with the Sâmaveda-Sanhitâ; while the tenth Man'd'ala has chiefly served for the collection of the Atharvaveda hymns. Again, as regards their author, the second Man'd'ala contains hymns which are attributed to the R'ishi Gr'itsamada; the third is said to belong to Viṣ'wâmitra, the fourth to Vâmadeva, the fifth to the Atris, the sixth to Bharadwâja, the seventh to Vasisht'ha, the eighth to Kaṅwa, the ninth to Angiras. The first and the tenth Man'd'ala are ascribed to the authorship of various R'ishis.

"The worship which the Sûktas describe comprehends offering prayer and praise: the former are chiefly oblations and libations,—clarified butter poured on fire; and the expressed and fermented juice of the Soma-plant, presented in ladles to the deities invoked,—in what manner does not exactly appear, although it seems to have been sprinkled, sometimes on the fire, sómetimes on the ground, or, rather, on the *Kus'a*, or sacred grass, strewed on the floor, and in all cases the residue was drunk by the assistants. The ceremony takes place in the dwelling of the worshipper, in a chamber appropriated to the purpose, and probably to the maintenance of a perpetual fire, although the frequent allusions to the occasional kindling of the sacred flame are rather at variance with this practice. There is no mention of any temple, nor any reference to a public place of worship, and it is clear that the worship was entirely domestic..... That animal victims were offered on particular occasions may be inferred from brief and obscure allusions in the hymns of the first book; and it is inferrible

from some passages that human sacrifices were not unknown, although infrequent and sometimes typical: but those are the exceptions, and the habitual offerings may be regarded as consisting of clarified butter and the juice of the Soma-plant.

"The *Súkta* almost invariably combines the attributes of prayer and praise: the power, the vastness, the generosity, the goodness, and even the personal beauty of the deity addressed are described in highly laudatory strains, and his past bounties or exploits rehearsed and glorified; in requital of which commendations, and of the libations or oblations which he is solicited to accept, and in approval of the rite in his honour, at which his presence is invoked, he is implored to bestow blessings on the person who has instituted the ceremony, and sometimes, but not so commonly, also on the author or reciter of the prayer. The blessings prayed for are, for the most part, of a temporal and personal description,—wealth, food, life, posterity, cattle, cows, and horses; protection against enemies, victory over them, and sometimes their destruction, particularly when they are represented as inimical to the celebration of religious rites, or, in other words, people not professing the same religious faith. There are a few indications of a hope of immortality and of future happiness, but they are neither frequent nor, in general, distinctly announced, although the immortality of the gods is recognised, and the possibility of its attainment by human beings exemplified in the case of the demigods termed R'ibhus, elevated for their piety to the rank of divinities. Protection against evil spirits (*Rákshasas*) is also requested, and in one or two passages *Yama* and his office, as ruler of the dead, are obscurely alluded to. There is little demand for moral benefactions, although in some few instances hatred of untruth and abhorrence of sin are expressed; a hope is uttered that the latter may be repented of or expiated; and the gods are in one hymn solicited to extricate the worshippers from sin

of every kind. The main object of the prayers, however, are benefits of a more worldly and physical character: the tone in which these are requested indicates a quiet confidence in their being granted, as a return for the benefits which the gods are supposed to derive from the offerings made to them, in gratifying their bodily wants, and from the praises which impart to them enhanced energy and augmented power: there is nothing, however, which denotes any particular potency in the prayer or hymn, so as to compel the gods to comply with the desires of the worshipper; nothing of that enforced necessity which makes so conspicuous and characteristic a figure in the Hindu mythology of a later date, by which the performance of austerities for a continued period constrains the gods to grant the desired boon, although fraught with peril and even destruction to themselves." (Wilson, 'R'igveda,' vol i. p. xxiii. ff.)

If we ask what divinities were worshipped by the authors of the R'igveda hymns, an answer is given by Yâska, the oldest Vaidik exegete of those whose writings are preserved, in the following manner:— "The Vaidik exegete says that there are *three* Devatâs, viz., Agni, who resides on earth; Vâyu, or Indra, who resides in the intermediate region (between heaven and earth); and Sûrya, who resides in heaven. Because each of these Devatâs has a variety of attributes, there are indeed many names of them" (vii. 5); and "of the Devatâ there is but one soul; but the Devatâ having a variety of attributes, it is praised in many ways; other gods are merely portions of the one soul" (vii. 4). The Anukraman'î, or explanatory index to this Veda, says, in a similar manner, "The deities are only three, whose places are the earth, the intermediate region, and heaven: (namely) fire, air, and the sun. They are pronounced to be (the deities of the mysterious names severally); and (Prajâpati) the lord of creation is (the deity) of them collectively. The syllable *Om* intends every deity: it belongs to

(Paramesht'hî) him who dwells in the supreme abode; it appertains to (Brahman) the vast one; to (Deva) God; to (Adhyâtman) the superintending soul. Other deities belonging to those several regions are portions of the three gods; for they are variously named and described, on account of their various operations; but (in fact) there is only one deity, the *Great Soul* (Mahân âtmâ). He is called the Sun; for he is the soul of all beings: (and) that is declared by the sage: 'the sun is the soul of (jagat) what moves and of (tasthivat) that which is fixed.' Other deities are portions of him." (Colebrooke, 'Misc. Ess.' i. p. 27.)

If we took this account for a correct representation of the Vaidik creed we could not but draw the inference that it was based on the belief in one god, or, at least, one principle of creation, and that the many gods met with in the Vaidik hymns are merely poetical allegories of the One Great Soul. We have quoted indeed, before, a mystical hymn of the R'igveda, which would seem to countenance this view. But an unbiassed examination of the R'igveda poetry must lead to the conclusion that religion did not take this course in India; that we must distinguish between one or more hymns, evidently the product of a later and philosophical age, and the bulk of that collection which contains nothing but the adoration of the elementary powers in their various manifestations and degrees. Nor can we give an unqualified assent to the threefold classification of the Vaidik divinities, as given by Yâska, and repeated by the Anukraman'î; for neither is Agni's abode restricted to earth, nor could Indra be identified or placed on the same level with Vâyu, nor would it be correct to assign to Sûrya such a place in the Vaidik pantheon as would equalise his rank with that of Agni or Indra. The real position and quality of the *principal* Vaidik divinities of the R'igveda is, in short, this:—The chief deities are *Agni* and *Indra*, the two gods, as we have noticed before, to whom the first series of hymns is addressed in eight out of the ten Man'd'alas

of the Sanhitâ. *Agni*[1] (from *aj*, "to move," Latin, *igni-*) is the God of Fire, under a threefold aspect of this element: as it exists on earth, in its daily use and in its sacrificial capacity, as well as the heat of digestion and the principle of animal and vegetable life; secondly, as the fire of lightning; and thirdly, as the fire of the sun. Agni is praised therefore as the originator of the sacrifice, and as the mediator between gods and men: he conveys offerings to the former, and brings the gods to the worshipper. During the night he protects mortals from the demons who haunt the altars and are hostile to religious rites. On the other hand, as the fire of lightning, Agni is the "son, or the grandson, of the waters;" and as the fire of the sun he grants wealth, food, health, and life, destroys and revives all things. Not many subordinate divinities are mentioned in his train; sometimes, the *Maruts*, or Winds, are, but they are more frequently the attendants of Indra; and the *Aprîs*, female divinities which also include insensible objects, such as the doors of the sacrificial hall. The proper offering to Agni is *ghee* (ghrita), or clarified butter.

Indra[2] (a word of doubtful etymology, probably from an obsolete radical *id* or *ind*, "to see" or "to know") is the powerful god of the firmament. He bestows blessings and riches when propitiated by the juice of the Soma-plant, which is his appropriate offering. He has elevated the sun and fixed the constellations in the sky; but above all he is the conqueror of *Vr'itra* ("the enveloper"), the demon who hides the sun, and of the clouds which threaten to withhold their waters from the earth; he pierces them with his thunderbolt and the waters are let down. He is also represented as discovering, and rescuing with his thunderbolt, the cows which had been stolen and were hidden in the hollows of the mountains by a demon named Pan'i or Vala. It is possible that these cows, as Professor Whitney believes ('Journal Amer.

[1] Muir, l. l., v. 199 ff. [2] Muir, l. l., v. 77 ff.

Or. Soc.' iii. p. 320) are meant for an allegory of the reservoirs of water which are freed by Indra, like the waters in the myth of Vr'itra; but it is possible also that this legend is merely a poetical record of an occurrence of pastoral life, such as we frequently meet with in the R'igveda poetry. A subordinate class of gods who are naturally associated with Indra, are the *Maruts*,[1] or Winds; they assist Indra in his battles with Vr'itra and the production of rain. "They ride on spotted stags, wear shining armour, and carry spears in their hands; no one knows whence they come nor whither they go, their voice is heard aloud as they come rushing on; the earth trembles and the mountains shake before them. They are called the sons of *Rudra*, who is conceived of as peculiar god of the tempest." (Ib. p. 315.) Besides them a god of wind, *Vâyu*, is named: "he drives a thousand steeds; his breath chases away the demons; he comes in the earliest morning, as the first breath of air that stirs itself at day break, to drink the Soma, and the Auroras weave for him shining garments." This god is sometimes identified with Indra: but there are verses in which both, Indra and Vâyu, are invoked conjointly to share in the sacrifice.

Amongst the gods assigned by Yâska to the sphere of heaven, we have to notice in the first rank the *Âdityas*, or the sons of the *Aditi*.[2] The latter word means "indestructibility," and the Âdityas are described as "elevated above all imperfection; they do not sleep or wink; their character is all truth; they hate and punish guilt; to preserve mortals from sin is their highest office." One of these Âdityas, is *Sûrya*, the sun, who is described as driving a chariot drawn by seven golden steeds, and is also personified as the ornamented bird of heaven.

[1] Ib., v. 147 ff.

[2] Muir, l. l., v. 54. Hillebrand, 'Über die Göttin Aditi.' Breslau, 1876. M. Müller, Translation of the Rigveda, i. p.230 ff.

But he does not occupy that prominent rank among Vaidik gods which we might expect, and which seems to be allowed to him by Yâska. It must be observed, too, that some other words which mean "sun" in classical Sanskrit, especially *Savitr'i*, *Pûshan*, and *Aryaman* are likewise Âdityas in Vaidik mythology; and that *Vishn'u* also is an Âditya when he is identified with the sun in its three stages of rise, culmination, and setting (R'igveda,' i. 22, 17). Of other Âdityas, moreover, we point out *Varun'a* (from *vr'i* "to surround."—Greek, Οὐρανο). He is the "all-embracing heaven, the orderer and ruler of the universe; he established the eternal laws which govern the movements of the world, and which neither immortal nor mortal may break; he regulated the seasons; appointed sun, moon, and stars, their courses; gave to each creature that which is peculiarly characteristic .... From his station in heaven Varun'a sees and hears everything, nothing can remain hidden from him." He is said to be the divinity presiding over the night, to support the light on high, and to make wide the path of the sun: he grants wealth, averts evil, and protects cattle. He is frequently invoked, together with *Mitra*, another Âditya, who is the divinity presiding over the day, and a dispenser of water.) Wilson, 'R'igveda,' i. p. xxxiv.)

The adoration of the sun is naturally connected with that of *Ushas*,[1] "dawn," or rather of *Ushasas*, "many dawns." "She is addressed as a virgin in glittering robes, who chases away the darkness, ... who prepares a path for the sun, is the signal of the sacrifice, rouses all beings from slumber, gives sight to the darkened, power of motion to the prostrate and helpless." (Whitney, 'Journal Amer. Or. Soc.,' iii. p. 322.)

The last divinities which deserve our special attention are the two

[1] Muir, ib. p. 181 ff.

As'wins.[1] They are the sons of the sea, and are represented as ever young and handsome, travelling in a golden, three-wheeled, triangular chariot, drawn by an ass or two horses, and the precursors of the dawn. They are called *Dasras*, "destroyers of fever or of diseases," for they are the physicians of the gods, and *Nâsatyas*, "never untrue." Many legends are connected with their career: they brought back to a father his lost child, they restored the blind to sight; they relieved one man of his old body by giving him a new one instead; they supplied another with a metal leg to replace the one he had lost in battle; they assisted seafarers in their perils, and so on. They are probably the two luminous points which precede the dawn; some compare them with the Dioscuri of the Greek.

The constellations are never named as objects of worship and, although the moon appears to be occasionally intended under the name *Soma*, particularly when spoken of as scattering darkness, yet the name and the adoration are in a much less equivocal manner applied to the Soma-plant. (Wilson, 'R'igveda,' i. p. xxvi.)

The great gulf which lies between this elementary worship of the R'igveda and the later mythology need not be pointed out; but it will not be without interest to observe that we already meet in its poetry with some of those names which assume so different a character in the epic poems and the Purân'as. Thus Rudra, the father of the Winds, becomes in the later mythology another name for S'iva, who is unknown to the Vaidik hymns. Their Vishn'u, a name of the Sun, and one of the Âdityas, is the second person of the later Hindu triad; and his epithet Trivikrama, or "he who takes three steps," which means, as we have seen, the sun in its three stages, gives rise to the myth of the fourth Avatâra of Vishn'u, when, as a dwarf, he strides over the

[1] Muir, ib. p. 234 ff. L. Myriantheus, 'Die Açvins.' München, 1876.

three worlds—earth, intermediate space, and heaven—and compels Bali, who threatened the sovereignty of Indra, to seek refuge in Tartarus.

From the nature of this worship, and from the desire for food, cattle, and the like, so frequently expressed in the hymns, it has sometimes been inferred that the condition of life as depicted in these hymns was that of a nomadic and pastoral people. There can be nothing more erroneous, if we look upon the actual collection of the hymns as a whole; as we did—and in the present state of Sanskrit philology are compelled to do—when drawing the previous sketch of the ancient Hindu belief. This collection, on the contrary, gives abundant proof that the Hindus of the R'igveda were settled in villages and towns, that they were a manufacturing people; for weaving, the melting of metallic substances, the fabrication of golden and iron mails, of ornaments, and the like, are not unfrequently alluded to. It is remarkable, also, that they were a seafaring and a mercantile people. Even a naval expedition against a foreign island is mentioned in a hymn (i. 116, 3).[1] Tugra, a friend of the As'wins, we are told, "sent (his son) Bhujyu to sea, as a dying man parts with his riches; but you (As'wins) brought him back in vessels of your own, floating over the ocean, and keeping out the waters. Three nights and three days, Nâsatyar, have you conveyed Bhujyu in three rapid revolving cars, having a hundred wheels, and drawn by six horses, along the watery bed of the ocean to the shore of the sea. This exploit you achieved, As'wins, in the ocean, where there is nothing to give support, nothing to rest upon, nothing to cling to, that you brought Bhujyu, sailing in a hundred-oared ship, to his father's house." We find them in possession of musical instruments, practising medicine, computing the division of time to a minute extent; and there is sufficient evidence in the hymns to show that they had not merely laws of buying and selling, but even

[1] Muir, l. l. v. 244 ff.

such complicated laws of inheritance as we meet with in the most advanced period of Hindu life. According to the latter, for instance, a son is the heir of the paternal property, to the exclusion of a daughter, as she transfers her property, by way of dower, to another family. But in default of a direct male heir, the son of a daughter may perform the funeral rites, or, what is equivalent, inherit the paternal property, provided that the daughter be *appointed* for such a purpose when given in marriage. (See Colebrooke's 'Digest,' 3, 161, and various authorities quoted in Goldstücker's 'Sanskrit Dictionary,' s.v. 'Aputrikâ.') The same law is laid down in the following verses of Rigv. iii. 31. 1. 2. (Wilson's translation):—"The sonless father regulating (the contract) refers to his grandson (the son) of his daughter, and relying on the efficiency of the rite, honours his (son-in-law) with valuable gifts; the father, trusting to the impregnation of the daughter, supports himself with a tranquil mind. (A son) born of the body, does not transfer (paternal) wealth to a sister; he has made (her) the receptacle of the embryo of the husband; if the parents procreate children (of either sex), one is the performer of holy acts, the other is to be enriched (with gifts)."

That so advanced a state of social life could not remain without its evils and vices is obvious; we find hymns which describe gambling, which speak of robbers and thieves, of secret births, of youths associating with courtesans.

This sketch of the religious and social condition of ancient India rests, as mentioned, on the supposition of the R'igveda-Sanhitâ having always been that which it is now—in fact, on the native theory of the eternity of the Veda. In the beginning we quoted some passages from the 'Purân'as' which show that these late productions of Hindu religion look upon all the Vedas as created by Brahmâ; but we also pointed out that the poets of the hymns are held even by the oldest

authorities to be inspired seers, who received them from the deities. Mr. Muir, in one of the most interesting and elaborate works of Sanskrit philology, the 'Original Sanskrit Texts,' has given other and very copious proof that the doctrine of the eternity of the Veda pervaded the poetry and the philosophical reasoning of ancient and mediæval India; and we must content ourselves with referring for further detail to the third volume of this excellent record of the 'Original Texts.' It may suffice therefore to add that even the differences which exist between the various editions of the sacred texts were explained away by an ingenious theory. It says that "the Vaidik texts got lost in the several Pralayas, or destructions of the worlds; and since each Manwantara had its own revelation, which differed only in the expression, not in the sense of the Vaidik texts, the various versions represent these successive revelations, which were remembered through their excessive accomplishments by the R'ishis." ('Orig. Sansk. Texts,' iii. p. 231, 232.) In short, though according to this theory, a succession of revelations is admitted by the Hindu divines, they are conceived of as a reproduction of the first revelation, which comprised the whole bulk of the sacred text.

The utter improbability of an original contemporaneousness of all the hymns of the R'igveda is such that a theory founded on it would scarcely require a remark for the non-Brahmanic student of Hindu antiquity. In reading these hymns, such a student would not fail to perceive that some describe the most primitive features, and others—as we have shown—the most complicated mechanism of social life; that in some the first bud of religious life is perceptible, while others contain "the full-grown fruit of long experience in thought, or mark the end, or the beginning, of a phase of religious development." In other words, he would perceive the gradual and historical growth of that oldest document of the Brahmanic creed, the R'igveda-Sanhitâ. But

even the Brahmanic student could not remain indifferent to the fact, that the hymns themselves destroy this theory of the eternity of the Veda, built up, as it was, in a priestly and systematising age. There are passages, for instance, in which the R'ishis themselves describe themselves as composers or "fabricators" or "generators," not as "seers" of the hymns. "This hymn," we read in one, "has been *made* to the divine race by the sages." "Thus, O Indra," says another, "have the Gotamas *made* for thee pure hymns;" or "desiring wealth, men have *fashioned* (lit. fabricated) for thee this hymn, as a skilful workman (fabricates) a car;" or, "thus have the Gr'itsamadas, desiring succour, *fashioned* (lit. fabricated) for thee a hymn, as men make roads;" or, "the sages *generated* a pure hymn and a prayer to Indra;" "Wise Agni Bâtavedas, I *generate* a hymn for thee, who receivest it with favour;" and so on in numerous other instances. (Muir, 'Orig. Sansk. Texts,' iii. pp. 128–150.)

In other hymns, says Mr. Muir (Ib. p. 117), "the . . . . passages from the R'igveda either expressly distinguish between contemporary R'ishis and those of a more ancient date, or, at any rate, make reference to the one or the other class. This recognition of a succession of R'ishis constitutes one of the *historical* elements in the Veda." If this succession were simply one of the poets, it might seem, from a Brahmanic point of view, to be not incompatible with the theory mentioned before; but it appears in conjunction with the narration of events, and thus excludes the possibility of their original coævity. "These gods," we read, for instance, "who formerly grew through reverence, were altogether blameless. They caused the dawn to rise, and the sun to shine for Vâyu and the afflicted Manu;" or, "listen to S'yâvâswa pouring forth libations, in the same way as thou didst listen to Atri when he celebrated sacred rites." (Comp. Muir, 'Orig. Sansk. Texts,' iii. pp. 116–128.)

Whichever view, therefore, one takes, it is clear that there are periods in the arrangement of those thousand and twenty-eight hymns which form the present R'igveda-Sanhitá, and that the growth of the religious and social life of ancient India cannot be fully understood until we have a knowledge of the relative age at least of these hymns, since their real date may perhaps for ever remain as much beyond the control of philological research as it has remained hitherto. In some cases the description of events or the allusion to institutions of a domestic or public kind, in others the character of the religious notions expressed and the detail of the rites explained, may lead to a surmise as to the chronological relation of certain hymns; but since the soundness of a criterion of this kind will more or less depend on personal feelings or views, a safer footing is obtained in those hymns where the R'ishi himself refers to a predecessor who is the poet of another hymn, or to events anterior to him, met with however in other portions of R'igveda poetry. For there it is possible at once to establish a relative order in time between such hymns. But as instances of this description are rare, the real burden of proof will probably always rest with the linguistic facts that may be gathered from the various hymns. They are the stubborn monuments which raise their heads above the confusion created by the systematising arrangement of later times. As yet, however, Sanskrit philology has done little or nothing to enable us to see clearly in the mist of the gradual development of the Vaidik age. It is struggling even at present to save the very meaning of the Vaidik words, as handed down to us by native scholarship, and the grammatical explanation of the Vaidik commentaries, from a conceit which strives to substitute its own fanciful notions for the traditional lore—the only real means we possess for understanding these ancient texts.

If now we turn to the Sanhitâs of the next two Vedas, our attention

will be particularly engaged by the purpose for which they were collected, or, as observed before, for which they were either entirely, or for the most part, extracted from the R'igveda-Sanhitâ. This purpose, we stated, was a liturgic one. The verses of the Sâmaveda were intoned at those sacrificial acts which were performed with the juice of the Soma-plant. A short account of the manner in which the libations of this juice were prepared and offered to the gods is given in the introduction of Stevenson's translation of the Sâmaveda. "The first thing to be done is to collect the Soma, or moon-plant, and the aran'i-wood for kindling the sacred fire; and this must be done in a moonlight night, and from the table-land on the top of a mountain. The moon-plants must be plucked up from the roots, not cut down; and after being stripped of their leaves, the bare stems are to be laid on a car drawn by two rams or he-goats, and by them to be brought to the house of the Yajamâna, the institutor of the sacrifice, for whose especial benefit, and at whose expense, all the ceremonies are performed. The stems of the plants are now deposited in the hall of oblation . . . . . bruised by the Brahmans with stones, and then put between two planks of wood, that they may be thoroughly squeezed and the juice expressed. The stalks, with their expressed juice, are then placed over a strainer made of goats' hair, sprinkled with water, and squeezed by the fingers of the officiating Brahmans, one or two of which must be adorned with flat gold-rings. The juice, mixed with water, now makes its way through the strainer and drops into the Dron'a Kalasa, the receiving vessel placed below, and situated at that part of the Yajnavedi (or sacrificial ground), called the Yoni, or womb. . . . . The juice, already diluted with water, is in the Dron'a Kalasa further mixed with barley, clarified butter, and the flour of a grain called by the Marathas *wari*, the Sanskrit names of which are *nivâra* and *tr'in'adhânya*. It is now allowed to ferment till a spirit is formed, after which it is drawn off for

oblations to the gods in a scoop called *sruch*, and in the ladle called *chamasa*, for consumption by the officiating Brahmans. The vessel, scoop, and ladle, are all made of the wood of the catechu-tree (*Mimosa catechu*). Nine days are mentioned in the Bhâshya as required for the purificatory rites. . . . . There are three oblations offered daily; one early in the morning, one at noon, and one at night."

The sacrifices at which such oblations were offered are very numerous.[1] The principal one seems to have been the *Jyotisht'oma*, a great sacrifice, which, if complete, consisted of seven *sansthâs* or stages, each occupying the space of several days. The Mîmânsists, however, probably yielding to the necessity of circumstances, consider the *Agnisht'oma* only, the first stage of the Jyotisht'oma, as obligatory for the performance of this rite; while they look upon the six others—the Atyagnisht'oma, Ukthya, Shod'as'in, Atirâtra, Aptoryâma, and Vâjapeya—as voluntary and supererogatory. "The Soma offering," says Dr. Windischmann, in his 'Dissertation on the Soma worship of the Arians,' "was unquestionably the greatest and the holiest offering of the ancient Indian worship. The sound of the trickling juice is regarded as a sacred hymn. The gods drink the offered beverage; they long for it (as it does for them); they are nourished by it, and thrown into a joyous intoxication; this is the case with Indra (who performs his great deeds under its influence), with the As'wins the Maruts, and Agni. The beverage is divine, it purifies, it inspires greater joy than alcohol, it intoxicates S'ukra, it is a water of life, protects and nourishes, gives health and immortality, prepares the way to heaven, destroys enemies, &c. The Sâmaveda distinguishes two kinds of Soma, the green and the yellow; but it is the golden colour which is for the most part celebrated." (Muir, 'Orig. Sansk. Texts,' iii. p. 471.)

And these exhilarating and inebriating properties of the plant,

[1] F. Kittel, 'A Tract on Sacrifice.' Mangalore, 1872.

divested from their poetical association with the gods, sufficiently explain the religious awe in which they were held by a people which learnt to experience their influence, and ascribed them to some mysterious cause.

Having explained before that the Sâmaveda verses are entirely taken from the R'igveda-Sanhitâ, we may now show the artificial manner in which these extracts were brought together for the purpose described; and how little value they possess as a poetical anthology. The Sanhitâ of the Sâmaveda consists of two separate portions. The first, called *Archika*, or *Chhandograntha*, is composed of five hundred and eighty-five verses; the second, called *Staubhika*, or *Uttarâgrantha*, contains twelve hundred and twenty-five verses. The verses of the first are arranged into fifty-nine *Das'ati*, or decades, subdivided again into *Prapât'hakas*, or chapters, with another subdivision into *Ardhaprapât'hakas*, or half-chapters. The second portion is also divided into *Prapât'hakas* with *Ardhaprapât'hakas;* these, however, are for the most part arranged according to triplets of verses, the first of which is already contained in the Archika portion, and thus appears twice in the Sâmaveda-Sanhitâ. This first verse is called the *Yoni*-verse, or the womb-verse, that in which the two others—the *Uttarâs*—are generated, because all the modifications which take place during the intonation of the former —the modulations, disruptions of letters, stoppages, &c.—must be likewise observed at the chanting of the latter. These modifications are taught in the Gânas, or song-books, the *Veyagâna* and *Aran'yagâna*, which contain the composition of the Archika, and the *Uhagâna* and *Uhyagâna*, which comprise that of the Staubhika. In the Archika portion, the verses of the R'igveda are nearly always disjoined from the connection in which they originally stood, while a somewhat greater continuity of extracts is observed in the Staubhika. In a very valuable synopsis given by Professor Whitney (in the second volume of Professor

Weber's 'Indische Studien'), it is shown in what proportion these extracts were made from the R'igveda; it enables the student, moreover, by comparing both collections, to ascertain that the compilers of the Sâmaveda completely lost sight of the original nature of the R'igveda hymns, and of their poetical worth; that no respect was paid to the integrity of the poets' thoughts, or to the motives which called forth their lays. Still, however inferior the collection of the Sâmaveda is to that of the R'igveda, so powerful is the poetical greatness of the principal Veda, that it could not be entirely destroyed, even in the garbled assemblage of its verses in the Sâmaveda.

But even this mite of æsthetical praise can scarcely be bestowed on the *Yajurveda-Sanhitâ*. Like the Sâmaveda, it also is a liturgic book: it also has largely drawn on the R'igveda hymns. But the first difference we observe is that its contents are not entirely taken from the principal Veda, and the second is marked by the circumstance that it often combines with verses passages in prose, which are called *yajus* (lit. "that by which the sacrifice is effected"), and have given to the Yajurveda its name. Besides, the ceremonial for which this Veda was made up is much more diversified and elaborate than that of the Sâmaveda, and the mystical and philosophical allusions which now and then appear in the R'igveda, probably in its latest portions, assume a more prominent place in the Yajurveda. In one word, it is *the* sacrificial Veda, as its name indicates. Hence we understand why it was looked upon in that period of Hindu civilisation which was engrossed by superstitions and rites, as the principal Veda, superior in fact to the R'igveda, where there is no system of rites. To Sâyan'a, for instance, the great commentator of the Vedas, who lived only four centuries ago, the poetry of the R'igveda, and even the collection of the Sâmaveda, are of far less importance than the Yajurveda. "The R'igveda and Sâmaveda," he says, in his introduction to the Taittirîya-Sanhitâ, "are

like fresco-paintings, whereas the Yajurveda is the wall on which they stand" (Müller, 'Anc. Sansk, Lit.' p. 175); and it is on the ritual works connected with the oldest recension of this Veda that the speculations of the Mîmânsists, who refer their doctrine to the Sûtras of Jaimini, are based. (Goldstücker, 'Pân'ini,' p. 9.)

There is one remarkable fact to be noticed in the history of this Veda, which has no parallel in that of the other Vedas, a schism to which its collection gave rise, and which ended in the putting forth of two Yajurveda texts, the one assuming the name of the Black, the other that of the White Yajurveda. The Vishn'u-Purân'a, iii. 5. 2 (and nearly in the same manner the Vâyu-Purân'a), contain the following legend concerning the origin of this schism: "Yâjnavalkya, son of Brahmarâti, was Vais'ampâyana's disciple, eminently versed in duty and obedient to his teacher. An agreement had formerly been made by the Munis, that any one of their number who should fail to attend at an assembly on Mount Meru on a certain day should incur the guilt of Brahmanicide within the period of seven nights. Vais'ampâyana was the only person who infringed this agreement, and he in consequence occasioned the death of his sister's child, by touching it with his foot. He then desired all his disciples to perform in his behalf an expiation which should take away his guilt, and forbade any hesitation. Yâjnavalkya then said to him, "Reverend sir, what is the necessity for these faint and feeble Brahmans? *I* will perform the expiation." The wise teacher, incensed, replied to Yâjnavalkya, "Contemner of Brahmans, give up all that thou hast learnt from me; I have no need of a disobedient disciple, who, like thee, stigmatises these eminent Brahmans as feeble." Yâjnavalkya rejoined, "It was from devotion (to thee) that I said what I did; but I, too, have done with thee; here is all that I have learnt from thee." Having spoken, he vomited forth the identical Yajus texts tainted with blood, and giving them to his

master, he departed at his will. The other pupils having then become transformed into partridges (*tittiri*) picked up the Yajus texts, and were thence called Taittirîyas. And those who had by their teacher's command performed the expiation, were from this performance (*charan'a*) called Charakâdhwaryus. Yâjnavalkya then, who was habituated to the exercise of suppressing his breath, devoutly hymned the sun, desiring to obtain Yajus texts." [The hymn follows.]

"Thus celebrated with these and other praises, the sun assumed the form of a horse, and said, "Ask whatever boon thou desirest." Yâjnavalkya then, prostrating himself before the lord of the day, replied, "Give me such Yajus texts as my teacher does not possess." Thus supplicated, the sun gave him the Yajus texts called *Ayâtayâma*, which were not known to his master. Those by whom these texts were studied were called Vâjins, because the sun (when he gave them) assumed the shape of a horse (vâjin)." (Muir, 'Orig. Sansk. Texts,' iii. pp. 32, 33).

However absurd this legend may be conceived to be, the two recensions of the Yajurveda which are preserved, plainly bear out the fact, that the "White" Yajurveda is more recent than the "Black," and that the former is evidently intended as an improvement of the latter —whence it is but reasonable to infer that such an infringement on an existing text cannot have taken place without some, and probably a great, conflict between the followers of the one and the originators of the other. To understand, however, the nature of this improvement, we must advert to the character of the older text.

It has been stated before, that each Veda consists of a collection of hymns—the Sanhitâ portion—and of a Brâhman'a portion, which is especially intended for the explanation of the rites at the performance of which the hymns were employed. This division is maintained in its purity so far as the R'ig- and Sâma-veda are concerned. It is greatly

obscured, however, in the Taittirîya-Sanhitâ, or that of the "Black" Yajur-veda. There, verses and description of ritual occur promiscuously; it is in reality a text-book for the guidance of the Adhwaryu priest, while the Hotr'i and Udgâtr'i had to study their special ritual books, in order to know when any particular verse of their Sanhitâs ought to come in at a certain rite. This motley character of the Taittirîya-Sanhitâ is probably indicated by the epithet "Black," or "Dark," which is given to the oldest recension of the Yajurveda; and though the Tittiris may be a real proper name, the meaning of this word being "partridge," it is not impossible that this coincidence suggested the etymological legend mentioned above. Now, the impurity of this text, as intimated by the legend, its "darkness," as it were, is removed in the "White" Yajurveda, which is ascribed to the R'ishi Yâjnavalkya; for in the latter we possess a "clear" Sanhitâ and a "clear" Brâhman'a.

The topics treated of in both redactions are on the whole the same, but they are differently placed, and vary sometimes in detail. The *As'wamedha*[1] or horse sacrifice, which is merely alluded to in a few hymns of the R'igveda-Sanhitâ, is dwelt upon in the Yajurveda with considerable detail. The fact of six hundred and nine animals of various descriptions, domestic and wild, including birds and reptiles, being tied to twenty-one posts, and the intervals between them, at the performance of this sacrifice, may convey an idea of the complicated ritual which existed at the time when this Veda was composed. Of ceremonies, unknown to the other Vedas, we may mention also, the *Purusha-Medha*[2] or man-sacrifice—an emblematic ceremony, in which a hundred and eighty-five men of various specified tribes, characters, and professions, are bound to eleven posts, and consecrated to various

[1] Kittel, l. l., 37 ff.

[2] Jour. As. Soc. Bengal, vol. xlv. i. 76 ff.

deities—the *Sarva-medha* or all-sacrifice, and the *Pitr'i-medha* or sacrifice to the names. It is worthy of notice, too, not only that all the four castes, the institution of which cannot with certainty be traced to the period of the R'igveda-Sanhitâ, make their distinct appearance in the Yajurveda, but also that it contains many words which in the mythology of the epic poems and the Purân'as are names of S'iva, the third god of the later Hindu triad.

The Taittirîya-Sanhitâ of the Black Yajurveda is arranged in seven *Kân'd'a* or books, with forty-four *Prapât'haka* or chapters, containing altogether six hundred and fifty-one *Anuvâka* or sections, divided into two thousand one hundred and ninety-eight *Kan'd'ikâ* or portions. The *Vâjasaneyi-Sanhitâ* of the White Yajurveda, in the Mâdhyandina recension, is divided into forty *Adhyâya* or lectures, with three hundred and three *Anuvâka* or sections, comprising one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five *Kan'd'ikâ* or portions. Other schools connected with either form of this Veda adopted other divisions, which, however, need not be adverted to here.

That the *Sanhitâ* of the *Atharvaveda* is not a sacrificial collection in the sense of that of the Samâ- and Yajur-veda we have explained already. It is divided into twenty *Kân'd'a* or books, the first eighteen of which contain thirty-four *Prapât'haka* or chapters, which comprise ninety-four *Anuvâka* or sections: the seventeenth Kân'd'a consisting of one Prapât'haka only, which has no further subdivision; the nineteenth Kân'd'a is not divided into Prapât'hakas, but simply into seven Anuvâkas; and the twentieth contains nine Anuvâkas, the third of which has three *Paryâyas*. The Anuvâkas in their turn consist of about six thousand verses. "Its first eighteen books," of which alone it was originally composed, Professor Whitney, the learned editor of the 'Atharvasanhitâ,' observes ('Journal of the American Oriental Society,' vol. iv. p. 254), "are arranged upon a like system throughout: the

length of the hymns, and not either their subject or their alleged authorship, being the guiding principle; those of about the same number of verses are combined together into books, and the books made up of the shorter hymns stand first in order. A sixth of the mass, however, is not metrical, but consists of longer or shorter prose pieces, nearly akin in point of language and style to passages of the Brâhman'as. Of the remainder, or metrical portion, about one-sixth is also found amongst the hymns of the R'ik, and mostly in the tenth book of the latter; the rest is peculiar to the Atharva. Respecting their authorship the tradition has no information of value to give; they are with few exceptions attributed to mythical personages.

"As to the internal character of the Atharva hymns, it may be said of them, as of the tenth book of the R'ik, that they are the productions of another and a later period, and the expressions of a different spirit, from that of the earlier hymns in the other Veda. In the latter, the gods are approached with reverential awe, indeed, but with love and confidence also; a worship is paid to them that exalts the offerer of it; the demons, embraced under the general name *Rakshas*, are objects of horror, whom the gods ward off and destroy; the divinities of the Atharva are regarded rather with a kind of cringing fear, as powers whose wrath is to be deprecated and whose favour curried for; it knows a whole host of imps and hobgoblins, in ranks and classes, and addresses itself to them directly, offering them homage to induce them to abstain from doing harm. The *mantra*, prayer, which in the older Veda is the instrument of devotion, is here rather the tool of superstition; it wrings from the unwilling hands of the gods the favours which of old their good-will to men induced them to grant, or by simple magical power obtains the fulfilment of the utterer's wishes. The most prominent characteristic feature of the Atharva is the multitude of incantations which it contains; these are pronounced either by the person who is

himself to be benefited, or, more often, by the sorcerer for him, and are directed to the procuring of the greatest variety of desirable ends; most frequently, perhaps, long life, or recovery from grievous sickness, is the object sought; then a talisman, such as a necklace, is sometimes given, or in very numerous cases some plant endowed with marvellous virtues is to be the immediate external means of the cure; farther, the attainment of wealth or power is aimed at, the downfall of enemies, success in love or in play, the removal of petty pests, and so on, even down to the growth of hair on a bald pate. There are hymns, too, in which a single rite or ceremony is taken up and exalted, somewhat in the same strain as the Soma in the Pâvamânya hymns of the R'ik. Others of a speculative mystical character are not wanting; yet their number is not so great as might naturally be expected, considering the development which the Hindu religion received in the periods following after that of the primitive Veda. It seems in the main that the Atharva is of popular than of priestly origin: that in making the transition from the Vedic to modern times, it forms an intermediate step, rather to the gross idolatries and superstitions of the ignorant mass, than to the sublimated pantheism of the Brahmans." (Ib. vol. iii. p. 307.)

The general character of the *Brâhman'a*, or dogmatic, portion of the Vedas having been explained before, a short notice of the principal works of that class, and a few extracts from them, will illustrate the position they hold between the collection of hymns and the remainder of the Vaidik literature.

The Brâhman'a of the Bahvr'ichas, by the priests of the R'igveda, is still preserved in two editions. The former—the *Aitareya Brâhman'a*—consists of eight *Panchikâ* or pentades of *Adhyâyas*, thus comprising forty Adhyâyas or lectures, which again are subdivided into two hundred and eighty-five *Khan'd'a* or portions. The latter, the *S'ânkhâyana-*

Brâhman'a, which bears also the name of the *Kaushîtaki-Brâhman'a*, consists of thirty Adhyâyas, likewise subdivided into a number of Khan'd'as. Both Brâhman'as contain on the whole the same matter; but the difference of the manner in which their subjects are arranged and treated leads to the supposition that the first thirty lectures of the Aitareya-Brâhman'a are older than those of the S'ânkhâyana, whereas the last ten lectures of the former contain rites not explained in the latter, and are probably therefore more recent than the S'ânkhâyana. These Brâhman'as do not follow the order of the hymns of the R'igveda-Sanhitâ, but quote them as they would be required by the Hotr'i priest for the performance of the rites described. In order to give an idea of the elaborate ceremonial which called these Brâhman'as into life, and of the mysticism which connects them with a subsequent class of works, we will first give an abstract of an important ceremony, treated of with great detail in the last books of the Aitareya-Brâhman'a, and several times alluded to in the epic poetry of the Mahâbhârata and Râmâyan'a,—the *Abhisheka* or inauguration of a king.

This ceremony is either part of a Râjasûya, and performed by a king at the end of this sacrifice, or it is not part of a sacrifice, and then occurs at a king's accession to the throne. For celebrating the former ceremony there must have been prepared a throne-seat of the wood of the *udumbara* (*Ficus glomerata*), resting on four legs a span high, with boards placed on them, and side-boards of the dimensions of a cubit or two spans; the whole well fastened together with a texture made of cords of *munja* grass (*Saccharum Munja*); a tiger skin, which is placed on the seat with the hair upward and the neck to the east, a large four-cornered ladle of *udumbara* wood, and a branch of the same. In the ladle have been put eight things: curd, honey, clarified butter, water proceeding from rain during sunshine, before it has fallen down, blades of *S'yâma* grass, sprouts, spirituous liquor, and *Dû'b* grass (*Panicum*

dactylon). To prepare a site for the throne three lines have been drawn on a place of sacrifice . . . . one southwards, another westwards, and a third northwards; the one to the south is that on which the throne is to be placed, with its front towards the east, so that the two feet to the north come to stand within the *Vedi* or sacrificial ground, and the two to the south without; this latter spot occupied by the throne seat, is called *S'rî* (comm., as a type of happiness or prosperity). The place within the *Vedi* being small, but that without being illimited, this portion of the throne indicates that the sacrificer may obtain definite and indefinite wishes within and without the *Vedi*. The tiger skin is the type of increase of military power, for the tiger is the hero of the wild beasts; the udumbara wood of the throne, ladle and branch, is the type of nourishing juice and of food (which the sacrificer is supposed to acquire by this symbol); curd, honey, and clarified butter typify the essence of water and plants (curd and butter, as the commentator observes, because they originate in grass and water, which are the food of cattle; honey, because it originates in the juice of plants collected by bees): water proceeding from rain during sunshine, before it has fallen down, typifies lustre (or energy); and rain (being the conseqnence of oblations to the gods) holiness; grass and sprouts typify food, hence prosperity and progeny; spirituous liquor is the type of a Kshatriya's power (comm., on account of its fierceness or hotness); Du'b grass (being the Kshatriya of the plants, and firmly established in the soil with its many roots) is the type of military power and of a firmly established rule. The principal features of the ceremony itself are the following. The king, who performs the sacrifice, kneels down at the back part of the throne-seat with his face to the east, and his right knee touching the ground. He then touches with his hands the throne-seat, and invites the gods to ascend it together with various metres—*Agni* with the metre Gâyatrî, *Savitr'i* with the Ushńih, *Soma* with the

Anusht'ubh, *Bri'haspati* with the Br'ihatî, *Mitra* and *Varun'a* with the Pankti, *Indra* with the Trisht'ubh, the *Vis'we Devâs* with the Jagatî—for the purpose of obtaining "kingly power, righteous government, increase of enjoyment, independent rule, attainment of more distinguished qualities than those possessed by other kings, coming (after death) into the world of Brahman, and obtaining there dominion, a mighty rule, mastership, independence, and a long residence there." The gods have arrived, and the king now ascends himself the throne-seat, first with his right and then with his left knee. The next ceremony is the propitiation of the liquid in the ladle, which is performed by the priest, who will pour it over the king by reciting these verses (from the Atharvaveda): "Waters, behold me with a favourable eye; with a favourable body touch my skin: all fires, for they reside in water, I invoke on your account; do not produce in me beauty, bodily strength, and energy;" and by the king repeating these words after him. If this propitiation did not take place, the liquid would destroy the vigour of the king. After this, the priest covers the head of the king with the udumbara branch, and pours the liquid over him while reciting the following three R'igveda verses: "These waters are most propitious; they have healing power to free from all disease; they are the augmenters of kingly power and its supporters; they are immortal." "With which Prajâpati (the lord of creatures) sprinkled Indra, the king Soma and Manu, with these I sprinkle thee, that thou becomest king of kings in this world." "The queen, thy mother, bore thee to be great amongst the great, and a righteous ruler over men; an auspicious mother bore thee." And this Yajurveda verse: "The divine Savitr'i has given his consent, therefore, I pour (this liquid) over thee with the arms of the As'wins (comm., not with my own), with the hands of Pûshan, with the beauty of Agni, with the radiance of Sûrya and with the senses of Indra, for the sake of strength, prosperity

glory, and increase of food." After the recital of other verses, by which spirituous liquor and Soma are intended to become identified, the king drinks the liquor, and presents the rest to a friend. He then places the udumbara branch on the ground, and prepares himself for descending from the throne-seat; but while he is still seated, and puts his feet on the ground, he says: "I firmly stand on heaven and earth, I firmly stand on exhaled and inhaled air, I firmly stand on day and night, I firmly stand on food and drink; on what is Brâhman'a, on what is Kshatriya—on these three worlds stand I firmly!" He then descends, sits down on the ground with his face towards the east, utters thrice the words, "adoration to what is Brâhman'a!" and offers a gift (comm., a cow) to a Brâhman'a. The object of this gift is the attainment of victory in every quarter, and over every description of enemies; and his threefold expression of adoration to what is a Brâhman'a, implies that a kingdom prospers and has valiant men when it is under the control of the Brâhman'as, and that a valiant son will be born to him. Then the king rises, puts fuel into the sacrificial fire, and takes three steps to the east, north, and to the north-east, while reciting several verses specified. Upon this he sits down by the domestic fire, and the Adhwaryu priest makes for him, out of a goblet, four times three oblations, with clarified butter, to Indra, while reciting other R'igveda verses. "A king for whom these libations are made to Indra in the indicated manner, becomes free from disease, cannot be injured by enemies, is exempt from poverty, everywhere protected against danger, and thus becomes victorious in all the quarters, and, after death, established in Indra's heaven."

The rites of the Abhisheka ceremony, which are performed at a king's accession to the throne, are founded on the proceedings which are described as having taken place when Indra was consecrated by the gods as their supreme ruler. The latter are, as a matter of course, of

an entirely mystical kind. Thus, the eight parts of his throne-seat are said to have consisted of Sâmaveda verses; of the threads of the texture which was to hold his structure together, those that went lengthwise were made of R'gveda-, and those that went crossways of Sâmaveda-, the intervals being Yajurveda-verses: the covering of the throne was the goddess of Glory, the pillow the goddess of Happiness; Savitr'i and Br'ihaspati supported the fore legs, Vâyu and Pûshan the hind legs, Mitra and Varun'a the two top boards, and the two As'wins the two side-boards, of the throne-seat, &c. The inauguration of the mortal king begins with the priest calling upon him to take the following oath;—"If I (the king) do ever harm to thee, thou (the priest) mayst deprive me of all pious acts which I have done from the time of my birth up to that of my death, of heaven, and whatever else good has been accomplished by me, of long life and offspring." He then orders his attendants to bring four kinds of fruits: the fruit of the *Nyagrodha* (*Ficus Indica*), of the *Udumbara* (*Ficus glomerata*), of the *As'wattha* (*Ficus religiosa*), and of the *Plaksha* (*Ficus infectoria*); besides four kinds of grain: rice with small grain, rice with large grain, *Priyangu*, and barley. Next they bring at his command a throne-seat of udumbara-wood (made in a manner as described before), a ladle of udumbara (or, instead of the latter, a vessel of udumbara), and an udumbara branch. Then they put the various kinds of fruit and grain in the ladle or vessel, and pour over them curds, honey, clarified butter, and water proceeding from rain during sunshine, before it has fallen down; afterwards, having placed the ladle or vessel on the ground they address the throne-seat with a Mantra, which recalls the component parts of Indra's throne, and thus tends to identify both. Then the priest asks the king to ascend the throne-seat, inviting the Vasus, Rudras, Âdityas, and the other divinities which were invited by Indra at his inauguration to ascend his throne, with the same metres and

songs, and for the same purposes. Upon this the relatives of the king proclaim his high qualities in the same words as the gods proclaimed the greatness of Indra; the priest recites a certain R'igveda verse, and, placing himself before the throne with his face towards the west, covers the head of the king with the udumbara branch, the leaves of which have been wetted, and with a gold Pavitra, and sprinkles him with the liquid (in the ladle or vessel) while reciting the three R'igveda verses, and the Yajurveda verses quoted above, and uttering the three sacred words *Bhûr Bhuvar Swar*. Lastly, he addresses the king with the prayer that the Vasus, the Rudras, and the other divinities who performed this ceremony for Indra in the east, south, &c., may severally do the same for him in thirty-one successive days, and to the same effect as they did it for him. Of the ingredients of the sacred liquid, the Nyagrodha, being, on account of its wide spread, the king of the trees, and rice with small grains, being among plants principally productive of strength, the fruit of the former and the grain of the latter are the type of the qualities of a Kshatra; the fruit of the udumbara and the grains of the Priyangu are the type of increase of enjoyment; the fruit of the As'wattha and rice with large grains, the type of righteous government; the fruit of the Plaksha, the type of independent rule and attainment of more distinguished qualities than those possessed by other kings: barley is the type of military commandership; curds, that of sharpness of the senses; honey, that of the essence of plants and trees; and water is the type of freedom from death, or that of long life (because it nourishes). The ceremony having been completed, the king has to make a present to the inaugurating priest, namely a thousand nishkas of gold, a field, and cattle, but this amount seems merely to constitute a minimum acknowledgement of the exertions of the priest, for the text of the Aitareya-Brâhman'a adds that "they say, a king should give innume-

rable, illimited presents, since a king is illimited (in wealth), and thus will obtain illimited benefit to himself;" and it adds, too, several instances in which kings bestowed unbounded wealth on the officiating priests. After the priest has received the gift, he hands to the king a goblet of spirituous liquor in reciting an appropriate R'igveda hymn, which has the power of transforming the qualities of the liquor drunk by the king into those of the juice of the Soma-plant Lastly, the king recites some other verses specified. (For a fuller account of this ceremony, compare Goldstücker's 'Sanskrit Dictionary,' s.v. 'Abhisheka.')

As an illustration of those passages of the Aitareya-Brâhman'a, which partake more of an incantatory nature, we may quote the description of a rite which occurs in its last chapter, and relates to rites to be performed, under the direction of a proper Purohita, or chaplain, for the destruction of the king's enemies. "Foes, enemies, and rivals," we read there, "perish around him who is conversant with these rites. That which (moves) in the atmosphere is air (Brahman), around which perish five deities—lightning, rain, the moon, the sun, and fire. Lightning having flashed, disappears behind rain: it vanishes, and none knows (whither it is gone). When a man dies, he vanishes; and none knows (whither his soul is gone). Therefore, whenever lightning flashes, pronounce this prayer: 'May my enemy perish: may he disappear, and none know (where he is).' Soon, indeed, none will know (whither he is gone). Rain having fallen (evaporates and), disappears within the moon, &c. When rain ceases, pronounce this (prayer), &c. The moon at the conjunction, disappears within the sun, &c. When the moon is dark, pronounce, &c. The sun when setting, disappears in fire, &c. When the sun sets, pronounce, &c. Fire, ascending, disappears in air, &c. When fire is extinguished, pronounce, &c. These same deities are again produced from this very origin. Fire is

born of air; for, urged with force by the breath, it increases. Viewing it, pronounce (this prayer), 'May fire be revived: but not my foe' be reproduced; may he depart averted.' Therefore, does the enemy go far away. The sun is born of fire. Viewing it, say, 'May the sun rise, but not my foe be reproduced,' &c. . . . . The observance (enjoined) to him (who undertakes these rites, is as follows): let him not sit down earlier than the foe; but stand while he thinks him standing. Let him not lie down earlier than the foe: but sit while he thinks him sitting. Let him not sleep earlier than the foe, but wake while he thinks him waking. Though his enemy had a head of stone, soon does he slay him: he does slay him." (Colebrooke, 'Misc. Ess.,' i. p. 45.)[1]

The legends narrated in this, as well as in other Brâhman'as, intend always, as indicated before, to explain the origin of a rite, or to illustrate its efficacy. Among those met with in the Aitareya-Brâhman'a, we may point particularly to one, as it is remarkable in several respects. It had to be recited by the Hotr'i, sitting on a gold-embroidered carpet, to a king whose inauguration had been completed; and another priest, sitting on a similar carpet, had to repeat the words of the Hotr'i. But a victorious king is likewise recommended to have this legend recited to him, though he may not have performed the sacrifice; and a man desirous of progeny is promised the birth of a son if it is properly read to him. We mean the legend of *S'unah's'epa*. Its substance is as follows:—

Once upon a time there lived Hariś'chandra, a son of Vedhas, and a descendant of Ikshwâku. Though he had a hundred wives, he did not obtain a son from them. His desire, however, of having one became still stronger than it was, when Parvata and Nârada visited him, and when Nârada explained to him the boons a man derives from being

[1] Haug, Aitareya Brâhman'a, viii. 5, 28.

blessed with the birth of a son. Following the advice of Nârada, Haris'chandra addressed himself, therefore, to Varun'a and promised the god to sacrifice him his son, if he granted him one. Varun'a assented to the offer. Now a son, who received the name of Rohita, being born to Haris'chandra, Varun'a presented himself, and claimed the fulfilment of the compact. But Haris'chandra said: "Cattle is fit for a sacrifice when it is ten days old; let him then become ten days old and I shall sacrifice him to thee." Varun'a assented: but the ten days having passed away, Haris'chandra again said: "Cattle is fit for a sacrifice when it has got teeth; let him then get teeth, and I shall sacrifice him to thee." Once more Varun'a assented; but when Rohita had got his teeth, his father said to Varun'a: "Cattle is fit for a sacrifice when it loses again its teeth; let him then lose his teeth, and I shall sacrifice him to thee." Again Varun'a assented; but Rohita having lost his teeth, his father said to Varun'a: "Cattle is fit for a sacrifice when it recovers its teeth; let him then recover his teeth, and I shall sacrifice him to thee." Varun'a assented; but Rohita having recovered his teeth, his father said to Varun'a: "A warrior is fit for a sacrifice when he is able to use his weapon; let him then learn to use his weapon, and I shall sacrifice him to thee." Again Varun'a assented; and when Rohita knew how to use his weapon, his father said to him: "Varun'a, my son, has given thee to me, and I shall sacrifice thee to him." But Rohita refused; took his bow and went to the forest, where he wandered about during a whole year. Varun'a, however, now seized Haris'chandra, and made him swell. On hearing this, Rohita went about and met Indra, who encouraged him to wander first for another, then a third, a fourth, a fifth, and a sixth year.

At the end of this period he saw in the forest a R'ishi of the name of Ajîgarta, the son of Suyavasa, who lived there in great poverty with his three sons, *S'unaspuchchha*, *S'unah's'epa*, and *S'unolângûla*. Rohita

offered him a hundred cows if he gave up one of his sons to be sacrificed instead of him to Varun'a. Ajîgarta accepted the offer but retained his oldest son; and his wife claiming the youngest, both agreed to give up S'unah's'epa. Rohita then took him to his father, Haris'chandra, and Varun'a also having confirmed the barter, since, he thought, a Brâhman'a is of greater value than a Kshatriya, Haris'-chandra in celebrating the rite of Râjusûya substituted S'unah's'epa for the victim to be immolated at this sacrifice. The Hotr'i priest who officiated at it was Vis'wâmitra, Jamadagni fulfilled the functions of the Adhwaryu, Vasisht'ha those of the Brahman, and Ayâsya those of the Udgâtr'i. Yet the preliminary rites having being fulfilled, no one could be found who would tie S'unah's'epa to the sacrificial post. Upon which Ajîgarta offered to do this if they gave him another hundred of cows. They did so; but though S'unah's'epa now was tied to the post, no one would immolate him. Again Ajîgarta came forward and promised to immolate his son if they would give him a third hundred of cows. They did so, and Ajîgarta sharpened his knife and approached his son. Now S'unah's'epa resolved to implore the gods to release him. He addressed himself first to Prajâpati with an appropriate R'igveda hymn, but the god told him to pray to Agni. Agni, invoked with another hymn, told him to pray to Savitr'i; and Savitr'i told him to address Varun'a; but Varun'a sent him once more to Agni, who now recommended him to praise all the gods with an appropriate hymn. S'unah's'epa obeyed; his ties were released, and Haris'chandra was restored to health. S'unah's'epa, on his part, now instituted a new sacrifice. But when he placed himself at the side of Vis'wâmitra, and Ajîgarta claimed him back, Vis'wâmitra replied: "No, the gods (*devâs*) have given him (*arâsata*) to me;" and from that time (he was no longer S'unah's'epa, that is, (Dogstail), but Devarâta (Θεοδοτος), the son of Vis'wâmitra. (For a literal and excellent translation of

this legend by Professor Roth, see Weber's 'Indische Studien,' i. p. 453, ff.; and for some additional remarks, *ibid.*, ii. p. 112, ff.)[1]

After these instances, which will convey an idea of the contents of the Brâhman'a in general, we must content ourselves with giving the names of the other *principal* works of this category. For, the difference which exists between them, however great, would be intelligible only if we could enter into the detail of the Vaidik rites, and into the growth of the legendary life which pervades this portion of the ancient literature of India.

Suffice it therefore to state that the Brâhman'a literature has found its greatest development in the train of the Veda which, as we might expect, would require more than any other Veda an explanation of the purposes for which it was formed—the Yajurveda. On the other hand, since the Sanhitâ of the Black Yajurveda is already a combination, as we have seen, of hymns and Brâhman'a, it is intelligible that we find in connection with the White Yajurveda that Brâhman'a which, though probably the most recent, still is the most systematic and the most complete of all the Brâhman'as. It is called the *S'atapatha-Brâhman'a*, and is ascribed, like the Sanhitâ of the White Yajurveda, to Yâjnavalkya. It is, like the Sanhitâ, preserved in the edition of the *Mâdhyandina* and in that of the *Kâńwa* school. The former is divided into fourteen *Kân'd'a* or books, which contain one hundred *Adhyâya* or lectures; or into sixty-eight *Prapât'haka* (sections) with four hundred and thirty eight *Brâhman'a*, and seven thousand six hundred and twenty-four *Kan'd'ikâ* (portions). In the *Kâńwa* edition it comprises seventeen *Kân'd'a*, with a hundred and four *Adhyâya*, four hundred and forty-six *Brâhman'a*, and five thousand eight hundred and sixty-six *Kan'd'ikâ*. The first nine Kân'd'a of this Brâhman'a follow the first eighteen books of the Sanhitâ almost step for step, in quoting

[1] Muir, 'Ancient Sanskrit Texts,' I², 355–60.

their verses and explaining their application at the sacrifices. The last five Kân'd'as, however, refer only partially—some even not at all—to the contents of the Sanhitâ, and may therefore be a later increase of this extensive Brâhman'a, which is extremely rich in antiquarian and mythological contents; but on account of its purely ritual character, cannot be understood without the complete and excellent commentary of Sâyan'a.

The Brâhman'a of the Black Yajurveda is preserved in the school of the Taittirîyas, and bears the name of the Taittirîya-Brâhman'a, differing but little in character from its Sanhitâ.

As regards the Sâmaveda, Sâyan'a enumerates eight Brâhman'as connected with it, namely, the *Praud'ha* (also called *Tân'd'ya-* or *Panchavins'a*), the *Sha'dvins'a*, the *Sâmavidhi*, *Ârsheya-Brâhman'a*, the *Devatâdhyâya-Brâhman'a*, and the *Upanishad*, which, according to Professor Müller ('Anc. Sansk. Lit.' p. 349) is probably the *Chhândogya-Upanishad*.[1] The first two are the most important of these works, the Panchavins'a treating of the sacrifices which are performed with the juice of the Soma-plant, in rites which last from one to one hundred days. The *Sha'dvins'a* is remarkable on account of the incantatory ceremonies it describes; it ends with a chapter on omens and the rites to be performed on unlucky occasions, such as diseases, or at portentous occurrences, such as earthquakes, unusual phenomena, and the like.

The Brâhman'a of the Atharvaveda is the *Gopatha-Brâhman'a*. "That it was composed after the schism of the Charakas and Vâjasaneyins (the followers of the Black and White Yajurveda), and after the completion of the Vâjasaneyi-Sanhitâ, may be gathered from the fact

[1] To these should be added the Sanhitopanishad, and the Vans'a-Brâhman'a. See Burnell's edition of the Sâmavidhâna-Brâhman'a, I. Introd., and Weber's 'Indische Literaturgeschichte, 2nd edition, p. 81 f.

that where the first lines of the other Vedas are quoted in the Gopatha, the first line of the Yajurveda is taken from the Vâjasaneyins, and not from the Taittirîyas. It is more explicit on the chapter of accidents than the Brâhman'as of the other Vedas. . . . . The ceremonial in general is discussed in it in the same manner as in the other Brâhman'as." (Müller, 'Anc. Sansk. Lit.,' pp. 451, 452.)[1]

The Sanhitâ or collection of Mantra, and the Brâhman'a, constitute that which is properly called the sacred literature of the Hindus, *the Veda;* they are also comprised under the name of *S'ruti* or revelation. But in speaking of the Veda we should not feel justified in leaving unnoticed that class of works, one portion of which is so intimately connected with it that it was held by later generations in the same awe as the Veda, whereas another portion has become so essential an appendage to it, that it was justly called Vedânga, or "limb of the Veda."

The former category comprises the theological or theosophical writings, which have sprung from the Brâhman'as, and are perhaps more popular among European students than any other portion of the Vaidik literature—the *Upanishads.* The word *Upanishad* is rendered by the native dictionaries "mystery." *S'ankara,* the great Vedânta philosopher and glossator of the Upanishads, assumes that the word being derived from the radical *sad,*—with the prefixes *upa* and *ni,*—which amongst others has also the sense of "destroying," literally means the science which destroys erroneous ideas or ignorance. European scholars, on the contrary, have expressed the belief that it "means originally the art of sitting down near a teacher, of submissively listening to him" (from *upa* "below," *ni* "down," and *sad* "to sit;" for instance, Müller, 'Anc. Sansk. Lit.,' p. 319). But

[1] Râjendralâl Mitra's introduction to his edition of the Gopatha-Brâhman'a. Calcutta, 1872, p. 11–37.

there is a strong probability that the word has been already used by a Hindu grammarian, who preceded the existence of the Upanishad works, in the sense of "secret" (Goldstücker, 'Pân'ini,' p. 141, note 164); and since this meaning is not incompatible with the etymology of the word—which may signify "entering into that which is hidden"—it seems certain that at no period the Upanishads were looked upon as mere lessons imparted to their pupils by old divines, but as the mysterious science which, through bestowing real knowledge on the human mind, leads to the attainment of eternal bliss.

For such is the object of all the Upanishads; and the knowledge they intend to convey is chiefly that of the production and nature of the world, of the properties of a Supreme Divinity, and those of the human soul, which they conceive to be part of it. The same object is pursued, and the same views of the nature of the divine and the human soul as in the Upanishads are entertained by the Vedânta philosophy. We perceive therefore at once the close connection which exists between the Upanishads and this orthodox system of Hindu philosophy. Their difference, indeed, is merely that which separates the beginning from the end of a certain kind of philosophical reasoning. In the Vedânta the Hindu mind possesses a system which endeavours to deduct and to connect its ideas on the creation of the world, on the identity of the absolute and individual soul. Its method would not stand the test of *our* philosophical reasoning; but its explanations evidently aim at scientific precision and shortness of expression, and they are generally free from mythological mysticism. In the Upanishads, on the contrary, there is merely the material for a system of philosophy. The subject treated of by them is frequently dealt with in a desultory manner; it is intercepted by legends and allegories; it is adapted to the form of dialogues; it abounds in repetitions and verbose phraseology. But all

these negative features of the Upanishads must be viewed in the mirror of the Hindu mind; and then we easily comprehend that, accessible to the popular understanding of the educated, they became the basis of that more enlightened belief which at all periods of Indian history has struggled against the idolatry and the gross practices produced by a misconception of the sacred texts, and doubtless also by the interested motives of a degenerated class of priests.

Within the circle of the Upanishad literature several periods are clearly distinguishable, though Sanskrit philology possesses no means of rendering them into intelligible dates. The first is that of the *Âran'yaka*. As the name indicates, and as it is explained by *Kâtyâyana* in one of his criticisms on the great grammarian *Pân'ini*, this class of Upanishads was studied in the solitude of the forests, apparently because it was thought necessary that the mind should divest itself from all contact with the world when meditating on the mysteries of life. These *Âran'yakas* are more immediately connected with the Brâhman'as than the Upanishads properly so called. The Br'ihad-Âran'yaka, for instance, is a part itself of the S'atapatha-Brâhman'a of the White Yajurveda; the Aitareya-Âran'yaka is added to the Aitareya-Brâhman'a, and the Chhândogya-Upanishad, as we have seen, though not bearing the name of an Âraṅyaka, is counted amongst the Brâhman'as of the Sâmaveda. These works combine their speculations with a considerable amount of legendary detail, in the same way as the Brâhman'as themselves; and they are held in especial respect on account of the obscure allusions in which they abound. A second class is much less burdened with mythological and allegorical detail; it is brief, and addresses itself more to the philosophical mind; it comprises the greater mass of the Upanishad literature, and is apparently more recent than the Âraṅyakas. A third and last category is marked by the tendency it has to reconcile the doctrines of later sects with Vaidik

theology; Upanishads belonging to it identify the universal Spirit with one or the other form of the gods of the Trimûrti, as it appears in sectarian belief. This latter description of Upanishads is chiefly connected with the Atharvaveda. We choose as an instance of the Âran'yaka class the following passages from the Aitareya-Âraṅyaka:—"This (world) verily was before (the creation of the world) soul alone, and nothing else whatsoever active (or non-active). He reflected: 'Let me create the worlds.' He created these worlds, namely, the sphere of water, the sphere of the sunbeams, the sphere of death, and the sphere of the waters. The sphere of water lies above the heavens, the heavens are its resting place; the sphere of the sunbeams is the atmosphere; the earth the world of death; the worlds which are beneath it, are the sphere of the waters. He reflected: These worlds indeed are created. Let me create the protectors of the world. Taking out from the waters a being of human shape, he formed him. He heated him (by the heat of his meditation). When he was thus heated, the mouth burst out as the egg (of a bird),—from the mouth speech,—from speech fire. The nostrils burst out,—from the nostrils breath,—from breath the wind. The eyes burst out,—from the eyes sight,—from the sight the sun. The ears burst out,—from the ears hearing,—from hearing the regions of space, &c. . . . . He reflected: Those worlds and protectors of the worlds (have been created). Let me now create food for them. He heated the waters (with the heat of his reflection). From them when heated, a being of organised form sprung forth; the form which sprung forth is verily food. When created it cried (by fear), and tried to flee. He (the first-born male) desired to seize it by speech. Had he seized it by speech (all) would be satisfied by pronouncing food. He desired to seize it by breath; he could not seize it by breathing. Had he taken it by breathing (all) would be satisfied by smelling food, &c. . . . . Of what nature is the *soul* which we worship by the words

'this soul,' and which of the two (the universal and individual) is the soul? (Are the instruments by which objects are perceived the soul, or the perceiver? No, not the instruments). Is it that by which the soul sees form, by which it hears sound, by which it apprehends smells, by which it expresses speech, by which it distinguishes what is of good, and what is not of good taste? The heart and the mind, knowledge about one's self, knowledge about one's power, the knowledge of the sixty-four sciences, the knowledge of what is practicable at this or another time, understanding of instruction, perception, endurance of pain thinking, independence of mind, sensibility, recollection, determination, perseverance, desire, submission—all these are names of knowledge (as an attribute of the soul in its modification as life, of the inferior Brahman, not attributes of the supreme Brahman, which is of no form whatsoever). This soul is Brahman (the inferior Brahman), this Indra, this Prajâpati, this all gods and the five great elements and the light. . . . . All this is brought to existence by knowledge, is founded on knowledge; the world is brought into existence by knowledge; knowledge itself is the foundation; Brahman is knowledge." (Röer's 'Translation of the Upan., Bibl. Ind.,' vol. xv. p. 28, ff.)[1]

In the Br'ihad-Âran'yaka it is told that Janaka, the king of the Videhas, performed a sacrifice at which many Brahmans were assembled. The king having a great desire to know who among those Brahmans knew best the Vedas, tied a thousand cows in a stable, and covered the horns of each of them with ten pâda of gold. He then said to the pious men: "O venerable Brahmans, whoever amongst you is the best knower of Brahman shall drive home these cows." The Brahmans, however, did not venture to come forward. Then said Yâjnavalkya to his student: "Drive home those cows." But the Brahmans became

[1] Aitareya-Âran'yaka, ed. Raj. Mitra. Calc., 1876. Introduction.

angry, and began to examine the sage as to his knowledge of the Veda. "Then asked him Uddâlaka, the son of Arun'a," the legend continues, —"'Yâjnavalkya,' said he, 'in the country of the Madras we abode in the house of Patanchala, of the family of Kapi, for the sake of studying the science of offering. His wife was possessed by a Gandharva. We asked him (the Gandharva), 'Who art thou?' He said 'Kabandha, the son of Atharvan'a.' He said to Patanchala, of the family of Kapi, and to (us) priests, 'O Kâpya, knowest thou that Thread by which this world and the other world, and all beings are bound together?' Patanchala, of the family of Kapi, said, 'I do not know it, O Venerable.' He said to Patanchala, and to (us) priests,—'Knowest thou, O Kâpya, that Inner Ruler who within rules this world, and the other world, and all beings?' Patanchala said,—'I do not know this, O Venerable.' He said to Patanchala, and to (us) priests,—'O Kâpya, whoever knows the Thread and the Inner Ruler, knows Brahman, knows the worlds, knows the gods, knows the Vedas, knows the elements, knows the soul,—knows all.' Then (the Gandharva) said (all about the Thread and the Inner Ruler) to them. 'Therefore do I know this. If thou, O Yâjnavalkya, ignorant of the Thread and the Inner Ruler, hast taken away the cows (destined for the best knower of Brahman), thy head will certainly drop down.' 'I know verily, Gautama, the Thread and the Inner Ruler.' 'Any one may say this, I know, I know, but tell the manner in which thou knowest.' He said—'The wind, O Gautama, is the Thread; by the wind, as by a thread, are this world, the other world, all beings bound together, O Gautama. Therefore, O Gautama, it is said of a dead man, that his members are relaxed; for by the wind, O Gautama, as by a thread, they are bound together.' 'This is so, O Yâjnavalkya; now explain the Inner Ruler.' 'He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who within

rules the earth, is thy soul,—the Inner Ruler—immortal. He who dwelling in the waters is within the waters, whom the waters do not know, whose body are the waters, who within rules the waters, is thy soul,—the Inner Ruler—immortal. He who dwelling in the fire is within the fire, &c..... he who dwelling in the atmosphere, &c..... he who dwelling in the wind, &c..... in the heavens, &c..... in the sun, &c..... in the regions of space, &c..... in the moon and stars, &c..... in the ether, &c..... in the darkness, &c..... in the light, &c..... in all elements. &c..... in the vital air, &c..... in speech, &c..... in the eye, &c..... in the ear, &c..... in the mind, &c..... in the skin, &c..... in knowledge, &c..... ; he who dwelling in the seed is within the seed, whom the seed does not know, whose body is the seed, who from within rules the seed, is thy soul—the Inner Ruler —immortal. Unseen, he sees; unheard, he hears; unminded, he minds; unknown, he knows. There is none that sees, but he; there is none that hears, but he; there is none that minds, but he; there is none that knows, but he. He is thy soul—the Inner Ruler—immortal. Whatever is different from him is perishable." ' (Ib., vol. ii. part iii., p. 199, ff.)

An Upanishad of the second class is, for instance, the I'sa-Upanishad, which derives an additional interest from the circumstance that it is the only Upanishad which forms part of a Sanhitâ itself, namely, of that of the White Yajurveda, and thus strengthens the proofs which may be alleged for the latter recension of this Veda. It runs as follows: " Whatever exists in this world is to be enveloped by (the thought of) God (the Ruler). By renouncing the world, thou shalt save (thy soul). Do not covet the riches of any one. Performing sacred works, let a man desire to live a hundred years. If thou thus (desirest), O man, there is no other manner in which thou art not tainted by work. To the godless worlds, covered with gloomy darkness, go all the people,

when departing (from this world), who are slayers of their souls. He (the soul) does not move, is swifter than the mind; not the gods (the senses) did obtain him, he was gone before. Standing, he outstrips all the other (gods, senses), how fast they run. Within him the ruler of the atmosphere upholds the vital actions. He moves, he does not move; he is far and also near; he is within this all, he is out of this all. Whoever beholds all beings in the soul alone, and the soul in all beings, does hence not look down (on any creature). When a man knows that all beings are even the soul, when he beholds the unity (of the soul), then there is no delusion, no grief. He is all-pervading, brilliant, without body, invulnerable, without muscles, pure, untainted by sin, he is allwise, the Ruler of the mind, above all beings, and self-existent. He distributed according to their nature the things for everlasting years. Those who worship ignorance, enter into gloomy darkness, into still greater darkness those who are devoted to knowledge. They say, different is the effect of knowledge, different the effect of ignorance; thus we heard from the sages who explained (both) to us. Whoever knows both, knowledge and ignorance together, overcomes death by ignorance, and enjoys immortality by knowledge. Those who worship uncreated nature, enter into gloomy darkness, into still greater darkness those who are devoted to created nature. They say, different is the effect from (worshipping) uncreated nature, different from (worshipping) created nature. This we heard from the sages who explained (both) to us. Whoever knows both, created nature and destruction together, overcomes death by destruction, and enjoys immortality by created nature. To me whose duty is truth, open, O Pûshan, the entrance to the truth concealed by the brilliant disk, in order to behold (thee). O Pûshan, R'ishi thou alone, O dispenser of justice (Yama), O Sun, offspring of Prajâpati, disperse thy rays (and) collect thy light; let me see thy most auspicious form; for the same

soul which is in thee, am I. Let my vital spark obtain the immortal air; then let this body be consumed to ashes. *Om.* O my mind, remember, remember (thy) acts, O mind, remember, remember thy acts. Guide us, O Agni, by the road of bliss to enjoyment; (guide us), O God, who knowest all acts. Destroy our crooked sin, that we offer thee our best salutation." (Ib., vol. xv. p. 71.)

The principal Âran'yakas and Upanishads connected with each of the four Vedas are the following: to the R'igveda belong the Aitareya-Âran'yaka and the Kaushîtaki-Âraṅyaka, the third book of which is the Kaushîtaki-Upanishad. The Upanishads of the Sâmaveda are the Chhândogya- and the Ḳena-Upanishad. To the Black Yajurveda belongs the Taittirîya-Âran'yaka, the four last books of which contain two Upanishads, namely, the Taittirîya- and the Nârâyan'îya-Upanishad; besides the S'wetâs'watara-, Maitrâyan'a-, and Kât'haka-Upanishad. That the Br'ihad-Âran'yaka is attached to the Brâhman'a of the White Yajurveda, has been stated already.

The largest number of Upanishads, however, has grown up in connection with the Atharvaveda, which seems to have favoured more than the sacrificial Vedas the tendency for mystical reasoning. Among them we name especially the Mun'd'aka-, Pras'na-, Brâhma-, and Mân'd'ûkya-Upanishads, as treating of the nature of the divine and human soul. The Jâbâla-, Sannyâsa-, Âs'rama-, and Hansa-Upanishads are some of those which describe the means by which deep meditation or the abstract union with the Supreme Soul can be obtained. A third class, as mentioned above, has a sectarian character, by identifying the Supreme Soul with Vishn'u or S'iva in their various forms; among those referring to Vishn'u we notice the Nârâyan'a-, and the Nr'isinha tâpanîya-Upanishad; among those connected with the worship of S'iva we find the S'atarudriya-, Kaivalya-, Skanda-Upanishad, and one called Atharvas'iras. (For a fuller account of this class of works, see Pro-

fessor Weber's 'Akademische Vorlesungen über Indische Literaturgeschichte,'[1] and his 'Indische Studien.')

While the Upanishads are the intermediate link between the Vedas and the later systems of Hindu philosophy, the *Vedângas* show us how scientific research grew up in India from the soil of the sacred texts. If we consider the bulk of literature which is comprised by the Sanhitâs and Brâhman'as, and the anxious desire which every Brahmanic believer must have felt to preserve it in its integrity, it is easily understood that in the course of time various means were devised for securing the correctness of the sacred texts, for guarding their senses against erroneous interpretations, and for maintaining in its purity a proper practice of the rites which were taught in the Brâhmanas. This is the object of the Vedânga works. The Brâhman'as of the Sâmaveda speak of six Vedângas or "limbs of the Veda," in other words, of six works or classes of works which were instrumental in maintaining the integrity of the Veda. But it is not certain whether this Brâhman'a means the same six Vedângas which have come down to us; Yâska, again, alludes to Vedângas, but does not state that they were six. We must distinguish therefore between categories of works which were called Vedângas, and between certain works which are the surviving representatives of these categories, but need not have been the first Vedânga works.

The doctrines comprised under this name are the following:—*S'ikshâ*, *Chhandas*, *Vyâkaran'a*, *Nirukta*, *Jyotisha*, and *Kalpa*.

S'ikshâ is the science of a proper pronunciation. One little treatise only is considered as representing this Vedânga,—the S'ikshâ ascribed to the authorship of the great grammarian Pân'ini. It consists in one recension of thirty five, in another of fifty-nine verses, and treats of the nature of the letters, of the accents, and the proper mode of sounding

[1] Second edition, Berlin, 1876.

them. A chapter of the Taittirîya-Âran'yaka treats likewise of S'ikshâ; but though it is possible that Pân'ini's S'ikshâ may not be the original Vedânga of this class, it is more than doubtful that this chapter of the Âran'yaka was ever considered as such.[1]

Chhandas means "metre;" and the Vedânga which is quoted by this name is referred to the authorship of Pingalanâga. But as the work of the latter treats of Prâkrit as well as of Sanskrit metres, it becomes doubtful again whether we possess in it an original Vedânga work.[2]

Vyâkaran'a signifies "grammar," but literally means "undoing," that is, analysis, for to the Hindu scholar grammar is linguistic analysis; his grammar *un-does* words and *un-does* sentences; it examines the component parts of a word, and therefore teaches the properties of a base and affix, and all the linguistic phenomena connected with both; it examines the relation, in sentences, of one word to another, and likewise unfolds all the linguistic phenomena which are inseparable from the meeting of words. The most renowned representative of this science is *Pân'ini*, who wrote a work in eight chapters, comprising thirty-two sections and three thousand nine hundred and ninety-six rules, three or four of which, however, probably did not belong to him. And so great was the renown of this wonderful labour, which may be placed at the side of the best grammatical works of any nation and any age, that Pân'ini was looked upon as a R'ishi who had received it, by inspiration, from the God S'iva himself. Pân'ini, it is true, quotes in his work various grammarians who preceded him, but Vyâkaran'a is typified by the grammar of Pân'ini, which has remained, up to this day, the standard for Sanskrit speech. We may add, that his work

[1] Weber, 'Ueber das Pratijñâsûtra,' 1872; Haug, 'Ueber das Wesen und den Werth des wedischen Accents,' 1873, p. 53 ff.; Kielhorn, in 'the Indian Antiquary,' v. 141 ff., 193 ff.; and Weber, ibid. 253.

[2] Weber, 'Ind. Lit.' p. 66.

was criticised and amplified by Kâtyâyana, who in his turn was criticised by Pantajali, a grammarian who lived in the middle of the second century before Christ;[1] and that these three grammarians are considered to be the greatest authorities in the science they taught. But Pân'ini only can be held to be the representative of the Vedânga we are speaking of. Nor should the Vyâkaran'a be confounded with a class of works which apparently stands in a closer relation than itself to the Veda-Sanhitâs—with the Prâtis'âkhya works; for though the latter are concerned in Vaidik language alone, whereas Pân'ini's work is even more engaged in teaching the classical than the Vaidik dialect, their aim and their contents materially differ from those of the Vyâkaran'a. Their object is merely the ready-made word, or base, in the condition in which it is fit to enter into a sentence or into composition with another base. They are nowise concerned in analysing or explaining the nature of a word or base; they take them such as they are, and teach the changes which they undergo when they become part of a spoken hymn. Whether there existed at one period other Prâtis'âkhyas than those which have survived, it is not easy to say in the present condition of Sanskrit philology; but it has been proved that the present Prâtis'ákhyas are even more recent than Pân'ini's work. (Goldstücker, 'Pân'ini,' p. 183, ff.)[2]

Nirukta, or "explanation," is represented by the *Nirukta* of *Yâska*, which is the oldest attempt, known to us, of an explanation of obscure passages of the Vaidik Sanhitâs. "It is important, however," says Professor Müller ('Anc. Sansk. Lit.' p. 154), "not to confound Yâska's Nirukta with Yâska's Commentary on the Nirukta, although it has

[1] Weber, 'Indische Studien,' xiii. 297 ff. Kielhorn, 'Kâtyâyana and Patanjali.' Bombay, 1876.

[2] M. Müller, 'Rigveda-Prâtis'âkhya,' 1869. Introd.; Weber, 'Ind. Stud.' xiii. 3 ff., and 'Ind. Lit.' p. 24.

become usual, after the fashion of modern manuscripts, to call that commentary Nirukta, and to distinguish the text of the Nirukta by the name of Nighan't'u. The original Niruktas that formed an integral part of the Vedânga literature, known to Yâska himself, can have consisted only of lists of words arranged according to their meaning, like that upon which Yâska's Commentary is based. . . . Sâyana gives the following account of this matter:—'Nirukta is a work where a number of words is given, without any intention to connect them in a sentence. . . . . The first part (of the Nirukta) is the *Naighaṅt'uka*, the second the *Naigama*, and the third the *Daivata*. . . . . The word *Nighaṅt'u* applies to works where, for the most part, synonymous words are taught. Therefore the first part of this work also has been called Naighaṅt'uka, because synonymous words are taught there. In this part there are three lectures: in the first, we have words connected with things of time and space in this and the other worlds; in the second, we have words connected with men and human affairs; and in the third, words expressing qualities of the preceding objects, such as thinness, multitude, shortness, &c. *Nigama* means Veda. As Yâska has quoted many passages from the Veda, which he usually introduces by the words, "For this there is also a Nigama;" and as in the second part, consisting of the fourth Adhyâya, words are taught which usually occur in the Veda only, this part is called Naigama. Why the third part, consisting of the fifth Adhyâya, is called *Daivata*, is clear. The whole work, consisting of five Adhyâyas and three parts, is called Nirukta, because the meaning of words is given there irrespective of anything else. A commentary on this has been composed by Yâska, in twenty Adhyâyas. This also is called Nirukta, because the real meaning conveyed by each word is fully given therein.'"

The fifth Vedânga is called *Jyotisha*, or "astronomy."[1] Its object

[1] Weber, 'Ueber den Vedakalender, namens Jyotisham,' 1862.

was to teach how to fix the proper time for the performance of sacrificial acts. It is a Vaidik calendar. There is but one manuscript work, in the library of the India Office, which would seem to belong to this category, but it is difficult to say whether it may aspire to the proud name of a Vedânga work.

The sixth Vedânga, on the contrary, the *Kalpa*, is represented by a great number of works, several of which are preserved in manuscripts in our libaries. *Kalpa* means "ceremonial," and the works of this class are the code of the Brahmanic rites. It was stated before that the Brâhman'a portion of the Veda contains explanations of the purposes for which the verses of the Sanhitâs were used, in consequence that it conveys a knowledge of the Vaidik rites. This knowledge, however, which apparently sufficed for the period at which these works were composed, must have been deemed insufficient at later ages, which required a more copious detail for a proper performance of the rites. Moreover, the Brâhman'a, as a first attempt, are wanting in proper arrangement of the matter they contain, and abound in legendary narratives, which interrupt their comment on the sacrificial acts. The Kalpa-Sûtras remedy this practical defect; they contain a complete system of the Vaidik rites according to the Veda to which they belong. Of such Kalpa-Sûtras, those connected with the ceremonial of the R'igveda are, the Sûtras of S'ânkhâyana, Âs'walâyana, and S'aunaka. Kalpa-Sûtras explaining the rites of the Sâmaveda are those of Mas'aka, Lât'yâyana, Gobhila, Drâhyâyan'a, and a Sûtra called Anupadasûtra, which explains the ceremonial taught in the Panchavins'a-Brâhman'a. Kalpa-Sûtras of the Black Yajurveda are the Âpastamba, Baudhâyana, Satyâshâd'ha-Hiraṅyakes'in, Mânava, Bhâradwâja, &c.; of the White Yajurveda, that of Kâtyâyana; of the Atharvaveda, that of Kus'ika.

Two other classes of Sûtras gradually completed the code of these

Kalpa works, which, in being founded on S'ruti or the Veda, bear also the name of *S'rauta-Sûtra*, namely, the *Gr'ihya-* and the *Sâmayâchârika-Sûtras*. The Gr'ihya-Sûtra describe the domestic ceremonies, as distinct from the great sacrificial acts enjoined by the S'rauta or Kalpa works: "First, the marriage ceremonies; then the ceremonies which are performed at the conception of a child, at various periods before his birth, at the time of his birth, the ceremony of naming the child, of carrying him out to see the sun, of feeding him, of cutting his hair, and, lastly, of investing him as a student and sending him to a Guru, under whose care he is to study the sacred writings. . . . . It is only after he has served his apprenticeship and grown up to manhood that he is allowed to marry, to light the sacrificial fire for himself, to choose his priests, and to perform year after year the solemn sacrifices prescribed by Smr'iti and S'ruti. The latter are described in the latter books of the Gr'ihya-Sûtras; and the last book contains a full account of the funeral ceremonies and of the services offered to the spirits of the departed." (Müller, 'Anc. Sansk. Lit.' p. 204.)

The Sâmayâchârika-Sûtras regulate the relations of every-day life. "It is chiefly in them that we have to look to the originals of the metrical law-books, such as Manu, Yâjnavalkya, and the rest." (Ibid., p. 200.) Both these Sûtras are comprised under the name of *Smârta-Sûtra* (from *Smr'iti*, "tradition"), as they are based on it. Of the Gr'ihya-Sûtras of the R'igveda, we possess those of S'ânkhâyana and Âs'walâyana; a Gr'ihya-Sûtra of the Sâmaveda is that of Gobhila; the Yajurveda in both its recensions seem to have had many Sûtras of this kind. Of the Black Yajurveda, we name especially the Baudhâyana; and of the White Yajurveda, the Pâraskara Gr'ihya-Sûtra.

We conclude these outlines of the principal works of the Vaidik literature with mentioning another class of compositions which arose from the desire of securing the integrity of the Vaidik texts, as well as

the traditional and exegetic material connected with them—the *Anukraman'î*, or Indices to various portions of this literature. The completest of this kind is that by Kâtyâyana, to the R'igveda-Sanhitâ. It gives the first words of each hymn, the number of verses, the name and family of the poets, the names of the deities, and the metres of every verse. Its name is *Sarvânukraman'î*,—that is, "the index of all things" and it seems to have improved on four similar writings which preceded it and are ascribed to S'aunaka. For the Yajurveda there are mentioned three Anukraman'î, for the Sâmaveda two, and there is one for the Atharvaveda. (Müller, 'Anc. Sansk. Lit.,' p. 215, ff.)

It would be but natural to ask, what date could be assigned to all or any of the various works which have been named in the course of this brief sketch of Vaidik literature; but Sanskrit philology is as yet not able to answer this question satisfactorily. It may offer conjectural dates according to the impressions of the individual mind, but it is bound to avow that past research has not provided it with facts which would impart to its chronological surmises any degree of plausibility.

ARTICLE II.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHAMBERS' ENCYCLOPÆDIA (1862), VOLS. IV. TO X.

THE GANGES.

AMONGST the rivers which at the *classical* and the *Paurânic* period of India were held in peculiar sanctity by the nation, the *Ganges*—or, as it is called, the *Gangâ* (feminine),—undoubtedly occupied the foremost rank. In the Vedic poetry, it is but seldom mentioned; and whenever its name occurs, whether in the hymns of the *Rigveda* or the ritual text of the *Yajurveda*, no legendary fact or mythical narrative is connected with it. Nor does the law-book of Manu justify the conclusion that its author was acquainted with any of the myths which connect this river in the epic poems and in the Purânas with the Pantheon of India. The earliest, and by far the most poetical legend of the Ganges, occurs in that master-piece of Sanscrit poetry, the *Râmâyana*. We give its substance, because it explains the principal epithets by which this river is spoken of, or invoked, in the ancient and modern Hindu poetry, and because it may be looked upon as the type of the many fables which refer to the purifying and supernatural properties of its waters. There lived, says the *Râmâyana*, in Ayodhyâ (the modern Oude), a king, by the name of Sagara, who had two wives, Kesinî and Sumati; but they bore him no issue. He therefore repaired

to the Himalaya; and after a hundred years' severe austerities, Bhrigu, the saint, became favourable to his wishes, and granted him posterity. Kesinî bore him a son, who was named Asamanjas, and Sumati brought forth a gourd, whence sprang 60,000 sons, who in time became as many heroes. Asamanjas, however, in growing up, was addicted to cruel practices, and was therefore banished by his father from the kingdom. His son was Ansumat, who thus became heir to the throne of Ayodhyâ. Now, it happened that Sagara resolved to perform a great horse-sacrifice: and in accordance with the sacred law, chose for this purpose a beautiful horse, which he confided to the care of Ansumat. But while the latter was engaged in the initiatory rites of the sacrifice, a huge serpent emerged from the soil, and carried off the horse to the infernal regions. Thereupon, Sagara, being informed of the obstruction which had befallen his pious undertaking, ordered his 60,000 sons to recover the horse from the subterranean robber. These then set to work, digging the earth, and striking terror into all creation. Having explored, for many years, the infernal regions, they at last found the sacred horse grazing, and watched by a fiery saint, in whom they recognised the serpent, the cause of their troubles. Enraged, they attacked him; but the saint, who was no other being than Vishnu, at once reduced them to ashes. Waiting in vain for the return of his sons, Sagara sent his grandson, Ansumat, in search of them and the sacred horse. Ansumat went, and soon ascertained the fate of his relatives; but when—mindful of his duties—he wished to sprinkle consecrated water on their ashes, so as to enable their souls to rise to heaven, Garuda, the bird of Vishnu, and brother of Sumati, came in sight, and told Ansumat that it was improper for him to use terrestrial water for such a libation, and that he ought to provide the water of the Gangâ, the heavenly daughter of Himavat (the Himalaya). Ansumat, bowing to the behest of the king of birds, went home with the horse to

Sagara; and the sacrifice being achieved, Sagara strove to cause the descent of the Gangâ, but all his devices remained fruitless; and after 30,000 years, he went to heaven. Nor was Ansumat more successful in his attempt with the austerities he performed for the same purpose, nor his son Dwilîpa, who, obeying the law of time, after 30,000 years, went to the heaven of Indra, Dwilîpa had obtained a son, named Bhagîratha. He, too, was eager to obtain the descent of the Gangâ; and having completed a course of severe austerities, he obtained the favour of Brahman, who told him he would yield to his prayers, provided that Siva consented to receive the sacred river on his head, as the earth would be too feeble to bear its fall when coming from heaven. And now Bhagîratha recommenced his penance, until Siva consented, and told the Gangâ to descend from heaven. The river obeyed; but, enraged at his command, she assumed a form of immense size, and increased her celerity, thinking thus to carry him off to the infernal regions. Yet the god becoming aware of her intentions, caught and entangled her in his matted hair, out of which she could find no means of extricating herself though erring there for many years. Nor would she have been released, had not Bhagîratha by his renewed penance appeased the god, who then allowed her to descend from his head in seven streams—Hlâdinî, Pâvinî, and Nalinî, which went eastwards; and Sîtâ, Suchakshus, and Sindhu, which went westwards, whilst the seventh stream followed Bhagîratha wherever he proceeded. But it so happened that the king on his journey passed by the hermitage of an irascible saint whose name was Jahnu. The latter seeing the Gangâ overflooding in her arrogance the precincts of his sacrificial spot, and destroying his sacred vessels, became impatient, and drank up all her waters; thereupon all the gods became terrified, and promised him that, in future, the Gangâ would pay him filial respect, and become his daughter, if he would restore her

again to existence. Quieted by this promise, Jahnu then allowed her to flow out from his ear, and therefore she is still called Jâhnavî, or the daughter of Jahnu. But, because Bhagîratha, by dint of his exertions, enabled his ancestors, now sprinkled with the waters of the Gangâ, to ascend to heaven, Brahman allowed him to consider her as his daughter, whence she is called Bhâgîrathî. And she is also called the river of 'the three paths,' because her waters flow in heaven, on earth, and pervaded the subterranean regions. Such is the account of the *Râmâyana*, and its substance is repeated by the *Mahâbhârata* and several of the Purânas, though they differ in the names of the streams formed in her descent by the Gangâ, some (for instance, the *Vishnu-* and *Vâyu-Purâna*) restricting their number from seven to four, called by the *Vishnu-Purâna* Sîtâ, Alakanandâ, Chakshu, and Bhadrâ. A further deviation from the original myth was caused by sectarian influence; for, whereas in the *Râmâyana* the Gangâ springs from the Himavat (Himalaya), whose daughter, therefore, she is, and whereas Siva plays the most prominent part in her descent to earth, the *Vishnu-Purâna* assigns her source to the nail of the great toe of Vishnu's left foot, and allows Siva merely to receive one of her branches on his head. The following passage from this Purâna will shew the ideas of the Vishnuite sect on the history and the properties of this river: 'From that third region of the atmosphere, or seat of Vishnu, proceeds the stream that washes away all sin, the river Gangâ, embrowned with the unguents of the nymphs of heaven, who have sported in her waters. Having her source in the nail of the great toe of Vishnu's left foot, Dhruva (Siva) reverses her, and sustains her day and night devoutly on his head, and thence the seven Rishis practise the exercises of austerity in her waters, wreathing their braided locks with her waves. The orb of the moon, encompassed by her accumulated current, derives augmented lustre from her contact. Falling from on high, as she issues from the moon, she alights on the summit of

Meru, and thence flows to the four quarters of the earth, for its purification. The Sîtâ, Alakanandâ, Chakshu, and Bhadrâ, are four branches of but one river, divided according to the regions towards which it proceeds. The branch that is known as Alakanandâ was borne affectionately by Siva upon his head for more than a hundred years, and was the river which raised to heaven the sinful sons of Sagara by washing their ashes. 'The offences of any man who bathes in this river are immediately expiated, and unprecedented virtue is engendered. Its waters, offered by sons to their ancestors in faith for three years, yield to the latter rarely attainable gratification. Men of the twice-born orders, who offer sacrifice in this river to the lord of sacrifice, Purushottama, obtain whatever they desire, either here or in heaven. Saints who are purified from all evil by bathing in its waters, and whose minds are intent on Kesava (Vishnu), acquire thereby final liberation. This sacred stream, heard of, desired, seen, touched, bathed in, or hymned day by day, sanctifies all beings; and those who, even at a distance of a hundred leagues, exclaim, "Gangâ, Gangâ," atone for the sins committed during three previous lives.' How far the belief expressed in the latter passage was carried at a period probably succeeding that of the composition of the *Vishnu-Purâna* may be seen from a legend which occurs in the *Kriyâyogasâra*, the sixth division of the *Padma-Purâna*. This Purâna relates that a king, Manobhadra, having grown old and weak, resolved upon dividing his kingdom between his two sons. He therefore convoked a council of his ministers, when, of a sudden, a vulture and his mate flew into the hall, to the surprise of the whole assembly. Questioned about the purpose of their visit, they replied that, having witnessed the evil luck of the two princes in a former birth, they now came to rejoice in their happiness. The king's curiosity having been roused, the male vulture then said, that in the age called Dwâpara, the two princes had been two men of low caste,

called Gara and Sangara, and when dead, were brought before Yama, the judge of the dead, who sentenced them to be thrown into a fearful hell. Their lives had indeed been faultless; no sin had been committed by them, but whenever they gave alms they did not offer them to a Brâhmana, and thus robbing the latter of the property which otherwise would have come to him, they became candidates for hell. He, the vulture, had come to the same place, because, when being a noble Brâhmana, Sarvâsa, he slighted his parents. Now the period of their sentence having expired, he was reborn as a member of the vulture tribe, which is living on the flesh of the dead, whereas they became a couple of locusts. Once, however, a hurricane arose, and threw the locusts into the Ganges; there they died; but having found their death in the water of the river which destroys all guilt, the servants of Vishnu came with heavenly chariots to conduct them to his town. Having stayed there up to the end of the third Kalpa, they were bidden by Brahman to enjoy themselves in the paradise of Indra; and after a certain time they were reborn in the family of Manobhadra, ultimately to rule his country. All the hymns addressed to the Ganges —and a remarkable one occurs in the same division of the *Padma-Purâna*—partly allude to the legends mentioned before, or to other feats of purification worked by the sacred water of this river. Its efficacy is deemed, however, greatest at the spot where the Ganges joins the Yamunâ, or Jumna, at Allahabad, and—the latter river having previously received the Saraswatî below Delhi—where in reality the waters of the three sacred rivers meet. In some representations of Siva, the Gangâ is seen in his hair, and the river issuing from her mouth; she is also pictured, as Moor tells in the *Hindu Pantheon*, as part of the *Trivenî*, or sacred triad of the rivers just named, when she is white, and bears the forehead mark of Siva; on her right is Saraswatî, red, and with a roll of paper in her hand; on her left,

Yamunâ, as Lakshmî, the deity of this river, blue, and holding a golden jar. The whole group is riding on a fish; the fish, the clothing of the goddesses, and the glory encircling their heads, being of gold.—Gangâ is also considered as the mother of the god of war.

INDIA.

We may divide Hinduism into three great periods, which for brevity's sake we will call the Vedic, Epic, and Purânic periods, as our knowledge of the first is derived from the sacred books called the *Veda;* of the second, from the epic poem called the *Râmâyana*, and more especially from the great epos, the *Mahâbhârata;* while the chief source of our information relative to the last period is that class of mythological works known under the name of *Purânas* and *Tantras*. It is necessary here to guard the reader against attempting to connect dates with the earlier of those periods. It has not been uncommon for writers on this subject to assign thousands of years before the Christian era as the starting-points of various phases of Hindu antiquity; others, more cautious, marked the beginnings of certain divisions of Vedic works with 1200, 1000, 800, and 600 years B.C. The truth is, that while Hindu literature itself is almost without known dates, owing either to the peculiar organisation of the Hindu mind, or to the convulsions of Indian history, the present condition of Sanskrit philology does not afford the scholar the requisite resources for embarking with any chance of success in such chronological speculations. This question of Hindu chronology will be more particularly considered in the article Veda. In the meantime, the utmost stretch of assumption which in the actual condition of Sanskrit philology it is permitted to make is, that the

latest writings of the Vedic class are not more recent than the 2d c. before Christ. A like uncertainty hangs over the period at which the two great epic poems of India were composed, although there is reason to surmise that the lower limits of that period did not reach beyond the beginning of the Christian era. The Puranic period, on the other hand, all scholars are agreed to regard as corresponding with part of our medieval history.

If the *Rig-Veda*—the oldest of the Vedas, and probably the oldest literary document in existence—coincided with the beginning of Hindu civilization, the popular creed of the Hindus, as depicted in some of its hymns, would reveal not only the original creed of this nation, but throw a strong light on the original creed of humanity itself. Unhappily, however, the imagination, indulging in such an hypothesis, would have as little foundation to work on as that which would fix the chronological position of this Veda. The Hindus, as depicted in these hymns, are far removed from the starting-point of human society; nay, they may fairly claim to be ranked among those already civilised communities experienced in arts, defending their homes and property in organised warfare, acquainted even with many vices which only occur in an advanced condition of artificial life. See VEDA. Yet in examining the ideas expressed in the greatest number of the Rig-Veda hymns, it cannot be denied that they are neither ideas engendered by an imagination artificially influenced, nor such as have made a compromise with philosophy. The Hindu of these hymns is essentially engrossed by the might of the elements. The powers which turn his awe into pious subjection and veneration are—*Agni*, the fire of the sun and lightning; *Indra*, the bright, cloudless firmament; the *Maruts*, or winds (see Marut); *Sûrya*, the sun (see Sûrya); *Ushas*, the dawn (see Ushas); and various kindred manifestations of the luminous bodies, and nature in general. He invokes them, not as representatives of a

superior being, before whom the human soul professes its humility; not as superior beings themselves, which may reveal to his searching mind the mysteries of creation or eternity, but because he wants their assistance against enemies—because he wishes to obtain from them rain, food, cattle, health, and other wordly goods. He complains to them of his troubles, and reminds them of the wonderful deeds they performed of yore, to coax them, as it were, into acquiescence and friendly help. "We proclaim eagerly, *Maruts*, your ancient greatness, for the sake of inducing your prompt appearance, as the indication of (the approach of) the showerer of benefits;" or: "Offer your nutritious viands to the great hero (*Indra*), who is pleased by praise, and to *Vishnu* (one of the forms of the sun), the two invincible deities who ride upon the radiant summit of the clouds as upon a well-trained steed. *Indra* and *Vishnu*, the devout worshipper glorifies the radiant approach of you two who are the granters of desires, and who bestow upon the mortal who worships you an immediately receivable (reward), through the distribution of that fire which is the scatterer (of desired blessings)." Such is the strain in which the Hindu of that period addresses his gods. He seeks them, not for his spiritual, but for his material welfare. Ethical considerations are therefore foreign to these instinctive outbursts of the pious mind. Sin and evil, indeed, are often adverted to, and the gods are praised because they destroy sinners and evil-doers; but one would err in associating with these words our notions of sin or wrong. A sinner, in these hymns, is a man who does not address praises to those elementary deities, or who does not gratify them with the oblations they receive at the hands of the believer. He is the foe, the robber, the demon—in short, the borderer infesting the territory of the "pious" man, who, in his turn, injures and kills, but in adoring Agni, Indra, and their kin, is satisfied that he can commit no evil act. Yet we should be likewise wrong did we judge

of those acts of retaliation by the standard of our own ethical laws. So far, indeed, from reflecting unfavourably on the internal condition of the Hindu community, the features of which may be gathered from these hymns, they seem, on the contrary, to bespeak the union and brotherhood which existed amongst its members; and the absence, in general, of hymns which appeal to the gods for the suppression of internal dissensions or public vices, bears, apparently, testimony to the good moral condition of the people whose wants are recorded in these songs.

It may be imagined that the worship of elementary beings like those we have mentioned was originally a simple and harmless one. By far the greatest number of the Rig-Veda hymns know of but one sort of offering made to these gods; it consists of the juice of the Soma or moon-plant, which, expressed and fermented, was an exhilarating and inebriating beverage, and for this reason, probably, was deemed to invigorate the gods, and to increase their beneficial potency. It was presented to them in ladles, or sprinkled on the sacred Kusa grass. Clarified butter, too, poured on fire, is mentioned in several hymns as an oblation agreeable to the gods; and it may have belonged to this, as we hold, primitive stage of the Vedic worship.

There is a class of hymns, however, to be found in the Rig-Veda which depart already materially from the simplicity of the conceptions we are referring to. In these, which we conceive to be of another order, this instinctive utterance of feeling makes room for the language of speculation; the allegories of poetry yield to the mysticism of the reflecting mind; and the mysteries of nature becoming more keenly felt, the circle of beings which overawe the popular mind becomes enlarged. Thus, the objects by which Indra, Agni, and the other deities are propitiated, become gods themselves; Soma, especially, the moon-plant and its juice, is invoked as the bestower of all worldly boons.

The animal sacrifice—the properties of which seem to be more mysterious than the offerings of Soma, or of clarified butter—is added to the original rites. We will quote a few verses from the second book of the Rig-Veda, which may illustrate the essential difference between this order of hymns and those we alluded to before. It is the horse of the sacrifice which is invoked by the worshipper, and its properties are praised in the following strain:

"Thy great birth, O Horse, is to be glorified; whether first springing from the firmament or from the water, inasmuch as thou hast neighed, for thou hast the wings of the falcon and the limbs of the deer. Trita harnessed the horse which was given by Yama, Indra first mounted him, and Gandharba seized his reins. Vasus, you fabricated the horse from the sun. Thou, horse, art Yama: thou art Âditya, thou art Trita by a mysterious act: thou art associated with Soma. The sages have said there are three bindings of thee in heaven," &c.

Mystical language like this doubtless betrays the aberration of the religious instinct of the nation: but it also reveals the fact, that the pious mind of the Hindus was no longer satisfied with the adoration of the elementary or natural powers; it shows that religion endeavoured to penetrate into the mysteries of creation. This longing we find, then, expressed in other hymns, which mark the beginning of the *philosophical creed of the Vedic period*. The following few verses may tend to illustrate the nature of this third class of hymns, as they occur in the oldest Veda: "I have beheld the Lord of Men," one poet sings, with seven sons [i. e., the seven solar rays], of which delightful and benevolent (deity), who is the object of our invocation, there is an all-pervading middle brother, and a third brother [i. e., Vâyu and Agni, the younger brothers of Âditya, the sun], well fed with (oblations of) clarified butter. They yoke the seven (horses) to the one-wheeled car [i. e., the orb of the sun, or time, or a year]: one horse [i. e., the sun],

named seven, bears it along: the three-axled wheel [i. e., the day with its three divisions, or the year with three seasons—hot, wet, and cold; or time—past, present, and future] is undecaying, never loosened, and in it all these regions of the universe abide. . . . . Who has seen the primeval (Being) at the time of his being born? What is that endowed with substance which the unsubstantial sustains? From earth are the breath and blood, but where is the soul? Who may repair to the soul to ask this? Immature (in understanding), undiscerning in mind, I inquire of those things which are hidden, (even) from the gods, (what are) the seven threads which the sages have spread to envelop the sun in whom all abide?" Another poet sings: "Then there was no entity or non-entity; no world, or sky, or aught above it; nothing anywhere in the happiness of any one, involving or involved; nor water deep or dangerous. Death was not, nor was there immortality, nor distinction of day or night: But THAT breathed without affiation, single with her (*Swadhâ*) who is within him. Other than him, nothing existed (which) since (has) been. . . . . Who knows exactly, and who shall in this world declare, whence and why this creation took place? The gods are subsequent to the production of this world, then who can know whence it proceeded, or whence this varied world arose, or whether it uphold itself or not? He who in the highest heaven is the ruler of this universe, does indeed know; but not another one can possess this knowledge."

As soon as the problem implied by passages like these was raised in the minds of the Hindus, Hinduism must have ceased to be the pure worship of the elementary powers. Henceforward, therefore, we see it either struggling to reconcile the latter with the idea of one supreme being, or to emancipate the inquiry into the principle of creation from the elementary religion recorded in the oldest portion of Vedic poetry. The first of these efforts is principally shown in that portion of the

Vedas called *Brâhmana* (see Veda), the second in the writings termed *Upanishad* (see Upanishad). In the *Brâhmanas*—a word of the neuter gender, and not to be confounded with the similar word in the masculine gender, denoting the first Hindu caste—the mystical allegories which now and then appear in what we have called the second class of Vedic hymns, are not only developed to a considerable extent, but gradually brought into a systematic form. Epithets given by the Rig-Veda poets to the elementary gods are spun out into legends, assuming the shape of historical narratives. The simple and primitive worship mentioned in the hymns becomes highly complex and artificial. A ponderous ritual, founded on those legends, and supported by a far more advanced condition of society, is brought into a regular system, which requires a special class of priests to be kept in a proper working order. Some of the Vedic hymns seem to belong already to the beginning of this period of the Brâhmana worship, for in the second book of the Rig-Veda several such priests are enumerated in reference to the adoration of Agni, the god of fire; but the full contingent of sixteen priests, such as is required for the celebration of a great sacrifice, does not make its appearance before the composition of the Brâhmanas and later Vedas. Yet, however wild many of these legends are, however distant they become from the instinctive veneration of the elementary powers of nature, and however much this ritual betrays the gradual development of the institution of castes—unknown to the hymns of the Rig-Veda—there are still two features in them, which mark a progress of the religious mind of ancient India. While the poets of the Rig-Veda are chiefly concerned in glorifying the *visible* manifestations of the elementary gods—in the Brâhmanas, their ethical qualities are put forward for imitation and praise. Truth and untruth, right and wrong—in the moral sense which these words imply—are not seldom emphasised in the description of the battles fought between

gods and demons; and several rites themselves are described as symbolical representations of these and similar qualities of the good and evil beings, worshipped or abhorred. A second feature is the tendency, in these Brâhmanas, of determining the *rank* of the gods, and, as a consequence, of giving prominence to one special god amongst the rest; whereas in the old Vedic poetry, though we may discover a predilection of the poets to bestow more praise, for instance, on Indra and Agni, than on other gods, yet we find no intention, on their part, to raise any of them to a supreme rank. Thus, in some Brâhmanas, *Indra*, the god of the firmament, is endowed with the dignity of a ruler of the gods; in others, the *sun* receives the attributes of superiority. This is no real solution of the momentous problem hinted at in such Vedic hymns as we quoted before, but it is a semblance of it. There the poet asks "whence this varied world arose"—here the priest answers that "one god is more elevated than the rest;" and he is satisfied with regulating the detail of the Soma and animal sacrifice, according to the rank which he assigns to his deities.

A real answer to this great question is attempted, however, by the theologians who explained the "mysterious doctrine," held in the utmost reverence by all Hindus, and laid down in the writings known under the name of *Upanishads*. It must suffice here to state that the object of these important works is to explain, not only the process of creation, but the nature of a supreme being, and its relation to the human soul. In the Upanishads, Agni, Indra, Vâyu, and the other deities of the Vedic hymns, become symbols to assist the mind in its attempt to understand the true nature of one absolute being, and the manner in which it manifests itself in its worldly form. The human soul itself is of the same nature as this supreme or great soul: its ultimate destination is that of becoming re-united with the supreme soul, and the means of attaining that end is not the performance of

sacrificial rites, but the comprehension of its own self and of the great soul. The doctrine which at a later period became the foundation of the creed of the educated—the doctrine that the supreme soul, or (the neuter) Brahman, is the only reality, and that the world has a claim to notice only in so far as it emanated from this being, is already clearly laid down in these Upanishads, though the language in which it is expressed still adapts itself to the legendary and allegorical style which characterises the Brâhmana portion of the Vedas. *The Upanishads became thus the basis of the enlightened faith of India.* They are not a system of philosophy, but they contain all the germs whence the three great systems of Hindu philosophy arose; and like the latter, while revealing the struggle of the Hindu mind to reach the comprehension of one supreme being, they advance sufficiently far to express their belief in such a being, but at the same time acknowledge the inability of the human mind to comprehend its essence. For the different periods which must be distinguished in the composition of these works, and for the gradual development of the general ideas briefly adverted to here, we refer the reader to the article Upanishad.

The Epic period of Hinduism is marked by a similar development of the same two creeds, the general features of which we have now traced in the Vedic writings. The popular creed strives to find a centre round which to group its imaginary gods, whereas the philosophical creed finds its expression in the groundworks of the *Sânkhya*, *Nyâya*, and *Vedânta* systems of philosophy. In the former, we find two gods in particular who are rising to the highest rank, Vishnu and Siva; for as to Brahmâ (the masculine form of Brahman), though he was looked upon, now and then, as superior to both, he gradually disappears, and becomes merged into the philosophical Brahma (the neuter form of the same word), which is a further evolution of the great soul of the Upanishads. In the *Râmâyana*, the superiority of Vishnu is admitted

without dispute; in the great epos, the *Mahâbhârata*, however, which, unlike the former epos, is the product of successive ages, there is an apparent rivalry between the claims of Vishnu and Siva to occupy the highest rank in the pantheon; but Sanskrit philology will first have to unravel the chronological position of the various portions of this work, to lay bare its groundwork, and to show the gradual additions it received, before it will be able to determine the successive formation of the legends which are the basis of classical Hindu mythology. Yet so much seems to be clear already, that there is a predilection during this Epic period for the supremancy of Vishnu; and that the policy of incorporating rather than combating antagonistic creeds, led more to a quiet admission, than to a warm support of Siva's claims to the highest rank. For the character of these gods, for the relation in which the conception of these beings stands to that of the Vedic time, for the new ideas which they impersonate at the Epic period, and for the group of mythological beings connected with both of them, we refer the reader to the respective articles. We will point, however, to one remarkable myth, as it will illustrate the altered position of the gods during the Epic period. In the Vedic hymns, the immortality of the gods is never matter of doubt; most of the elementary beings are invoked and described as everlasting, as liable neither to decay nor death. The offerings they receive may add to their comfort and strength; they may invigorate them, but it is nowhere stated that they are indispensable for their existence. It is, on the contrary, the pious sacrificer himself who, through his offerings, secures to himself long life, and, as it is sometimes hyperbolically called, immortality. And the same notion prevails throughout the oldest Brâhmanas. It is only in the latest work of this class, the *S'atapatha-Brâhmana*, and more especially in the Epic poems, that we find the inferior gods as mortal in the beginning, and as becoming immortal through exterior agency.

In the *S'atapatha-Brâhmana*, the juice of the Soma plant, offered by the worshipper, or at another time clarified butter, or even animal sacrifices, impart to them this immortality. At the Epic period, Vishnu teaches them how to obtain the *Amrita*, or beverage of immortality, without which they would go to destruction; and this Epic *Amrita* itself is merely a compound, increased by imagination, of the various substances which in the Vedic writings are called or likened to *Amrita*, i. e., a "substance that frees from death." It is obvious, therefore, that gods like these could not strike root in the religious mind of the nation. We must look upon them more as the gods of poetry than of real life; nor do we find that they enjoyed any of the worship which was allotted to the two principal gods, Vishnu and Siva.

The philosophical creed of this period adds little to the fundamental notions contained in the Upanishads; but it frees itself from the legendary dross which still imparts to those works a deep tinge of mysticism. On the other hand, it conceives and develops the notion, that the union of the individual soul with the supreme spirit may be aided by penances, such as peculiar modes of breathing, particular postures, protracted fasting, and the like; in short, by those practices which are systematised by the Yoga doctrine. The most remarkable Epic work which inculcates this doctrine is the celebrated poem *Bhagavadgîtâ*, which has been wrongly considered by European writers as a pure Sânkhya work, whereas *S'ankara*, the great Hindu theologian, who commented on it, and other native commentators after him, have proved that it is founded on the Yoga belief. The doctrine of the reunion of the individual soul with the supreme soul, was necessarily founded on the assumption, that the former must have become free from all guilt affecting its purity before it can be re-merged into the source whence it proceeded: and since one human life is apparently too short for enabling the soul to attain its accomplishment, the Hindu

mind concluded that the soul, after the death of its temporary owner, had to be born again, in order to complete the work it had left undone in its previous existence, and that it must submit to the same fate until its task is fulfilled. This is the doctrine of *metempsychosis*, which, in the absence of a belief in grace, is a logical consequence of a system which holds the human soul to be of the same nature as that of an absolute God. The beginning of this doctrine may be discovered in some of the oldest Upanishads, but its fantastic development belongs to the Epic time, where it pervades the legends, and affects the social life of the nation. See Metempsychosis.

The Purânic period of Hinduism is the period of its decline, so far as the popular creed is concerned. Its pantheon is nominally the same as that of the Epic period. Brahmâ, Vishnu, and Siva remain still at the head of its imaginary gods; but whereas the Epic time is generally characterised by a friendly harmony between the higher occupants of the divine spheres, the Purânic period shows discord and destruction of the original ideas whence the Epic gods arose. Brahmâ withdraws, in general, from the popular adoration, and leaves Vishnu and Siva to fight their battles in the minds of their worshippers for the highest rank. The elementary principle which originally inhered in these deities is thus completely lost sight of by the followers of the Purânas. The legends of the Epic poems relating to these gods become amplified and distorted, according to the sectarian tendencies of the masses; and the divine element which still distinguishes these gods in the Râmâyana and Mahâbhârata, is now more and more mixed up with worldly concerns and intersected with historical events, disfigured in their turn to suit individual interests. Of the ideas implied by the Vedic rites, scarcely a trace is visible in the Purânas and Tantras, which are the text-books of this creed. In short, the unbridled imagination which pervades these works is neither pleasing from a

poetical, nor elevating from a philosophical point of view. Some Purânas, it is true—for instance, the *Bhâgavata*—make in some sense an exception to this aberration of original Hinduism; but they are a compromise between the popular and the Vedânta creed, which henceforward remains the creed of the educated and intelligent. They do not affect the worship of the masses as practised by the various sects; and this worship itself, whether harmless, as with the worshippers of Vishnu, or offensive, as with the adorers of Siva and his wife Durgâ, is but an empty ceremonial, which, here and there, may remind one of the symbolical worship of the Vedic Hindu, but, as a whole, has no connection whatever with the Vedic scriptures, on which it affects to rest. It is this creed which, with further deteriorations, caused by the lapse of centuries, is still the main religion of the masses in India. The opinion these entertain, that it is countenanced by the ritual, as well as by the theological portion of the Vedas, is the redeeming feature of their belief; for, as nothing is easier than to disabuse their mind on this score, by reviving the study of their ancient and sacred language, and by enabling them to read again their oldest and most sacred books, it may be hoped that a proper education of the people in this respect, by learned and enlightened natives, will remove many of the existing errors, which, if they continued, must inevitably lead to a further, and, ultimately, total degeneration of the Hindu race.

The philosophical creed of this period, and the creed which is still preserved by the educated classes, is that derived from the tenets of the Vedânta philosophy. It is based on the belief of one supreme being, which imagination and speculation endeavour to invest with all the perfections conceivable by the human mind, but the true nature of which is, nevertheless, declared to be beyond the reach of thought, and which, on this ground, is defined as not possessing any of the qualities by which the human mind is able to comprehend intellectual or material entity.

INDRA.

INDRA (from the Sanscrit *id*, which probably meant 'to see, to discover,' hence literally, 'he who sees or discovers,' scil.; the doings of the world) is the name of one of those Hindu deities that were worshipped more especially in the Vedic period of the Hindu religion, but enjoyed a great legendary popularity also in the Epic and Purânic periods. See India, sect. *Religion*. In that class of R'ig-Veda hymns which there is reason to look upon as the oldest portion of Vedic poetry, the character of Indra is that of a mighty ruler of the bright firmament, and his principal feat is that of conquering the demon *Vr'itra*, a symbolical personification of the cloud which obstructs the clearness of the sky, and withholds the fructifying rain from the earth. In his battles with Vr'itra, he is therefore described as 'opening the receptacles of the waters,' as 'cleaving the cloud' with his 'far-whirling thunderbolt,' as 'casting the waters down to earth,' and 'restoring the sun to the sky.' He is, in consequence, 'the upholder of heaven, earth, and firmament,' and the god 'who has engendered the sun and the dawn.' And since the atmospherical phenomena personified in this conception are ever and ever recurring, he is 'undecaying' and 'ever youthful.' All the wonderful deeds of Indra, however, are performed by him merely for the benefit of the good, which in the language of the Veda means the pious men who worship him in their songs, and invigorate him with the offerings of the juice of the Soma plant. See India, sect. *Religion*. He is therefore the 'lord of the virtuous,' and the 'discomfiter of those who neglect religious rites.' Many other epithets, which we have not space to enumerate, illustrate the same conception. It is on account of the paramount influence which the deeds of Indra exercise on the

material happiness of man, that this deity occupies a foremost rank in the Vedic worship, and that a greater number of invocations are addressed to him than to any other of the gods. But to understand the gradual expansion of his mythical character, and his ultimate degradation to an inferior position in the Hindu pantheon of a later period, it is necessary to bear in mind that, however much the Vedic poets call Indra the protector of the pious and virtuous, he is in their songs essentially a warlike god, and gradually endowed by imagination, not only with the qualities of a mighty, but also of a self-willed king. The legends which represent him in this light seem, it is true, to belong to a later class of the R'ig-Veda hymns, but they show that the original conception of Indra excluded from his nature those ethical considerations which in time changed the pantheon of elementary gods into one of a different stamp. Whether the idea of an incarnation of the deity, which, at the Epic and Purânic periods, played so important a part in the history of Vishnu, did not exercise its influence as early as the composition of some of the Vedic hymns in honour of Indra, may at least be matter of doubt. He is, for instance, frequently invoked as the destroyer of cities—of seven, of ninety-nine, even of a hundred cities—and he is not only repeatedly called the slayer of the hostile tribes which surrounded the Aryan Hindus, but some of the chiefs slain by him are enumerated by name. The commentators, of course, turn those 'robbers' and their 'chiefs' into demons, and their cities into celestial abodes; but as it is improbable that all these names should be nothing but personifications of clouds destroyed by the thunderbolt of Indra, it is, to say the least, questionable whether events in the early history of India may not have been associated with the deeds of Indra himself, in like manner as, at the Epic period, mortal heroes were looked upon as incarnations of Vishnu, and mortal deeds transformed into exploits of this god.

The purely kingly character of Indra assumes its typical shape in the *Aitareya-Brâhmana*, where his installation as lord of the inferior gods is described with much mystical detail; and from that time he continues to be the supreme lord of the minor gods, and the type of a mortal king During the Epic and Purânic periods, where ethical conceptions of the divine powers prevail over ideas based on elementary impressions, Indra ceases to enjoy the worship he had acquired at the Vedic time, and his existence is chiefly upheld by the poets, who, in their turn, however, work it out in the most fantastical detail. Of the eight guardians of the world, he is then the one who presides over the east, and he is still the god who sends rain and wields the thunderbolt; but poetry is more engrossed by the beauty of his paradise, *Swarga*, the happy abode of the inferior gods, and of those pious men who attain it after death in consequence of having, during life, properly discharged their religious duties; by the charms of his heavenly nymphs, the *Apsarasas*, who now and then descend to earth, to disturb the equanimity of austere penitents; by the musical performances of his choristers, the *Gandharvas*; by the splendour of his capital, *Amarâvatî;* by the fabulous beauty of his garden, *Nandana*, &c. A remarkable trait in this legendary life of Indra is the series of his conflicts with Krishna, an incarnation of Vishnu, which end, however, in his becoming reconciled with the more important god. As the god who is emphatically called the god of the hundred sacrifices (*S'atakratu*), Indra is jealous of every mortal who may have the presumption of aiming at the performance of that number of sacrifices, for the accomplishment of such an intention would raise the sacrificer to a rank equal to that which he occupies. He is therefore ever at hand to disturb sacrificial acts which may expose him to the danger of having his power shared by another Indra. According to the Purânas, the reign of this god Indra, who is frequently also called *S'akra*, or the mighty, does not last longer than the first *Manwantara*, or mundane epoch.

After each successive destruction of the world, a new Indra was created, together with other gods, saints, and mortal beings. Thus the Indra of the second Manwantara is *Vipas'chit*; of the third, *Sus'ânti;* of the fourth, *S'ivi;* of the fifth, *Vibhu;* of the sixth, *Manojava;* and the Indra of the present age is *Purandara.* When represented in works of art, Indra is generally seen riding on his elephant; and where he is painted, he is covered with eyes.

JAINAS.

JAINAS is the name of a heterodox sect of the Hindus, numerous adherents of which are found in every province of Upper Hindustan, in the cities along the Ganges, and in Calcutta, but more especially to the westward; the provinces of Mewar and Marwar being apparently the cradle of the sect. They are also numerous in Guzerat, in the upper part of the Malabar coast, and are scattered throughout the peninsula. They form a large, and, from their wealth and influence, an important division of the population of India. The name of the sect means a follower of *Jina*, the latter being one of the denominations of their deified saints; and as another name of these saints is *Arhat*, their followers are also called *Árhatas.*

The tenets of the Jainas or Arhatas are in several respects analogous to those of the Buddhists (see BUDDHA,) but they resemble in others those of the Brahmanical Hindus. With the Buddhists, they share in the denial of the divine origin and authority of the Veda, and in the worship of certain saints, whom they consider superior to the other beings of their pantheon. They differ, indeed, from them in regard to the history of these personages, but the original notion which prevails in this worship is the same. With the Brahmanical Hindus, on the

other hand, they agree in admitting the institution of caste, in performing the essential ceremonies called *Sanskâras*, and in recognising some of the subordinate deities of the Hindu pantheon, at least apparently, as they do not pay especial homage to them, and as they disregard completely all those Brahmanical rites which involve the destruction of animal life. It deserves notice, too, that though rejecting in general the authority of the Vedas, they admit it, and quote the Vedic texts, if the doctrines of the latter are conformable to the Jaina tenets.

According to their doctrine, all objects, material or abstract, are arranged under nine categories, called *Tattwas*, truths or principles, of which we need notice only the ninth and last, called *Moksha*, or liberation of the vital spirit from the bonds of action—*i.e.*, final emancipation. In reference to it, the Jainas not only affirm that there is such a state, but they define the size of the emancipated souls, the place where they live, their tangible qualities, the duration of their existence, the distance at which they are from one another, their parts, natures, and numbers. Final emancipation is only obtained 'in the state of manhood (not in that of a good demon or brute), while in possession of five senses, while possessing a body capable of voluntary motion, in a condition of possibility, while possessing a mind, through the sacrament of the highest asceticism, in that path of rectitude in which there is no retrogression, through the possession of perfect knowledge and vision, and in the practice of abstinence.' Those who attain to final liberation do not return to a worldly state, and there is no interruption to their bliss. They have perfect vision and knowledge, and do not depend on works. *See* J. Stevenson, *The Kalpa Sûtra, and Nava Tattwa.*

The principles of faith, as mentioned before, are common to all classes of Jainas, but some differences occur in the practice of their duties, as they are divided into religious and lay orders, *Yatis* and *S'râvakas*.

Both, of course, must place implicit belief in the doctrines of their saints; but the *Yati* has to lead a life of abstinence, taciturnity, and continence; he should wear a thin cloth over his mouth, to prevent insects from flying into it, and he should carry a brush to sweep the place on which he is about to sit, to remove any living creature out of the way of danger; but, in turn, he may dispense with all acts of worship; whilst the *S'râvaka* has to add to the observance of the religious and moral duties the practical worship of the saints, and a profound reverence for his more pious brethren. The secular Jaina must, like the ascetic, practise the four virtues—liberality, gentleness, piety, and penance; he must govern his mind, tongue, and acts; abstain, at certain seasons, from salt, flowers, green fruits, roots, honey, grapes, tobacco; drink water thrice strained, and never leave a liquid uncovered, lest an insect should be drowned in it; it is his duty also to visit daily a temple where some of the images of the Jaina saints are placed, walk round it three times, make an obeisance to the image, and make some offerings of fruits or flowers, while pronouncing some such formula as 'Salutation to the Saints, to the Pure Existences, to the Sages, to the Teachers, to all the Devout in the world.' The reader in a Jaina temple is a Yati, but the ministrant priest is not seldom a Brahman, since the Jainas have no priests of their own, and the presence of such Brahmanical ministrants seems to have introduced several innovations in their worship. In Upper India, the ritual in use is often intermixed with formulas belonging more properly to the S'aiva and S'ákta worship, and images of S'iva and his consort take their place in Jaina temples. In the south of India, they appear, as mentioned before, to observe also all the essential rites or Sanskâras of the Brahmanical Hindu. The festivals of the Jainas are especially those relating to events in the life of their deified saints; but they observe also several common to other Hindus, as the spring festival, the S'rîpanchamî, and others.

The Jainas are divided into two principal divisions, *Digambaras* and *S'wetâmbaras.* The former word means 'sky-clad,' or naked, but in the present day ascetics of this division wear coloured garments, and confine the disuse of clothes to the period of their meals. *S'wetâmbara* means 'one who wears white garments;' but the points of difference between these two divisions are far from being restricted to that of dress: it is said to comprehend a list of 700 topics, of which eighty-four are considered to be of paramount importance. Amongst the latter are mentioned the practice of the S'wetâmbaras to decorate the images of their saints with earrings, necklaces, armlets, and tiaras of gold and jewels; whereas the Digambaras leave their images without ornaments. Again, the S'wetâmbaras assert that there are twelve heavens and sixty-four Indras; whereas the Digambaras maintain that there are sixteen heavens and one hundred Indras. In the south of India, the Jainas are divided into two castes; in Upper Hindustan, they are all of one caste. It is remarkable, however, that amongst themselves they recognise a number of families between which no intermarriage can take place, and that they resemble, in this respect also, the ancient Brahmanical Hindus, who established similar restrictions in their religious codes.

As regards the pantheon of the Jaina creed, it is still more fantastical than that of the Brahmanical sects, whence it is borrowed to a great extent, but without any of the poetical and philosophical interest which inheres in the gods of the Vedic time. The highest rank amongst their numberless hosts of divine beings—divided by them into four classes, with various subdivisions—they assign to the deified saints, which they call *Jina*, or *Arhat*, or *Tirthakara*, besides a variety of other generic names. The Jainas enumerate twenty-four Tirthakaras of their past age, twenty-four of the present, and twenty-four of the age to come; and they invest these holy personages with thirty-six superhuman attri

butes of the most extravagant character. Notwithstanding the sameness of these attributes, they distinguish the twenty-four Jinas of the present age from each other in colour, stature, and longevity. Two of them are red, two white, two blue, two black; the rest are of a golden hue, or a yellowish brown. The other two peculiarities are regulated by them with equal precision, and according to a system of decrement, from *Rishabha*, the first Jina, who was 500 poles in stature, and lived 8,400,000 great years, down to *Mahâvîra*, the 24th, who had degenerated to the size of a man, and was no more than 40 years on earth; the age of his predecessor, *Pârs'wanâtha*, not exceeding one hundred years. The present worship is almost restricted to the two last Tîrthakaras; and as the stature and years of these personages have a reasonable possibility, H. T. Colebrooke inferred that they alone are to be considered as historical personages. As, moreover, amongst the disciples of Mahâvîra there is one, Indrabhûti, who is called *Gautama*, and as Gautama is also a name of the founder of the Buddha faith, the same distinguished scholar concluded that, if the identity between these names could be assumed, it would lead to the further surmise that both these sects are branches of the same stock. But against this view, which would assign to the Jaina religion an antiquity even higher than 543 before Christ—the date which is commonly ascribed to the apotheosis of Gautama Buddha—several reasons are alleged by Professor Wilson. As to the real date, however, of the origin of the Jaina faith, as the same scholar justly observes, it is immersed in the same obscurity which invests all remote history amongst the Hindus. We can only infer from the existing Jaina literature, and from the doctrines it inculcates, that it came later into existence than the Buddhist sect. The best essays on the tenets, mythology, observances, and literature of this sect are those by Colebrooke in his "Miscellaneous Essays," and by Wilson in the first volume of his works (London, 1862)

KÂLIDÂSA.

KALIDASA was the greatest dramatist, and one of the most celebrated poets of India. He is known to the literary public of Europe especially through his drama *S'akuntalâ*, which, first introduced to the notice of the western world by Sir William Jones (1789), created so great a sensation throughout Europe, that the early success obtained by Sanscrit studies in England and Germany may be considered due to this masterpiece of Sanscrit literature. Another drama of the same poet, and next in renown to *S'akuntalâ*, is the *Vikramorvas'î*, or the Hero and the Nymph. Besides these works, Hindu tradition ascribes to his authorship a third drama and several poems, which no European critic will believe could ever have sprung from a mind like that of Kâlidâsa. Professor Lassen, in the *Indische Alterthumskunde*, passes the following judgment on this poet: 'Kâlidâsa may be considered as the brightest star in the firmament of Hindu artificial poetry. He deserves this praise on account of the mastery with which he wields the language, and on account of the consummate tact with which he imparts to it a more simple or more artificial form, according to the requirements of the subject treated by him, without falling into the artificial diction of later poets, or over-stepping the limits of good taste; on account of the variety of his creations, his ingenious conceptions, and his happy choice of subjects; and not less on account of the complete manner in which he attains his poetical ends, the beauty of his narrative, the delicacy of his sentiment, and the fertility of his imagination.' But although we are enabled by his works to appreciate the merits of this poet, we know little of his personal history. That he lived at Ujjayinî or Oujein, and that he was 'one of the nine gems of the court of Vikramâditya,' is all

that is related in regard to him. But as there have been several Vikramâdityas at Ujjayinî, his date is as uncertain as that of any personage of the ancient history of India. Dr. Bhâo Dâjî, in a learned and ingenious essay 'On the Sanscrit Poet, Kâlidâsa,' (*Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal As. Soc.*, October 1860), has endeavoured to identify Vikramâditya, the contemporary of Kâlidâsa, with Harsha Vikramâditya, and that the great poet would therefore have lived in the middle of the 6th century of the Christian era.*

KÂMA, OR KÂMADEVA.

KAMA, or Kâmadeva, the Hindu god of Love, and one of the most pleasing creations of Hindu fiction. In Sanscrit poetry, especially that of a later period, he is the favourite theme of descriptions and allusions; and mythology exalts his power so much that it allows even the god Brahmâ to succumb to it. According to some Purâṇas, he was originally a son of Brahmâ; according to others, a son of *Dharma* (the genius of Virtue), by *S'raddhâ* (the genius of Faith), herself a daughter of *Daksha*, who was one of the mind-born sons of Brahmâ. The god S'iva being on one occasion greatly incensed at Kâma, reduced him to ashes; but ultimately, moved by the affliction of Rati (Voluptuousness), the wife of Kâma, he promised her that her husband should be reborn as a son of *Kr'ishna*. The god Kr'ishna, accordingly, having married Rukminî, she bore him *Pradyumna*, who was the god of Love. But when the infant was six days old, it was stolen from the lying-in chamber by the terrible demon S'ambara; for the latter foreknew that Pradyumna, if he lived, would be his destroyer. The boy was thrown into the ocean, and swallowed by a large fish. Yet he did not die; for that fish was caught by

* See also Shankar Pandurang Pandit in "Tansactions of the Second International Congress of Orientalists. London, 1876," pp. 227–54.

fishermen, and delivered to *Mâyâvatî*, the mistress of S'ambara's household; and when it was cut open, the child was taken from it. Whilst Mâyâvatî wondered who this could be, the divine sage, Nârada, satisfied her curiosity, and counselled her to rear tenderly this offspring of Kr'ishna. She acted as he advised her; and when Pradyumna grew up, and learned his own history, he slew the demon S'ambara. Mâyâvatî, however, was later apprised by Kr'ishna that she was not the wife of S'ambara, as she had fancied herself to be, but that of Pradyumna—in fact, another form of Rati, who was the wife of Kâma in his prior existence.—Kâma is described or represented as holding in his hands a bow made of sugar-cane, and strung with bees, beside five arrows, each tipped with the blossom of a flower which is supposed to conquer one of the senses. His standard is, agreeably to the legend above mentioned, a fabulous fish, called Makara; and he rides on a parrot or sparrow—the symbol of voluptuousness. His epithets are numerous, but easily accounted for from the circumstances named, and from the effects of love on the mind and senses. Thus, he is called *Makaradhwaja*, 'the one who has Makara in his banner;' *Mada*, 'the maddener,' &c. His wife, as before stated, is *Rati;* she is also called *Kâmakalâ*, 'a portion of Kâma,' or *Prîti*, 'affection.' His daughter is *Trishâ*, 'thirst or desire;' and his son is *Aniruddha*, 'the unrestrained.'

LAKSHMI.

Lakshmi, in Hindu Mythology, the name of the consort of the god Vishn'u (q. v.), and considered also to be his female or creative energy. According to the mystical doctrine of the worshippers of Vishn'u, this god produced the three goddesses, Brâhmî, Lakshmî, and Chan'd'ikâ, the first representing his creating, the second, his preserving, and the third, his destroying energy. This view, however, founded on

the superiority of Vishn'u over the two other gods of the Hindu triad—Brâhmî, or Saraswatî, being generally looked upon as the energy of Brahmâ, and Chan'd'ikâ, another name of Durgâ, as the energy of S'iva—is later than the myth, relating to Lakshmî, of the epic period; for, according to the latter, Lakshmî is the goddess of Fortune and of Beauty, and arose from the Ocean of Milk when it was churned by the gods to procure the beverage of Immortality, and it was only after this wonderful occurrence that she became the wife of Vishn'u. When she emerged from the agitated milk-sea, one text of the Râmâyan'a relates, 'she was reposing on a lotos-flower, endowed with transcendent beauty, in the first bloom of youth, her body covered with all kinds of ornaments, and marked with every auspicious sign. . . . . Thus originated, and adored by the world, the goddess, who is also called *Padmâ* and *S'rî*, betook herself to the bosom of Hari—i. e., Vishnu.' A curious festival is celebrated in honour of this divinity on the fifth lunar day of the light half of the month Mâgha (February), when she is identified with Saraswatî, the consort of Brahmâ, and the goddess of learning. In his treatise on festivals, a great modern authority, Raghunandana, mentions, on the faith of a work called *Samwatsara-sandîpa*, that L. is to be worshipped in the forenoon of that day with flowers, perfumes, rice, and water; that due honour is to paid to inkstand and writing-reed, and no writing to be done. Wilson, in his essay on the *Religious Festivals of the Hindus* (works, vol ii. p. 188, ff.), adds that, on the morning of the 2nd February, 'the whole of the pens and inkstands, and the books, if not too numerous and bulky, are collected, the pens or reeds cleaned, the inkstands scoured, and the books, wrapped up in new cloth, are arranged upon a platform, or a sheet, and strewn over with flowers and blades of young barley, and that no flowers except white are to be offered. After performing the necessary rites . . . . all the members of the family assemble and make their prostrations; the books, the pens,

and ink having an entire holiday; and, should any emergency require a written communication on the day dedicated to the divinity of scholarship, it is done with chalk or charcoal upon a black or white board.' In different parts of India, this festival is celebrated at different seasons, according to the double aspect under which Lakshmî is viewed by her worshippers. The festival in the month Mâgha seems originally to have been a vernal feast, marking the commencement of the season of spring.

LAMAISM.

Lamaism (from the Tibetan *bLama*,* spiritual teacher or lord) is the name of the religion prevailing in Tibet and Mongolia. It is Buddhism corrupted by S'ivaism (see Siva), and by Shamanism or spirit-worship. As ancient Buddhism knows of no worship of God, but merely of an adoration of saints, the latter is also the main feature of Lamaism. The essence of all that is sacred is comprised by this religion under the name of dKon mChhog gSsum (pronounced *Konchogsum*), which consists of the 'three most precious jewels'—viz., the 'Buddha-jewel,' the 'doctrine-jewel,' and the 'priesthood-jewel.' A similar triad is implied by the three Buddhistic formulæ: 'I take my refuge in Buddha; I take my refuge in the law (or doctrine); I take my refuge in the congregation (of the priests),' but it did not obtain the same dogmatic importance in Buddhism as in Lamaism, where it is looked upon as a kind of trinity, representing an essential unity. The first person of this trinity is the Buddha; but he is not the creator,

* The small letters prefixed to the initials of the Tibetan words in this article are not pronounced.

or the origin of the universe; as in Buddhism, he is merely the founder of the doctrine, the highest saint, though endowed with all the qualities of supreme wisdom, power, virtue, and beauty, which raise him beyond the pale of ordinary existence. The second jewel, or the doctrine, is the law or religion—that which is, as it were, the incarnation of the Buddha, his actual existence after he had disappeared in the Nirvâna. The third jewel, or the priesthood, is the congregation of the saints, comprising the whole clergy, the incarnate as well as the non-incarnate representatives of the various Buddhistic saints. The latter comprise the five Dhyâni-Buddhas, or the Buddhas of contemplation, and, besides, all those myriads of Bodhisattwas, Pratyeka-Buddhas, and pious men, who became canonised after their death. It is obvious that among their number a portion only can enjoy practical worship; but the clergy, as the visible representative of these saints, claim and receive due homage at all the religious ceremonies. Inferior in rank to these saints are the gods and spirits, the former chiefly taken from the Pantheon of the S'ivaits. The highest position amongst these is occupied by the four spirit-kings—viz., *Indra* (q. v.), the god of the firmament; *Yama*, the god of death and the infernal regions; *Yamântaka*, or S'iva, as revenger in his most formidable shape; and *Vais'ravana*, or the god of wealth. The worship of these saints and gods consist chiefly in the reciting of prayers, and sacred texts, and the intonation of hymns, accompanied with a kind of music, which is a chaos of the most unharmonious and deafening sounds of horns, trumpets, and drums of various descriptions. During this worship, which takes place three times a day, the clergy, summoned by the tolling of a little bell, are seated in two or more rows, according to their rank; and on special holidays, the temples and altars are decorated with symbolical figures, while offerings of tea, flour, milk, butter, and others of a similar nature, are made by the worshippers; animal sacrifices or

offerings entailing injury to life being forbidden, as in the Buddhistic faith. Lamaism knows especially three great festivals. The *Log gSsar*, or the festival of the new year, in February, marks the commencement of the season of spring, or the victory of light and warmth over darkness and cold. The Lamaists, like the Buddhists, celebrate it in commemoration of the victory obtained by the Buddha S'âkyamuni, over the six heretic teachers. It lasts fifteen days, and consists of a series of feasts, dances, illuminations, and other manifestations of joy; it is, in short, the Tibetan carnival. The second festival, probably the oldest festival of the Buddhistic Church, is held in commemoration of the conception or incarnation of the Buddha, and marks the commencement of summer. The third is the *water-feast*, in August and September, marking the commencement of autumn. Baptism and confirmation are the two principal sacraments of Lamaism. The former is administered on the third or tenth day after birth; the latter, generally when the child can walk and speak. The marriage ceremony is to Tibetans not a religious, but a civil act; nevertheless, the Lamas know how to turn it to the best advantage, as it is from them that the bridegroom and bride have to learn the auspicious day when it should be performed; nor do they fail to complete the act with prayers and rites, which must be responded to with handsome presents. A similar observation applies to the funeral ceremonies of the Tibetans. Properly speaking, there are none requiring the assistance of the clergy, for Lamaism does not allow the interment of the dead. Persons distinguished by rank, learning, or piety, are burned after their death; but the general mode of disposing of dead bodies in Tibet, as in Mongolia, is that of exposing them in the open air, to be devoured by birds and beasts of prey; yet it is the Lama who must be present at the moment of death, in order to superintend the proper separation of body and soul, to calm the departed spirit, and to enable him to be reborn

in a happy existence. He must determine the auspicious day and hour when, and the auspicious place where, the corpse is to be exposed. The most lucrative part of his business, however, is the masses which he has to perform, until the soul is released from Yama, the infernal judge, and ready to re-enter into its new existence; the doctrine of metempsychosis being the same in this religion as in Buddhism.

One of the most interesting features of Lamaism is the organisation of its hierarchy. Its summit is occupied by two Lama popes, the one called *Dalai-lama*, i.e., Ocean-priest, or priest as wide as the ocean—he resides at Potala, near H'lassa—the other bearing the titles of *Tesho-lama*, *Bogdo-lama*, &c., and officially called *Pan-chhen Rin po chhe*, literally, "the right reverend great teacher-jewel" (i.e., precious teacher); he resides in the convent at bKra Shiss Lhun po, near gShiss-Ka rTse. In theory, both popes have the same rank and authority, in spiritual as well as in temporal matters; but as the Dalai-lama possesses a much larger territory than the other, he is in reality much more powerful. Next in rank are the *Khutuktus*, who may be compared to the Roman Catholic cardinals and archbishops. The third degree is that of the Khubilghans and Hobilghans—which Mongol name is more frequently given to them than the Tibetan title *Bjang chhub*—a translation of the Sanscrit Bodhisattwa. Their number is very great. These three degrees represent the clergy that claims to be the incarnation of the Bhuddistic saints. The Dalai-lama and the Pan-chhen were in their former lives the two chief disciples of the great Lamaist reformer bTsong kha pa, who was an incarnation of the Bodhisattwa Amitâbha, or, as some will have it, of Manjus'rî and Vajrapân'i, and who is reputed to have founded, in 1355 or 1357 of the Christian era, the present system of the Lama hierarchy. The Khutuktus were in their prior existences other Bhuddhistic saints of very great renown; and the Khubilghans are those reborn hosts of saintly patrons whom

the temples and convents of Lamaism possess in boundless numbers. Up to the end of last century, the clergy of these various classes determined the choice of the children into whose bodies the souls of their departed members had migrated. At present, however, it seems that the Emperor of China exercises the paramount influence on the discovery of those transmigrations—or, in other words, on the filling up of clerical posts—and there can be no doubt that his influence is supreme in the case of determining the election of the two highest functionaries of this theocracy. In order to ascertain the re-birth of a departed Lama, various means are relied upon. Sometimes the deceased had, before his death, confidentially mentioned to his friends where and in which family he would re-appear, or his will contained intimations to this effect. In most instances, however, the sacred books and the official astrologers are consulted on the subject; and if the Dalai-lama dies, it is the duty of the Pan-chhen to interpret the traditions and oracles; whereas, if the latter dies, the Dalai-lama renders him the same service. The proclamation of so great an event, however, as the metempsychosis of a Dalai-lama or Pan-chhen is preceded by a close examination of the child that claims to be in possession of the soul of either of these personages. The reborn arch-saint, usually a boy four or five years old, is questioned as to his previous career; books, garments, and other articles used and not used by the deceased, are placed before him, to point out those which belonged to him in his former life. But however satisfactory his answers be, they do not yet suffice. Various little bells required at the daily devotions of the Lama, are put before the boy, to select that which he did use when he was the Dalai-lama or Panchhen. "But where is my own favourite bell?" the child exclaims, after having searched in vain; and this question is perfectly justified; for, to test the veracity of the reborn saint, this particular bell had been withheld from him. Now, however,

there can be no doubt as to the Dalai-lama or Pan-chhen being bodily before them: the believers fall on their knees, and the Lamas who successfully performed all these frauds join them in announcing the momentous fact.

Besides these three classes of the higher clergy—representing the incarnate existences of departed saints, and chosen, therefore, without regard to merit, amongst the children of privileged families—Lamaism possesses a lower clergy, which, having no claim to incarnate holiness, recruits its ranks on the principle of merit and theological proficiency. It has four orders: the pupil or novice, who enters the order generally in his seventh or ninth year; the assistant priest; the religious mendicant: and the teacher or abbot. To these may be added two academical or theological degrees, and also two dignities, conferred by the sovereign Lamas on those doctors who have distinguished themselves by extraordinary sanctity or learning. All the members of these orders must make the vow of celibacy, and by far the greatest number of them live in convents. A Lamaist convent, *dGon pa*, consists of a temple, which forms its centre, and of a number of buildings, connected with the temple, and appropriated to the meeting-rooms, the library, refectory, dwellings, and other spiritual and worldly wants of the monks. At the head of the convent is a Khubilghan, or an abbot, the latter being elected by the chapter, and appointed by the Dalai-lama, or the provincial Khubilghan. In addition to these orders of monks and convents, Lamaism has likewise its nuns and nunneries.

The Lamaist bible bears the name of *bKa' gyur* (pronounced *Kanjur*) —i. e., "translation of the words, *scil.*, of the Buddha. It contains not less than 1083 works, which in some editions fill 102 to 108 volumes in folio. It consists of the following sections: 1. "*Dulba* (Sanscrit, Vinaya), or discipline; 2. *Sher phyin* (Sans. Prajnâpâramitâ), or philosophy and metaphysics; 3. *Phal chhen* (Sans. Buddhavata

Sangha), or the doctrine of the Buddhas, their incarnations, &c.; 4. *dKon brTsegss* (Sans. Ratnakût'a), or the collection of precious things; 5. *mDo ssDe* (Sans. Sûtra), or the collection of Sûtras; 6. *Myang 'dass* (Sans. Nirvâna), or the liberation from worldly pains; 7. *rGyud* (Sans. Tantras), or incantations, &c. Besides this mass of works, there is a very voluminous collection the *bssTan 'gyur*, or the translation of the doctrine, in 225 vols, in folio; but it does not seem to possess canonical authority.

The oldest history of Lamaism is shrouded in darkness. For its growth and development under the Mongol and Manju dynasties see the article Tibet.—The best work on Lamaism is *Die Lamaische Hierarchie und Kirche, von Karl Friedrich Koeppen* (Berlin, 1859). See also Huc, *Souvenirs d'un Voyage dans la Tartarie, le Tibet et la Chine* (Paris, 1852), and Karl Ritter's *Erdkunde* (vol. iv.).

MÂDHAVÂCHÂRYA.

MADHAVACHARYA (i. e., *Mâdhava*, the Âchârya, or spiritual teacher) is one of the greatest Hindu scholars and divines that graced the medieval literature of India. He is famed for his numerous and important works relating to the Vedic, philosophical, legal, and grammatical writings of the ancient Hindus, and also for his political connection with the history of some renowned kings of the Deccan. His learning and wisdom were so eminent, that he was supposed to have received them from the goddess Bhuvanes'warî, the consort of S'iva, who, gratified by his incessant devotions, became manifest to him in a human shape, conferred on him the gift of extraordinary knowledge, and changed his name to Vidyâran'ya (the Forest of Learning), a title by which he is sometimes designated in Hindu writings. All the

traditions about Mâdhavâchârya, however differing from one another, agree in ascribing the origin of Vijayanagara to Mâdhava. His birthplace is said to have been Pampa, a village situated on the bank of the river Tungabhadrâ; and as all the accounts of his life admit his having been the prime-minister of Sangama, the son of Kampa, whose reign at Vijayanagara commenced about 1336, and to have filled the same post under King Bukka I., who succeeded Harihara I. about 1361, and as he died at the age of ninety, the date of his birth coincides probably with the beginning of the 14th century. Amongst his works, the principal are his great commentaries on the Rig-, Yajur-, and Sâma-vedas (see VEDA); an exposition of the Mîmânsâ philosophy; a summary account of fifteen religious and philosophical systems of Indian speculation; some treatises on the Vedânta philosophy; another on salvation; a history of S'ankara's (q. v.) polemics against multifarious misbelievers and heretics; a commentary on Parâs'ara's code of law; a work on determining time, especially in reference to the observation of religious acts; and a grammatical commentary on Sanscrit radicals and their derivatives. The chief performance of Mâdhava is doubtless the series of his great commentaries on the Vedas, for without them no conscientious scholar could attempt to penetrate the sense of those ancient Hindu works. In these commentaries, Mâdhava labours to account for the grammatical properties of Vedic words and forms, records their traditional sense, and explains the drift of the Vedic hymns, legends, and rites. That in an undertaking almost unparalleled, in the literary history of any nation for its magnitude and difficulty, Mâdhava should have committed sundry inaccuracies—the remedy against which, however, is really always afforded by himself—can surprise no one; but when modern Sanscrit philology affords the spectacle of writers haughtily exaggerating these shortcomings, and combining with their would-be criticisms the pretence of establishing the true sense of the Vedas without the assistance of

Mâdhava, a mere comparison of the commentary of the latter with what the European public is called upon to accept as its substitute, adds a new testimony to the vast superiority of the Hindu scholar over his European antagonists. See VEDA. Some of Mâdhava's works seem to have been lost.*

MAHÂBHÂRATA.

MAHABHARATA (from the Sanscrit *mahat*—changed to *mahâ*—great, and *Bhârata*) is the name of one of the two great epic poems of ancient India. For the other, see the article RAMAYAN'A. As its main story relates to the contest between two rival families, both descendants of a king Bharata, the word Mahâbhârata probably implies "the great history of the descendants of Bharata;" for another explanation of the word, which connects it with *bhâra*, weight, was obviously invented merely to convey an idea of the enormous extent of this poem. According to this explanation, it would mean the "very weighty (poem)," because, "when weighed, it was found to be heavier than all the four Vedas together with their mystical writings." However devoid of grammatical value this popular account of the word Mahâbhârata may be, it does not exaggerate the bulk of this epos, which, in its present condition, consists of upwards of one hundred thousand verses, each containing thirty-two syllables; while, if a tradition, reported in the introduction to the work itself, could be trusted, it was formerly known in other recensions of a still greater extent. In its actual shape, it is divided into eighteen parvans or books, the *Harivans'a* being considered as a supplementary part of it. That this huge composition was not the work of one single individual, but a production of successive ages, clearly results from the multifariousness of its contents, from the

* The Vança-brâhmana, by A. C. Burnell. Mangalore, 1873. Introd. pp. viii.—xl.

difference of style which characterises its various parts, and even from the contradictions which disturb its harmony. Hindu tradition ascribes it to *Vyâsa;* but as Vyâsa means "the distributor or arranger," and as the same individual is also the reputed compiler of the Vedas, Purânas, and several other works, it is obvious that no historical value can be assigned to this generic name. The contents of the Mahâbhârata may be distinguished into the leading story and the episodical matter connected with it. The former is probably founded on real events in the oldest history of India, though in the epic narrative it will be difficult to disentangle the reality from the fiction. The story comprises the contest of the celebrated families called the Kauravas and Pân'd'avas, ending in the victory of the latter, and in the establishment of their rule over the northern part of India. Kuru, a descendant of Bharata, had two sons, Dhr'itarâsht'ra and Pân'd'u. The sons of the former, commonly called the *Kauravas*, were a hundred in number, the eldest of them being Duryodhana; those of Pân'd'u—the *Pân'd'avas*—were five, Yudhisht'hira, Bhîma, Arjuna, and the twins Nakula and Sahadeva. Pân'd'u, having resigned his throne, Dhr'itarâsh'tra, though blind assumed the government, and ultimately divided his kingdom between his sons and the sons of Pân'd'u. The former, however, coveting the territory allotted to the Pân'd'u princes, endeavoured to get possession of it. A game of dice was the means by which they bound over their cousins to relinquish their kingdom, promising, however, to restore it to them if they passed twelve years in the forests, and a thirteenth year in such disguises as to escape detection. This promise was faithfullykept by the Pân'd'avas, but the term of their banishment having expired, the Kuru princes refused to redeem their word. A war ensued, ending in the complete destruction of the Kauravas. These are the meagre outlines of the leading story of the Mahâbhârata, where, as may be inferred, Duryodhana and his brothers are pictured as the type of all

conceivable wickedness, and the Pân'd'u princes as paragons of virtue and heroism. That the latter are the incarnations of sundry deities—that the gods take an active part in the development of the plot, in short, that Hindu mythology is always interwoven with these stirring events of semi-historical Hindu antiquity, requires no further remark to anyone but slightly acquainted with Hindu poetry. It is necessary, however, to observe that out of the one hundred thousand verses which constitute the great epos, barely a fourth part is taken up by this narrative; all the rest is episodical. The matter thus, as it were, incidentally linked with the main story, may be distributed under three principal heads; passing over such minor additions as fables, genealogical lists, geographical enumerations, and the like. One category of such episodes comprises narratives relating to the ancient or mythical history of India, as, for instance, the episodes of Nala and S'akuntalâ; a second is more strictly mythological, comprising cosmogony and theogony; a third is didactic or dogmatic—it refers to law, religion, morals, and philosophy, as in the case of the celebrated Bhagavadgîtâ, and the principal portions of the 12th and 13th books. By means of this episodical matter, which at various periods, and often without regard to consistency, was superadded to the original structure of the work, the Mahâbhârata gradually became a collection of all that was needed to be known by an educated Hindu; in fact, it became the encyclopædia of India. "There is no narrative on earth," the Mahâbhârata says of itself, "that is not founded on this epos. . . . . The twice-born, though knowing the four Vedas and their supplementary sciences, has no wisdom unless he knows this great epos. . . . . It is the great manual of all that is moral, useful, and agreeable." Yet it should be noticed that the Brahmanic authors of the great epos intended it especially as an encyclopædia for the Kshattriya or military caste; for it is chiefly the history, the interests, the religion, and the duties of the second caste which are

taught in it, always, of course, with a view of establishing the superiority of the Brahmanic caste. Sectarian religion is for this reason not emphasised in the Mahâbhârata, though the later sectarian works (see PURANA) have largely drawn, for their purposes, on the mythological material afforded them by the great epic work. The text of the Mahâbhârata has been published in Calcutta in four quarto volumes 1834—1839), to which is added a fifth volume, containing a table of contents. Two other editions are in the course of publication at Bombay. The best researches on the Mahâbhârata are those by Lassen, in his *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* (1837, ff.) and in his *Indische Alterthumskunde*. A sort of analysis of the leading story of the Mahâbhârata (not of the episodes) has lately been given by F. G. Eichhoff (*Poésie Héroïque des Indiens*, Paris, 1860), and by Professor Monier Williams (*Indian Epic Poetry*, London, 1863).*

MAHÂVIRA.

MAHAVIRA (literally, "the great hero)," also called *Vîra* and *Vardhamâna*, is the twenty-fourth or last Jina, or deified saint, of the Jainas (q. v.), described as of a golden complexion, and having a lion for his symbol. His legendary history is given in the *Kalpa-Sûtra* and the *Mahâvîra-Charitra*, two works held in great authority by the Jainas. According to these works, Mahâvîra's first birth occurred at a period infinitely remote; it was as Nayasâra, head man of a village, that he first appeared in the country of Vijaya, subject to S'atrumardana. He was next born as *Marîchi*, the grandson of the first Jaina saint, *R'ishabha;* he then came to the world of Brahmâ, was reborn as a worldly-minded Brâhman'a, and after several other births—each being separated from the other by an interval passed in one of the Jaina

* Indian Wisdom, by M. Williams. London, 1875, pp. 309—448.

heavens, and each period of life extending to many hundreds of thousands of years—he quitted the state of a deity to obtain immortality as a saint, and was incarnate towards the close of the fourth age (now past), when 75 years and 8½ months of it remained. After he was thirty years of age, he renounced worldly pursuits, and departed, amidst the applauses of gods and men, to practise austerities. Finally, he became an Arhat or Jina; and at the age of seventy-two years, the period of his liberation having arrived, "he resigned his breath," and his body was burned by Indra and other deities, who divided amongst them such parts as were not destroyed by the flames, as the teeth and bones, which they preserved as relics; the ashes of the pile were distributed amongst the assistants: the gods erected a splendid monument on the spot, and then returned to their respective heavens. At what period these events occurred is not stated, but judging from some of the circumstances narrated, the last Jina expired about five hundred years before the Christian era. Other authorities make the date of this event about a century and a half earlier. The works above referred to state, with considerable detail, the conversions worked by Mahâvîra. Among the pupils were *Indrabhûti* (also called Gautama, and for this reason, but erroneously, considered as the same with the founder of the Buddhist religion), *Agnibhûti*, *Vâyubhûti*,—all three sons of Vasubhûti, a Brâhman'a of the Gotama tribe, and others. These converts to Jaina principles are mostly made in the same manner: each comes to the saint prepared to overwhelm him with shame, when he salutes them mildly, and, as the Jainas hold, solves their metaphysical or religious doubts. Thus, Indrabhûti doubts whether there be a living principle or not; Vâyubhûti doubts if life be not body; Man'd'ita has not made up his mind on the subjects of bondage and liberation; Achalabhrâtr'i is sceptical as to the distinction between vice and virtue; and so on. Mahâvîra removes all their difficulties, and by teaching them

the Jaina truth, converts them to the doctrine of his sect. For a summary account of the life of this saint, see H. T. Colebrooke's "Miscellaneous Essays," vol. ii., p. 213, ff.; H. H. Wilson's "Works," vol. i., p. 291, ff.*

MANU.

MANU (from the Sanscrit *man*, to think, literally, the thinking being) is the reputed author of the most renowned law-book of the ancient Hindus; and likewise of an ancient Kalpa work on Vedic rites. It is matter, however, of considerable doubt whether both works belong to the same individual, and whether the name Manu, especially in the case of the author of the law-book, was intended to designate an historical personage; for, in several passages of the Vedas as well as the Mahâbhârata Manu is mentioned as the progenitor of the human race; and in the first chapter of the law-book ascribed to him, he declares himself to have been produced by Virâj, an offspring of the Supreme Being, and to have created all this universe. Hindu mythology knows, moreover, a succession of Manus, each of whom created, in his own period, the world anew after it had perished at the end of a mundane age. The word Manu—kindred with our "*man*"—belongs, therefore, properly speaking, to ancient Hindu mythology, and it was connected with the renowned law-book, in order to impart to the latter the sanctity on which its authority rests. This work is not merely a law-book in the European sense of the word, it is likewise a system of cosmogony; it propounds metaphysical doctrines, teaches the art of government, and, amongst other things, treats of the state of the soul after death. The chief topics of its twelve books are the following:—1. Creation; 2. Education and the duties of a pupil, or the first order; 3. Marriage and the duties

* A. Weber, Ueber ein Fragment der Bhagavatî. Berlin, 1867. II., p. 236 ff. 315 ff.

of a householder, or the second order; 4. Means of subsistence, and private morals; 5. Diet, purification, and the duties of women; 6. The duties of an anchorite and an ascetic, or the duties of the third and fourth orders; 7. Government, and the duties of a king and the military caste: 8. Judicature and law, private and criminal; 9. Continuation of the former, and the duties of the commercial and servile castes; 10. Mixed castes, and the duties of the castes in time of distress: 11. Penance and expiation; 12. Transmigration and final beatitude. The text of this work has been published in several editions, both in India and Europe. An excellent English translation of it we owe to Sir W. Jones (2nd ed., by Haughton, London, 1825), and a very good French translation to A. Loiseleur Deslongchamps (Paris, 1833).

MIMÂNSÂ.

Mimansa (from Sanscrit *man*, to investigate; hence, literally, investigation) is the collective name of two of the six divisions of orthodox Hindu philosophy. See Sanscrit Literature. It is distinguished as *Pûrva-* and *Uttara-mîmânsâ*, the latter being more commonly called *Vedânta* (q. v.), while the former is briefly styled *Mîmânsâ*. Though the Mîmânsâ is ranked, by all native writers, with the five other philosophical systems, the term philosophy—as understood in a European sense—can scarcely be applied to it; for the Mîmânsâ is neither concerned with the nature of the absolute or of the human mind, nor with the various categories of existence in general—topics dealt with more or less by the other five philosophies; its object is merely to lay down a correct interpretation of such Vedic passages as refer to the Brâhman'ic ritual, to solve doubts wherever they may exist on matters concerning sacrificial acts, and to reconcile discrepancies—according to the Mîmânsâ,

always apparent only—of Vedic texts. The foundation of this system is therefore preceded by a codification of the three principal Vedas—the R'ik, Black-Yajus, and Sâman—and by the existence of schools and theories which, by their different interpretations of the Vedic rites, had begun to endanger, or, in reality, had endangered a correct, or at least authoritative understanding of the Vedic texts. It is the method, however, adopted by the Mîmânsâ which imparted to it a higher character than that of a mere commentary, and allowed it to be looked upon as a philosophy; for, in the first place, the topics explained by this system do not follow the order in which they occur in the Vedic writings, especially in the Brâhma'na portion of the Vedas (q. v.); they are arranged according to certain categories, such as authoritativeness, indirect precept, concurrent efficacy, co-ordinate effect, &c.; and secondly, each topic or case is discussed according to a regular scheme, which comprises the proposition of the subject-matter, the doubt or question arising upon it, the *primâ-facie* or wrong argument applied to it, the correct argument in refutation of the latter, and the conclusion devolving from it. Some subjects treated of in the Mîmânsâ, incidentally as it were, and merely for the sake of argument, belong likewise more to the sphere of philosophic thought than to that of commentatorial criticism, such, for instance, as the association of articulate sound with sense, the similarity of words in different languages, the inspiration or eternity of the Veda, the invisible or spiritual operation of pious acts, &c. The reputed founder of this system is Jaimini—of unknown date—who taught it in twelve books, each subdivided into four chapters, except the third, sixth, and tenth books, which contain eight chapters each; the chapters, again, are divided into sections, generally comprising several Sûtras or aphorisms, but sometimes only one. The extant commentary on this obscure work is the *Bhâshya* of 'Sabaraswâmin, which was critically annotated by the great Mîmânsâ authority, Kumârila-

swâmin. Out of these works, which, in their turn, quote several others, apparently lost, has arisen a great number of other writings, explaining and elucidating their predecessors. The best conpendium, amongst these modern works, is the *Jaiminîya-nyâya-mâlâ-vistara*, by the celebrated Mâdhavâchârya (q. v.)

MITÂKSHARÂ.

MITAKSHARA is the name of several commentatorial works in Sanscrit, for instance, of a commentary on the text-book of the Vedânta philosophy, of a commentary on the Mîmânsâ work of Kumârila, of a commentary on the Br'ihadâran'yaka (see VEDA), &c. The most renowned work, however, bearing this title is a detailed commentary by Vijnânes'wara (also called Vijnânanâtha), on the law-book of Yâjnavalkya, (q. v.); and its authority and influence are so great that 'it is received in all the schools of Hindu law from Benares to the southern extremity of the peninsula of India as the chief groundwork of the doctrines which they follow, and as an authority from which they rarely dissent' (cf. two treatises on the Hindu Law of inheritance, translated by H. T. Colebrooke, Calcutta, 1810). Most of the other renowned law-books of recent date, such as the Smr'iti-Chandrikâ, which prevails in the south of India, the Chintâman'i, Vîramitrodaya, and Mayûkha, which are authoritative severally in Mithilâ, Benares, and with the Mahrattas, generally defer to the decisions of the Mitâksharâ; the Dâyabhâga of Jimûtavâhana alone, which is adopted by the Bengal school, differs on almost every disputed point from the Mitâksharâ, and does not acknowledge its authority. The Mitâksharâ, following the arrangement of its text-work, the code of Yâjnavalkya, treats in its first part of duties in general; in its second, of private and administrative law; in its third, of purification,

penance, devotion, and so forth; but, since it frequently quotes other legislators, expounding their texts, and contrasting them with those of Yâjnavalkya, it is not merely a commentary, but supplies the place of a regular digest. The text of the Mitâksharâ has been edited several times in India. An excellent translation of its chapter 'On Inheritance' was published by Colebrooke in the work above referred to; and its explanation of Yâjnavalkya is followed by the same celebrated scholar in his *Digest of Hindu Law* (3 vols. Calcutta and London, 1801), when translating passages from this ancient author.

NIRUKTA.

NIRUKTA, or 'Explanation' is the name of one of the six *Vedângas* (see VEDA) which explains difficult Vedic words. That there have been several works engaged in such a task, even at a very remote period of Hindu antiquity, and that they bore the name of Nirukta is probable, for 'Nirukta authors' are quoted either generally or by name in several Sanskrit authors; but the work which is emphatically called *Nirukta*, and which, for the present, is the only surviving representative of this important Vedânga is that of *Yâska*, who was a predecessor of Pân'ini (q. v.). His work consists of three parts—the *Naighan't'uka*, where, for the most part, synonymous words are taught; the *Naigama*, which contains words that usually occur in the Vedas only; and the *Daivata* which contains words chiefly relating to deities and sacrificial acts. A Commentary on this work has been composed by the same Yâska, and it likewise bears the name of Nirukta. In the latter, Vedic passages are quoted in illustration of the works to be explained, and the comment

given by Yâska on these passages is the oldest instance, known at present to Sanskrit philology, of a Vedic gloss. Besides the great importance which Yâska's *Nirukta* thus possesses for a proper understanding of the Vedic texts, it is valuable also on account of several discussions which it rases on grammatical and other questions, and on account of the insight it affords us into the scientific and religious condition of its time.—Text and Commentary of *Yâska's Nirukta* have been edited by Professor R. Roth (Göttingen, 1852).

NIRVÂNA.

NIRVANA (from the Sanscrit *nir*, out, and *vâna*, blown; hence, literally, that which is blown out or extinguished) is, in Buddhistic doctrine, the term denoting the final deliverance of the soul from transmigration. It implies, consequently, the last aim of Buddhistic existence, since transmigration is tantamount to a relapse into the evils or miseries of *Sansâra*, or the world. But as Hinduism, or the Brahmanical doctrine, professes to lead to the same end, the difference between *Nirvâna* and *Moksha*, *Apavarga*, or the other terms of Brahmaism designating eternal bliss, and consequent liberation from metempsychosis, rests on the difference of the ideas which both doctrines connect with the condition of the soul after that liberation. *Brahman*, according to the Brahmanical doctrine, being the existing and everlasting cause of the universe, eternal happiness is, to the Brahmanical Hindu, the absorption of the human soul into that cause whence it emanated, never to depart from it again. According to this doctrine, therefore, the liberation of the human soul from transmigration is equivalent to that state of felicity which religion and philosophy attribute to *that* Entity

(see INDIA—*Religion*). As, however, the ultimate cause of the universe, according to Buddhism, is the Void or Non-entity, the deliverance from transmigration is, to the Buddhists, the return to non-entity, or the absolute extinction of the soul. However much, then, the pious phraseology of their *oldest* works may embellish the state of Nirvâna, and apparently deceive the believer on its real character, it cannot alter this fundamental idea inherent in it. We are told, for instance, that Nirvâna is quietude and identity, whereas Sansâra is turmoil and variety; that Nirvâna is freedom from all conditions of existence, whereas Sansâra is birth, disease, decrepitude and death, sin and pain, merit and demerit, virtue and vice; that Nirvâna is the shore of salvation for those who are in danger of being drowned in the sea of Sansâra; that it is the free port ready to receive those who have escaped the dungeon of existence, the medicine which cures all diseases, the water which quenches the thirst of all desires, &c.; but to the mind of the orthodox Buddhist, all these definitions convey but the one idea, that the blessings promised in the condition of Nirvâna are tantamount to the absolute 'extinction of the human soul,' *after* it has obeyed, in this life, all the injunctions of Buddhism, and become convinced of all its tenets on the nature of the world and the final destination of the soul.

Although this is the orthodox view of Nirvâna, according to the oldest Buddhistic doctrine, it is necessary to point out two categories of different views which have obscured the original idea of Nirvâna, and even induced some modern writers to believe that the final beatitude of the oldest Buddhistic doctrine is not equivalent to the absolute annihilation of the soul.

The first category of these latter, or, as we may call them, heterodox views, is that which confounds with Nirvâna the preparatory labour of the mind to the arrival at the end, and therefore assumes that Nirvâna is the extinction of thought, or that cessation, to thought, of all difference

between subject and object, virtue and vice, &c., or certain speculations on a creative cause, the conditions of the universe, and so on. All these views the Buddha himself rejects, as appears from the work *Lankâvatâra*, where relating his discourse on the real meaning of Nirvâna, before the Bodhisattwa Mahâmati. The erroneousness of those views is obviously based on the fact, that the mind, even though in a state of unconsciousness, as when ceasing to think, or when speculating, is still within the pale of existence. Thus, to obviate the mistaken notion that such a state is the real Nirvâna, Buddhistic works sometimes use the term *Nirupadhis'esha Nirvâna*, or "the Nirvâna *without* a remainder of substratum" (i.e., without a rest of existence), in contradistinction to the "Nirvâna *with* a remainder;" meaning by the latter expression that condition of a saint which, in consequence of his bodily and mental austerities, immediately precedes his real Nirvâna, but in which, nevertheless, he is still an occupant of the material world.

The second category of heterodox views on the Nirvâna is that which, though acknowledging in principle the original notion of Buddhistic salvation, represents, as it were, a compromise with the popular mind. It belongs to a later period of Buddhism, when this religion, in extending its conquests over Asia, had to encounter creeds which abhorred the idea of an absolute nihilism. This compromise coincides with the creation of a Buddhistic pantheon, and with the classification of Buddhist saints into three classes, each of which has its own Nirvâna: that of the two lower degrees consisting of a vast number of years, at the end of which, however, these saints are born again; while the absolute Nirvâna is reserved for the highest class of saints. Hence Buddhistic salvation is then spoken of, either simply as *Nirvâna*, or the lowest, or as *Parinirvâna*, the middle, or as *Mahâparinirvâna*, or the highest extinction of the soul; and as those who have

not yet attained to the highest Nirvâna must live in the heavens of the two inferior classes of saints until they reappear in this world, their condition of Nirvâna is assimilated to that state of more or less material happiness which is also held out to the Brahmanical Hindu before he is completely absorbed into Brahman.

When, in its last stage, Buddhism is driven to the assumption of an Âdi, or primitive, Buddha, as the creator of the universe, Nirvâna, then meaning the absorption into him, ceases to have any real affinity with the original Buddhistic term.*

NYÂYA.

Nyaya (from the Sanscrit *ni*, into, and *âya*, going, a derivative from *i*, to go; hence literally "entering," and figuratively, "investigating analytically") is the name of the second of the three great systems of ancient Hindu philosophy; and it is apparently so called because it treats analytically, as it were, of the objects of human knowledge, both material and spiritual, distributed by it under different heads or topics; unlike, therefore, the *Vedânta* (q. v.) and *Sânkhya* (q. v.) which follow a synthetic method of reasoning, the former of these systems being chiefly concerned in spiritual and divine matters, and the latter in subjects relating to the material world and man. The Nyâya consists, like the two other great systems of Hindu philosophy (see Mîmânsâ and Sânkhya), of two divisions. The former is called Nyâya (proper), and will be exclusively considered in this article; the other is known under the name of Vais'eshika (q. v.). With the other systems of philosophy, it concurs in promising beatitude, that is, final deliverance of the soul from re-birth or transmigration, to those who acquire

* R. Childers, Pali Dictionary. 1875, s. vv. *nibbânam, upadhi, parinibbânam.*

truth, which, in the case of the Nyâya, means a thorough knowledge of the principles taught by this particular system.

The topics treated of by the Nyâya are briefly the following: 1. The *pramân'a*, or instruments of right notion. They are: *a.* Knowledge which has arisen from the contact of a sense with its object; *b.* Inference of three sorts (*à priori*, *à posteriori*, and from analogy); *c.* Comparison; and *d.* Knowledge, verbally communicated, which may be knowledge of "that whereof the matter is seen," and knowledge of "that whereof the matter is unseen" (revelation). 2. The objects or matters about which the inquiry is concerned (*prameya*). They are: *a.* The *Soul* (*âtman*). It is the site of knowledge or sentiment, different for each individual coexistent person, infinite, eternal, &c. Souls are therefore numerous, but the supreme soul is one; it is demonstrated as the creator of all things. *b. Body* (*s'arîra*). It is the site of action, of the organs of sensation, and of the sentiments of pain or pleasure. It is composed of parts, a framed substance, not inchoative, and not consisting of the three elements, earth water, and fire, as some say, nor of four or all the five elements (viz. air and ether in addition to the former), as others maintain, but merely earthy. *c. Organs of Sensation* (*indriya*); from the elements, earth, water, light, air, and ether, they are smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing. *d. Their objects* (*artha*). They are the qualities of earth, &c.—viz. odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and sound. *e. Understanding* (*buddhi*), or *apprehension* (*upalabdhi*), or *conception* (*jnâna*), terms which are used synonymously. It is not eternal, as the Sânkhya maintains, but transitory. *f. The organ of imagination and volition* (*manas*). Its property is not giving rise simultaneously to more notions than one. *g. Activity* (*pravr'itti*), or that which originates the utterances of the voice, the cognitions of the understanding, and the gestures of the body. It is therefore oral, mental, or corporeal, and the reason of all worldly proceedings. *h.*

Faults or *failings* (*dosha*), which cause activity—viz. affection, aversion, and bewilderment. *i. Transmigration* (*pretyabhâva*, literally, the becoming born after having died), or the regeneration of the soul, which commences with one's first birth, and ends only with final emancipation. It does not belong to the body, because the latter is different in successive births, but to the soul, because it is eternal. *k. Fruit* or *retribution* (*phala*), or that which accrues from activity and failings. It is the consciousness of pleasure or of pain. *l. Pain* (*duh'kha*), or that which has the characteristic mark of causing vexation. It is defined as "the occurrence of birth," or the originating of "body," since body is associated with various kinds of distress. Pleasure is not denied to exist, but, according to the Nyâya, it deserves little consideration, since it is ever closely connected with pain. *m. Absolute deliverance* or *emancipation* (*apavarga*). It is annihilation of pain, or absolute cessation of one's troubles once for all.

After (1) "instruments of right notion," and (2) "the objects of inquiry," the Nyâya proceeds to the investigation of the following topics.

3. *Doubt* (*sam's'aya*). It arises from unsteadiness in the recognition or non-recognition of some mark, which if we were sure of its presence or absence, would determine the subject to be so or so, or not to be so or so; but it may also arise from conflicting testimony. 4. *Motive* (*prayojana*), or that by which a person is moved to action. 5. *A familiar case* (*dr'isht'ânta*), or that in regard to which a man of an ordinary and a man of a superior intellect entertain the same opinion. 6. *Tenet* or *dogma* (*siddhânta*). It is either "a tenet of all schools," i. e. universally acknowledged, or "a tenet peculiar to some school," i. e. partially acknowledged; or "a hypothetical dogma," i. e. one which rests on the supposed truth of another dogma; or "an implied dogma," i. e. one the correctness of which is not expressly proved, but tacitly admitted by the Nyâya. 7. The different members (*avayava*)

of a regular argument or *syllogism* (*nyâya*). 8. *Confutation* or reduction to absurdity (*tarka*). It consists in directing a person who does not apprehend the force of the argument as first presented to him, to look at it from an opposite point of view. 9. *Ascertainment* (*nirn'aya*). It is the determination of a question by hearing both what is to be said for and against it, after having been in doubt. The three next topics relate to the topic of controversy, viz. 10. *Discussion* (*vâda*), which is defined as consisting in the defending by proofs on the part of the one disputant, and the controverting it by objections on the part of the other, without discordance in respect of the principles on which the conclusion is to depend; it is, in short, an honest sort of discussion, such, for instance, as takes place between a preceptor and his pupil, and where the debate is conducted without ambition of victory. 11. *Wrangling* (*jalpa*), consisting in the defence or attack of a proposition by means of tricks, futilities, and such like means; it is therefore a kind of discussion where the disputants are merely desirous of victory, instead of being desirous of truth. 12. *Cavilling* (*vitan'd'â*), when a man does not attempt to establish the opposite side of the question, but confines himself to carping disingenuously at the arguments of the other party. 13. *Fallacies*, or semblances of reasons (*hetvâbhâsa*), five sorts of which are distinguished, viz. the erratic, the contradictory, the equally available on both sides, that which, standing itself in the need of proof, does not differ from that which is to be proved, and that which is adduced when the time is not that when it might have availed. 14. *Tricks*, or unfairness in disputation (*chhala*), or the opposing of a proposition by means of assuming a different sense from that which the objector well knows the propounder intended to convey by his terms. It is distinguished as verbal misconstruing of what is ambiguous, as perverting, in a literal sense, what is said in a metaphorical one, and as generalising what is particular.

15. *Futile objections* (*jâti*), of which twenty-four sorts are enumerated; and, 16. Failure in argument or reason of defeat (*nigraha-sthâna*), of which twenty-two distinctions are specified.

The great prominence given by the Nyâya to the *method*, by means of which truth might be ascertained, has sometimes misled European writers into the belief, that it is merely a system of formal logic, not engaged in metaphysical investigations. But though the foregoing enumeration of the topics treated by it could only touch upon the main points which form the subject-matter of the Nyâya, it will sufficiently show that the Nyâya intended to be a complete system of philosophical investigation; and some questions, such as the nature of intellect, articulated sound, &c., or those of genus, variety, and individual, it has dealt with in a masterly manner, well-deserving the notice of western speculation. That the atomistic theory has been devolved from it, will be seen under the article Vais'eshika. On account of the prominent position, however, which the *method* of discussion holds in this system, and the frequent allusion made by European writers to a Hindu syllogism, it will be expedient to explain how the Nyâya defines the "different members of a syllogism" under its seventh topic. A regular argument consists, according to it, of five members—viz. *a*. the proposition (*pratijnâ*), or the declaration of what is to be established; *b*. the reason (*hetu*), or "the means for the establishing of what is to be established;" *c*. the *example* (*udâharan'a*), i.e. some familiar case illustrating the fact to be established, or inversely, some familiar case illustrating the impossibility of the contrary fact; *d*. the application (*upanaya*), or "re-statement of that in respect of which something is to be established;" and *e*. the conclusion (*nigamana*), or "the re-stating of the proposition because of the mention of the reason." An instance of such a syllogism would run accordingly thus: *a*. This hill is fiery, *b*. for it smokes, *c*. as a culinary hearth, or (inversely) not as a lake,

from which vapour is seen arising, vapour not being smoke, because a lake is invariably devoid of fire; *d.* accordingly, the hill is smoking; *e.* therefore, it is fiery.

The founder of the Nyâya system is reputed under the name of *Gotama*, or, as it also occurs, *Gautama* (which would mean a descendant of Gotama). There is, however, nothing as yet known as to the history of this personage or the time when he lived, though it is probable that the work attributed to him is, in its present shape, later than the work of the great grammarian Pân'ini. It consists of five books or *Adhyâyas*, each divided into two "days," or diurnal lessons, which are again subdivided into sections or topics, each of which contains several aphorisms, or *Sûtras*. See Sûtra. Like the text-books of other sciences among the Hindus, it has been explained or annotated by a triple set of commentaries, which, in their turn, have become the source of more popular or elementary treatises.—The Sanskrit text of the Sûtras of Gotama, with a commentary by *Vis'wanâtha*, has been edited at Calcutta (1828); and the first four books, and part of the fifth, of the text, with an English version, an English commentary, and extracts from the Sanskrit commentary of Vis'wanâtha, by the late Dr. J. R. Ballantyne (Allahabad, 1850-1854). This excellent English version and commentary, and the celebrated Essay on the Nyâya, by H. T. Colebrooke (*Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. i. London, 1827; and reprinted in the *Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i. London, 1837), are the best guide for the European student who, without a knowledge of Sanskrit, would wish to familiarise himself with the Nyâya system.*

* Nyâyakos'a, or Dictionary of the Technical Terms of the Nyâya Philosophy, by Bhîmâchârya Jhalakîkar. Bombay, 1875.

OM.

OM is a Sanscrit word which, on account of the mystical notions that even at an early date of Hindu civilisation were connected with it, acquired much importance in the development of Hindu religion. Its original sense is that of emphatic or solemn affirmation or assent. Thus, when in the White-Yajur-Veda (see VEDA) the sacrificer invites the gods to rejoice in his sacrifice, the god Savitr'i assents to his summons by saying: "*Om* (*i.e.* be it so); proceed!" Or, when in the Br'ihad-áranyaka-Upanishad, Prajâpati, the father of gods, men, and demons, asks the gods whether they have understood his instruction; he expresses his satisfaction with their affirmative reply, in these words: "*Om*, you have fully comprehended it;" and, in the same Upanishad, Pravâhan'a answers the question of S'wetaketu, as to whether his father has instructed him, by uttering the word "*Om*," *i.e.*, "forsooth (I am)." A portion of the R'igveda, called the Aitareya-Brâhman'a, where, describing a religious ceremony at which verses from the R'igveda, as well as songs called Gâthâs, were recited by the priest called Hotr'i, and responses given by another priest, the Adhwaryu, says: "*Om* is the response of the Adhwaryu to the R'igveda verses (recited by the Hotr'i), and likewise *tathâ* (*i.e.*, thus) his response to the Gâthâs, for *Om* is (the term of assent) used by the gods, whereas *tathâ* is (the term of assent) used by men" (the R'igveda verses being, to the orthodox Hindu, of divine, and the Gâthâs of human, authorship). In this, the original sense of the word, it is little doubtful that *om* is but an older and contracted form of the common Sanscrit word *evam*, "thus," which, coming from the pronominal base "*a*"—in some derivations changed to "*e*"—may have at one time occurred in the form *avam*, when, by the

elision of the vowel following *v*—for which there are numerous analogies in Sanskrit—*avam* would become *aum*, and hence, according to the ordinary phonetic laws of the language, *om*. This etymology of the word, however, seems to have been lost, even at an early period of Sanskrit literature; for another is met with in the ancient grammarians, enabling us to account for the mysticism which many religious and theological works of ancient and mediæval India suppose to inhere in it. According to this latter etymology, *om* would come from a radical *av* by means of an affix *man*, when *om* would be a curtailed form of *avman* or *oman;* and as *av* implies the notion of "protect, preserve, save," *om* would be a term implying "protection or salvation;" its mystical properties and its sanctity being inferred from its occurrence in the Vedic writings, and in connection with sacrificial acts, such as are alluded to before.

Hence *Om* became the auspicious word with which the spiritual teacher had to begin, and the pupil had to end each lesson of his reading of the Veda. "Let this syllable," the existing Prâtis'âkhya, or grammar of the R'igveda, enjoins, "be the head of the reading of the Veda, for alike to the teacher and the pupil, it is the supreme Brahman, the gate of heaven." And Manu (q. v.) ordains: "A Brahman, at the beginning and end (of a lesson on the Veda), must always pronounce the syllable *Om;* for unless *Om* precede, his learning will slip away from him; and unless it follow, nothing will be long retained." At the time when another class of writings, the Purân'as (q. v.), were added to the inspired code of Hinduism, for a similar reason, *Om* is *their* introductory word.

That the mysterious power which, as the foregoing quotation from the law-book of Manu shows, was attributed to this word, must have been the subject of early speculation, is obvious enough. A reason assigned for it is given by Manu himself. "Brahmâ," he says, "extracted from the three Vedas the letter *a*, the letter *u*, and the letter *m* (which

combined result in *Om*), together with the (mysterious) words *Bhûh*, (earth), *Bhuvah'* (sky), and *Swah'* (heaven);" and in another verse: "These three great immutable words, preceded by the syllable *Om*, and (the sacred R'igveda verse, called) Gâyatrî, consisting of three lines, must be considered as the mouth (or entrance) of Brahman (the Veda)"—or, as the commentators observe—the means of attaining final emancipation; and "The syllable *Om* is the supreme Brahman, (three) regulated breathings (accompanied with the mental recitation of Om, the three mysterious words, Bhûh', Bhuvah', Swah', and the Gâyatrî), are the highest devotion. . . . . All rites ordained in the Veda, such as burnt and other sacrifices, pass away; but the syllable *Om* must be considered as imperishable, for it is (a symbol of) Brahman (the supreme Spirit) himself, the Lord of Creation." In these speculations, Manu bears out, and is borne out by, several Upanishads. See VEDA. In the *Kat'ha-Upanishad*, for instance, *Yama*, the god of death, in replying to a question of Nachiketas, says, "The word which all the Vedas record, which all the modes of penance proclaim, of which desirous the religious students perform their duties, this word I will briefly tell thee, it is *Om*. This syllable means the (inferior) Brahman and the supreme (Brahman). Whoever knows this syllable, obtains whatever he wishes." And in the *Pras'na-Upanishad*, the saint Pippalâda says to Satyakâma: "The supreme and the inferior Brahman are both the word *Om;* hence the wise follows by this support the one or the other of the two. If he meditates upon its one letter (*a*) only, he is quickly born on the earth; him carry the verses of the R'igveda to the world of man; and if he is devoted there to austerity, the duties of a religious student, and faith, he enjoys greatness. But, if he meditates in his mind on its two letters (*a* and *u*), he is elevated by the verses of the Yajur-Veda to the intermediate region; he comes to the world of the moon, and having enjoyed there power, returns again (to the world of man). If, however, he meditates on the supreme Spirit

by means of its three letters (*a*, *u*, and *m*), he is produced in light, in the sun; as the snake is liberated from its skin, so he is liberated from sin." According to the Mân'd'ûkya-Upanishad, the nature of the soul is summarised in the three letters *a*, *u*, and *m*, in their isolated and combined form—*a* being Vais'wânara, or that form of Brahman which represents the soul in its waking condition; *u*, Taijasa, or that form of Brahman which represents it in its dreaming state; and *m*, Prâjna, or that form of Brahman which represents it in its state of profound sleep (or that state in which it is temporarily united with the supreme Spirit); while *a*, *u*, *m* combined, *i.e.*, Om, represent the fourth or highest condition of Brahman, "which is unaccountable, in which all manifestations have ceased, which is blissful and without duality. *Om*, therefore, is soul; and by this soul, he who knows it enters into (the supreme) soul." Passages like these may be considered as the key to the more enigmatic expressions used, for instance, by the author of the *Yoga* (q v.) philosophy, where, in three short sentences, he says: "His (the supreme Lord's name) is *Pran'ava* (*i.e.*, *Om*); its muttering (should be made) and reflection on its signification; thence comes the knowledge of the transcendental spirit, and the absence of the obstacles" (such as sickness, languor, doubt, &c., which obstruct the mind of an ascetic). But they indicate, at the same time, the further course which superstition took in enlarging upon the mysticism of the doctrine of the Upanishads. For as soon as every letter of which the word *Om* consists was fancied to embody a separate idea, it is intelligible that other sectarian explanations were grafted on them, to serve their special purposes. Thus, while S'ankara, the great theologian and commentator on the Upanishads, is still contented with an etymological punning, by means of which he transforms "*a*" (or rather "*â*") into an abbreviation of *âpti* (pervading), since speech is pervaded by Vais'wânara; "*u*" into an abbreviation of *utkarsha* (superiority), since Taijasa is superior to Vais'wânara; and "*m*"

into an abbreviation of *miti* (destruction), Vais'wânara and Taijasa, at the destruction and regeneration of the world, being, as it were, absorbed into Prâjna—the Purân'as (q. v.) make of "*a*" a name of Vishn'u; of "*u*," a name of his consort *S'rî;* and of "*m*," a designation of their joint worshipper; or they see in *a*, *u*, *m* the Triad, Brahmâ, Vishn'u, and S'iva; the first being represented by "*a*," the second by "*u*," and the third by "*m*"—each sect, of course, identifying the combination of these letters, or Om, with their supreme deity. Thus, also, in the Bhagavadgîtâ, which is devoted to the worship of Vishn'u in his incarnation as Kr'ishn'a, though it is essentially a poem of philosophical tendencies, based on the doctrine of the Yoga, Kr'ishn'a in one passage says of himself that he is *Om;* while, in another passage, he qualifies the latter as the supreme Spirit. A common designation of the word *Om*—for instance, in the last-named passages of the Bhagavadgîtâ—is the word *Pran'ava*, which comes from a so-called radical *nu*, "praise," with the prefix *pra*, amongst other meanings, implying emphasis, and therefore literally means "eulogium, emphatic praise." Although *Om*, in its original sense, as a word of solemn or emphatic assent, is, properly speaking, restricted to the Vedic literature, it deserves notice that it is now-a-days often used by the natives of India in the sense of "yes," without, of course, any allusion to the mystical properties which are ascribed to it in the religious works.

That there exists no connection whatever, as has been supposed by some writers to be the case, between *Om* and *Amen*, requires scarcely any remark, after the etymological explanations given above; but it may not be without interest to observe that, though the derivation of *Om* as a curtailment of *av-man*, from *av*, "protect, save," is probably merely artificial, and, as stated before, invented to explain the later mystical use of the Vedic word, it seems more satisfactory to compare the Latin *omen*

with a Sanskrit *avman*. "protection," as derived by the grammarians from *av* (in the Latin *ave-o*), than to explain it in the fashion of the Roman etymologists: "Omen, quod ex ore primum elatum est, osmen dictum;" or, "Omen velut oremen, quod fit ore augurium, quod non avibus aliove modo fit." And since *pra-n'ava*, from Sanskrit *nu*, "praise," is, like *Om*, used in the sense of "the deity," it is likewise probable that *numen* does not come, as is generally believed, from Latin *nu-(ere)*, "nod," but from a radical corresponding with the Sanskrit *nu*, "praise."

PÂN'INI.

PAN'INI, the greatest known grammarian of ancient India, whose work on the Sanscrit language has up to the present day remained the standard of Sanscrit grammar. Its merits are so great, that Pân'ini was ranked among the R'ishis (q. v.), or inspired seers, and at a later period of Sanscrit literature, was supposed to have received the fundamental rules of his work from the god S'iva himself. Of the personal history of Pân'ini, nothing positive is known, except that he was a native of the village S'alâtura, situated north-west of Attock, on the Indus—whence he is also surnamed S'âlâturîya—and that his mother was called Dâkshî, wherefore, on his mother's side, he must have been a descendant of the celebrated family of Daksha. A tale-book, the *Kathâsaritsâgara* (i. e., the ocean for the rivers of tales), gives, indeed, some circumstantial account of the life and death of Pân'ini; but its narrative is so absurd, and the work itself of so modern a date—it was written in Cashmere, at the begining of the 12th century—that no credit whatever can be attached to the facts related by it, or to the inference which modern scholars have drawn from them. According to the views expressed in the work entitled *Pân'ini, his Place in Sanscrit Literature:*

London, 1861, it is probable that Pàn'ini lived before S'âkyamuni, the founder of the Buddhist religion, whose death took place about 543 B.C. but that a more definite date of the great grammarian has but little chance of ascertainment in the actual condition of Sanscrit philology.—The grammar of Pàn'ini consists of eight Adhyâyas, or books, each book comprising four Pâdas, or chapters, and each chapter a number of Sûtras (q. v.), or aphoristical rules. The latter amount in the whole to 3996; but three, perhaps four, of them did not originally belong to the work of Pân'ini. The arrangement of these rules differs completely from what a European would expect in a grammatical work, for it is based on the principle of tracing linguistic *phenomena*, and not concerned in the classification of the linguistic *material*, according to the so-called parts of speech. A chapter, for instance, treating of a prolongation of vowels, will deal with such a fact wherever it occurs, be it in the formation of bases, or in conjugation, declension, composition, &c. The rules of conjugation, declension, &c., are, for the same reason, not to be met with in the same chapter or in the same order in which European grammars would teach them; nor would any single book or chapter, however apparently more systematically arranged—from a European point of view—such as the chapter on affixes or composition, suffice by itself to convey the full linguistic material concerned in it, apart from the rest of the work. In a general manner, Pân'ini's work may therefore be called a natural history of the Sanscrit language, in the sense that it has the strict tendency of giving an accurate description of facts, instead of making such a description subservient to the theories according to which the linguistic material is usually distributed by European grammarians. Whatever objections may be raised against such an arrangement, the very fact of its differing from that in our grammars makes it peculiarly instructive to the European student, as it accustoms his mind to survey language from

another point of view than that usually presented to him, and as it must induce him, too, to question the soundness of many linguistic theories now looked upon as axiomatic truths. As the method of Pân'ini requires in a student the power of combining many rules scattered all over the work, and of combining, also, many inferences to be drawn from these rules, it exercises, moreover, on the mind of the student an effect analogous to that which is supposed to be the peculiar advantage of the study of mathematics. The rules of Pân'ini were criticised and completed by Kâtyâyana (q. v.) who, according to all probability, was the teacher, and therefore the contemporary, of Patanjali; and he, in his turn, was criticised by Patanjali (q. v) who sides frequently with Pân'ini. These three authors are the canonical triad of the grammarians of India; and their works are, in truth, so remarkable in their own department, that they exceed in literary merit nearly all, if not all, grammatical productions of other nations, so far as the two classes are comparable. The rules of Pân'ini are commented on by many authors. The best existing commentary on them is that called the *Kâs'ikâvr'itti*, by Vâmana Jayâditya, which follows these rules in their original order. At a later period, attempts were made to arrange the rules of Pân'ini in a manner which approaches more to the European method; the chief work of this category is the *Siddhânta-Kaumudî*, by Bhat't'oji-dîkshita. Pân'ini mentions, in his Sûtras, several grammarians who preceded him, amongst others, S'âkat'âyana. Manuscripts of a grammar ascribed to a grammarian of this name exist in the Library of the India Office in London, and in the Library of the Board of Examiners at Madras. On the ground of a few pages only of the latter an attempt has been very recently made to prove that this grammar is the one referred to by Pân'ini, and therefore older than the work of the latter. But the facts adduced in proof of this hypothesis are so ludicrously weak, and the reasoning upon them so feeble and inconclusive, whereas

the evidence in favour of the comparatively recent date of this work is so strong, that no value whatever can be attached to this hasty hypothesis. For the present, therefore, Pân'ini's work still remains the oldest grammatical work of India, and probably of the human race. The Sûtras of Pân'ini, with a modern commentary by two native pandits, and with extracts from the *Vârttikas* of Kâtyâyana and the *Mahâbhâshya* of Patanjali, were edited at Calcutta in 1809. This edition, together with the modern commentary, but with garbled extracts from the extracts mentioned, was reprinted at Bonn in 1839—1840 by Dr. O. Boehtlingk, who added to it remarks of his own, and some indices.—For the literature connected with Pân'ini, see Colebrooke's preface to his *Grammar of the Sanscrit Language* (Calc. 1805), and Goldstücker's *Pân'ini*, &c., as mentioned above.*

PARÂS'ARA.

PARAS'ARA is the name of several celebrated personages of ancient India, met with in the *Mahâbhârata* (q. v.), the *Purân'as* (q. v.), and other works. Of one personage of this name, the *Mahâbhârata* relates that he was the son of S'akti, who was the son of the patriarch Vasisht'ha. King Kalmâshapâda once meeting with S'akti in a narrow path in a thicket, desired him to stand out of the way. The sage refused; on which the Râja beat him with his whip, and S'akti cursed him to become a Râkshasa, or demon. The Râja, in this transformation, killed and ate S'akti, together with the other sons of Vasisht'ha. S'akti, however, had left his wife, Adr'is'yantî, pregnant, and she gave birth to Parâs'ara, who was brought up by his grandfather. When he

* Aufrecht, Cat. Codd. Sanscrit., p. 158, ff. Burnell, On the Aindra School. Mangalore, 1875, p. 38, ff. and Cat. of Tanjore MSS., p. 37 ff.

grew up, and was informed of his father's death, he instituted a sacrifice for the destruction of all the Râkshasas, but was dissuaded from its completion by Vasisht'ha and other sages, The same legend is referred to by the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, where Parâs'ara is introduced as relating, himself, part of this story, and adding, that the saint Pulastya, one of the mind-born sons of Brahmâ, in reward of the clemency he had shewn even towards such beings as the Râkshasas, bestowed on him the boon of becoming the author of a compendium, or rather the compiler, of the *Purân'as*, and of the *Vishn'u-Purân'a* in particular. 'This tradition,' Professor Wilson observes (*Vishn'u-Purân'a*, ed. Hall, vol. i. p. 10), 'is incompatible with the general attribution of all the *Purân'as* to Vyâsa;' but it may perhaps point to a later recension when, to the native mind, Vyâsa would still remain the reputed author of the older *Purân'as*, although, of course, even this assumption has little claim to historical truth.—A Parâs'ara, probably different from the one named, is the author of a celebrated code of laws; he is mentioned by Yâjnavalkya in his standard work, and often quoted by the commentaries.—A probably third Parâs'ara is the reputed author of a Tantra (q. v.); and a fourth, the author of an astronomical work.—Parâs'aras (in the plural) designates the whole family to which the different Parâs'aras belong.

PÂTÂLA.

Patala (from *pat*, fall) is, in Hindu Mythology, the name of those inferior regions which have seven, or, according to some, eight divisions, each extending downwards ten thousand *yojanas*, or miles. The soil of these regions, as the *Vishn'u-Purân'a* relates, is severally white, black,

purple, yellow, sandy, stony, and of gold; they are embellished with magnificent palaces, in which dwell numerous Dânavas, Daityas, Yakshas, and great snake-gods, decorated with brilliant jewels, and happy in the enjoyment of delicious viands and strong wines. There are in these regions beautiful groves, and streams and lakes, where the lotus blows, and the skies are resonant with the kokila's songs. They are, in short, so delightful, that the saint Nârada, after his return from them to heaven, declared among the celestials that Pâtâla was much more delighful than Indra's heaven. Professor Wilson, in his *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, says 'that there is no very copious description of Pâtâla in any of the *Purân'as;* that the most circumstantial are those of the *Vâyu* and *Bhâgavata Purân'as;* and that the *Mahâbhârata* and these two *Purân'as* assign different divisions to the Dânavas, Daityas, and Nâgas. . . . . The regions of Pâtâla and their inhabitants are oftener the subjects of profane than of sacred fiction, in consequence of the frequent intercourse between mortal heroes and the serpent-maids. A considerable section of the *Vr'ihat-Kathâ* consists of adventures and events in this subterraneous world.'

PATANJALI.

PATANJALI is the name of two celebrated authors of ancient India, who are generally looked upon as the same personage, but apparently for no other reason than that they bear the same name. The one is the author of the system of philosophy called Yoga (q. v.), the other the great critic of Kâtyâyana (q. v.) and Pân'ini (q. v.). Of the former, nothing is known beyond his work—for which see the article Yoga.

The few historical facts relating to the latter, as at present ascertained, may be gathered from his great work, the *Mahâbhâshya*, or 'the great commentary.' The name of his mother was Gon'ika; his birthplace was Gonârda, situated in the east of India, and he resided temporarily in Cashmere, where his work was especially patronised. From circumstantial evidence, moreover, it has been proved that he wrote betweed 140 and 120 B.C. (*Pân'ini, his place in Sanscrit Literature*, p. 235, ff.). The *Mahâbhâshya* of Patanjali is not a full commentary on Pân'ini, but, with a few exceptions, only a commentary on the Vârttikas, or critical remarks of Kâtyâyana on Pân'ini. 'Its method is analogous to that of other classical commentaries: it establishes, usually by repetition, the correct reading of the text, in explaining every important or doubtful word, in shewing the connection of the principal parts of the sentence, and in adding such observations as may be required for a better understanding of the author. But frequently Patanjali also attaches his own critical remarks to the emendations of Kâtyâyana, often in support of the views of the latter, but not seldom, too, in order to refute his criticisms, and to defend Pân'ini; while, again, at other times, he completes the statement of one of them by his own additional rules.' Pân'ini being the third of the grammatical triad of India (see Pân'ini), and his work, therefore, having the advantage of profiting by the scholarship of his predecessors, he is looked upon as a paramount authority in all matters relating to classical Sanscrit grammar; and very justly so, for as to learning, ingenuity, and conscientiousness, there is no grammatical author of India who can be held superior to him. The *Mahâbhâshya* has been commented on by Kaiyyat'a, in a work called the *Bhâshya-Pradîpa;* and the latter has been annotated by Nagojîbhat't'a, in a work called the *Bhâshya-pradîpodyota.* So much of these three latter works, as relates to the first chapter of the first book of Pân'ini, together

with the Vârttikas connected with them, has been edited at Mirzapore, 1856, by the late Dr. J. R. Ballantyne, who also gave a valuable literal translation of the first forty pages of the text.*

PITR'I.

PITR'I (a Sanscrit word literally meaning father=Latin *pater*, in the plural *Pitaras*, but in English translations from the Sanscrit usually Anglicised to *Pitr'is*), a name which, in a general sense, means the deceased ancestors of a man, but in the special sense in which it occurs in Hindu mythology, denotes an order of divine beings inhabiting celestial regions of their own, and receiving into their society the spirits of those mortals for whom the funeral rites (see S'râddha) have been duly performed. They include, therefore, collectively the manes of the deceased ancestors; but the principal members of this order are beings of a different nature and origin. According to Manu, they were the sons of Marîchi, Atri, Angiras, and the other R'ishis or saints produced by Manu, the son of Brahmâ; and from them issued the gods, demons, and men. According to several Purâńas (q. v.), however, the first Pitr'is were the sons of the gods; and to reconcile this discrepancy, a legend relates that the gods having offended Brahmâ by neglecting to worship him, were cursed by him to become fools; but upon their repentance, he directed them to apply to their sons for instruction. Being taught accordingly the rites of expiation and penance by their sons, they addressed the latter as fathers, whence the sons of the gods were the first Pitr'is (fathers). See Wilson's *Vishn'u-Purân'a*. Manu enumerates various classes of Pitr'is in defining those who were the

* On the later editions of the Mahâbhâshya. See the "Academy" for 1877, p. 578. Weber, "Indische Studien," xiii. p. 293–496. Kielhorn, in the "Indian Antiquary," v. p. 241 ff., and "Kâtyâyana and Patanjali." Bombay, 1876.

ancestors of the gods, those who were the ancestors of the demons, and those from whom proceeded the four castes severally; but he adds, at the same time, that these are merely the principal classes, as their sons and grandsons indefinitely must likewise be considered as Pitr'is. The Purân'as divide them generally into seven classes, three of which are without form, or composed of intellectual, not elementary substance, and assuming what forms they please, while the four other classes are corporeal. In the enumeration, however, of these classes the Purân'as differ. The Pitr'is reside in a world of their own, called Pitr'i-loka, which is sometimes supposed to be the moon; according to the Purân'as, it is below the paradise of Indra, and is also the abode of the souls of devout Brahmans. The time at which the Pitr'is are to be worshipped, the libations which they are to receive, the benefit which they derive from them, and the boons which they confer on the worshipper, are all minutely described in the Purân'as. See S'râddha. A song of the Pitr'is, as given in the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, may convey an idea of the importance attributed to this worship, and of the manner in which the Brahmans turned it to their profit. It runs as follows: 'That enlightened individual who begrudges not his wealth, but presents us with cakes, shall be born in a distinguished family. Prosperous and affluent shall that man ever be who, in honour of us, gives to the Brahmans, if he is wealthy, jewels, clothes, lands, conveyances, wealth, or any valuable presents; or who, with faith and humility, entertains them with food, according to his means, at proper seasons. If he cannot afford to give them dressed food, he must, in proportion to his ability, present them with unboiled grain, or such gifts, however trifling, as he can bestow. Should he be utterly unable even to do this, he must give to some eminent Brahman, bowing at the same time before him, sesamum seeds, adhering to the tips of his fingers, and sprinkle water to us, from the

palms of his hands, upon the ground; or he must gather, as he may, fodder for a day, and give it to a cow; by which he will, if firm in faith, yield us satisfaction. If nothing of this kind is practicable, he must go to a forest, and lift up his arms to the sun and other regents of the spheres, and say aloud: "I have no money, nor property, nor grain, nor any thing whatever fit for an ancestral offering; bowing therefore to my ancestors, I hope the progenitors will be satisfied with these arms tossed up in the air in devotion." See Wilson's *Vishn'u-Purân'a*.

PRAJÂPATI.

PRAJAPATI (from *prajâ*, creation, created beings; and *pati*, lord) is, in Hindu Mythology, a name of the god Brahmâ, but also a name of those divine personages who, produced by Brahmâ, created all existing beings, inclusive of gods, demons, and natural phenomena. Manu knows of ten such *Prajâpatis* engendered, through pure meditation, by the god Brahmâ—*viz.*, Marîchi, Atri, Angiras, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Prachetas or Daksha, Vasisht'ha, Bhr'igu, and Nârada. The Mahâbhârata, however, leaves out Daksha, Bhr'igu, and Nârada; and other varieties occur in the different Purân'as. Whereas, also, these "lords of creation," in conformity with Manu, are in some of these works looked upon as the mind-born sons of Brahmâ, some Purân'as derive them from different parts of Brahmâ's body. The only interesting point in this theory of the Prajâpatis is the assumption, that the world did not immediately proceed from Brahmâ, the highest god, but through the intermediate agency of beings which thus stand between him and creation.

PRAJNÂ PÂRAMITÂ.

PRAJNA PARAMITA (literally, the wisdom which has gone to the other shore, *viz.*, of its object; *i.e.*, absolute or transcendental wisdom, from the Sanskrit *prajnâ*, wisdom, *pâram*, to the other shore, and *ita*, gone) is the title of the principal Sûtra (q. v.) of the Mahâyâna school of the Buddhists (see BUDDHISM). Its main object is metaphysical; but the commencement of the work is merely a eulogy of Buddha, and of the Bodhisattwas, who form his retinue. Other parts of it contain incidental narratives of wonderful phenomena connected with the apparition of Buddhist saints, or a description of the benefits arising from an observance of the Buddhistic doctrine, or verses in which the Buddha is praised by his disciples, and similar irrelevant matter. It is probably on account of the extent which could easily be imparted to such episodical topics, but also by amplifying the real substance of the work, that several recensions of the Prajnâ Pâramitâ are in existence, both with the Buddhists and Tibetans; some of these do not contain more than 7,000, or 8,000, or 10,000 s'lokas, or paragraphs; but others amount to 18,000, 25,000, or 100,000 s'lokas. The following may serve as a specimen of the abstruse ideas treated of in this great work of the Buddhistic doctrine. No object has existence or non-existence; nothing belongs to eternity or non-eternity, to pain or pleasure, to vacuity or non-vacuity. All objects are without attributes and with attributes, with and without characteristic marks. Bodhisattwa (the name for a deified saint) and Prajnâ (wisdom) are synonymous terms; such a term neither arises nor perishes; it exists neither inwardly nor outwardly, because it cannot be seized; but the Bodhisattwa must accomplish his career under this fallacious name; it is his duty, however, to look neither upon form nor anything else as an

eternal or non-eternal, as a pure or impure matter, &c. Then, only when he is in a condition of complete indifference regarding everything, is he capable of encompassing the whole wisdom. . . . . The absence of nature is the nature of everything; all objects are separated from their characteristics. All objects neither appear nor are born, nor disappear, nor cease to be, nor are they pure nor impure, nor are they acquirable nor non-acquirable. Want of understanding is the not understanding that objects are nonentities. From the want of understanding proceed all subjective notions; and through the latter one becomes incapacitated from fulfilling the behests of the sacred doctrine, and from entering the path which leads to wisdom. . . . . Everything is like the echo, or a shadow, or anything else without substance. In short, the doctrine of the Prajnâ Pâramitâ is the entire negation of the subject as well as the object; and whatever be the difference in detail between the points of view from which it looks upon subject or subject, or between its comparisons and circumlocutions, the result is always the same: that the object of ascertainment, or the highest wisdom, has no more real existence than the subject striving to attain to it, or the Bodhisattwa. See E. Burnouf, *Introduction a l'Histoire du Buddhisme Indien* (Paris, 1844); W. Wassiljew, *Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur* (St. Petersburg, 1860).*

PRÂKRIT.

PRAKR'IT (from the Sanskrit *prakr'iti*, nature; hence, natural, not accomplished, vulgar) is the collective name of those languages or dialects which are immediately derived from, or stand in an immediate

* Köppen, Die Religion des Buddha. ii. 19.

relation to Sanskrit, or "the accomplished" Language (q. v.) of the Hindus. These languages, however, must not be confounded with those modern languages of India which also have an affinity with the Sanskrit language; for, in the Prâkr'it languages, however much they may differ from Sanskrit in their phonetic laws, the words and grammatical forms are immediately derived from that language; whereas, in the modern tongues of India there is not only no connection between their phonetic laws and those of Sanskrit, but their grammatical forms also are wholly different from those of the ancient language; and, while many of their words have no Sanscritic origin, even those which have, show that they are not immediately drawn from that source. The Prâkr'it languages comprise, besides the *Pâlí*, which generally, however, is not included amongst them, those dialects which are found in the dramas and in the oldest inscriptions. In the dramas, it is women, except female religious characters, and subordinate male personages, who are made to speak in these languages—the use of Sanskrit being reserved for the higher characters of the play—and amongst the former, again, the choice of the special Prâkr'it dialect is adapted by the poet to the rank which such a subordinate personage holds, the more refined dialect being appropriated, for instance, to the wives of the king or hero of the play; an inferior Prâkr'it to his ministers; others less in degree to the sons of the ministers, soldiers, town-people, and the like; down to the lowest Prâkr'it, which is spoken only by servants, or the lowest classes. A work on the poetical art, the *Sâhityadarpan'a*, enumerates fourteen such Prâkr'it dialects,—viz., the *S'aurasenî*, *Mâhârâsht'rî*, *Mâgadhî*, *Ardhamâgadhî*, *Prâchyâ*, *Avantikâ*, *Dâkshin'âtyâ*, *S'âkvarî*, *Bâhlîkâ*, *Drâvid'î*, *Abhîrî*, *Chân'd'âlî*, *S'âbarî*, and *Pais'âchî;* but Vararuchi, the oldest known grammarian of the Prâkr'it dialects, knows but four—viz., the *Mahârâsht'rî*, *S'aurasenî*, *Mâgadhî*, and *Pais'âchî;* and Lassen, in the *Indische Alterthumskunde*, holds that, of those, only the *S'aurasenî*

and the *Mâgadhî* have a really local character—the former, as he assumes, having been the vernacular of a large district of Western, and the latter —which is also the Prâkr'it in the inscriptions of King As'oka—of Eastern India; whereas the Mahârâsht'rî, or the language of the Mahrattas, does not seem to have been the language of the country the name of which it bears; and the Pais'âchî, or the language of the Pis'âcha, is obviously merely a fancy name. The principal Prâkr'it dialect is the Mahârâsht'rî; the lowest, according to some, the Pais'âchî, of which two varieties are mentioned; but according to others, the *Apabhrans'a*—which word originally means "a falling-off"—*i.e.*, a dialect which completely deviates from the grammatical laws of Sanskrit, but in this special application would designate a dialect even inferior to the Pais'âchî, and is compared by a grammarian to the language of the reptiles. On the grammar of the Prâkr'it languages, see Chr. Lassen, *Institutiones Linguæ Pracriticæ* (Bonn, 1837). The Sûtras, or grammatical rules of Vararuchi, have been edited in the same work; but more elaborately, with a commentary, copious notes, an English translation, appendices, and an index, by Edward Byles Cowell, who has also added to this excellent edition, *An Easy Introduction to Prâkr'it Grammar* (Hertford, 1854.)*

INDIAN PRIESTS.

Indian Priests.—The priesthood of India belongs to the first caste, or that of the Brâhman'as exclusively; for no member either of the Kshattriya or the Vais'ya, or the S'ûdra caste is allowed to perform the functions of a priest. But as the proper performance of such functions

* Hemacandra's Grammatik der Prâkritsprachen, herausgegeben von R. Pischel. Halle, 1877. Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. ii.;[2] p. 11 ff.

requires, even in a Brâhman'a, the knowledge of the sacred texts to be recited at a sacrifice, and of the complicated ceremonial of which the sacrificial-acts consist, none but a Brâhman'a learned in one or more Vedas (q. v.), and versed in the works treating of the ritual (see Kalpa-Sûtra), possesses, according to the ancient law, the qualification of a priest; and so strict, in ancient times, were the obligations imposed on a priest, that any defective knowledge on his part, or any defective performance by him of the sacrificial rites, was supposed to entail upon him the most serious consequences both in this life and in the future. As the duration of a Hindu sacrifice varies from one to a hundred days, the number of priests required at such a ceremony is likewise stated to be varying; again, as there are sacrificial acts at which verses from the R'igveda only were recited, others requiring the inaudible muttering of verses from the Yajurveda only; others, again, at which verses only of the Sâmaveda were chanted; and others, too, at which all these three Vedas were indispensable—there were priests who merely knew and practised the ritual of the R'igveda, or the Yajurveda, or the Sâmaveda; while there were others who had a knowledge of all these Vedas and their rituals. The full contingent of priests required at the great sacrifices amounts to 16. Other inferior assistants at a sacrifice, such as the ladle-holders, slayers, choristers, and the like, are not looked upon as priests. Such was the staff of priests required at the great and solemn sacrifices, which took place on special occasions, and could be instituted only by very wealthy people; from one to four priests, however, sufficed at the minor sacrifices, or those of daily occurrence. These were the rules and practices when the Hindu ceremonial obeyed the canon of the Vaidik ritual; and the latter probably still prevailed at the epic period of India, though many deviations from it are perceptible in the Mahâbhârata and Râmâyan'a. But at the Paurân'ik period, and from that time downwards, when the study of the Vedas

had fallen into disuse, and the Vaidik rites had made room for other ceremonies which required no knowledge on the part of a priest, except that of the reading of a prayer-book, and an acquaintance with the observances enjoined by the Purân'as, but easy to go through, almost every Brahman, not utterly ignorant, became qualified to be a priest.*

PR'ITHU.

PR'ITHU is the name of several legendary kings of ancient India. It is, however, especially one king of this name who is the favourite hero of the Purân'as. His father was Ven'a, who perished through his wickedness; for when he was inaugurated monarch of the earth, he caused it to be everywhere proclaimed that no worship should be performed, no oblations offered, and no gifts bestowed upon the Brahmans. The R'ishis, or Saints, hearing of this proclamation, entreated the king to revoke it, but in vain, hence they fell upon him, and slew him. But the kingdom now being without a king, as Ven'a had left no offspring, and the people being without protection, the sages assembled, and consulted how to produce a son from the body of the dead king. First, then, they rubbed his thigh; from it, thus rubbed, came forth a being called Nishâda; and by this means the wickedness of Ven'a having been expelled, they proceeded to rub the right arm of the dead king, and by this friction engendered Pr'ithu, who came forth resplendent in person, and in his right hand the mark of the discus of Vishńu, which proved him to be a universal emperor, one whose power would be invincible even by the gods. The mighty Pr'ithu soon removed the grievances of the people; he protected the earth, performed many sacri-

* Haug, Brahma und die Brahmanen. München, 1871.

fices, and gave liberal gifts to the Brahmans. On being informed that, in the interval in which the earth was without a king, all vegetable products had been withheld; and that, consequently, the people had perished, he in great wrath marched forward to assail the earth. The earth, assuming the figure of a cow, fled before him; but seeing no escape from the power of the king, at last submitted to him, and promised to renew her fertility, provided that he made all places level. Pr'ithu therefore uprooted mountains, levelled the surface of the earth, established boundaries of towns and villages, and induced his subjects to take up their abode where the ground was made level. The earth now fulfilled her promise; and as Pr'ithu, by thus granting her new life became, as it were, her father, she was henceforth called Pr'ithivî. However little the worth of this piece of popular etymology—for *pr'ithivî*, or *pr'ithwî*, 'earth,' the feminine of *pr'ithu* (Greek *platu*) means etymologically 'the large' or 'wide'—the legend of Pr'ithu itself seems to record some historical fact regarding civilising influences exerted by a great king of Hindu antiquity.*

PURÂN'A.

PURAN'A (literally "old," from the Sanskrit *purâ*, before, past) is the name of that class of religious works which, besides the Tantras, is the main foundation of the actual popular creed of the Brahminical Hindus (see Hindu Religion under India). According to the popular belief, these works were compiled by *Vyâsa* (q v.), the supposed arranger of the *Vedas* (q. v.), and the author of the *Mahâbhârata* (q. v.), and possess an antiquity far beyond the reach of historical computation.

* Muir, Sanskrit Texts, i.,[2] p. 298, ff.

A critical investigation, however, of the contents of the *existing* works bearing that name must necessarily lead to the conclusion, that in their present form they do not only not belong to a remote age, but can barely claim an antiquity of a thousand years. The word *Purân'a* occurs in some passages of the *Mahâbhârata*, the law-books of Yâjnavalkya and Manu (q. v.); it is even met with in some *Upanishads* and the great Brâhman'a portion of the White-Yajur-Veda; but it is easy to show that in all these ancient works it cannot refer to the existing compositions called Purân'a, and therefore that no inference relative to the age of the latter can be drawn from that of the former, whatever that may be. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there are several circumstances tending to show that there existed a number of works called Purân'a, which preceded the actual works of the same name, and were the source whence these probably derived a portion of their contents. The oldest known author of a Sanskrit vocabulary, Amara-Sinha, gives as a synonym of Purân'a the word *Panchalakshan'a*, which means "that which has five (*panchan*) characteristic marks" (*lakshan'a*); and the scholiasts of that vocabulary agree in stating that these *lakshaṇ'as* are: 1. Primary creation or cosmogony; 2. Secondary creation, or the destruction and renovation of worlds; 3. Genealogy of gods and patriarchs; 4. *Manwantaras*, or reigns of Manus; and 5. The history of the princes of the solar and lunar races. Such, then, were the characteristic topics of a Purân'a at the time, if not of Amara-Sinha himself—which is probable—at least of his oldest commentators. Yet the distinguished scholar most conversant with the existing Purân'as, who, in his preface to the translation of the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, gives a more or less detailed account of their chief contents (Professor H. H. Wilson), observes, in regard to the quoted definition of the commentators on Amara-Sinha, that in no one instance do the actual Purân'as conform to it exactly; that "to some of them it is utterly inapplicable;

to others it only partially applies." To the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, he adds, it belongs more than to any other Purân'a; but even in the case of this Purân'a he shows that it cannot be supposed to be included in the term explained by the commentators. The age of Amara-Sinha is, according to Wilson, the last half of the century preceding the Christian era; others conjecture that it dates some centuries later. On the supposition, then, that Amara-Sinha himself implied by Pancha-lakshan'a the sense given to this term by his commentators, there would have been Purân'as about 1900 and 1600 years ago; but none of these have descended to our time in the shape it then possessed.

Various passages in the actual Purân'as furnish proof of the existence of such elder Purân'as. The strongest evidence in this respect is that afforded by a general description given by the *Matsya-Purân'a* of the extent of each of the Purân'as (which are uniformly stated to be 18 in number), including itself; for, leaving aside the exceptional case in which it may be doubtful whether we possess the complete work now going by the name of a special Purân'a, Professor Wilson, in quoting the description from the *Matsya-Purân'a*, and in comparing with it the real extent of the great majority of Purân'as, the completeness of which, in their actual state, does not admit of a reasonable doubt, has conclusively shown that the *Matsya-Purân'a* speaks of works which are not those we now possess. We are then bound to infer that there have been Purân'as older than those preserved, and that their number has been 18, whereas, on the contrary, it will be hereafter seen that it is very doubtful whether we are entitled to assign this number to the actual Purân'a literature.

The modern age of this latter literature, in the form in which it is known to us, is borne out by the change which the religious and philosophical ideas, taught in the epic poems and the philosophical Sûtras, have undergone in it; by the legendary detail into which older legends

and myths have expanded; by the numerous religious rites—not countenanced by the Vedic or epic works—which are taught, and, in some Purân'as at least, by the historical or quasi-scientific instruction which is imparted, in it. To divest that which, in these Purân'as, is ancient, in idea or fact, from that which is of parasitical growth, is a task which Sanskrit philology has yet to fulfil; but even a superficial comparison of the contents of the present Purân'as with the ancient lore of Hindu religion, philosophy and science, must convince every one that the picture of religion and life unfolded by them is a caricature of that afforded by the Vedic works, and that it was drawn by priestcraft, interested in submitting to its sway the popular mind, and unscrupulous in the use of the means which had to serve its ends. The plea on which the composition of the Purân'as was justified even by great Hindu authorities—probably because they did not feel equal to the task of destroying a system already deeply rooted in the national mind, or because they apprehended that the nation at large would remain without any religion at all, if, without possessing the Vedic creed, it likewise became deprived of that based on the Purân'as—this plea is best illustrated by a quotation from Sâyan'a, the celebrated commentator on the three principal *Vedas*. He says (*Rigv.*, ed. Müller, vol. i. p. 33): "Women and S'ûdras, though they, too, are in want of knowledge, have no right to the Veda, for they are deprived of (the advantage of) reading it in consequence of their not being invested with the sacred cord: but the knowledge of law (or duty) and that of the supreme spirit arises to them by means of the Purân'as and other books (of this kind)." Yet to enlighten the Hindu nation as to whether or not these books—which sometimes are even called a fifth Veda—teach that religion which is contained in the *Vedas* and *Upanishads*, there would be no better method than to imitate such a system of popular education

as would reopen to the native mind those ancient works, now virtually closed to it.

Though the reason given by Sâyan'a, as clearly results from a comparison of the Purân'as with the oldest works of Sanskrit literature, is but a poor justification of the origin of the former, and though it is likewise indubitable, that even at his time (the middle of the 15th century A.D.), they were, as they still are, not merely an authoritative source of religion for "women and Sûdras," but for the great majority of the males of other castes also, it nevertheless explains the great variety of matter of which the present Purân'as are composed, so great and so multifarious indeed, that, in the case of some of them, it imparts to them a kind of cyclopædical character. They became, as it seems, the source of all popular knowledge; a substitute to the masses of the nation, not only for the theological literature, but for scientific works, the study of which was gradually restricted to the leisure of the learned few. Thus, while the principal subjects taught by nearly all the Purân'as are cosmogony, religion, including law, and the legendary matter which, to a Hindu, assumes the value of history, in some of them we meet with a description of places, which gives to them something of the character of geography; while one, the *Agni-Purân'a*, also pretends to teach archery, medicine, rhetoric, prosody, and grammar; though it is needless to add that that teaching has no real worth.

One purpose, however, and that a paramount one, is not included in the argument by which Sâyan'a endeavoured to account for the composition of the Purân'as—it is the purpose of establishing a sectarian creed. At the third phase of Hindu Religion (q. v.), two gods of the Hindu pantheon especially engrossed the religious faith of the masses, Vishn'u (q. v.) and S'iva (q. v.), each being looked upon by his worshippers as the supreme deity, to whom the other as well as the remain-

ing gods were subordinate. Moreover, when the power or energy of these gods had been raised to the rank of a separate deity, it was the female S'akti, or energy, of S'iva, who, as Durgâ, or the consort of this god, was held in peculiar awe by a numerous host of believers. Now, apart from the general reasons mentioned before, a principal object, and probably *the* principal one of the Purân'as, was to establish as the case might be, the supremacy of Vishn'u or S'iva, and it may be likewise assumed of the female energy of S'iva, though the worship of the latter belongs more exclusively to the class of works known as Tantras. There are accordingly, Vaishn'ava-Purân'as, or those composed for the glory of Vish'nu, S'aiva-Purâ'nas, or those which extol the worship of S'iva; and one or two Purân'as, perhaps, but merely so far as a portion of them is concerned, will be more consistently assigned to the S'âkta worship, or that of Durgâ, than to that of Vishn'u or S'iva.

"The invariable form of the Purân'as," says Professor Wilson, in his *Preface to the Vishn'u-Purân'a*, "is that of a dialogue in which some person relates its contents in reply to the inquiries of another. This dialogue is interwoven with others, which are repeated as having been held, on other occasions, between different individuals, in consequence of similar questions having been asked. The immediate narrator is commonly, though not constantly, Lomaharshan'a, or Romaharshan'a, the disciple of Vyâsa, who is supposed to communicate what was imparted to him by his preceptor, as he had heard it from some other sage. . . . Lomaharshan'a is called Sûta, as if it was a proper name; but it is, more correctly, a title; and Lomaharshan'a was 'a Sûta,' that is, a bard or panegyrist, who was created, according to the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, to celebrate the exploits of princes, and who, according to the *Vâyu* and *Padma Purân'as*, has a right, by birth and profession, to narrate the Purân'as, in preference even to the Brahmans."

The number of the actual Purân'as is stated to be 18, and their

names in the order given, are the following: 1. *Brahma-*; 2. *Padma-*; 3. *Vishn'u-*; 4. *S'iva-*; 5. *Bhâgavata-*; 6. *Nâradîya-*; 7. *Mârkan'd'eya-*; 8. *Agni-*; 9. *Bhavishya-*; 10. *Brâhma-vaivartta*; 11. *Linga-*; 12. *Varâha-*; 13. *Skanda-*; 14. *Vâmana-*; 15. *Kûrma-*; 16. *Matsya-*; 17. *Garud'a-*; and 18. *Brahmân'da-Purân'a*. In other lists the *Agni-Purân'a* is omitted, and the *Vâyu-Purân'a* is inserted instead of it; or the *Garud'a* and *Brahmân'da* are omitted, and replaced by the *Vâyu* and *N'risinha Purân'as*. Of these Purân'as, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 17, and probably 1, are Purânas of the Vaishn'ava sect; 4, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, of the S'aiva sect; 7 is, in one portion of it, called Devîmâhâtmya, the text-book of the worshippers of Durgâ; otherwise, it has little of a sectarian spirit, and would therefore neither belong to the Vaishn'ava nor to the S'aiva class; 14, as Professor Wilson observes, "divides its homage between S'iva and Vishn'u with tolerable impartiality; it is not connected, therefore, with any sectarial principles, and may have preceded their introduction." The *Bhavishya-Purân'a* (9), as described by the *Matsya-Purân'a*, would be a book of prophesies; but the *Bhavishya-Purân'a* known to Professor Wilson consists of five books, four of which are dedicated to the gods Brahmâ, Vishn'u, S'iva, and Twashtr'i; and the same scholar doubts whether this work could have any claim to the name of a Purân'a, as its first portion is merely a transcript of the words of the first chapter of Manu, and the rest is entirely a manual of religious rites and ceremonies. There are similar grounds for doubt regarding other works of the list.

If the entire number of works, nominally, at least, corresponding with those of the native list, were taken as a whole, their contents might be so defined as to embrace the five topics specified by the commentators on the glossary of Amara-Sinha: philosophical speculations on the nature of matter and soul, individual as well as supreme; small codes of law; descriptions of places and pilgrimages; a vast ritual

relating to the modern worship of the gods; numerous legends; and, exceptionally, as in the *Agni-Purân'a*, scientific tracts. If taken, however, individually, the difference between most of them, both in style and contents, is so considerable that a general definition would become inaccurate. A short description of each Purân'a has been given by the late Professor H. H. Wilson, in his preface to his translation of the *Vishn'u-Purâna*; and to it, as well as to his detailed account of some Purân'as in separate essays (collected in his works), we must, therefore, refer the reader who would wish to obtain a fuller knowledge of these works.—The age of the Purân'as, though doubtless modern, is uncertain. The *Bhâgavatâ*, on account of its being ascribed to the authorship of the grammarian Vopadeva, would appear to yield a safer computation of its age than the rest; for Vopadeva lived in the 12th century, or, as some hold, 13th century, after Christ; but this authorship, though probable, is not proved to a certainty. As to the other Purân'as, their age is supposed by Professor Wilson to fall within the 12th and 17th centuries of the Christian era, with the exception, though, of the *Mârkan'd'eya-Purân'a*, which, in consideration of its unsectarian character, he would place in the 9th or 10th century. But it must be borne in mind that all these dates are purely conjectural, and given as such by the scholar whose impressions they convey.

Besides these eighteen Purân'as or great Purân'as, there are minor or *Upapurân'as*, "differing little in extent or subject from some of those to which the title of Purân'a is ascribed." Their number is given by one Purân'a as four; another, however, names the following 18: 1. *Sanatkumâra-*; 2. *Narasinha-*; 3. *Nâradîya-*; 4. *S'iva-*; 5. *Durvâsasa-*; 6. *Kâpila-*; 7. *Mânava-*; 8. *Aus'anasa-*; 9. *Vârun'a-*; 10. *Kâlikâ-*; 11. *S'âmba-*; 12. *Nandi-*; 13. *Saura-*; 14. *Pârâs'ara-*; 15. *Âditya-*; 16. *Mâhes'wara-*; 17. *Bhâgavata-* (probably, however, a misreading for *Bhârgava*); and 18. *Vâs'ishth'a-Upapurân'a*. Another

list, differing from the latter, not in the number, but in the names of the Upapurân'as, is likewise given in Professor Wilson's *Preface to the Vishn'u-Purân'a*. Many of these Upapurân'as are apparently no longer procurable, while other works so called, but not included in either list, are sometimes met with; for instance, a *Mudgala* and *Ganes'a* Upapurân'a. The character of the Upapurân'as is, like that of the Purân'as, sectarian; the *S'iva-Upapurân'a*, for instance, inculcates the worship of S'iva, the *Kâlikâ-Upapurân'a* that of Durgâ or Devî.

Both Purân'as and Upapurân'as are for a considerable portion of their contents largely indebted to the two great epic works, the *Mahâbhârata* (q. v.) and *Râmâyan'a* (q. v.), more especially to the former of them. Of the Purân'as, the original text of three has already appeared in print: that of the *Bhâgavata* in several native editions, published at Bombay, with the commentary of S'rîdharaswâmin, and partly in a Paris edition by Eugène Burnouf, which remained incomplete through the premature death of that distinguished scholar: that of the *Mârkan'd'eya-Purân'a*, edited at Calcutta in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, by the Rev. K. M. Banerjea; and that of the *Linga-Purân'a*, edited at Bombay; for, regarding a fourth, the *Garud'a-Purân'a*, edited at Benares and Bombay, it seems doubtful whether that little work is the same as the Purân'a spoken of in the native list. Besides these, small portions from the *Padma*, *Skanda*, *Bhavishyottara*, *Mârkan'd'eya*, and other Puran'as have been published in India and Europe. Of translations, we have only to name the excellent French translation by Burnouf of the first nine books of the *Bhâgavata*, and the elegant translation of the whole *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, together with valuable notes by the late Professor H. H. Wilson, which has recently been republished in his works, in a new edition, amplified with numerous notes, by Professor F. E. Hall.—For general information on the character

and contents of the Purân'as, see especially Wilson's preface to his translation of the *Vishn'u-Purân'a* (Works, vol. vi., Lond. 1864), Burnouf's preface to his edition of the *Bhâgavata* (Paris, 1840), Wilson's *Analysis of the Purân'as* (Works, vol. iii. Lond. 1864, edited by Professor R. Rost), K. M. Banerjea's *Introduction to the Mârkan'd'eyâ* (Calcutta, 1862), and John Muir's *Original Sanskrit Texts on the Origin and History of the People of India*, vols. 1—4 (Lond. 1858—1863).*

RÂHU.

Rahu is, in Indian Mythology, the demon who is imagined to be the cause of the eclipses of sun and moon. When, in consequence of the churning of the milk-sea, the gods had obtained the Amr'ita, or beverage of immortality, they endeavoured to appropriate it to their exclusive use; and in this attempt they had also succeeded, after a long struggle with their rivals, the Daityas, or demons, when Râhu, one of the latter, insinuating himself amongst the gods, obtained a portion of the Amr'ita. Being detected by the sun and moon, his head was cut off by Vishn'u; but the Amr'ita having reached his throat, his head had already become immortal, and out of revenge against sun and moon, it now pursues them with implacable hatred, seizing them at intervals, and thus causing their eclipses. Such is the substance of the legend as told in the *Mahâbhârata*. In the *Purân'as* it is amplified by allowing both head and tail of the demon to ascend heaven, and produce the eclipses of sun and moon, when the head of the demon is called *Râhu*, and his tail *Ketu*, both, moreover, being represented in

* Vol. V., 1871. Editions of the Agni-, Padma-, and Matsya-Purâ'nas are in progress in India.

some *Purân'as* as the sons of the demon *Viprachitti* and his wife *Sinhikâ*. In the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, Râhu is also spoken of as the king of the meteors.—In Hindu Astronomy, Râhu is personified as the moon's ascending, and Ketu as the moon's descending, node.

RÂJATARANGIN'I.

RAJATARANGIN'I (or 'the river of kings,' from the Sanscrit *râjan*, king and *tarangin'i*, a river or stream) is the name of four chronicles of the history of Cashmir written in Sanscrit verse; the first by *Kalhan'a*, bringing the history of Cashmir till about 1148 after Christ; the second, a continuation of the former, by *Jonarâja*, to 1412; the third, a continuation of the second, by *S'rîvara*, a pupil of Jonarâja, to 1477; and the fourth, by *Prâjyabhat't'a*, from that date to the conquest of the valley by the Emperor Akber. Amongst these chronicles, however, it is especially the first which has earned a great reputation, inasmuch as it is the most important and the completest of all *known* Hindu chronicles, and, for this reason, may be considered as the only surviving work of Sanscrit literature which betrays an attempt at historiography. The author of the work, the Pandit Kalhan'a—of whom we merely know that he was the son of Champaka, and lived about 1150, under the reign of Sinhadeva of Cashmir—reports that before entering on his task, he had studied eleven historical works written previously to his time, and also a history of Cashmir by the sage Nîla,* which seems to be the oldest of all; but that, not yet contented with these sources of information alone, he had also examined old documents, such as grants and proclamations made by kings, texts of law, and sacred books. It may

* Professor Cowell's Abstract of the "Nîla-mata," in Fergusson's "Tree and Serpent Worship," App. B.

be presumed, therefore, that Kalhan'a had not merely the desire, but set honestly to work to elucidate the history of Cashmir up to his date. And so far as the last few centuries preceding him are concerned, it is possible that the facts narrated by him are reliable; but owing to the uncritical disposition of the Hindu mind in all matters that regard historical facts, those especially of a more or less religious or legendary character, and also to his bias to produce a consistent system of chronology, great doubt must attach to all that relates in his work to the ancient history of India. In spite of these shortcomings, however, which are more those of the nation to which the author belonged, than those of the individual himself, much that is reported by Kalhan'a is the only source of information we have of the history of Cashmir, and much very valuable as coming from an indigenous source. Kalhan'a begins his work, as may be expected, with the mythological history of the country; the first king named by him is Gonarda, who, according to his chronology, would have reigned in the year 2448 before Christ; and the last mentioned by him is Sinhadeva, about 1150 after Christ. The Sanscrit text of the complete work, together with that of the three other Râjatarangin'îs, which is of little extent, has been edited at Calcutta, 1835, under the auspices of the General Committee of Public Instruction and the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Six sections of it have been edited, with notes, and learned appendixes, in French, by A. Troyer, who likewise translated into French these sections, as well as the remaining two (*Râdjataranginî, Histoire des Rois du Kachmir* &c., vols. 1—3, Paris, 1840—1852).—See also H. H. Wilson, *An Essay on the Hindu History of Cashmir*, in the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. xv., and Lassen's *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vols. i. and iii.*

* Bühler in "The Indian Antiquary," vol. V., p. 27f., and his edition of the "Vikramânkadevacharita," Introduction.

RAKSHAS, OR RÂKSHASA.

RAKSHAS, or Râkshasa, is, in Hindu Mythology, the name of a class of evil spirits or demons, who are sometimes imagined as attendants on Kuvera, the god of riches, and guardians of his treasures, but more frequently as mischievous, cruel, and hideous monsters, haunting cemeteries, devouring human beings, and ever ready to oppose the gods and to disturb pious people. They have the power of assuming any shape at will, and their strength increases towards the evening twilight. Several of them are described as having many heads and arms (see, for instance, RAVANA), large teeth, red hair, and, in general, as being of repulsive appearance; others, however, especially the females of this class, could also take beautiful forms in order to allure their victims. In the legends of the *Mahâbhârata*, *Râmâyan'a*, and the *Purân'as*, they play an important part, embodying, as it were, at the period of these compositions, the evil principle on earth, as opposed to all that is physically or morally good. In the *Purân'as*, they are sometimes mentioned as the offspring of the patriarch Pulastya, at other times as the sons of the patriarch Kas'yapa. Another account of their origin, given in the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, where, treating of the creation of the world (book i. chap. 5), is the following: "Next, from Brahmâ, in a form composed of the quality of foulness, was produced hunger, of whom anger was born; and the god put forth in darkness beings emaciate with hunger, of hideous aspects, and with long beards. Those beings hastened to the deity. Such of them as exclaimed: "Not so, oh! let him be saved," were named Râkshasa (from *raksh*, save); others who cried out: "Let us eat," were denominated, from that expression, Yaksha" (from *yaksh*, for *jaksh*, eat.) This popular etymology of the name, however, would be at variance with

the cruel nature of these beings, and it seems, therefore, to have been improved upon in the *Bhâgavata-Purân'a*, where it is related that Brahmâ transformed himself into night, invested with a body; this the Yakshas (q. v.) and Râkshasas seized upon, exclaiming: "Do not spare it—devour it!" when Brahmâ cried out: "Don't devour me (*mâ mâm jakshata*)—spare me! (*rakshata*)." (See F. E. Hall's note to Wilson's *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, vol. i. p. 82.) The more probable origin of the word *Rakshas*—kindred with the German *Recke* or *Riese*—is that from a radical *r'ish* or *rish*, hurt or destroy, with an affix *sas;* hence, literally, the destructive being.

RÂMÂYAN'A.

RAMAYAN'A is the name of one of the two great epic poems of ancient India (for the other, see the article MAHABHARATA). Its subject-matter is the history of Râma, one of the incarnations of Vishn'u, and its reputed author is *Valmîki*, who is said to have taught his poem to the two sons of Râma, the hero of the history; and, according to this legend, would have been a contemporary of Râma himself. But though this latter account is open to much doubt, it seems certain that Valmîki —unlike Vyâsa, the supposed compiler of the *Mahâbhârata*—was a real personage; and, moreover, that the Râmâyan'a was the work of one single poet—not like the *Mahâbhârata*, the creation of various epochs and different minds. As a poetical composition, the Râmâyan'a is therefore far superior to the *Mahâbhârata;* and it may be called the best great poem of ancient India, fairly claiming a rank in the literature of the world equal to that of the epic poetry of Homer. Whereas the

character of the *Mahâbhârata* is cyclopædical, its main subject-matter overgrown by episodes of the most diversified nature, its diction differing in merit, both from a poetical and grammatical point of view, according to the ages that worked at its completion—the Râmâyan'a has but one object in view, the history of Râma. Its episodes are rare, and restricted to the early portion of the work, and its poetical diction betrays throughout the same finish and the same poetical genius. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt as to the relative ages of both poems, provided that we look upon the *Mahâbhârata* in the form in which it is preserved, as a whole. Whether we apply as a test the aspect of the religious life, or the geographical and other knowledge displayed in the one and the other work, the Râmâyan'a appears as the older of the two. Since it is the chief source whence our information of the Râma incarnation of Vishn'u is derived, its contents may be gathered from that portion of the article VISHN'U which relates to *Râmachandra*. The Râmâyan'a contains (professedly) 24,000 epic verses, or *S'lokas*, in seven books, or *Kân'd'as*, called the *Bâla-*,*Ayodhyâ-*,*Aran'ya-*,*Kishkindhâ-*,*Sundara-*,*Yuddha-* (or *Lankâ-*), and *Uttara-Kân'd'a*. The text which has come down to us exhibits, in different sets of manuscripts, such considerable discrepancies, that it becomes necessary to speak of two recensions in which it now exists. This remarkable fact was first made known by A. W. Von Schlegel, who, in Europe, was the first who attempted a critical edition of this poem; it is now fully corroborated by a comparison that may be made between the printed editions of both texts. The one is more concise in its diction, and has less tendency than the other to that kind of descriptive enlargement of facts and sentiments which characterises the later poetry of India; it often also exhibits grammatical forms and peculiarities of an archaic stamp, where the other studiously avoids that which must have appeared to its editors in the light of a grammatical difficulty. In short, there can be little doubt that the former is the

older and more genuine, and the latter the more recent, and, in some respect, more spurious text. A complete edition of the older text, with two commentaries, was published at Madras in 1856 (in the Telugu characters, vol. i.—iv.); another edition of the same text, with a short commentary, appeared at Calcutta in two vols. (1860), and a more careful and elegant one at Bombay (1861). Of the later edition, Signor Gaspare Gorresio has edited the first six books (vols. i.—v., Paris, 1843—1850) without a commentary, but with an Italian, somewhat free, translation in poetical prose (vols. vi.—x., Paris, 1847—1858.) Former attempts at an edition and translation of the Râmâyan'a remained unfortunately incomplete. The earliest was that made by William Carey and Joshua Marshman, who edited the first two books, and added to the text a prose translation in English and explanatory notes (vols. i.—iii., Serampore, 1806—1810; and vol. i., containing the first book, Dunstable, 1808.) Another edition, of an eclectic nature, is that by A. W. Von Schlegel; it contains the first two books of the text, and an excellent Latin translation of the first book and twenty chapters of the second (vol. i., parts 1 and 2, and vol. ii. part 1, Bonn, 1846). Various episodes from the Râmâyan'a, it may also be added, have at various times occupied sundry editors and translators.*

R'ISHI.

R'ISHI (from the obsolete Sanskrit *r'ish*, see, kindred with *dr's'-*, δερκ-) is the title given to the inspired poets of the Vedic hymns, as they were supposed to have "seen," or, in other words, received, the Vedic hymns from the deity through the sense of sight. "The R'ishis," Yâska (q. v.)

* On the later editions, and on the controversies respecting the Râmâyan'a, see Weber, Indische Literaturgeschichte," 2nd ed., p. 211f. Ind. Antiquary, V., p. 247f.

says, "see the hymns with all kinds of intentions." They were therefore the oldest poets of India, and the word R'ishi itself becomes thus even identified with Vedic poetry. At a later period, however, the title R'ishi was given to renowned authors, though they were not considered as inspired by a deity, as, for instance, to the authors of the Vedic Kalpa, works which, by all Hindu writers, are admitted to be of human authorship.—Compare Goldstücker, *Pân'ini*, &c., p. 64, ff.*

RUDRA.

Rudra is, in Vedic Mythology, a collective name of the gods of the tempest, or Maruts, Rudra (in the singular) being the name of their father. (See John Muir's *Contributions to a Knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology*, in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, new series, vol. i., part 4, London, 1864.) In later and Puranic mythology (see Hindu Religion and Purana), Rudra (the terrible) is a name of S'iva, and the Rudras are his offspring. "From Brahmâ's forehead," the *Vishn'u-Purân'a* relates, "darkened with angry frowns, sprang Rudra, radiant as the noontide sun, fierce and of vast bulk, and of a figure which was half male, half female. "Separate yourself," Brahmâ said to him, and having so spoken, disappeared: obedient to which command, Rudra became twofold, disjoining his male and female natures. This male being he again divided into eleven persons, of whom some were agreeable, some hideous, some fierce, some mild; and he multiplied his female nature manifold, of complexions black or white." See Wilson's *Vishn'u-Purân'a*. The word *rudra* apparently comes from the Sanskrit *rud* weep; but as the sense of this radical does not yield any satisfactory clue to the meaning of the deity called Rudra, the *Purân'as*

* Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. III², p. 217 ff.

invented a legend, according to which Rudra received this name from Brahmâ, because, when a youth, he *ran about crying aloud;* and when asked by Brahmâ why he wept, replied that he wanted a name. "Rudra be thy name," rejoined Brahmâ: "be composed; desist from tears." In this legendary etymology there is, moreover, a punning on the similarity between *rud*, cry, and *dru*, run—an illustration of one of the sources whence the later mythology of India derived some of its boundless stock of absurd myths.*

S'AIVAS.

S'AIVAS is the name of one of the three great divisions of Hindu sects. See INDIA. The word designates the votaries of S'iva, and comprises different special sects, which varied in number at different periods of medieval Hinduism. To judge by the number of shrines dedicated to S'iva in his form as Linga, it would seem that the worship of this deity was the most prevalent of all the modes of adoration; but these temples are scarcely ever the resort of numerous votaries, and they are regarded with comparatively little veneration by the Hindus. In Upper India, the worship of S'iva has, indeed, never assumed a popular form. No legends are recorded of this deity of a poetic or pleasing character; the S'aivas, unlike the Vaishnavas, have no works in any of the common dialects, such as the *Râmâyan'a*, the *Vârttâ*, or the *Bhaktamâlâ;* no establishments in Hindustan, like S'rînâth or Pûrî; and their teachers of repute, like S'ankara (q. v.), are too philosophical and speculative to be really popular. The worship of S'iva seems, therefore, to have been, from a remote period, more that of the learned and speculative classes, than that of the masses of the people. In a renowned work called the

* Muir, l.l., vol. IV., pp. 252—356.

S'ankara-dig-vijaya,* or the victory of S'ankara over the world, composed by Ânandagiri, one of the disciples of S'ankara, several subdivisions of the S'aivas are named—viz., the *S'aivas*, properly so called—who wore the impression of the Linga on both arms;—the *Raudras*, who had a trident stamped on the forehead; the *Ugras*, who had the drum of S'iva on their arms; the *Bhâktas*, with an impression of the Linga on their foreheads; the *Jangamas*, who carried a figure of the Linga on their head; and the *Pâs'upatas*, who imprinted the same symbol on the forehead, breast, navel, and arms. The present divisions of the S'aivas, however, are the following:—the Dan'd'ins and Das'nâmi-Dan'd'ins, the Yogins, the Jangamas, the Paramahansas, the Aghorins, the Urdhabâhus, Âkâs'mukhins and Nakhins, the Gûdaras, the Rûkharas, Sûkharas and Ukharas; the Karâlingins, the Brahmachârins and the Nâgas.

The *Dan'd'ins*, or staff bearers, properly so called, are the representatives of the fourth order, or mendicant life, into which a Hindu is to enter after he passed through the stages of a religious student, householder and hermit. The Dan'd'in is distinguished by carrying a *dan'd'a*, or small staff, with several projections from it, and a piece of cloth dyed with red ochre—in which the Brahmanical cord is supposed to be enshrined—attached to it. He shaves his hair and beard, wears only a cloth round his loins, and subsists upon food obtained ready-dressed from the houses of the Brahmans once a day only, which he deposits in the small clay-pot that he always carries with him. He should live alone, and near to, but not within a city; this latter rule, however, is rarely observed. The genuine Dan'd'in is not necessarily of the S'aiva sect; but those who worship S'iva, especially in his form as Bhairava, or the Terrific, have, at the ceremony of initiation, a small incision made on the inner part of the knee, the blood drawn by this process being deemed

* K. T. Telang, "On the S'ankaravijaya of Anandagiri," in "The Indian Antiquary," v., p. 287 ff.

an acceptable offering to the god. The *Das'nâmi-Dan'd'ins* are included in this class; but they admit none but Brahmans into their body, and are considered to be the descendants of the original members of the fraternity, who refer their origin to the celebrated *S'ankara* or *S'ankarâchârya* (q. v.) He is said to have had four disciples, who are called Padmapâda, Hastâmalaka, Sures'wara or Mandana, and Trot'aka. Of these, the first had two pupils, Tîrtha and Âs'rama; the second two, Vana and Aran'ya; the third had three, Saraswatî, Purî, and Bhâratî; and the fourth had also three, Giri or Gir, Pârvata and Sâgara. These ten constitute collectively the Das'nâmi (from *das'an*, ten, and *nâman*, name); and when a Brahman enters into either class, he attaches to his denomination that of the class of which he becomes a member: as Tîrtha, Giri, &c. The philosophical tenets of this sect are mainly those of the *Vedânta* (q. v.), as taught by S'ankara and his disciples; but they generally superadd the practice of the *Yoga* (q. v.), and many of them have adopted the doctrines of the *Tantras* (q. v.)

The *Yogins* are, properly speaking, followers of the *Yoga* (q. v.) system; and the term implies a class of men who practise the most difficult austerities, in order to become absorbed into the universal spirit, and thus liberated from repeated births. The votaries of S'iva, so called, hold that, by dint of these practices—such as continued suppressions of respirations, sitting in eighty-four different attitudes, fixing the eyes on the top of the nose—they will be finally united with S'iva, whom they consider as the source and essence of all creation. The principal sect of this class is that of the *Kanphat'â Yogins*, who trace their origin to a teacher named *Gorakhnâth*, who seems to have lived in the beginning of the 15th century, and, according to his followers, was an incarnation of S'iva. A temple of Gorakhnâth exists at Gorakhpur; a plain, called Gorakhkhetr, is near Dwârakâ, and a cavern of his name at Haridwâr. The Yogins of Gorakhnâth are called Kanphat'âs, from

having their ears bored and rings inserted in them at the time of their initiation. They may be of any caste; they live as ascetics, single or in colleges; officiate as priests of S'iva in some places; mark the forehead with a transverse line of ashes, and smear the body with the same substance; they deal in fortune-telling, profess to cure diseases with drugs and spells; and some play and sing, and exhibit animals.

The *Jangamas*, or *Lingavats*, are likewise not an important division of the S'aiva sect. Their essential characteristic is the wearing of the Linga emblem on some part of their dress or person.

The *Paramahansas* are ascetics who pretend to be solely occupied with the investigation of Brahman, and to be equally indifferent to pleasure or pain, insensible of heat or cold, and incapable of satiety or want. In proof of this, they go naked in all weathers, never indicate any natural want, and receive from their attendants what is brought to them as their alms or food.

The same apparent worldly indifference characterises the *Aghorins;* but they seek occasions for its display, and demand alms as a reward for its exhibition. Their practices, too, seem to betray that originally their worship was not of an inoffensive kind, but required even human victims for its performance. They eat and drink whatever is given to them, even ordure and carrion; and in order to extort money from the credulous, they resort to the most disgusting devices.

The *U'rdhabâhus* are solitary mendicants; they extend one or both arms above their heads till they remain of themselves thus elevated. They also close the fist, and the nails being suffered to grow, completely perforate the hand. They usually assume the S'aiva marks, and twist their hair so as to project from the forehead, in imitation of the matted hair of S'iva.

The *Âkâs'mukhins* hold up their faces to the sky till the muscles of the back of the neck become contracted and retain it in that position.

The peculiarities of the other sects we cannot afford space to specify; they are equally trifling, and sometimes disgusting.—For fuller details on the S'aivas, see H. H. Wilson, *A Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus;* Works, vol. i. (London, 1862), pp. 188, ff.*

S'ÂKTAS.

S'AKTAS is the name of one of the great divisions of Hindu sects (see India). The term is derived from the Sanscrit *s'akti,* which means 'power, energy;' but, in its special application, denotes the energy of the deity, and particularly that of the gods of the Hindu triad, Brahmâ, Vishn'u, and S'iva. This energy, originally spoken of as the wish or will of the Supreme Being to create the universe, and afterwards dilated upon in metaphorical and poetical speech, assumed at the Pauranik period (see *Hindu Religion* under India) the form of a separate deity, thought of as the wife of the god to whom it belongs. Accordingly, Saraswatî (q. v.) became the S'akti or wife of Brahmâ; Lakshmî (q. v.), the S'akti or wife of Vishn'u; and Devî, or Durgâ, or Umâ (q. v.), the S'akti or wife of S'iva. *S'âkta,* properly speaking, means, therefore, a worshipper of any of these female representations of the divine power; but, in its special and usual sense, it is applied to the worshipper of the female energy or wife of S'iva alone; and the S'âktas, properly so called, are, therefore, the votaries of Durgâ, or Devi, or Umâ (q. v.). Since S'iva (q. v.) is the type of destruction, his energy or wife becomes still more so the type of all that is terrific: and, in consequence, her worship is based on the assumption that she can be propitiated only by practices which involve the destruction of life, and

* M. A. Sherring, Hindu Tribes and Castes (1872), p. 255 ff.

in which she herself delights. That such a worship must lead to the brutalisation, and degenerate into the grossest licentiousness, of those addicted to it, is but natural; and it will easily be understood that the S'âkta religion became the worst of all forms which the various aberrations of the Hindu mind assumed. Appealing to the superstitions of the vulgar mind, it has its professors, chiefly amongst the lowest classes; and, amongst these again, it prevails especially in Bengal, where it is cultivated with practices even scarcely known in most other provinces. The works from which the tenets and rites of this religion are derived, are known by the collective term of *Tantras* (q. v.), but as in some of these works the ritual enjoined does not comprehend all the impure practices which are recommended in others, the sect became divided into two leading branches, the *Dakshin'âchârins* and *Vâmâchârins*, or the followers of the right-hand and left-hand ritual.

The *Dakshin'âchârins* are the more respectable of the two. They profess, indeed, to possess a ritual as pure as that of the Vedas. Nevertheless, they annually decapitate a number of helpless animals, especially kids, and in some cases pommel the animal to death with their fists, or offer blood without destroying life—practices contrary to the Vedic ritual. The *Vâmâchârins*, on the other hand—the type of the S'âktas—and amongst these especially that branch called Kaula or Kulîna, adopt a ritual of the grossest impurities. Their object is, by reverencing Devî, who is one with S'iva, to obtain supernatural powers in this life, and to be identified after death with S'iva and his consort. 'According to the immediate object of the worshipper,' Professor Wilson says, 'is the particular form of worship; but all the forms require the use of some or all of the five letters M—viz., Mânsa, Matsya, Madya, Maithuna, and Mudrâ—i. e., flesh, fish, wine, women, and certain mystical gesticulations. Suitable *mantras* (or formulas) are also indispensable, according to the end proposed, consisting of various

unmeaning monosyllabic combinations of letters, of great imaginary efficacy. Where the object of the ceremony is to acquire an interview with, and control over, impure spirits, a dead body is necessary. The adept is also to be alone, at midnight, in a cemetery or place where bodies are burned or buried, or criminals executed; seated on the corpse, he is to perform the usual offerings, and if he does so without fear, the Bhûtas, the Yoginîs, and other male or female goblins, become his slaves. In this, and many of the observances practised, solitude is enjoined; but all the principal ceremonies comprehend the worship of S'akti, and require for that purpose the presence of a female as the living representative and type of the goddess. This worship is mostly celebrated in a mixed society, the men of which represent Bhairava (or S'iva as the Terrific), and the women, Bhairavi (S'akti or Devî as the Terrific). The S'akti is personated by a naked female, to whom meat and wine are offered, and then distributed amongst the assistants; the recitation of various Mantras and texts, and the performance of the Mudrâ, or gesticulations with the fingers, accompanying the different stages of the ceremony; and it is terminated with the most scandalous orgies amongst the votaries." The same author adds that, "in justice to the doctrines of the sect, it is to be observed, that these practices, if instituted merely for sensual gratification, are held to be as illicit and reprehensible as in any other branch of the Hindu faith;" but full assent must be given to his remark which follows a text quoted by him in support of this view, for he says: "It is only to be added that if the promulgators of these doctrines were sincere, which is far from impossible, they must have been filled with a strange frenzy, and have been strangely ignorant of human nature."

"The members of this sect are very numerous, especially amongst the Brahmanical caste; all classes are, however, admissible, and equal at the ceremonies of the sect. The particular insignia of these S'âktas

are a semicircular line or lines on the forehead, of red sanders or vermilion, or a red streak up the middle of the forehead, with a circular spot of red at the root of the nose. They use a rosary made of the seeds of the eleocarpus, or of coral beads, but of no greater length than may be concealed in the hand; or they keep it in a small purse, or a bag of red cloth. In worshipping, they wear a piece of red silk round the loins, and decorate themselves with garlands of crimson flowers." Two other sects are likewise mentioned as belonging to the S'âktas, the *Kânchulîyas* and *Karârins*, but it is doubtful whether they are still in existence. The former are said to have belonged to the south of India; and the latter seem to have been worshippers of Devî in her terrific forms, the offering to her of human sacrifices being the principal feature of their ritual. If there are still any votaries of this sect, Professor Wilson believes that they are the miscreants who, more for pay than devotion, at certain festivals, inflict upon themselves bodily tortures, such as piercing their flesh with hooks or spits, reclining upon beds of spikes, gashing themselves with knives, &c.—See H. H. Wilson, *A Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus;* Works, vol. i. pp. 240, ff.*

S'AKUNTALÂ.

S'AKUNTALA is one of the most pleasing female characters of Hindu mythology. She is mentioned as a water-nymph in the *Yajurveda;* she is the subject of a beautiful episode of the *Mahâbhârata*, and is

* P. Wurm, Geschichte der indischen Religion (1874), p. 260 ff.

spoken of in the *Purân'as;* but her name has become especially familiar in Europe through the celebrated drama of Kâlidâsa (q. v.), which, introduced to us by Sir William Jones in 1789, became the starting-point of Sanskrit philology in Europe. The principal features of the legend of S'akuntalâ, as narrated in the *Mahâbhârata*, are the following:— S'akuntalâ was the daughter of the saint Vis'wâmitra and the Apsaras, or water-nymph, Menakâ. Abandoned by her parents, she was adopted by the saint Kan'wa, who brought her up in his hermitage as his daughter. Once upon a time, King Dushyanta went a-hunting in the forest, and accidentally coming to the hermitage of Kan'wa, saw S'akuntalâ, and fell in love with her. He persuaded her to marry him according to the rite of the Gandharva marriage, and promised her that the son she would bear him should be the heir to his throne, and that he would take her home as his queen to his royal city. Kan'wa, who had been absent while this event happened, returned to the hermitage, and through his divine knowledge, knew the whole secret, though it had not been confessed to him by S'akuntalâ. She in due time was delivered of a son, and remained at the hermitage until the boy was six years old; but as Dushyanta, unmindful of his promise, did not send any messenger for her, Kan'wa directed her to proceed with her boy to the residence of Dushyanta. This she did; but when she arrived at his residence, she was repudiated by the king. Nor did her speech, however touching and eloquent, move his heart, until at last a heavenly voice assured him that S'akuntalâ had spoken the truth, and that he saw before him his lawful son. Thereupon, Dushyanta recognised S'akuntalâ as his queen, and her son as his heir. The latter was named Bharata, and became the founder of the glorious race of the Bhâratas. In the drama, Kâlidâsa's genius had full scope to work out the incidents of this legend, so as to display the accomplished female character of S'akuntalâ, and likewise to show that the obstacle which arose to her recognition was not the fault

of Dushyanta, but the consequence of a curse which S'akuntalâ had incurred from a wrathful saint who, when once on a visit to Kan'wa's hermitage, had considered himself neglected by her. Since, in the drama, Dushyanta recognises S'akuntalâ by means of a ring he had given her at the hermitage, the name of the drama is *Abhijnâna-'Sakuntalâ*, or "the drama in which S'akuntulâ (is remembered) by a token." There are two versions in which this drama now exists—an older and a more recent one. The latter was first edited at Calcutta, 1761, then at Paris, 1830, by A. L. Chézy, who also gave a French translation of it; later and better editions of it (Cal. 1860 and 1864) were prepared by the Pandit Prem Chunder Tarkabâgîsh, under the superintendence of Professor Edward B. Cowell, the Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. The older version has been edited by Dr. O. Boehtlingk (Bonn, 1842), by Professor M. Williams (Hertford, 1853),* and by a Bombay Pandit at the Induprakâs'a press (Bombay, 1861). The first English translation of it is that by Sir William Jones (Calcutta, 1789); the second was made by Professor M. Williams (Hertford, 1856); it deserves the highest acknowledgment, on account of the consummate taste with which it has rendered the metrical part of the original. Among the various German, Italian, Danish, and other translations of this drama, the German translation by Ernst Meyer (Stuttgard, 1852) is worthy of especial notice.†

* Second edition, 1876.

† Concerning the *three* recensions of 'Sakuntalâ and the literature on the subject see R. Pischel's preface to his edition of the Bengali recension of the drama (Kiel, 1877); also A. Weber, "Indische Studien," xiv., 161 ff.

S'ANKARA, OR S'ANKARÂCHÂRYA.

S'ANKARA, or S'ankarâchârya, i.e., the *âchârya*, or spiritual teacher, S'ankara, is the name of one of the most renowned theologians of India. His date, as is the case with most celebrities of that country, is unknown. Tradition places him about 200 B.C., but H. H. Wilson assigns him, with more probability, to the 8th or 9th century after Christ. With regard to his place of birth and to his caste, most accounts agree in making him a native of Kerala or Malabar, and a member of the caste of the Nambûri Brahmans. In Malabar, he is said to have divided the four original castes into seventy-two, or eighteen subdivisions each. All accounts represent him as having led an erratic life, and engaged in successful controversies with other sects. In the course of his career, he founded the sects of the *Das'nâmi-Dan'd'ins* (see S'aivas). Towards the close of his life, he repaired to Cashmere; and finally to Kedârnâth, in the Himalaya, where he died at the early age of 32. His principal works, which are of considerable merit, and exercised a great influence on the religious history of India, are his commentary on the *Vedânta* (q. v.) Sûtras, and his commentaries on the *Bhagavadgîtâ* and the *Upanishads* (q. v.). His learning and personal eminence were so great, that he was looked upon as an incarnation of the god S'iva, and was fabled to have worked several astounding miracles. One of these was his animating the dead body of a King Amaru, in order to become temporarily the husband of the latter's widow, so as to be able to argue with the wife of a Brahman Mandana upon the topic of sensual enjoyments—the only topic on which he had remained ignorant, as he had always led the life of a Brahmachârin, or bachelor student. A number of works are current in the south of India relating to his life; among these, the *S'ankara-*

dig-vijaya, or the conquest of the world by S'ankara, composed by *Ânandagiri*, one of his disciples, is the most important. See H. H. Wilson, *A Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus;* works, vol. i. pp. 197, ff.; and Cavelly Venkata Ramaswami, *Biographical Sketches of Deccan Poets* (Bombay, 1847).*

SÂNKHYA.

SANKHYA (from the Sanskrit *sankhyâ*, synthetic reasoning) is the name of one of the three great systems of orthodox Hindu philosophy. See Sanskrit Literature. It consists of two divisions—the Sânkhya, properly so called, and the Yoga (q v.); and like the other systems (see Mîmâṅsâ and Nyâya), it professes to teach the means by which external beatitude, or the complete and personal exemption from every sort of ill, may be attained. This means is the discriminative acquaintance with *tattwa*, or the true principles of all existence, and such principles are, according to the Sânkhya system, the following twenty-five: (1), *prakr'iti* or *pradhâna*, substance or nature; it is the universal and material cause; eternal, undiscrete, inferable from its effects: productive, but unproduced. It first production is (2) *mahat* (lit. the great), or *buddhi* (lit. intellect), or the intellectual principle, which appertains to individual beings. From it devolves (3) *ahankâra* (lit. the assertion of "I"), the function of which consists in referring the objects of the world to one's-self. It produces (4—8) five *tanmâtra*, or subtle elements, which themselves are productive of the five gross elements (see 20—24). Ahankâra further produces (9—13) five in-

* The Indian Antiquary, v., 287 ff.

struments of sensation—viz., the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; (14—18), five instruments of action—viz., the organ of speech, the hands the feet, the excretory termination of the intestines, and the organ of generation; lastly (19), *manas*, or the organ of volition and imagination. The five subtle elements (see 4—8) produce (20—24) the five gross elements—viz., *âkâs'a*, space or ether, which has the property of audibleness, is the vehicle of sound, and is derived from the *sonorous* tanmâtra; air, which has the properties of audibleness and tangibility, is sensible to hearing and touch, and is derived from the *aërial* tanmâtra; fire, which has the properties of audibleness, tangibility and colour, is sensible to hearing, touch, and sight, and is derived from the *igneous* tanmâtra; water, which has the properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour, and savour, is sensible to hearing, touch, sight, and taste, and is derived from the *aqueous* tanmâtra: lastly, earth, which unites the properties of audibleness, tangibility, colour, savour, and odour, is sensible to hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell, and is derived from the *terrene* tanmâtra. The 25th principle is *purusha*, or soul. It is neither produced nor productive; it is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, and immaterial. The union of soul and nature takes places for the contemplation of nature, and for abstraction from it, "as the halt and the blind join for conveyance and for guidance, the one bearing and directed, the other borne and directing." From their union creation is affected. The soul's wish is fruition or liberation. In order to become fit for fruition, the soul is in the first place invested with a *linga-s'arîra*, or *sûkshma-s'arîra*, a subtle body, which is composed of *buddhi* (2), *ahankâra* (3), the five *tanmâtras* (4—8), and the eleven instruments of sensation, action, and volition (9—19). This subtle body is affected by sentiments, but being too subtle to be capable of enjoyment, it becomes invested with a grosser body, which is composed of the five gross elements (20—24), or, accord-

ing to some, of four, excluding *âkâs'a*, or, according to others, of one alone—viz., earth. The grosser body, propagated by generation, perishes; the subtle frame, however, transmigrates through successive bodies, "as a mimic shifts his disguises to represent various characters." Some assume, besides, that between these two there is intermediately a corporeal fame, composed of the five elements, but tenuous or refined, the so-called *anusht'hâna s'arîra*.

Creation, resulting from the union of prakr'iti (1) and purusha (25), is *material*, or consisting of souls invested with gross bodies, and *intellectual*, or consisting of the affections of intellect, its sentiments or faculties. *Material creation* comprises eight orders of superior beings —gods, demigods, and demons; five of inferior beings—quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, fishes, and insects; besides vegetable and inorganic substances, and man, who forms a class apart. This material creation is again distributed into three classes: that of *sattwa*, or goodness, comprising the higher gods, with virtue prevailing in it, but transient; that of *tamas*, or darkness, where foulness or passion predominates; it comprises demons and inferior beings; and between these, that of *rajas*, or impurity (lit. coloured condition), the human world, where passion together with misery prevails. Throughout these worlds, soul experiences pain, arising from death and transmigration, until it is finally liberated from its union with person. *Intellectual creation* comprises those affections which obstruct, disable, content, or perfect, the understanding; these amount to fifty. *Obstructions* of intellect are error, conceit, passion, hatred, fear, severally subdivided into 62 species. *Disability* of intellect arises from defect or injury of organs, such as deafness, blindness, &c., and from the contraries of the two next classes: making a total of 28 species. *Content* is either internal or external—the one fourfold, the other fivefold. Internal content concerns nature, proximate cause, time, and luck; external content

relates to abstinence from enjoyment upon temporal motives—viz., aversion to the trouble of acquisition, or to that of preservation, and reluctance to incur loss consequent on use, or evil attending on fruition, or offence of hurting objects by the enjoyment of them. The *Perfecting* of intellect comprises eight species; it is direct, as preventing the three kinds of pain; or indirect, such as reasoning, oral instruction, amicable intercourse, &c.

Besides the 25 principles, the Sânkhya also teaches that nature has three essential *gun'as*, or qualities, viz., *sattwa*, the quality of goodness or purity; *rajas* (lit. colouredness), the quality of passion; and *tamas*, the quality of sin or darkness; and it classifies accordingly material and intellectual creation. Thus, four properties of intellect partake of goodness or purity—viz., virtue, knowledge, dispassionateness, and power; and four, the reverse of the former, partake of sin or darkness—sin, error, incontinency, and powerlessness. It is worthy of notice that by power the Sânkhya understands eight faculties—viz., that of shrinking into a minute form, to which everything is pervious; of enlarging to a gigantic body; of assuming extreme levity; of possessing unlimited reach of organs; of irresistible will; dominion over all beings, animate or inanimate; the faculty of changing the course of nature; and the ability to accomplish everything desired. The knowledge of the principles, and hence the true doctrine, is, according to the Sânkhya, obtained by three kinds of evidence—viz., perception, inference, and right affirmation, which some understand to mean the revelation of the Veda and authoritative tradition.

It will be seen from the foregoing summary that the Sânkhya proper does not teach the existence of a supreme Being, by whom nature and Soul were created, and by whom the world is ruled. It was therefore accused by its opponents to be atheistical, or to deny the existence of a creator; and it is the special object of the *Yoga* system to remove

this reproach by asserting his existence, and defining his essence (see Yoga). The truth, however, is, that the Sânkhya proper merely maintains that there is no proof for the existence of a supreme Being; and the passages quoted by the opponents, to show that the founder of the Sânkhya *denied I's'wara*, or a supreme God, are quite compatible with the view, that he confined his teaching to those *tattwas* or principles which in his opinion, were capable of demonstration. Nor is it at all probable that the founder of the orthodox Yoga would have propounded his system as supplementary to that of the Sânkhya proper, had there been that incompatible antagonism between them which must separate an atheistical from a theistical philosophy. The Sânkhya system underwent a mythological development in the Purân'as, in the most important of which it is followed as the basis of their cosmogony. Thus, *Prakr'iti*, or nature, is identified by them with *Mâyâ*, or the energy of Brahmâ; and the Matsya-Purân'a affirms that *Buddhi*, or *Mahat*, the intellectual principle, through the three qualities, goodness, passion, and sin, "being one form becomes the three gods, Brahmâ, Vishn'u, and S'iva." The most important development, however, of the Sânkhya is that by the Buddhistic doctrine, which is mainly based on it. The Sânkhya system is probably the oldest of the Hindu systems of philosophy; for its chief principles are, with more or less detail, already contained in the chief Upanishads (see Veda); but whether the form in which it has come down to us, and in which it is now spoken of as *the* Sânkhya, is also older than that in which the other systems are preserved, is a question as yet not solved by Sanskrit philology. That this form, however, is not the oldest one, is borne out, for instance, by the differences which exist between the Sânkhya doctrine of the Upanishads and the doctrine propounded in the first book of the Institutes of Manu on the one side, and the doctrine of the actual Sânkhya on the other.

The reputed founder of the actual Sânkhya is *Kapila* (lit. *tawny*), who is asserted to have been a son of Brahmâ, or, as others prefer, an incarnation of Vishn'u. He taught his system in Sûtras (q. v.), which, distributed in six lectures, bear the name of *Sânkhya-Pravachana*. The oldest commentary on this work is that by *Aniruddhâ;* another is that by *Vijnânabhikshu*. The best summary of the Sânkhya doctrine is given by I's'wara Kr'ishn'a, in his *Sânkhya-Kârikâ*, edited by H. H. Wilson, with a translation of the text by H. T. Colebrooke, and a translation of the commentary of Gaud'apâda by himself (Oxford, 1837). For the various theories concerning the word Sânkhya, and the founder of the system, Kapila, and for the literature relating to it, see the elaborate and excellent preface by Fitzedward Hall to his edition of the *Sânkhya-Prâvachana*, with the commentary of Vijnânabhikshu, in the *Bibliotheca Indica* (Calcutta, 1856); and see also his valuable *Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems* (Calcutta, 1859). Amongst essays on the Sânkhya philosophy, the most reliable still remains that by H. T. Colebrooke, reprinted from the *Transactions* of the Royal Asiatic Society, in his *Miscellaneous Essays* (London, 1837), vol. i. p. 227, ff.*

SANSCÂRA, OR SANSKÂRA.

SANSCARA, or SANSKARA (lit. completing, perfecting), is the name of the ten essential rites or ceremonies of the Hindus of the first three castes. They are the ceremonies to be performed at the conception of a child; on vitality in the fœtus, in the fourth, sixth, or eighth month of

* R. G. Bhandarkar, The Sânkhya Philosophy. Bombay, 1871. Weber, Ind. Lit., 252 ff.

pregnancy; and at the time of his birth, before dividing the navel string; the ceremony of naming the child on the tenth, eleventh, or hundred and first day; the ceremony of carrying the child out to see the moon on the third lunar day of the third light fortnight, or to see the sun in the third or fourth month; of feeding him in the sixth or eighth month (or at other stated periods); the ceremony of tonsure in the second or third year; of investiture with the string in the fifth, eighth, or sixteenth year—when he is handed to a *guru* to become a religious student; and the ceremony of marriage, after he has completed his studies, and is fit to perform the sacrifices ordained by his sacred writings.

SANSCR'IT.

Sanscr'it, or Sanskr'it (from the Sanscrit *sam*=Gr. *syn*, 'with, together,' and *kr'ita*, 'done,' with an epenthetic *s*, imparting greater emphasis to the sense of the compound; hence, 'thoroughly done, finished, accomplished') is the name of the ancient language of the Hindus; in which their whole sacred literature, and by far the greatest amount of their numerous ritual, legal, poetical, and scientific works are written. Sanscr'it belongs to that stock of languages commonly called the Indo-European, or Indo-Germanic, which includes the Indian, the Medo-Persian, the Græco-Latin, the Germanic, the Lithuanian-Slavonian, and the Gallo-Keltic families. It is therefore intimately allied to the ancient and modern languages comprised in each of these families, itself being the parent of the *Prâkr'it* (q. v.) dialects, the *Pâli*

(q. v), and the languages spoken in the north of India. Compared with the ancient languages kindred with it, Sanscr'it has come down to us in a state of preservation and development so much superior to theirs, that it must be looked upon as the principal means which enables us to understand the affinity, and in general the linguistic laws which pervade the structure of these languages. The essay of Franz Bopp, *Ueber das Conjugations-System der Sanskrit-Sprache,* dated 16th May, 1816, began a new era in the study of language.

There are two great periods into which the history of the Sanscr'it language may be conveniently divided: the first embracing the language as contained in the Vedic hymns (see Veda); and the second, that represented by the so-called classical Sanscr'it, in which the epic works, the law-codes, and the later literature are written. Between the two there is a transition period of the language, to which the Brâhma'na and ritual portion of the Vedas, and the Upânishads, may be assigned. In the language of the Vedic hymns, the grammar is less developed and much less settled than in the classical Sanscr'it; it contains, moreover, many forms which at the second period became obsolete, or altogether disappeared from use; the structure of its sentences, too, is simpler, though it is more elliptical than in classical poetry. Another main difference between the two periods lies in the sense of its words. Though this is the same in many words of the Vedic hymns and the classical literature, still there are numerous words, which, though the same in form at both periods, have a sense which differs according as it belongs to the one or the other class of writings. The difficulty thus presented by the Vedic hymns is in a great measure removed by the commentators who explain the meanings of the Vedic words, and, in doing so, follow tradition, which, considering the peculiarities of Hindu history, and also internal evidence, is in all probability immemorial, and therefore the safest if not the only guide

in the understanding of the oldest Vedic works. That their explanations may have become unsafe in some instances, would be but natural; but it is certain that these instances are the rare exceptions; and it is likewise certain that when modern Sanscritists—and several of these only imperfectly acquainted with Sanscrit grammar—have attempted to supersede those traditional meanings by interpretations which they suppose better suited to the context, or to some assumed etymology of their own, their rendering may better adapt the Vedic to the classical vocabulary, but is sure to falsify that understanding which the Hindu mind had of its oldest and most sacred works, and on which its further historical development is based. In the transition period of the Brâhmaṅa and ritual portion of the Vedas and the Upanishads, grammar and vocabulary offer similar difficulties to those of the Vedic hymns; but though for this reason the aid of the commentaries is likewise indispensable, they are much less numerous: and in those works of this extended period, which probably were composed at the classical epoch, the difference between the two is even inconsiderable. In comparing Sanscrit with other kindred languages, it is therefore necessary not to lose sight of these periods of the language, and of the peculiarities inherent in them.

SANSCRIT LITERATURE.

The most natural, and, at the same time, the most scientific distribution of Sanscrit literature would be that according to the dates at which its writings were composed. The actual condition of Sanscrit philology, however, renders such a course impossible; for, with the exception of a very few works, no date whatever is known to which they could be safely

assigned. (See India—*Religion;* Veda). In spite, therefore, of an apparent plausibility with which some authors have propounded a regular literary chronology of Sanscrit works, even with figures or dates appended to them, the general reader will do well to look upon all such dates as imaginary, and to rest satisfied with the hope, that perhaps future results of Sanscrit philology may afford a more satisfactory settlement of this vexed question of Sanscrit chronology. Under these circumstances, the only possible arrangement of Sanscrit literature is that suggested by their contents, irrespectively of the time at which they were composed, but, under each head, in that order which, within large margins, may be suggestive of consecutiveness.

1. *Religious Literature.*—It comprises, in the first place, the Vedas, and the mystical, philosophical, and ritual works connected with them (see Veda and Upanishad); and secondly, the Purân'as (q. v.) and Tantras (q. v.), besides prayer-books and smaller works, and treatises of less importance relating to the modern worship, based on the two latter classes of works.

2. *Law Literature.*—It is comprised under the name of *Dharma-s'âstra* (from *dharma*, law—religious and civil—and *s'âstra*, book), and its origin is traceable to the ritual Sûtras relating to the Vedas. A complete Dharmas'âstra consists of three portions: the first treating of *Âchâra*, or 'established rules of conduct,' comprising such matters as education, marriage, the funeral rites, the duties of a king, &c.; the second treating of *Vyavahâra*, or judicature, including law, private and criminal, and under the former, for instance, the law of inheritance and adoption; the third, on *Prâyas'chitta*, or penance, treating, besides this subject, also of impurity, the duties of a devotee, transmigration, and final beatitude. The chief extant representatives of this class are the codes of Manu (q. v.) and Yâjnavalkya (q. v.). Less complete than the latter—for it does not contain the Vyhavahâra portion—is the code of

Parâs'ara (q. v.); but it deserves special mention, as the modern Hindus consider it to have been especially composed for the requirements of the Kaliyuga, or the present mundane age, and as it is cited, therefore, as *the* authority, for instance, on the question, and in favour, of the remarriage of Hindu widows. For practical purposes, especially those concerning Vyavahâra, the chief actual authorities are the commentaries on Manu, *Yâjnavalkya*, and similar works, and the digests which have grown up from them. Amongst the former, the Mitâksharâ by Vijnânes'wara, occupies the principal rank; and amongst the latter, the *Chintâman'i*, *Viramitrodaya*, *Vyavahâra-mayûkha*, *Smr'itichandrikâ*, and *Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya*, which generally defer to the authority of the *Mitâksharâ*; and, besides these, the *Dâyabhâga* of Jîmûtavâhana, which, like the *Dâyatattwa* of Raghunandana, differs from it on several important questions, for instance, on that relating to the hereditary rights of women. As on the Vyavahâra, there are numerous smaller treatises on the Âchâra and Prâyas'chitta.

3. *Poetical Literature.*—*(a.)* The two great epic poems. See Râmâyan'a and Mahâbhârata.

(b.) The Modern Epic Poems.—Their subject-matter is entirely borrowed from the two great epic poems and other legendary works; and their only merit consists in the art bestowed by their authors on the versification, and all that relates to the æsthetical canon of Hindu poets, which, in some respects, may meet with the approbation of western critics, but, in others, would require in the European reader a total abnegation of his ideas of poetical beauty, in order to make these poems acceptable to him. Minute descriptiveness, elaborateness of diction, and an abundance of figures of speech, are some of the characteristics of these poems, amongst which those of Kâlidâsa approach nearest our standard of poetical worth. One of them, the *Bhat'tikâvya*, which relates to the history of Râma, was purposely composed for illustrating rules of grammar and formations of words of special interest.

In another, the *Râghava-Pân'd'avîya*, the ambiguity of the diction is so studied, that the poem may be interpreted as relating to the history of Râma, or other descendants of Das'aratha (see Râmâyan'a), or to that of the descendants of Pân'd'u (see Mahâbhârata). The following are the *Mahâ-kâvya* or great poems of this class: the *Raghuvans'a* and *Kumârasambhava*, by Kâlidâsa (q. v.); the *Nalodaya*, also ascribed, though probably wrongly, to the same poet; the *Bhat't'ikâvya* or the poem by Bhat't'i; the *S'is'upâlabadha*, by Mâgha, hence also called the *Mâghakâvya;* the *Naishadhîyacharita*, by S'rîharsha; the *Kirâtârjunîya*, by Bhâravi; and the *Râghava-Pân'd'avîya*, by Kavirâja (i. e., the prince of poets), as the author calls himself.

(*c.*) *Lyric and Erotic Poetry.*—Several works of this class are more of a descriptive character, and would differ therefore from what in European poetry might be included under this head. The principal works belonging to it are the following: the *R'itusanhâra*, or a description of the seasons, attributed to Kâlidâsa (q. v.); the *Meghadûta*, or the cloud-messenger, also supposed to have been written by Kâlidâsa—a poem in which a demigod, separated by fate from his wife, is imagined to make a cloud the messenger to her of his woes, and incidentally, as it were, describes his course over a large tract of India; the *Amaru-s'ataka*, or hundred stanzas of Amaru, on amatory feelings and scenes, the natural sense of which commentators have twisted also into one of a mystical character, so as to make them appear less objectionable, especially as they were supposed by some to have been composed by the celebrated theologian S'ankara, when he had animated the dead body of King Amaru (see S'ankara); these stanzas have an epigrammatic character, and share in this respect the style of the first S'ataka, or hundred verses on love, by Bhartr'ihari; the *Bhâminîvilâsa*, by Jagannâtha Pan'd'itarâja, in four books, the second of which is connected with amatory subjects, while the third is a beautiful elegy on the death

of the poet's wife; the *Gîtagovinda*, by Jayadeva, who probably lived in the 12th c., which, in ten sections, describes the amours of Kr'ishn'a with the cowherdesses, his separation from his wife Râdhâ, and his ultimate reconciliation with her, and which, like the *Amarus'ataka*, has also been explained in a mystical sense, Kr'ishn'a then being represented as the soul which for a time becomes estranged from the supreme soul, its original source, but finally returns to it. This poem differs from those mentioned before in being intended for singing and for representation at a festival held in honour of Vishn'u; it combines the lyric and the melo-dramatic character.

(*d.*) *Didactic Poetry.*—A portion of this class of poetry may be included under the former head, since even such works as the *Amarus'ataka*, and the erotic stanzas of *Bhartr'ihari* have much of the sententious character; another is contained in the episodes of the *Mahâbhârata*, and another forms a considerable portion of the books of fables. The chief special representatives of this class are, 'the three *S'atakas*,' or hundred stanzas on love, good and wise conduct, and renunciation of worldly desires, by Bhartr'ihari. Similar pieces of poetry are the hundred stanzas of *Chânakya*, and some stanzas in the anthology of *S'ârngadhara*, called the *S'ârngadharapaddhati*. Others have been collected in various modern anthologies, such as the *Nîtisankalana*, and the *Kavitâmr'itakûpa*. For the poem *Bhagavadgîtâ*, see under Yoga.

(*e.*) *Dramas.*—The plays of the Hindus are not numerous; they were only acted on special occasions, and the subject of the plot is with predilection borrowed from the legendary literature of ancient India. Hindu dramatists have little regard for unity of time, place, and action; and with the exception of Kâlidâsa, they must be considered as inferior in poetical worth to the renowned dramatic writers of ancient Greece and of modern Europe. Besides the reasons to be sought for in the religious, mystical, and metaphysical tendencies of the Hindu mind, a

free development of the Hindu drama was probably also impeded by the heavy and artificial canon which weighed upon Hindu dramaturgy, and which, ascribed to sacred sources, and looked upon as a law not to be transgressed by any dramatic poet, did not allow much scope for poetical imagination, and would keep down any free movement upon which it might have ventured. The various kinds of dramatic performances, the number of their acts, the characters of the plays, the conduct of the plot, the sentiments to be represented, and even the modes of diction—all these were strictly regulated; so much so, that in spite of the differences which must exist between different authors and plays, there is still a kind of uniformity which pervades the whole Hindu drama, and must strike any one unacquainted with this elaborate dramatical canon. It must suffice here to mention a few of its peculiarities. All dramatic composition is divided, according to it, into two great classes—the *Rûpaka* or performance, and the *Uparûpaka*, or the minor *Rûpaka*: the former containing ten species, from the *Nâṭ'aka*, or the play, *par excellence*, which represents exalted personages, down to the *Prahasana*, or farcical comedy; and the latter with eighteen species. Neither class contains the species 'tragedy'—which is incompatible with a belief in fate, one of the main features of the Hindu mind. Every drama opens with a prelude in the form of a dialogue between the stage-manager and one of his company, in which the name of the author and of his work, and such prior events as the spectators should know, are brought before the audience. The first part of this prelude is a prayer invoking the benediction of some deity in favour of the assembly. The piece being thus opened, is then carried on in the usual manner; but so long as the same act lasts, the stage is never left empty, but the entrance of a new personage is always announced by a special person. The piece closes as it began, with a benediction. The principal characters of the play are the hero (*nâyaka*)

and the heroine (*nâyikâ*). The former is either *lalita*, gay, thoughtless, and good-humoured; or *s'ânta*, gentle and virtuous; or *dhîrodâtta*, high-spirited, but temperate and firm; or *udâtta*, ardent and ambitious; but as each of these categories is again subdivided, they become multiplied to 144 kinds. Equal minuteness is displayed in specifying the classes of the heroines. The hero has his antagonist in the *pratinâyaka*, or counter-hero; and each of these may have his officers, ministers, and friends. The heroine, on her part, has always a confidential companion, who is often her foster-sister. The subordinate characters are described as being eunuchs, mutes, dwarfs, foresters or barbarians. Two characters, however, deserve special notice, as being peculiar to the Hindu stage—the *Vit'a* and the *Vidûshaka*. The *Vit'a* may be the companion of a man or woman; he is generally on familiar, yet dependent terms, with his associate, and though somewhat like the parasite of the Greek comedy, yet not rendered contemptible; if a female, she is a courtesan. The *Vidûshaka* is the humble companion of a prince or man of rank; he is always lively, sometimes witty, and, according to the definition of his attributes, he is to excite mirth by being ridiculous in person, age, and attire. He is, curiously enough, always a Brâhman. The plays have eight, or, according to some, nine *rasa*, or characteristic flavours: these *rasas* are love, mirth, tenderness, fierceness, heroism, terror, disgust, wonder, and tranquillity; and they again consist of conditions with numerous divisions and subdivisions. The manner according to which the form of speech is regulated, is another peculiarity of the Hindu drama. Only the hero and the principal personages speak Sanscrit, but women—with rare exceptions—and the inferior personages speak Prâkr'it; the various, higher or inferior, idioms of that language being adapted to their higher or inferior character. See Prâkr'it. The oldest known Sanscrit drama is the *Mr'ichchhakat'i*, or 'the Clay Cart,' by King S'ûdraka, which, in the

opinion of H. H. Wilson—who translated it in his *Select Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindus*—was written in the 1st century B.C. Of other dramas may here be mentioned *Abhijnânas'akuntalâ*, (see Sakuntalâ) and *Vikramorvas'î*, by Kâlidâsa (q. v.), to whom also the drama *Mâlavikâgnimitra* is attributed; *Mâlatîmâdhava*, *Mahavîracharita*, and *Uttararâmacharita*, by Bhavabhûti; *Ratnâvalî*, by S'rîharsha; *Mudrârâkshasa*, by Vis'âkhadatta; *Hanumannât'aka*, fabled to have been composed by the monkey Hanumat (q. v.); and *Anargharâghava*, by Murâri. A drama of peculiar nature is the *Prabodhachandrodaya*, by Kr'ishn'amis'ra, who, in the opinion of Goldstücker, expressed in the preface to his translation of this drama, lived at the end of the 12th century. Its leading personages are all of a transcendental kind; such as the supreme spirit, faith in Vishńu, volition, organ of imagination, opinion, devotion, quietude, friendship, &c., on the one side; and error, egotism, hypocrisy, love, voluptuousness, anger, avariciousness, &c., on the other; and its object is to represent the victory of the former over the latter. The general dulness of the play is relieved by a number of sectarian worshippers, who appear on the scene, each eulogising the truth of his own religion, and ridiculing that of his antagonist. That this drama, which would baffle the patience of a European audience, was acted 'before King Kîrtivarman, who, with his whole assembly, was very eager to see it,' the poet relates in the prelude to it. An imitation of this drama is the *Chaitanyachandrodaya*, by Kavikarn'apura. For the translation of several of these dramas, and an account of others, see H. H. Wilson's *Select Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindus* (2 vols., London, 1835).

(*f.*) *Fables and Narratives.*—Fables, as such, occur, and are referred to, as early as in the great epic poems; but the oldest *collection* of fables is the *Panchatantra*; and after it, the *Hitopades'a*. These works are considered by the Hindus to belong to the class called

nîtis'âstra, or works on conduct and polity, since the morals drawn from the fables, and expressed in sententious verses, with which they are interwoven, are the object for which these collections were made. A different class of writings are the ghost-stories, merely composed for amusement, such as the *Vetâlapanchavins'ati*, or the 25 tales of the vampire; and the *S'ukasaptati*, or the 70 tales of the parrot; and the *S'inhâsanadwâtrins'ati*, or the 32 tales of the statues on the throne of Vikramâditya. A work of a higher order is the *Vr'ihatkathâ*, the "Grand Tale," or *Kathâsaritsâgara*, "the Ocean for the Rivers of Tales," by Somadeva of Cashmere. Amongst narratives of the romance class, the most celebrated are, the *Das'akumâracharitra*, or the "Adventures of the Ten Princes," by Dan'd'in, who lived about the middle of the 11th century, edited, with an elaborate preface, by H. H. Wilson; *Kâdambarî*, by Vâńabhatta; and the *Vâsavadattâ*, by Subandhu, a critical account of which work is given by Fitzedward Hall, in the preface to his edition of it (Calcutta, 1859).

(*g*). *Chronicles.*—Historical works, in the European sense of the word, do not exist in Sanskrit literature. The same causes which have clouded all Hindu chronology, and even, at recent periods of Hindu history, have transformed historical facts into myths, seemed to have rendered the Hindu mind indifferent to the research and the recording of *historical* truth. The only approach to historical works is found in some chronicles, though these, also, are not devoid of fictitious narratives. The most renowned among them is the *Râjatarangin'î* (q. v.), or the Chronicle of Cashmere, by Kalhana. A modern work of a similar kind, but of much smaller extent, is the *Kshitîs'avans'âvalîcharita*, or the Chronicle of a series of royal families who reigned in Bengal. It was composed in the middle of the last century.

4. *Scientific Literature.*—(*a.*) *Philosophy.* See the articles Sânkhya, Yoga, Nyâya, Vaiś'eshika, Mîmânsâ, Vedânta.

(*b*). *Grammar.*—That a scientific study of grammar was cultivated at a very early period of Hindu literature, is borne out by the testimony of the oldest glossator on the Vedas, Yâska (q. v.). The oldest extant work, however, on Sanskrit grammar is posterior to the work of Yâska; it is the grammar of Pân'ini (q. v.), which was criticised by Kâtyâyana (q. v.) in the *Vârttikas*, these, again, being commented on and criticised by Patanjali in the *Mahâbhâshya*. (See Pân'ini, where some of the principal later works connected with his system are mentioned.) That the *Prâtis'âkhyas* (see Veda) did not precede the grammar of Pân'ini, has been shown by Goldstücker in his *Pân'ini, his Position in Sanscrit Literature*, &c. Of authors of grammars, not following the technical system of Pân'ini, the principal are, Hemachandra, a Jaina writer, and Vopadeva, who probably lived about six centuries ago, and is especially esteemed in Bengal.*

(*c*). *Lexicography.*—It consists of glossaries of words and *dhâtus*—a term which may be vaguely rendered by "roots," or "radicals," though it does not imply, to the Hindu grammarian, the idea of a linguistic *element*—and of commentaries on these glossaries. The oldest known glossary of *Vedic* words—nouns and verbs—is the *Nirukta* (q. v.) of Yâska. Renowned glossaries of *classical* words are the *Amarakosha*, by Amarasinha, who is probably not later than the 3rd century after Christ; *Abhidhânaratnamâlâ*, by Halâyudha; the *Haimakosha*, by Hemachandra; and *Vis'waprakâs'a*, by Mahes'wara. (For other works of this class, see Wilson's *Sanskrit English Dictionary*, preface to 1st ed., 1819;† and Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i. p. 50, ff.)‡ The glossaries of *dhâtus* are called *Dhâtupât'has*. The oldest was probably composed by Pân'ini himself, and is the groundwork of the

* Colebrooke, Misc. Ess., II.², p. 33 ff. Burnell, Cat. of Tanjore, MSS., p. 37 ff.

† Works, vol. V., p. 158 ff.

‡ Second ed., vol. II., p. 46 ff. Burnell, l.l., p. 44, b ff.

existing works of this name, though the latter contain numerous additions of later forms. The chief commentary on the *Dhâtupât'ha* is that by the celebrated Mâdhavâchârya (q. v.)

(*d.*) *Prosody.*—Sanskrit prosody admits three sorts of metre: one governed by the number of syllables, and which is mostly uniform, or monoschematic, in profane poetry, but not so in various passages of the Vedas; the other regulated by feet equivalent to two long syllables, or to four short; and the third regulated by the proportion of syllabic instants, without noticing the number of feet. Some Sûtras (q. v.) connected with the Vedas contain rules on the Vedic metres; but the principal work on Vedic as well as profane prosody is the *Chhandah'-s'âstra*, by Pingala, which has been commented on by various writers, the most conspicuous of whom is Halâyudhabhat't'a. A short treatise on prosody, which only exhibits the most common sorts of metre, the *S'rutabodha*, is attributed, but probably wrongly, to Kâlidâsa (q. v.)

(*e.*) *Art of Poetry.*—It is treated in works on dramaturgy, and works on the poetical art in general. The oldest work on the dramatic art is the *Sûtra* of Bharata; a later one is the *Das'arûpa* by Dhananjaya. Some of the principal works of the latter category are the *Kâvya-prakâs'a*, by Mammat'a, the *Kâvyâdars'a*, by Dan'd'in, and the *Sâhityadarpan'a*, by Vis'wanâtha Kavirâja. Several other works of this class are especially concerned in the explanation of figures of speech.

(*f.*) *Works on Music.*—In general, they treat of notes, musical scales, melodies, the art of singing, and musical instruments; and some of them also of the art of dancing and performing. The melodies, or *Râgas*, are represented as deities, who have wives, the *Râgin'îs*. Their number is uniform in the different works, and it is probable that the passages in dramas and other poetical works intended for singing were written to suit these fixed melodies, and not that the melodies were

composed after the poet had performed his task. The principal works of this kind are the *Sangîtaratnâkara*, by Sârngadeva, the *Sangîtadarpan'a*, by Dâmodara, and the *Sangîtadâmodara*, by S'ubhankara. Special treatises relate to the melodies alone.

(*g.*) *Amatory Art.*—Works treating of this art purport methodically to explain and to classify all that relates to love, and they refer for many of their statements to the oldest authorities. The chief work on this subject is the *Kâma-Sûtra* of Vâtsyâyana.

(*h*). *Astronomy and Arithmetic.*—The calendars connected with the Vedas are the earliest evidence of Hindu proficiency in astronomy; they presuppose a knowledge of a solar year of 365 days, and their date is assumed by Colebrooke to belong to the 13th century B.C., while others would place them a few centuries later. The scientific works of later Hindu astronomers are professedly based on five ancient systems, or Siddhântas, called the Paulis'a-, Romaka-, Vâs'isht'ha-Saura-, and Paitâmaha-Siddhânta; and the earliest renowned author among these astronomers is Âryabhat't'a, who, according to Colebrooke's calculation, did not live later than the 5th century after Christ. From the quotations by Brahmagupta, it appears that Âryabhat't'a "affirmed a diurnal revolution of the earth on its axis, that he possessed the true theory of the causes of lunar and solar eclipses, and that he noticed the motion of the solstitial and equinoctial points, but restricted it to a regular oscillation, of which he assigned the limit and the period." See, for further detail, Colebrooke's *Algebra*, &c. (Lond. 1817, p. 38).* His principal work, the *Âryâsht'as'ata*, is at present only known from the quotations of Brahmagupta, Bhat't'otpala, and others; but his other works, the *Das'agîtikâ* and *Âryabhat't'îya*, are extant. Varâhamihira, the next important astronomical writer, a native of Ujjayini, lived about the beginning of the 6th century after Christ. His compilation of the five Siddhântas, the *Panchasiddhântika*, is not yet

* Miscell. Essays, II.^{2}. p. 281—480.

recovered; but several of his astrological treatises, and the scholia on them by Bhat't'otpala or Utpala are preserved, and his *Br'ihatsanhitâ* has been recently edited by Dr. H. Kern (Calc. 1865). Another great astronomical authority is Brahmagupta, who appears to have written towards the close of the sixth, or the beginning of the following century; his work bears the title of *Brahmasiddhânta;* and it was followed up by Bhâskara, who, in the middle of the 12th century, composed a celebrated work, the *Siddhântas'iroman'i*, translated by Lancelot Wilkinson (Calc. 1861). The *Sûryasiddhânta* has been edited by Fitzedward Hall (Calc. 1859); and two translations of it are due, one to E. Burgess, in the *Journal* of the American Oriental Society, accompanied with notes by Whitney (New Haven, 1860); another to Bâpûdeva S'âstri (Calc. 1861); but whether this Siddhânta is the Saura, one of the five original Siddhântas above mentioned, or a later work bearing a similar title, is matter of doubt.* That Hindu astronomy is largely indebted for its progress to the kindred sciences of western nations, may be inferred from the occurrence in Sanskrit of terms which are of Arabic and Greek origin. Thus, the terms *horâ, dreshkân'a, liptâ, kendra,* &c., are easily traced to the Greek *hōra, dekanos, lepta, kentron,* &c.—That works on Hindu astronomy contain more or fewer chapters or passages which no longer concern astronomy, but belong to the sphere of astrology, can be no matter of surprise, considering the intimate connection in which, in India, religion and superstition stand to every branch of human knowledge, and much more especially to one concerning the heavenly bodies. There are, moreover, numerous works which are purely astrological, merely treating of nativities and the influence of the planets on certain periods of the day or month, and the occurrences that would take place at them. Among celebrated writers

† Bhau Daji in Jour. R. As. Soc., N.S., I., 392 ff.

on algebra, it must here suffice to name Varâhamihira and Bhâskara. See Colebrooke's *Algebra*, as quoted above.

(*i*). *Medicine.*—The origin of Hindu medicine is referred to the god Brahman, from whom the Âyurveda, or "the science of long life," was obtained by Daksha, who communicated it in his turn to the As'wins. Some time after this, mankind, in consequence of their wickedness, becoming afflicted with numerous diseases, the Munis, or saints, met in the Himalaya Mountains to search for a remedy. A long list of these saints is given by *Charaka*, one of the greatest medical writers, and it is so far of interest as it contains several names known in Hindu history, and which thus may be probably connected with the early study of Hindu medicine. The two greatest medical authorities the works of whom are still extant are *Charaka* and *Sus'ruta*. Both treat of the duties of physicians and their pupils, of anatomy and physiology; hygeology; materia medica, pharmacy, and preparations of medicine; surgery; the diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of a considerable number of diseases; midwifery, toxicology, &c. Several chapters in them are devoted to omens and portents, as well as to the evil influence of planets and demons on the human body. Charaka, who is older than Sus'ruta, contains more mythological detail than the latter. Of the authorities quoted by Charaka, Âtreya seems still preserved in a work, the *Atreyasanhitâ*, which is far less scientific and complete than either the work of Charaka or Sus'ruta, and therefore appears to have preceded them.—See also T. A. Wise, *Commentary on the Hindu System of Medicine* (London, 1860).*

(j). *Architecture.*—Treatises on architecture, sculpture, &c., are collectively called *S'ilpas'âstra*. There appear to have been 32, or, according to some, 64 standard treatises on these arts, but of these

* Haas in Zeitschrift der d. Morg Ges., xxx., 617 ff. A translation of Charaka, accompanied with the Sanskrit text, is in progress in "the Calcutta Journal of Medicine."

only a few are probably still in existence. The most important of them is the *Mânasâra,* which consists of 58 chapters, each of which is devoted to a particular topic—such as measures used in architecture; the different sites to be selected for building temples and houses; the mode of determining the different points of the compass; the several sorts of villages, towns, and cities, with directions for building them; the different parts of an edifice, its ornaments, pedestals, bases, pillars, &c.; the various sorts of temples; the construction of porticoes, gates, palaces, &c.; the construction of images, and cars in which the gods are carried in procession, together with the ceremonies attending the consecration of images; the mode of determining the propitious moment for commencing to lay the foundation of an edifice, &c. See, for further detail, Râm Râz, *Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus* (London, 1834).

For a more copious supply of titles of books on the subjects mentioned, the reader may consult Gildemeister, *Bibliotheca Sanscrita*, Bonn (1847), and the printed catalogues of the Library of the India Office, of the Sanskrit MSS. of the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and of the Sanskrit MSS. of the Royal Library at Berlin.*

S'IVA.

S'IVA (a Sanskrit word, literally meaning happy, auspicious) is the name of the third god of the Hindu Trimûrti (q. v.) or triad, in which he represents the principle of destruction. The name S'iva, as that of a deity, is unknown in the Vedic hymns, but established as such in the epic poems, *Purân'as* and *Tantras*. The worshippers of S'iva (see S'AIVAS) assign to him the first place in the Trimûrti; and to them he

* Weber, Indische Literaturgeschichte, 2 ed., 1876; Haas, Catalogue of Sanskrit and Pali Books in the British Museum. 1876.

is not only the chief deity, but the deity which comprises in itself all other deities. Thus, in the *S'iva-Purân'a* (see PURAN'A), he is addressed as Brahmâ, Vishn'u, Indra, Varun'a, as the sun and the moon, as earth, fire, water, wind, &c.; but even in the Purân'as relating to Vishn'u, his power is exalted in praise, and he is addressed with the utmost awe. The symbol of S'iva is the *Linga*, emblematic of creation, which follows destruction. From each of his numerous attributes or characteristics he derives a name or epithet. He has five heads (hence his name, *Panchânana*, &c., the five-faced); three eyes (hence his name, *Trinetra*, &c., the three-eyed), one of which is on his forehead, and indicates his power of contemplation; and in the middle of his forehead he wears a crescent. His hair is clotted together, and brought over the head so as to project like a horn from the forehead. On his head he carries the Ganges, whose course he intercepted by his hair, when this river descended from heaven, so as to enable the earth to bear its fall (hence his name, *Gangâdhara*, &c., the Ganges-bearer.) Round his neck he carries a garland of human skulls; and his throat is dark blue, from the poison which he swallowed when it emerged from the ocean, churned by the gods for the attainment of the beverage of immortality, and threatened to destroy the world. In his hands he holds the trident, a club or pole, armed at the upper end with transverse pieces, representing the breastbone and ribs adjoining, and surmounted by a skull and one or two human heads. His weapons are the *Khinkhira*, which is not described, a bow called *Ajakava*, or *Ajagava*, a thunderbolt, and an axe. As the destroyer of the world, he is also called *Kâla* (Time or Death), and represented as of black colour. One of his representations is also half-male and half-female, emblematic of the indissoluble unity of the creative principle (hence his name, *Ardhanârîs'a*, the half-female-lord.) He is clothed in a deer-skin; or he also holds a deer in one of his hands; or he sits on a tiger-skin, or is clothed in it. When riding, his vehicle

is the bull Nandi, whom he also carries as an emblem in his banner. He resides on the wonderful mount Kailâsa, the northern peak of the Himalaya, where he also rules over the north-east quarter. His principal wife is *Durgâ* or *Umâ;* his sons are GANEṢ'A and KARTTIKEYA. One of his principal attendants is *Tan'd'u*, who is one of the original teachers of the arts of dancing and mimicry, whence S'ivas is the patron of the dancers, and is called *Na'tes'wara* (lord of the dancers.) Besides Tan'd'u, a host of other attendants and companions, together with demons and other beings surrounding him, are named by the Purâṇ'as.

Amongst the principal achievements of this god is his conflict with the god Brahmâ, who was originally possessed of five heads, but lost one through exciting the anger of S'iva; for the fifth head of Brahmâ once disrespectfully addressing S'iva, and even challenging his power, S'iva immediately cut off the offending member with the nail of his left thumb. A similar penalty he inflicted on *Daksha*, his father-in-law, who once performed a great sacrifice, but neither invited his daughter Satî nor her husband S'iva. S'iva, nevertheless, appeared at the sacrifice; but when Satî, offended at the reception she met with, threw herself into the sacrificial flames, S'iva cut off the head of Daksha; and Daksha would have remained headless, had not the gods interfered in his favour with S'iva, who, out of compassion, replaced his head by that of a ram. Besides these feats, he killed several demons—*Ruru*, *Andhaka*, *Tripura;* and he also reduced to ashes *Kâma* (the god of love), who, at the instigation of the gods, undertook to excite the desire of S'iva to procreate a son, but was indiscreet enough to choose for this purpose a time when S'iva was engaged in fierce austerities. S'iva is especially worshipped under the symbol of the Linga; but there are periods at which homage is paid to him also, under other forms, corresponding with the description given above. Hindu mythology knows, properly speaking, no incarnations of S'iva like those of Vishn'u; in some writings, however, some

of his forms, especially that called Bhairava, and that called Vîrabhadra, are considered to be his sons or incarnations. S'iva, like Vishn'u (q. v.) has a thousand names by which he is addressed; some derived from his exterior attributes have been mentioned before; among the rest, the principal are *I's'a* or *I's'wara* (lord); *Mahes'a* or *Mahes'wara* (the great lord); *S'ankara* (the conferrer of happiness); *Rudra* (the terrible), or *Mahârudra* (the very terrible) and *Mahâdeva* (the great god.) For his worshippers, see S'AIVAS.*

SOMA.

SOMA ("the moon plant," or *Asclepias acida*) is, in the Vedic hymns, the god who represents this plant, and one of the most popular deities of the Vedic religion. The reason for this popularity must be sought for in the important part which the juice of the Soma plant played in the great Vedic sacrifices, and probably also in its alcoholic and invigorating properties, which the sacrificer experienced when he drank of it in the exercise of his functions. These properties are constantly described or alluded to in the hymns addressed to Soma. Thus, in some hymns, Soma is said to exhilarate Varun'a, Mitra, Indra, and the other gods who partake of its juice; and in another, the worshippers exclaim: "We have drunk the Soma; we have become immortal: we have entered into light; we have known the gods. What can an enemy now do to us, or what can the malice of any mortal effect?" In other passages, the juice of the Soma is said to be a draught of immortality, medicine for the sick, and a remedy for blindness and lameness. Thus Soma

* Wurm, "Geschichte der Indischen Religion," p. 125, ff.; Ziegenbalg "Genealogie der Malabarischen Götter," p.47, ff.

became endowed with supernatural qualities and divine attributes, and gradually was exalted as one of the most powerful deities. He is the friend, helper, and soul of Indra; he is the slayer of the cloud-demon Vr'itra, the destroyer of foes, the dispeller of darkness, the creator of the sun, the upholder of the sky, and the sustainer of the earth, the king of gods and men; he is thousand-eyed, the most heroic of heroes; he is wise, strong, energetic, &c. See the interesting article on Soma by John Muir, in his "Contributions to a Knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology," in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, new series, vol. i., pp. 135, ff. In the classical period of Hinduism, Soma ceases to be worshipped in the character which he has at the Vedic period; he then becomes the god of the moon. This transition from Soma, the plant and its juice, to Soma, the moon, which is perceptible even as early as in the S'atapatha Brâhmaña of the White Yajurveda (see VEDA), is apparently due to the belief, that *Amr'ita*, the beverage of immortality, was guarded by the moon, and to the circumstance that, in the Vedic hymns, Soma is frequently called or described as *Amr'ita*. The myths connected with Soma, the moon, are wholly different from those relating to the Vedic Soma. As moon, Soma was born from the eyes of Atri, a son of Brahman, the first god of the Trimûrti (q. v.); and became installed by Brahman as the sovereign of plants, Brâhman'as, and planets. But after he had acquired extensive dominion, he became arrogant and licentious, and carried off Târâ (lit., a star), the wife of Vr'ihaspati, the preceptor of the gods. Vr'ihaspati seeking to recover his bride, and some of the gods siding with him, and others with Soma, a war broke out, which ended in Târâ's being restored to her husband. The result, however, of her stay with Soma was the birth of a son named Budha, who became the ancestor of a dynasty of kings, called the lunar dynasty.*

* Weber, "Ind. Stud.," x., 352, ff.; Muir, "Sanskrit Texts," II., 469, ff.; III., 264, ff.; V., 258, ff. Kittel, "A Tract on Sacrifice," Mangalore, 1872, p. 35, ff.

S'RÂDDHA.

S'RADDHA (from the Sanskrit *s'raddhâ*, faith, belief) is the name of the funeral ceremony of the Hindus, in which balls of food, and water, are offered to the deceased ancestors of the sacrificer, or to the *Pitr'is* or manes collectively. It is especially performed for a parent recently deceased, or for three paternal ancestors, and is supposed necessary to secure the ascent and residence of the souls of the deceased in a world appropriated to the manes. But this ceremony is observed also on occasions of rejoicing as well as of mourning; and hence various S'râddhas are enumerated—viz., 1. S'râddhas which are *constant*, or the daily offerings to the manes in general, and those offered on the eighth lunation of every month; 2. S'râddhas which are *occasional*, as those for a relative recently deceased, or those to be performed on various domestic occurrences, as the birth of a son, &c.; and 3. S'râddhas which are *voluntary*, performed for a special object, such as the hope of religious merit, &c. The proper seasons for the worship of the manes collectively are the dark fortnight or period of the moon's wane, the day of new moon, the summer and winter solstices, eclipses, &c. The presentation of the ball of food to the deceased, and to his progenitors in both lines, is the office of the nearest male relative, *and is the test and title of his claim to the inheritance.*—See for further detail, H. H. Wilson's *Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms* (London, 1855), under *S'râddha.**

* Further on the article "On the Deficiencies in the present Administration of Hindu Law."

SU'TRA.

SUTRA (from the Sanskrit *siv*, to sew, literally, therefore, a thread or string) is, in Sanskrit Literature, the technical name of aphoristic rules, and of works consisting of such rules. The importance of the term will be understood from the fact, that the *groundworks* of the whole ritual, grammatical, metrical, and philosophical literature of India are written in such aphorisms, which therefore constitute one of the peculiarities of Hindu authorship. The object of the Sûtras is extreme brevity; and, especially in the oldest works of this class, this brevity is carried to such an excess, that even the most experienced would find it extremely difficult, and sometimes impossible, to understand these aphorisms without the aid of commentaries, which, however, are fortunately never wanting, wherever a work is written in this style. Though there is no positive evidence as to the cause or causes which gave rise to this peculiarity of Hindu composition, the method of teaching in ancient India—an account of which is afforded in some of the oldest works—renders it highly probable that these Sûtras were intended as memorial sentences which the pupil had to learn by heart, in order better to retain the fuller oral explanation which his teacher appended to them. But it is likewise probable that this method of instruction itself originated in the scarcity or awkwardness of the writing material used, and, in the necessity, therefore, of economising this material as much as possible; for that writing was known and practised at the remotest period of Hindu antiquity, is now placed beyond a doubt, though a startling theory was propounded, some years ago, to the effect that writing was unknown in India, even at the time of the great grammarian Pân'ini. The manner, however, in which, up to this day, the Hindus are in the habit of keeping the leaves of their

books together, seems to throw some light on the name given to this aphoristic literature. The leaves—generally narrow, and even at the present time often being dried palm leaves, on which the words are either written with ink or scratched with a style—are piled up, and, according to the length of the leaves, pierced in one or two places, when, through the hole or holes, one or two long *strings* are passed to keep them together. The name of Sûtra was probably, therefore, applied to works, not because they represent a thread or string of rules, but on account of the manner in which these works were rendered fit for practical use; just as in German a volume is called *Band*, from its being "bound." That a habit deeply rooted outlives necessity, is probably also shown by these Sûtra works; for while the oldest works of this class may be called Sûtras by necessity, there are others which convey the suspicion that they merely imitated the Sûtra style after the necessity had passed away, more especially as they do not adhere to the original brevity of the oldest Sûtras; and the Sûtras of the Buddhists (see Pit'aka), conspicuous for their prolixity, could scarcely lay claim to the term, if compared with the Sûtras of the Brahmanical literature.*

SUTTEE'.

SUTTEE' (an English corruption from the Sanskrit *satî*, a virtuous wife) means the practice which prevailed in India, of a wife burning herself on the funeral pile, either with the body of her husband, or separately, if he died at a distance *

* Weber, "Ind. Lit.," 2nd ed., p. 16.

The practice of suttee is based by the orthodox Hindus on the injunctions of their S'âstras, or sacred books, and there can be no doubt that various passages in their Purân'as and codes of law *countenance* the belief which they entertain of its meritoriousness and efficacy. Thus, the *Brahma-Purân'a* says: "No other way is known for a virtuous woman after the death of her husband; the separate cremation of her husband would be lost (to all religious intents). If her lord die in another country, let the faithful wife place his sandals on her breast, and, pure, enter the fire. The faithful widow is pronounced no suicide by the recited text of the R'igveda." Or the code of *Vyâsa*: "Learn the power of that widow who, learning that her husband has deceased, and been burned in another region, speedily casts herself into the fire," &c. Or the code of *Angiras*: "That woman who, on the death of her husband, ascends the same burning pile with him, is exalted to heaven, as equal in virtue to Arundhatî (the wife of Vasisht'ha). She who follows her husband (to another world) shall dwell in a region of joy for so many years as there are hairs on the human body, or 35 millions. As a serpent-catcher forcibly draws a snake from his hole, thus drawing her lord (from a region of torment), she enjoys delight together with him. The woman who follows her husband to the pile expiates the sins of three generations on the paternal and maternal side of that family to which she was given as a virgin. . . . . No other effectual duty is known for virtuous women, at any time after the death of their lords, excepting casting themselves into the same fire. As long as a woman (in her successive transmigrations) shall decline burning herself, like a faithful wife, on the same fire as her deceased lord, so long shall she be not exempted from springing again to life in the body of some female animal. When their lords have departed at the fated time of attaining heaven, no other way but entering the same fire is known for women whose virtuous conduct and whose thoughts

have been devoted to their husbands, and who fear the dangers of separation." See for other quotations, H. T. Colebrooke, *Digest of Hindu Law*, vol. ii. p. 451, ff. (Lond. 1801); and his "Essay on the Duties of a Faithful Hindu Widow," reprinted from the *Asiatic Researches* in his *Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i. (Lond. 1837).* But however emphatically these and similar passages recommend a wife to burn herself together with her deceased husband, it should, in the first place, be observed, that *Manu*, who, among legislators of ancient India, occupies the foremost rank, contains no words which enjoin, or even would seem to countenance, this cruel practice; and, secondly, that no injunction of any religious work is admitted by the orthodox Hindus as authoritative, unless it can shew that it is taken from, or based on, the revealed books, the Vedas (see S'ruti). An attempt has of late years been made by Râjâ Râdhakânt Deb, to show that, in a text belonging to a particular school of the black Yajurveda (see Veda) there is really a passage which would justify the practice of suttee; but in the controversy which ensued on this subject between him and the late Professor H. H. Wilson, it clearly transpired that the text cited by the learned Râjâ is of anything but indubitable canonicity; moreover, that there is a verse in the R'igveda which, if properly read, would enjoin a widow not to burn herself, but, after having attended the funeral ceremonies of her husband, to return to her home, and to fulfil her domestic duties, and it seems, at the same time, that merely from a misreading of a single word of this verse from the R'igveda, that interpretation arose which ultimately led to a belief and an injunction so disastrous in their results. See H. H. Wilson, "On the Supposed Vaidik Authority for the Burning of Hindu Widows, and on the Funeral Ceremonies of the Hindus," reprinted from the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xvi., in his Works, vol. ii., edited by Dr. Rost (Lond. 1862). That

* Second ed., I., 133, ff., with Professor Cowell's notes.

an immense number of widows have fallen victims to this erroneous interpretation of the oldest Vedic texts, is but too true. Some thirty years ago, however, the East India Company took energetic measures to suppress a practice which it was perfectly justified in looking upon as revolting to all human feelings, and which it would have likewise been entitled to consider as contrary to the spirit of the Vedic religion. This practice may now be said to have been successfully stopped; for though, from habit and superstition, even now-a-days cases of suttee occur, they are extremely rare; and all reports agree that the enlightened natives everywhere, except, perhaps, in certain native states, support the action of government to repress this evil of bygone times.

TANTRA.

TANTRA (from the Sanskrit *tan*, to believe, to have faith in; hence, literally, an instrument or means of faith) is a name of the sacred works of the worshippers of the female energy of the god S'iva. See S'AKTAS. A Tantra is said to comprise five subjects—the creation and destruction of the world, the worship of the gods, the attainment of all objects, magical rites for the acquirement of six superhuman faculties, and four modes of union with spirit by meditation. A variety of other subjects, however, are introduced into many of them, whilst some are limited to a single topic, as the mode of breathing in certain rites, the language of birds, beasts, &c. They always assume the form of a dialogue between S'iva and his wife, in one of her many forms, but mostly as *Umâ*, or *Pârvatî* in which the goddess questions the god as to the mode of performing various ceremonies, and the *mantras*, or prayers and

incantations to be used in them. These he explains at length, and under solemn cautions that they involve a great mystery, on no account whatever to be divulged to the profane. The efficacy of these *mantras* is deemed to be all-powerful, and according to some Tantras, that of the faith in these revelations of S'iva so great, as to free a believer from the consequences of even the most atrocious sins. The followers of the Tantras profess to consider them as a fifth Veda, and attribute to them equal antiquity and superior authority. Though such an antiquity, or even one approaching the age of the four Vedas, is entirely imaginary, the question of their date is nevertheless involved in obscurity. As Tantras are referred to in some of the *Purân'as*, they must have preceded these; but as, on the one hand, the age of the Purân'as themselves is merely conjectural, and as there probably existed older Purân'as than those we possess now; and, on the other hand, as there might likewise have been older Tantras, from which the works now so called were compiled, the circumstance that Tantras are quoted by some Purân'as would not throw much light on the date of those now extant. It seems more significant, however, that the oldest known author of a glossary of classical words, Amarasinha (see *Lexicography*, under SANSKRIT LITERATURE), should have omitted from amongst the meanings he assigns to the word *tantra*, that of "a sacred book;" whereas the later commentators on his work do not fail to supply this omission, which certainly would have been an extraordinary one had Tantras existed at the time of Amarasinha. If, then, this negative evidence has the value which it seems to have, the Tantras would, at all events, be later than the first centuries of the Christian era. The works of this class are very numerous, and it is to be regretted that Sanskrit philology, which has already investigated, more or less profoundly, nearly all the branches of Sanskrit literature, should hitherto have almost entirely neglected this particular branch of it. The principal Tantras are the *S'yâmâra-*

hasya, Rudrayâmala, Mantramahodadhi, S'âradâtilaka, and *Kâlikâtantra.* —See H. H. Wilson, *A Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, Works, vol. i. (London, 1862).*

TRIMU'RTI.

TRIMURTI (from the Sanskrit *tri*, three, and *mûrti*, form) is the name of the Hindu triad, or the gods *Brahman* (masculine), *Vishn'u*, and *S'iva*, when thought of as an inseparable unity, though three in form. The *Padma-Purân'a*, which, being a Purân'a of the Vaishn'ava sect, assigns to Vishn'u the highest rank in the Trimûrti, defines its character in the following manner:—"In the beginning of creation, the great Vishn'u, desirous of creating the whole world, became threefold: creator, preserver, and destroyer. In order to create this world, the supreme spirit produced from the right side of his body himself as Brahman; then, in order to preserve the world, he produced from the left side of his body Vishn'u; and in order to destroy the world, he produced from the middle of his body the eternal S'iva. Some worship Brahman, others Vishn'u, others S'iva; but Vishn'u, one, yet threefold, creates, preserves, and destroys; therefore, let the pious make no difference between the three." And the *Matsya-Purân'a*, where speaking of *Mahat*, or the intellectual principle of the Sânkhya philosophy (see SANKHYA), says that "Mahat becomes distinctly known as *three* gods through the influence of the three qualities, goodness, passion, and sin; being one person and three gods—viz., Brahman, Vishn'u, and S'iva." Apart, therefore, from sectarian belief, which makes its own god the

* Mon. Williams, "Indian Wisdom," pp. 501—505.

highest, and gives him the attributes also of the other gods, *Trimûrti* implies the unity of the three principles of creation, preservation, and destruction, and as such belongs more to the philosophical than to the popular belief. When represented, the Trimûrti is one body with three heads: in the middle, that of Brahman; at its right, that of Vishn'u; and at its left, that of S'iva. The symbol of the Trimûrti is the mystical syllable *om*, where (*o* being equivalent to *a* + *u*) *a* means Brahman; *u*, Vishn'u; and *m*, S'iva. See OM.

TRANSMIGRATION.

TRANSMIGRATION, or the passing from one place, state, or condition into another, means, in the theological acceptation of the term, the supposed transition of the soul after death into another substance or body than that which it occupied before. The belief in such a transition is one of the most important phases in the religions of mankind. It was common to the most uncivilised and the most civilised nations of the earth; it was the object of fantastical superstition, as well as that of philosophical speculation, and it is the property of both ancient and modern times. Its basis being the assumption that the human soul does not perish together with the body, it could belong to those nations only which had already conceived an idea of the immortality of the soul; but in proportion as such an idea is crude or developed, as it is founded merely on a vague fear of death, and a craving for material life, or on ethical grounds, and a supposed causal connection between this and a future life, the belief in transmigration assumes various forms, and influences more or less the actions of men.

The lowest forms of this belief are probably those met with among several tribes of Africa and America, which hold that the soul, immediately after death, must look out for a new owner, and, if need be, enter even the body of an animal. Several negro tribes entertain this belief; they assume that the soul will choose with predilection the body of a person of similar rank to that of its former owner, or a near relation of his; and they frequently therefore bury their dead near the houses of their relatives, in order to enable the souls of the former to occupy the newly-born children of the latter, and the princely souls to re-enter the princely family; and until the soul is thus accommodated, milk, brandy, and food are placed on the grave of the deceased, to keep it, as it were, from starving; and sometimes holes are dug in the grave, to facilitate the soul's egress from it. In North America, some tribes slaughter their captives, to feed with their blood such souls in suspense. The negro widows of Matamba are especially afraid of the souls of their husbands, for at the death of these they immediately throw themselves into the water, to drown their husbands' souls, which otherwise, as they suppose, would cling to them. The natives of Madagascar seem to have invented a kind of artificial transmigration, for in the hut where a man is about to die, they make a hole in the roof, in order to catch the outgoing soul, and to breathe it into the body of another man on the point of death. From these and instances of a similar kind, it will be seen that nations which entertain such a belief in transmigration, assume that the souls of the deceased must continue to dwell upon earth, and that one human being may be possessed of several souls. With them, the final destination of the soul is a matter of comparative indifference; its transition from one body into another a mere matter of chance, devoid —apparently, at least—of any ethical principle, and therefore without any moral effect on the living, except, perhaps, that of a stolid indifference to death, as often manifested in the plantations of the West Indies.

where negroes hang themselves, in the belief that their souls will migrate into other countries, and there enjoy a happier life.

Another, more poetical, and in some respect also, more ideal form of this belief in transmigration, is that which occurs in Germanic mythology, and is still entertained in some parts of Germany and England. According to it, the soul, before entering its divine abode, assumes certain forms, or animates certain objects, in which it lives for a short period. Thus, it is supposed to enter some flower or tree, a rose, a vine, a plantain, a pine tree; or to animate a butterfly, a pigeon, and sometimes also—if a person dies while enchanted or sleeping—a serpent, a weasel, or a mouse. The most popular form of these supposed transmigrations, however, is that of a pigeon, a representation of which bird, therefore, often occurs on the oldest tombstones. When the robber Madej, for instance, under an apple-tree confessed his crimes, one apple after another, transformed into a white pigeon, flew into the air. They were the souls of the persons murdered by him; only one apple remained because he had not yet confessed the murder of his father; but when he did so, the last apple also—the soul of his father—assuming the shape of a grey pigeon, flew after the rest.

Different from this kind of belief in transmigration is that which is based on ethical grounds. It proceeds from the theory, that the human souls, being of divine essence, are originally pure, but during their earthly career, lose of their purity; being destined, however, to regain their original quality, are reborn again and again, until they have become free from fault, and thus worthy of re-entering the place of their origin.

A belief of this nature was entertained by the old Mexicans, and probably also the Druids. It is met with in a more developed form with the old Egyptians; but its real importance it obtained as a tenet of the religion and philosophy of the Brahmanical Hindus and the Buddhists, whence it passed into the doctrine of several philosophers of ancient Greece, and into that of some Jewish and Christian sects.

The ethical and philosophical value which such a belief may have, is necessarily relative. It will depend on what a religion or philosophy may call right or wrong, virtue or sin; it will likewise depend on the notions which religion or philosophy may entertain on the origin of the human soul, on the cause of its first birth, and on its ultimate destination, whether this destination is the merging of the soul into the essence of its Creator, or a personal immortality; and again, the mode in which such a personal immortality is conceived, will also necessarily influence the mode in which transmigration is supposed to take place.

Where the ideas on these questions have remained crude, the idea of transmigration, too, is but of little ethical or philosophical worth. The old Mexicans imagine that the gods *Ometeuctli* and *Omecihuatl* create in heaven the soul of a child destined to be born, and that by its acts on earth it will either ascend to the abode of the highest felicity, or remain in an intermediate heaven, or fall to hell. The highest goal, situated in the house of the sun with the god *Huitzilopochtli*, is full of pleasure and joy, and is attained merely by the souls of fallen warriors, or those who died in captivity, and women dying in childbirth. The second or intermediate heaven, cool and pleasant, but of moderate enjoyments, falls to the lot of men who are not wicked. The wicked, however, go to the abode of darkness; and in darkness consists their punishment. But those entitled to the second heaven may, if they like, also return to earth, in order to qualify themselves for the highest heaven, if such is their aspiration.

Of the Druids, it is told by classical writers that they believed in the immortality of the soul, and in its migration after a certain period subsequent to death. Little is known of the manner in which they imagined such migrations to take place; but to judge from their religious system, there can be no doubt that they looked upon transmigrations as a means of purifying the soul, and preparing it for eternal life.

According to the doctrine of the old Egyptians, the human race origi-

nated after the pure gods and spirits had left the earth; and this they did because the demons, who inhabited the earth, had revolted against them, and therefore tainted it with guilt. But, in order to enable the demons to purge themselves of their guilt, the gods created earthly bodies, which the demons were sentenced to animate, so that by expiations they might regain their state of original purity. And these earthly bodies, united to the demons, are the human race; their souls were therefore created at the same time as that of the gods; and human life—the connexion of body and soul—is merely intended as a means of purifying the soul, which had rebelled against its divine nature. All the precepts regulating the course of life are laid down by the Egyptians for this end; and the judgment passed after death, in the palace of Osiris, decides whether it has been attained or not. If it has not, the soul must return to the earth again, to renew its expiations; and according to the nature and measure of the guilt which it had contracted during its previous career, it must form a new union with a human body, or with the body of an animal, or even a plant. But if the soul is declared pure by the judge of the dead, it gradually ascends through the various regions of heaven, to the highest abodes of the gods and pure spirits, presided over by Phtah and Neith.

At the time when in *India* the dogma of transmigration became an integral part of the Brahmanic religion, the Hindus believed that the human souls emanated from a supreme Being, which, as it were, in a state of bewilderment or forgetfulness, allowed them to become separate existences, and to be born on earth. The soul, thus severed from the real source of its life, is bound to return to it, or to become merged again into that divine substance with which it was originally one; but as its nature becomes contaminated with sin through its earthly career, it must, so long as it remains in this world, endeavour to free itself from all guilt, and thus to become fit for its ultimate destiny. Religion

teaches that this is done by the observance of religious rites, and a life in conformity with the precepts of the sacred books; philosophy, that the soul will be re-united with Brahman, if it *understands* the true nature of the divine essence whence it comes. So long, therefore, as the soul has not attained this condition of purity, it must be born again, after the dissolution of the body to which it was allied; and the degree of its impurity at one of these various deaths, determines the existence which it will assume in a subsequent life. See INDIA, sec. *Religion and Philosophy;* and UPANISHAD.

Since there can be no proof of the soul's migrations, the detail in which these are described in the religious works of the Hindus, is merely fantastical, and interesting only so far as it affords a kind of standard by which, at various epochs, and by different writers, the moral merit or demerit of human actions was measured in India. Thus, Manu (in the 12th book of his "Code of Laws)" teaches: "The slayer of a Brâhman'a —according to the degree of his guilt—is reborn as a dog, a boar, an ass, a camel, a bull, a goat, a sheep, a stag, a bird, a Chân'dâla, or a Pukkas'a. A Brâhman'a, who drinks spirituous liquor, will migrate into the bodies of a worm, an insect, a grasshopper, a fly feeding on ordure, or some mischievous animal. A twice-born who steals (the gold of a Brâhman'a), will pass a thousand times into the bodies of spiders, snakes, and chameleons, of aquatic monsters, or of murderous, blood-thirsty demons. He who violates the bed of his guru, will a hundred times migrate into the forms of grasses, of shrubs, and of creeping plants, of carnivorous animals and beasts with long teeth, or of cruel brutes. Those who inflict injury (on sentient beings), become flesh-eaters; and those who eat forbidden things, worms. Thieves become devourers of each other; and those who embrace women of the lowest castes, become ghosts. . . . . If a man, through covetousness, has stolen gems, pearl, or coral, or whatever belongs to the precious

substances, he is reborn in the tribe of goldsmiths; if he has stolen grain, he becomes a rat; if kânsya (a composition of zinc and copper), a *hansa* bird; if water, a diver; if honey, a gadfly; if milk, a crow; if juice (of the sugar-cane or the like), a dog; if clarified butter, an ichneumon; if flesh, a vulture; if fat, a shag; if oil, a cockroach; if salt, a cricket; if curds, the crane, called Valâkâ;" &c. A more general doctrine of the migration of souls is based by Hindu philosophers on the assumption of the three cosmic qualities of *sattwa*, i.e., purity or goodness; *rajas*, i. e., troubledness or passion; and *tamas*, i. e., darkness or sin, with which the human soul may become endued. And on this doctrine, again, Manu and other writers build an elaborate theory of the various births to which the soul may become subject. Manu, for instance, teaches that "souls endued with the quality of *sattwa*, attain the condition of deities; those having the quality of *rajas*, the condition of men; and those having the quality of *tamas*, the condition of beasts." Each of these conditions, he continues, is, according to the acts or knowledge of the soul, threefold: the lowest, the middle, and the highest. "The lowest embodiment of the quality *tamas* is inanimate objects, worms, insects, fish, serpents, tortoises, tame and wild beasts; the middle state, to which the same quality leads, is (the state of) an elephant, a horse, a S'ûdra, a Mlechchha or barbarian, a lion, a tiger, and a boar; the highest, that of a public performer, a bird, a cheat, a demon called Rakshas, and a vampire-demon. The lowest condition to which the soul imbued with the quality *rajas* arrives, is that of a cudgel-player, a boxer, a public dancer, a man who lives on the use of weapons, and one addicted to gambling and drinking; the middle condition, that of a king, a man of the Kshattriya or military caste, a house-priest of a king, and a man fond of learned controversy; the highest, that of a Gandharva or musician in Indra's heaven, a Guhyaka or Yaksha (two kinds of attendants on the god of riches), or another attendant on another

god, or an Apsaras or heavenly nymph in Indra's heaven. The lowest state procured by the quality of *sattwa* is that of a Vânaprastha—or a hermit of the third order of life—a religious mendicant, a Brâhman'a, or one of the demigods travelling about in palace-like cars, one of (the genii presiding over) the lunar mansions, or an offspring of Diti. The middle state, procured by the same quality, is that of a sacrificer, a Rishi (q. v.), a god of the lower heaven, (a deity personating one of) the Vedas, (a deity presiding over one of) the luminaries or years, one of the manes or progenitors of mankind, and of the demigods called Sâdhya. The highest condition to which the quality of *sattwa* leads us is that of the god Brahmâ, that of a creator of the world (as *Marîchi*, or another patriarch of the same rank), that of the genius of Dharma (virtue or right), of *Mahat*, or the intellectual principle of creation, and of *Prak'riti*, or matter." See SANKHYA.

It is not necessary here to show that this detail regarding the migrations of the souls is more or less differently given by other authors at other periods of Hindu religion, according to the views which they entertained of right and wrong, of the value and rank of imaginary or created beings, and of the social conditions of men. For, since all orthodox Hindu writers agree in principle with Manu, the quotations alleged from his work suffice to illustrate the imaginary positiveness with which the doctrine of transmigration was propounded, and to establish the conclusion that this doctrine rested in India on ethical grounds.

It has been already pointed out that the belief in the soul's life after the death of the body must precede the doctrine of transmigration. As such a belief, however, may be traced in some hymns of the *R'igveda* (see VEDA), it has been supposed that this doctrine, too, is as old as this Veda. But, apart from the uncertainty which still exists regarding not only the age, but even the relative age at which the different hymns of the *R'igveda* were composed, and setting aside the fallacy which

therefore attaches to speaking of this Veda as a contemporaneous whole, it is necessary to observe that the only passage which has been adduced in proof of this important discovery does not bear it out. It is the 32nd verse of the hymn I., 164, and, according to the translation of Professor Wilson (vol. ii., pp. 137, 138), runs as follows: "He who has made (this state of things) does not comprehend it; he who has beheld it, has it also verily hidden (from him); he, whilst yet enveloped in his mother's womb, *is subject to many births*, and has entered upon evil." But the word of the text, *bahuprajâh'*, rendered by Wilson, according to the commentator, "is subject to many births," may, according to the same commentator, also mean, "has many offsprings." or "has many children;" and as the latter sense is the more literal and usual sense of the word, whereas the former is artificial, no conclusion whatever regarding the doctrine of transmigration can safely be founded on it.

The Buddhistic belief in transmigration is derived from that of the Brahmanic Hindus; it agrees with the latter in principle, though it differs from it in the imaginary detail in which it was worked out.

Like Brahmanic Hindus, the Buddhists believe that all souls have existed from the beginning; like them they believe in the unreality and sinfulness of the world, in the necessity of the soul's freeing itself from the bondage of this world, and in the casual connection between the actions of man in this, and his condition in a subsequent, life. Like the Brahmanic Indus, they hold, therefore, that sin is the cause of transmigration, and that by a total expiation of sin, the soul ceases to be born, and attains its final resting-place. But since this resting-place is to the Buddhists Nirvâna (q. v.), or Non-entity, whereas to Brahmanism it is Brahman, or the principle of Entity; since they reject the institution of caste, which is the social foundation of Brahmanic life; since they do not acknowledge the authority of the Vedas,

and the codes based on it, and therefore consider as morally wrong much that the Brahmanic 'Sâstras enjoin as morally right, the standard according to which the life of a Buddhist is regulated must differ in many respects from that which governs the conduct of a Brahmanic Hindu; and his ideas of reward and punishment, therefore, as reflected by his ideas of the mode of transmigration, likewise differ from those of the Brahmanic believer. To enlarge here on this difference is not necessary, for, after the illustrations already afforded from Manu, it is easy to conceive that the *detail* of the Buddhistic doctrine of transmigration is as fanciful as that of the Brahmanic doctrine; that it is therefore partly devoid of interest, and partly intelligible only if taken in connection with the detail of Buddhistic religion and literature (see Buddhism; also Lamaism). Yet it is not superfluous to point out one great difference which separates the notions of one class of Buddhists from those of the rest, as well as those of the Brahmanic Hindus. According to the latter, and the great mass of Buddhists, it is always the same soul which ever from its first birth reappears in its subsequent births, until it is finally liberated from transmigration. But among the southern Buddhists, another idea has also taken root. In their belief the succession of existences of a being is also a succession of souls; and each such soul, though the result of its predecessor, is not identical with it. According to this view, the body dies, and with it the soul, too, is "extinguished," leaving behind only the good and bad acts which it has performed during its life. The result of these acts now becomes the seed of a new life, and the soul of this new life is therefore the necessary product of the soul of the former life. Thus all the succeeding souls have to labour at the solution of the same problem, which began when their first ancestor entered the world, but no succeeding birth is animated by the same soul. This dogma is illustrated in their works by various similes. One lamp, they say, for instance, is kindled at

another; the light of the former is not identical with that of the latter, but nevertheless, without this, the other light could not have originated. Or, a tree produces fruit; from the fruit, another tree arises, and so on; the last tree is therefore not the same as the first, though the fruit is the necessary cause of the last.

In Greece, the doctrine of transmigration—or, as it is there called *metempsychosis*—did not become the belief of the people, but was confined to the teaching of the mysteries and the tenets of philosophers, who probably derived it, either directly or indirectly, from Egypt or India. According to some, Thales was the first Greek philosopher who propounded it; according to others, Pherecydes the teacher of Pythagoras; but its importance in Greek philosophy it first obtained through the system of Pythagoras, who, it seems, became acquainted with it through Egyptian sources. After him, it was Plato who assigned to it a prominent place in his philosophy; and he probably was indebted to Hindu writers for his views on metempsychosis, as explained in his dialogues, especially in *Phædros*. Plato's doctrine was refuted by Aristotle, but revived, though in a modified shape, by the Neo-Platonists.

Since a belief that the consequences of the acts of man must follow their inevitable course, and can neither be averted nor stopped by the intercession of a divine power, is incompatible with a belief in divine grace, the doctrine of transmigration or metempsychosis could never gain a firm ground in the religion of the Jews and Christians. It deserves notice, however, that in both these religions it found adherents as well in ancient as modern times. Amongst the Jews, the doctrine of transmigration—the *Gilgul Neshamoth*— was taught in the mystical system of the *Kabbala*, which pretends to divulge the secret of creation and those of the nature of the divine and human soul. "All the souls," the *Sohar*, or the book of "light," the spiritual code of this system,

says, "are subject to the trials of transmigration; and men do not know which are the ways of the Most High in their regard. They do not know how they are judged in all times, as well before they come to this world as after they leave it. They do not know how many transformations and mysterious trials they must undergo; how many souls and spirits come to this world without returning to the palace of the divine king." The principle, in short, of the Kabbala is the same as that of Brahmanism. The souls, like all other existences of this world, it teaches, must re-enter the absolute substance whence they have emerged. But to accomplish this end, they must develop all the perfections the germ of which is planted in them; and if they have not fulfilled this condition during one life, they must commence another, a third, and so forth, until they have acquired the condition which fits them for their re-union with God. On the ground of this doctrine, which was shared in by Rabbis of the highest renown, it was held, for instance, that the soul of Adam migrated into David, and will come into the Messiah; that the soul of Japhet is the same as that of Simeon, and the soul of Terah migrated into Job. Generally, it was supposed by writers of this school, the souls of men are reborn in men, and those of women in women; but also the reverse takes place, as in the case of Thamar, who had the soul of a man, and in that of Judah, whose soul was in part that of a woman. And because Ruth had the soul of Thamar, she could not bear children until God imparted to her sparks of a female soul. If the soul of a man, however, is reborn in a woman, such a migration is held by some to be a punishment for the committal of great sins, as when a man refuses to give alms, or communicate to others his wisdom. And it is by way of punishment, too, that the soul of a Jew is reborn in a heathen, or in an animal—a clean or unclean beast, a bird, a fish—or even in an inanimate object. Of all these transmigrations, biblical instances are adduced—according to

their mode of interpretation—in the writings of Rabbi Manasse ben Israel, Rabbi Naphtali, Rabbi Meyer ben Gabbai, Rabbi Ruben, in the Jalkut Khadash, and other works of a similar character. Modern Kabbalists—for instance, Isaac Loria—have imagined that divine grace sometimes assists a soul in its career of expiation by allowing it to occupy the same body together with another soul, when both are to supplement each other, like the blind and the lame. Sometimes only one of these two souls requires a supplement of virtue, which it obtains from the other soul, better provided than its partner. The latter soul then becomes, as it were, the mother of the other soul, and bears it under her heart like a pregnant woman. Hence the name of gestation or impregnation is given to this strange association of two souls. That all these wild fancies have for their main object the explanation of obscure or mystical passages of the Bible, and the reconciliation of such as are or may seem contradictory, requires no remark; the philosopher however, must look to their basis, which is purely ethical.

Among the early Christians, St. Jerome relates, the doctrine of transmigration was taught as a traditional and esoteric one, which was only communicated to a selected few; and Origenes, like the Kabbalists considers it as the only means of explaining some biblical traditions, as that of the struggle of Jacob and Esau before their birth, or the selection of Jeremiah when he was not yet born, and many more events which would throw discredit on divine justice, unless they were justified by good or bad acts done in a former life. Of Christian sects, the Manichæans, especially adhered to this belief, but the church always rejected it as a heresy.

In concluding, at least one great philosopher of modern times may here be named, as one whose views of the progress of mankind are based on the same doctrine; it is the celebrated German critic, G. E. Lessing, who endeavoured to establish it on metaphysical grounds.

His arguments are briefly these: The soul is a simple being, capable of infinite conceptions. But being a finite being, it is not capable of such infinite conceptions at the same time; it must obtain them gradually in an infinite succession of time. If, however, it obtain them gradually, there must be an order in which, and a degree to which, these conceptions are acquired. This order and this measure are the senses. At present, the soul has of such senses five; but neither is there any ground to assume that it has commenced with having five senses, nor that it will stop there. For, since nature never takes a leap, the soul must have gone through all the lower stages before it arrived at that which it occupies now . . . . and since nature contains many substances and powers which are not accessible to those senses with which it is now endued, it must be assumed that there will be future stages, at which the soul will have as many senses as correspond with the powers of nature. And "this my system," he concludes his little but important essay, *Dass mehr als fünf Sinne für den Menschen sein können*—in a fragmentary note discovered after his death—"this my system is certainly the oldest of all philosophical systems; for it is in reality no other than the system of the pre-existence of the soul and metempsychosis, which did not only occupy the speculation of Pythagoras and Plato, but also before them of Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Persians—in short, of all the sages of the East; and this circumstance alone ought to work a good prejudice in its favour; for the first and oldest opinion is, in matters of speculation, always the most probable, because common sense immediately hit upon it."*

* Wurm, l.l., p. 92 ff. Muir, in Jour. R. As Soc., N.S., I., p. 305 ff.

UMA.

UMA is, in the epic and Purânic mythology of India (see *Religion*, under India), one of the principal names of the consort of the god S'iva. Other names by which she is also usually designated are *Durgâ*, *Devî*, *Kâlî*, *Pârvatî*, *Bhavânî*, while there are many more belonging to her which are of less frequent occurrence, as *Kâtyâyanî*, *Ambikâ*, *Haimavatî*, *S'ivâ*, &c. As S'iva is not yet a deity of the Vedic period of India, such of these names as are met with in Vedic writings have there a different import from that assigned to them by the later mythology. Thus, *Ambikâ* is, in the Yajurveda, a sister of *Rudra*; *Kâlî*, a word which occurs in the Mun'd'aka Upanishad is there the name of one of the seven flickering tongues of Agni, the god of fire; *Durgâ*, in a hymn of the Taittirîya Âran'yaka, is an epithet of the sacrificial flame; and *Umâ*, when mentioned in one recension of the same Âran'yaka (see Veda and Upanishad), and in the Kena Upanishad, means the Brahma-science, or the knowledge of what is the nature of Brahman, the Supreme Soul; and in this sense she is identified in the Taittirîya Âran'yaka with Ambikâ. But since Rudra is in later mythology a name of *S'iva*, and the Vedic Rudra is a form of Agni, the fire, more especially of the fire of the sun; and since Umâ, in the Kena Upanishad, probably designates the power of Sûrya, the sun, it becomes intelligible that S'iva (q. v.), who, at a later period of Hindu religion, is both the type of destruction and contemplation, had then associated with him deities which originally represented the energy of the fire and the power or wisdom of the sun, and that those deities were afterwards held to be merely different forms or names of one and the same deity, viz., his female energy (see S'âktas), or wife. Though this double character of the consort of S'iva is not always

discernible in the myths which are connected with special designations of hers, and though at a late period the popular creed looked upon her far more as the type of destruction than as that of divine wisdom, yet the works devoted to her praise never fail to extol her also as the personification of the highest knowledge. Thus in the *Devîmâhâtmya*, the R'ishi Mârkan'd'eya, in reply to a question of King Suratha, says: 'By Devî, this whole universe, with what is movable and immovable, has been created, and, when propitious, she who bestows blessings leads men to their eternal bliss; for she, the eternal goddess, is the highest wisdom, the cause of eternal bliss, and also the cause of bondage for this world; she, who lords over the Lord of the univer'e.' And in another passage of the same work, she is invoked thus: 'O Devî, thou art the seed of the universe, the highest Mâyâ; all this world is bewildered, but, descendi ıg on earth, thou art the cause of its final liberation: all the sciences are merely different modes of thyself.' Similarly, also, in the *Mahâbhârata*, Arjuna says to her: 'Of sciences thou art the Brahma-science,' &c.; and in the *Harivans'a*, Vishn'u addresses her as Saraswatî, the goddess of eloquence, as Smr'iti, tradition, and, of sciences, as the Brahma-science, &c.

The myths relating to this goddess, who is worshipped in various parts of India—particularly, however, in Bengal (see S'âktas)—are met with in the great epic poems and Purân'as, in poetical works, such as the *Kumârasambhava* (see Kâlidâsa), and in modern popular compositions; but the text-book of her worshippers is the *Devîmâhâtmya*, or 'the majesty of Devî'—a celebrated portion of the *Mârkan'd'eya-Purân'a*, and considered to be of especial holiness by the worshippers of this goddess. In the *Râmâyan'a* she is spoken of as the daughter of Mount Himâlaya (her names *Pârvatî*, *Haimavatî*, *Adrijâ*, *Girijâ*, and similar ones, mean 'the mountainous or the mountain-born'), and of the nymph Menâ, whose eldest daughter, however, was the

Ganges. According to the Vishn'u- and other Purân'as, she was in a former life *Satî*, the daughter of Daksha, who abandoned her corporeal existence in consequence of having been slighted by her father when he performed a great sacrifice, and did not invite S'iva to share in it; but it was only as Umâ that she bore children to her husband, viz., *Ganes'a*, the god of wisdom, and *Kârttikeya*, the god of war. According to the *Harivans'a*, she was, in another life, born as the daughter of Yas'odâ, and exchanged for *Vishn'u*, when in his incarnation as *Kr'ishn'a*, he was born as a son of Devakî. On that occasion, she was killed by *Kansa*; but as soon as he had dashed her to the ground, she rose to the sky, leaving behind her corporeal frame, and became a divine virgin, to whom the gods addressed their praises. Hence her names, *Kanyâ*, *Kumârî*, &c., the virgin. This connection between the legendary history of Umâ and Vishn'u is also briefly referred to in the *Devîmâhâtmya*, though this work is chiefly concerned in the narrative of the martial feats of the goddess. The latter consisted in the destruction by her of two demons, *Madhu* and *Kait'abha*, who had endangered the existence of the god Brahman; and of the demon *Mahisha*, or *Mahishâsura*, who, having conquered all the gods, had expelled them from heaven, and who met Devî, assisted only by her lion, with a numberless host of demons; moreover, in her defeating the army of *Chan'd'a* and *Mun'd'a*, two demon-servants of S'umbha and Nis'umbha; in her killing the demon *Raktavîja*, who had a sort of charmed life, each drop of his blood, when shed, producing hundreds of demons like himself; and ultimately, in her destroying the demons *S'umbha* and *Nis'umbha* themselves. In commemoration of her victory over Mahishâsura, a festival called the *Durgâpûjâ* or *Durgotsava*, is annually celebrated in Bengal. 'The goddess,' the Rev. Mr. Bannerjea relates in his introduction to the *Mârkan'd'eya Purân'a*, 'is there represented with ten arms,

trampling upon the demon, who is also attacked by her lion, and wounded in the chest by her spear. She has also laid hold of him by the hair, and is about to chop off his head. The most popular commemoration of this event takes place in the autumn, about the time of the equinox; and if the practice may be supposed to be 800 or 1000 years old, it is not inconceivable that it was originally fixed at the equinox, though the precession has since made it a few days later. The calculation of the day depends, however, on a certain lunar day; but it can never be earlier than the seventh of As'win, which is about the time of our present equinox: nor can it be more than a month later than that date. The idea of the possible connection of the *Durgâpûjâ* with the equinox, is suggested by the fact, that there is a corresponding festival about the time of the vernal equinox too, in which, though it is not so popular as the autumnal *pûjâ*, the same group of figures is constructed, and the image of the goddess is in the same attitude, with the same attendance, and the same enemy.' (For a somewhat more detailed account of this festival, see Moor's *Hindu Pantheon*, p. 156.) Three weeks after the *Durgâpûjâ*, another festival in honour of this goddess, called the *Kâlîpûjâ*, takes place, to commemorate her victory over *Chan'd'a* and *Mun'd'a*. 'The sable goddess,' Mr. Banerjea says, 'is represented holding the severed head of Chan'd'a in her hand, with the heads of his soldiers formed into a garland suspended from her neck, and their hands wreathed into a covering round her loins—the only covering she has in the image constructed for the *pûjâ*. The worship of *Kâli* (i. e., the Black), to which the narrative (of her victory over Chan'd'a and Mun'd'a) has given rise, is considered by the Hindus themselves as embodying the principle of *tamas*, or darkness. She is represented as delighting in the slaughter of her foes, though capable of kindlier feelings towards her friends. She is, however, styled the Black Goddess of Terror,

frequenting cemeteries, and presiding over terrible sprites, fond of bloody sacrifices; and her worship taking place in the darkest night of the month.' (For this worship, see also the article Thug.) With S'iva, she resides on Mount *Kailâsa*, the northern peak of the Himâlaya, or in her own palace on the Vindhya mountain, where she amuses herself with hunting. Her representations are numerous and various. Sometimes she is seen riding on a bull, with a trident in her hand, a serpent as bracelet, and a half-moon on her forehead; sometimes, when in the act of fighting Mahishâsura, she rides on her lion (*Manastâla*), the latter standing between the frontal bones of her elephant. Or, as *Bhadra-Kâlî*, she is represented 'eight-handed, two of her hands being empty, pointing upward and downward, one of her right hands holding something like a caduceus, its corresponding left hand, a cup; the next right and left hands, a crooked sword, and a shield with an embossed flower or fruit; the superior right hand, an agricultural implement; and the left, the noose to strangle victims with. Her person is richly dressed and ornamented; between her full breasts, a five-headed serpent uprears itself; she has a necklace of human heads; her ear-drops are elephants; and a row of snake-heads peeps over her coronet. Her forehead is marked either with S'iva's thin eye, or her own symbol; and her open mouth shews her teeth and tusks, giving her a fierce and threatening aspect.' See Moor's *Hindu Pantheon*, where, besides, other descriptions of images of this goddess are given.—For the myths relating to her, see John Muir's excellent work, the *Original Sanskrit Texts*, vol. iv. (Lond. 1863); the *Harivans'a*, translated by A. Langlois (Paris, 1834—1835); and the *Mârkan'd'eya Purân'a*, in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, edited, with an elaborate Preface, by the Rev. K. M. Bannerjea (Calcutta, 1862).*

* Wurm, l.l., p. 130 f. 262 f. Ziegenbalg, l.l., 62 ff., 170 ff.

UPANISHAD.

UPANISHAD is the name of those Sanscrit works belonging to the Vedic literature which contain the mystical doctrine of the Hindus on the nature of a supreme being, its relation to the human soul, and the process of creation (see India, sec. *Religion*). The word (derived from the Sanskrit prefixes *upa*, "beneath," or "near," and *ni*, "in," combined with the radical *sad*, "sit") is explained by the great theologian *S'ankara* (q. v.), and others after him, as meaning the "science of Brahman," or "the understanding of the identity of Brahman and the soul," because "in those devoted to it, this science *sets to rest* (or destroys) the world, together with (ignorance) its cause;" or, in other words, because it shows to them that the world has, besides Brahman, no reality. Grammatical commentators explain its etymology as implying that "eternal bliss *reposes on it* (*upanishîdati s'reyo 'syâm*); and Professor M. Müller has surmised that the word "Upanishad meant originally the act of sitting down near a teacher, of submissively listening to him," whence it came to mean "implicit faith, and at last truth or divine revelation." But apart from the artificialness of all these interpretations, it deserves notice that the earliest sense of the word appears to be that of "secret," or "mystery" (literally, "that which *sits* or rests *beneath*"). In this sense, it is mentioned by the grammarian Pân'ini; and it is very probable that, in his time, the works bearing the name of Upanishads were not yet in existence (see Goldstücker's *Pân'ini*, &c., p. 141). It may be assumed that these works derived their name from the mysteriousness of the doctrine contained in them; and perhaps also from the mystical manner in which they propounded it.

In order to understand the origin and purport of the Upanishads, as

well as the relation in which they stand to the Vedas, properly so called, it must be borne in mind that, though the Vedic hymns are based on the worship of the elementary powers, and the Brâhman'a portion connected with them is chiefly concerned in legendary and ritual matter relating to that worship, yet in both these portions of the Vedas, and especially in the Brâhman'as, the beginnings of a period become already visible when the poets raised the questions as to the origin of the world and the true nature of the gods. See India, sec. *Religion.* A first attempt at a systematic answer to these questions was made in works which bear an intimate relation to the Brâhman'as; and so great was the awe in which, on this account, these works were held, that they had to be read in the solitude, where the mind could ponder in perfect calmness over the mysterious problems in which they are engaged. These are *Âran'yakas* (from *aran'ya*, a forest). But as the style and contents of the Âran'yakas are extremely obscure, and as, through the close alliance of these works to the Brâhman'as, of which some of them form part, the theological questions of which they treat are much overlaid with ritual and other matters which properly belong to the Brâhman'as, a further progress made in the same direction led to the composition of works and treatises, the diction of which is somewhat clearer, and less entangled with subjects extraneous to the problems they intend to solve. Such works and treatises are the *Upanishads.* Their object, like that of the Âran'yakas, is to impress the mind with the belief in one Supreme Spirit (*Brahman*, as a neuter, and different, therefore, from the same word as a masculine, which is the name of the first god of the *Trimûrti*, q. v.), to show that this Supreme Spirit is the creator of the world; that the world has no reality if thought of besides Brahman, and that the human soul is identical in nature with that same Spirit whence it emanates. The reward the Upanishads hold out to the believer, who understands their

doctrine, and firmly adheres to it, is freedom from Transmigration (q. v.), and consequent eternal bliss. The object and aim of the Upanishads are therefore the same as those propounded in the philosophical systems (see Sanskrit, sec. *Literature*); and the Upanishads may therefore be looked upon as the forerunners of these systems themselves—those Upanishads, at least, which we may call the older Upanishads; for as to the more recent ones, and those which bear the stamp of a sectarian character, their claim to be ranked among the Vedic writings is extremely doubtful, if at all admissible.

Though agreeing in the main points of their doctrine, it is easily understood that works of this nature, ranging over different periods of Hindu religion, will also differ from one another both in the manner and detail in which they deliver their subject-matter, and in the degree of completeness with which they treat of it. Thus, in some, the legendary narrative, and even ritual detail, are still considerably blended with the theosophical speculation—and these stand nearest, therefore, the Âran'yakas, probably also in time; in others, more philosophical, the nature of Brahman and the human soul is the only subject of inquiry; in others, the process of creation is also enlarged upon, with detail which harmonises more or less either with the ulterior views of the Vedânta (q. v.) or those of the Sânkhya (q. v.) philosophy; some Upanishads, again, especially emphasise the inefficiency, for the attainment of eternal bliss, of the performing religious acts and of worldly studies—the knowledge of Brahman being the only means that leads to this end; others on the contrary, in conformity with the Yoga (q. v.) doctrine, assign a prominent place to the exterior means, by using which the soul would qualify itself for union with the Supreme Spirit; while the sectarian Upanishads, which identify this Spirit with Vishn'u and S'iva, have, besides, the tendency of reconciling the popular with the philosophical creed.

Of the older Upanishads, a typical instance is furnished in the Chhândogya Upanishad of the Sâmaveda, the framework of which is legendary throughout, and its contents allegorical and mystical. Other shorter Upanishads, freer from narratives and allusions to the mysterious import of ritual acts, aim at a more intelligible exposition of the doctrine of the soul. Of their mode of treatment, the following passage from the *Kâthaka* Upanishad will serve as an example: *Nachiketas*, the son of Vâjas'ravas, having come to the abode of Yama, the judge of the dead, and obtained from him the grant of three boons, asks of him, for his third boon, an answer to the following question: "There is this doubt: some say that (the soul) exists after the death of a man (in connection with another body than this): others say that it does not. This I should like to know, instructed by thee." And Yama, after some hesitation, explains to him that the soul and Brahman are one, but that a man attains immortality only by understanding this unity, and that, to arrive at this understanding, he must free his mind from sensual desires, and get a correct knowledge both of the nature of Brahman and of the soul. "Know the soul as the rider, and the body as the car; know intellect as the charioteer, and *manas* (the origin of volition) as the rein. The senses, they say, are the horses, the objects (their) roads; and the enjoyer (i. e., the rider) is (the soul) endowed with body, senses, and manas. Thus say the wise. If he (the charioteer) is unwise, and his manas is always unbridled, his senses are uncontrolled like vicious horses; but if he is wise, and his manas is always bridled, his senses are controlled like good horses. He who, always impure, is unwise, and whose manas is unbridled, does not attain *that* abode (of immortality), but comes to the world (of birth and death); he, however, who, always pure, is wise, and whose manas is bridled, attains *that* abode whence he is not born again. The man who has a wise charioteer, and whose manas is bridled, reaches the other shore of

the road (of the world), the highest abode of Vishn'u. Higher (i. e., subtler), indeed, than the objects are the senses; higher than the senses is manas; higher than manas, intellect; and higher than intellect, the great one, the soul. Higher than the great one is that which is unmanifested, and higher than the unmanifested is Purusha, the supreme spirit. But higher than Purusha there is nothing: he is the goal, the highest resort. This highest spirit is the soul hidden in all created beings; it is not manifest, but is beheld by those who can see what is subtle with an attentive, subtle intellect." The coincidence between the allegory, in the foregoing passage, and that in Plato's *Phædrus*, imparts an additional interest to this Upanishad, which is valuable, moreover, on account of the evidence it affords as to points of agreement and difference between its views of the development of the world and those expounded in the Sânkhya (q. v.). The *Muńdaka* Upanishad is important for the relative position which it assigns to the teaching of the Vedas, and the doctrine of the Upanishads. "Two sciences," it says, the knowers of Brahman tell us, "must be known, the higher and the inferior. The inferior is (the knowledge of) the R'igveda, the Yajurveda, the Sâmaveda, and the Atharvaveda, the knowledge of pronunciation, the ritual, grammar, explanation of Vedic texts, prosody, and astronomy. But the higher knowledge is that by which that imperishable Brahman is comprehended. That which is invisible, unseizable, without descent (or origin), without either colour, eye, or ear, without hand or foot, eternal, manifold (in creation), all-pervading, very subtle, undecaying—the wise behold it as the cause of created beings." And in another place, the performers of the sacrificial rites ordained by the Veda are said to attain, indeed, to Indra's heaven in virtue of their pious work; but this state of bliss is declared to be unstable and perishable, and these "fools . . . . drop (from their heaven) as soon as this heaven (the reward of their acts) has faded

away. Fancying that pious acts, ordained by the Vedas and codes of law, are the highest (object of man), these ignorant people do not know that there is something else which leads to eternal bliss. Having enjoyed (the reward of their deeds) on the happy summit of paradise, they enter again this world, or one that is (even) lower. Those on the contrary, who practise penance and faith, and, with subdued desire, live in the forest, under the vow of a religious mendicant, they, free from sin, enter through the sun to that abode where resides that immortal spirit, that spirit, indeed, of undecaying nature."

The *Talavakâra*, or *Kena*, Upanishad, which, being one of the shortest, is in form one of the most philosophical treatises of this kind, puts in clearer language, perhaps, than any other Upanishad, the doctrine that the true knowledge of the supreme spirit consists in the consciousness which man acquires of his *incapacity* to understand it, since the human mind being capable only to comprehend finite objects, cannot have a knowledge of what is infinite.

The Upanishads are not supposed to have been revealed in the same manner as the Vedic hymns. See Veda. Nevertheless, with the exception of a few confessedly modern Upanishads, they are not assigned to human authorship, but looked upon as inspired writings, to which the term *S'ruti* applies. In several Upanishads, no special mention is made of their divine origin; in some, however, this is done. Thus the *Chhândogya* Upanishad, in its concluding section, relates: "This (knowledge of the soul) Brahman (the god of the Trimûrti) imparted to Prajâpati (a lord of creation—the patriarch Kas'yapa, as S'ankara explains); Prajâpati imparted it to Manu, and Manu to mankind;" the *Br'ihadâraṅyaka* Upanishad, which on three occasions gives long lists of teachers who handed it down to their pupils always ascribes itself, in the last instance, to the authorship of "the self-existent Brahman (the supreme spirit);" and in a similar

manner the *Mun'd'aka* Upanishad says that it was Brahman (the god of the Trimûrti), the creator of the universe, who first taught the science of the supreme spirit to his eldest son, Atharvan. As in the case of most ancient works of Sanskrit literature, the date of the Upanishads also still remains quite uncertain, and, wherever given is purely conjectural. According to the native system, they are classified as belonging to one or the other of the four Vedas, with which they are held to stand in immediate connection. There are Upanishads, consequently, of the R'ig-, Yajur-, Sâma, and Atharvaveda. But this classification has no reference whatever to chronology.—For a fuller account of these works, see Professor Weber's *Indische Studien*, vols. i. ii. (Berlin, 1850—1853),* and his *Akademische Vorlesungen über Indische Literaturgeschichte* (Berlin, 1852);† Professor M. Müller's *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature* (Lond. 1860); John Muir's *Original Sanskrit Texts*, vol. i.—iv. (Lond. 1858—1863); and the edition and translation of several of these Upanishads by E. Roer, *Râjendra Lâla Mitra*, and E. B. Cowell, in the *Bibliotheca Indica*; also Raja Rammohun Roy's *Translation of several Principal Books, Passages, and Texts of the Veds* (Lond. 1832). The names of 149 Upanishads, as compiled from various sources, by Professor M. Müller, may be found in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. xix. p. 137, ff.

USHAS.

Ushas (from the Sanscrit *ush*, 'to shine, to burn,' and kindred with the Greek *ēōs* or *heōs*, and the Latin *aurora*), 'the Dawn,' is one of the

* Vol. ix., 1-173.

† 2nd. ed., 170—190. Haug. "Brahma und die Brahmanen" (1871), p. 31 f.

female deities of the Vedic religion of India (see India, sec. *Religion*) and amongst these is invoked with special predilection by the poets of the R'igveda hymns. The invigorating influence which the dawn exercises on body and mind, and the luminous and other phenomena connected with the beginning of the day, form the subject of some of the best portions of Vedic poetry; and out of them Ushas arises as one of the most pleasing goddesses of the ancient Hindu pantheon. She is invoked as 'the affluent,' as 'the giver of food,' and 'the bringer of opulence;' she is asked to bestow on the pious 'riches with horses and cattle,' 'posterity and troops of slaves;' and she is praised for the many boons she has showered on the worshippers who were liberal to her. She is the goddess 'endowed with an excellent intellect,' and the 'truthful,' or fulfiller of her promises. 'She animates the diligent;' when she appears, 'bipeds and quadrupeds (are in motion),' 'the winged birds flock around from the boundaries of the sky,' and 'men who have to earn their bread quit their homes.' She rides in a 'golden chariot,' which is 'ample and beautiful;' and the Sanscrit word *go*, meaning a cow (or, as a masculine, an ox), and also a ray of light, she is not only 'the mother of the rays of light,' or attended by them, and rays of light are her banner, but her chariot is drawn by 'ruddy *kine*,' or, as they are sometimes called 'ruddy oxen.' Less frequently she is spoken of as travelling with horses; for the horse, as a symbol of light, is more especially appropriated to the god of the sun. The relation of Ushas to other Vedic deities is of a twofold, a physical and a ritual, character, inasmuch as phenomena of dawn are connected with other phenomena of nature, and as certain religious ceremonies are performed at daybreak. On these grounds, she is frequently addressed as 'the daughter of heaven;' and when her 'parents' are spoken of, the commentator explains this word as implying 'heaven and earth.' She is further called the daughter of night (night being the precursor of the

dawn); but, on other occasions, she is also spoken of as having night for her sister. She is, besides, the sister of the two luminous deities, *Bhaga* and *Varun'a*, and the faithful wife of *Sûrya*, the sun. According to an old commentator (*Yáska*), she would in one passage of the R'igveda also be the deity 'who has the sun for her child,' either because the sun is her companion, or because he absorbs the moisture (i. e., the frost); but as *rus'advatsâ*, the word, so interpreted, admits also of another rendering, it is doubtful whether she bears this epithet, the more so as in another passage the sun is said to follow Ushas as a man follows a woman. The As'wins being the luminous twin-gods, who probably represent the transition from darkness to light, and therefore that intermingling of both which becomes inseparable (see John Muir's 'Contribution to a Knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology,' in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, new series, vol. ii., 1866), Ushas is called their 'friend'—according to Sâyan'a, also their sister; she 'follows their lustre,' and 'awakes' them to partake of the Soma prepared for them; and in their turn they are asked 'to unite with the dawn.' Another god, who originally on physical grounds is associated with Ushas, is *Indra*, the ruler of the bright firmament. He 'generates (i. e., causes to appear) sun and dawn,' and 'appoints them to their office,' which is that of dispelling darkness; but though, 'when (in the morning), desiring (the Soma), he honours the dawn,' his ascendancy during the day becomes fatal to her; for then 'he slays her,' 'breaks her chariot;' and 'her shattered chariot reposing on (the banks of) the river Vipás', she departs from afar,' Most of these deities become, in consequence, associated with Ushas also as sharers in certain sacrifices which are offered to her; and besides these, Agni, the god of fire, who carries the offerings to the gods, and Soma. Like many of the most poetical deities of the Vedic creed, also Ushas is excluded from the Hindu pantheon of the classical period. Her place is there

taken by *Arun'a* (the ruddy), whom the epic poems and the Purâṇ'as make the son of the patriarch Kas'yapa and his wife Vinatâ, and the younger brother of Garud'a, the bird-vehicle of Vishn'u. According to the *Mahâbhârata*, he was appointed by the gods to the office of charioteer of the sun, in order to intercept his fiery heat, when the sun, angry with the gods for being exposed to the enmity of Râhu, it was feared, would consume the world. Where represented, *Arun'a* is therefore seated before the sun on his chariot, driving his horses; but as the legends deprive him of his legs, his body is seen perfect to his knees.

VAIS'ESHIKA.

VAIS'ESHIKA is the name of one of the two great divisions of the *Nyâya* (q. v.) school of Hindu philosophy, and probably a later development of the Nyâya itself, properly so called, with which it agrees in its analytical method of treating the subjects of human research, but from which it differs in the arrangement of its topics, and more especially by its doctrine of atomic individualities or *vis'eshas*—whence its name is derived.

The topics or categories (*padârthas*) under which *Kan'âda*, the founder of this system, arranges his subject-matter, are the following six: (1) substance, (2) quality, (3) action, (4) generality, (5) atomic individuality, and (6) co-inherence; and later writers of his school add to these a seventh category, viz., non-existence. 1. Substance is the intimate cause of an aggregate effect; it is that in which qualities abide, and in which action takes place. It is ninefold, viz., earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, and *manas*, or the organ of affection.

2. Quality is united with substance; it comprises the following 24: colour, savour, odour, feel, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, sound, understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition or effort, merit, demerit, and self-restitution. 3. Action consists in motion, and abides in substance alone. It affects a single, that is, a finite substance, which is matter. Action is either motion upwards or motion downwards, or contraction or expansion, or motion onwards. 4. Generality abides in substance, quality, and action. It is of two kinds, higher and lower—genus and species. 5. Atomic individuality resides in eternal substances, by which are meant the organ of affection, soul, time, space, ether, earth, water, light, and air; it is the ultimate difference, technically called *vis'esha;* such differences are endless; and two atoms of the same substance, though homogeneous with one another, differ merely in so far as they exclude one another. 6. Co-inherence, or perpetual intimate connection, resides in things which cannot exist independently from one another, such as the parts and the whole, quality and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, atomic individuality, and eternal substance. 7. Non-existence, the last category, added to the foregoing by the modern Vais'eshikas, is defined by them as being either non-existence, which is without beginning, but has an end—as that of a jar, which did not exist until its antecedent non-existence ceased when being formed out of the clay; or non-existence, which has a beginning, but no end—as that of a jar which is smashed by a blow of a mallet; or absolute non-existence, which, extending through all times, has neither beginning nor end—as when it is said that a jar is not on the ground; or mutual non-existence, which is the reciprocal negation of identity—as when it is remarked that a jar is not a piece of cloth. The nature of each of these substances, qualities, actions, &c, is, then, the subject of special

investigation. Thus, *earth* is said to be that of which the distinguishing quality is odour; it is described as being of two kinds: eternal, in its atomic character; and uneternal, when in the shape of some product. Again, products are defined as either organised bodies of five sorts, or organs of perception, or unorganic masses, such as stones, &c. Amongst the qualities, colour is defined as that quality which is apprehended only by the sense of sight; which resides in earth, water, and light; which is distinguishable in earth as white, yellow, green, red, black, tawny, and variegated; in water, as white, but not resplendent; in light, as white and resplendent, &c. *Self-restitution*—to give another instance of the definition of the qualities—is described as threefold: as impetus, the cause of activity in earth, water, light, air, and the organ of affection; as the mental process peculiar to the soul, which is the cause of memory; and as elasticity, in mats and similar substances, which causes an altered thing to reassume its former position.

Though this cursory statement must here suffice to give a general idea of the Vais'eshika system, it is worthy of especial notice that, according to it, understanding is the quality of *soul*, and the instruments of right notion are treated of under the head of "understanding (*buddhi*)." Kan'âda admits of only two such instruments, or *pramân'as*, viz., knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and inference. Comparison, revelation, and the other instruments of right notion, mentioned in other systems, the commentators endeavour to show are included in these two. Fallacies and other modes of inconclusive reasoning are further dealt with in connection with "inference," though with less detail than in the Nyâya, where these topics are enlarged upon with particular predilection.—The reputed founder of the Vais'eshika is *Kan'âda*, which name the native authorities derive from *Kan'a*, minute, and *âda*, eating, and sometimes, therefore, also change into *Kan'abhuj* or *Kan'abhaksha* (*bhuj* and *bhaksha* being

synonyms of *áda*). Nothing, however, is known as to the history or date of this personage, as they are involved in the same obscurity which covers most of the renowned writers of ancient India. His work is divided into ten *adhyâyas*, or books, each of which is subdivided into two diurnal lessons; these, again, being subdivided into sections containing two or more *Sûtras* or aphorisms, on the same topic. Like the Nyâya-Sûtras, the work of Kan'âda has been commented upon by a triple set of commentaries, and popularised in several elementary treatises. The text with the commentary of *S'ankara Mis'ra*—who is not to be confounded with the celebrated Vedânta author—has been edited at Calcutta in 1861 by the Pan'd'it Jayanârâyana Tarka Panchânana, who added to it a gloss of his own;* and some of the Sûtras have been translated by the late Dr. Ballantyne (Mirzapore, 1851). Of later works on the same system, may be mentioned the *Bhâshâparichchheda*, edited with the commentary called *Siddhântamuktâvali*, and translated by the late Dr. Roer in the *Bibliotheca Indica* (Calcutta, 1850), and the popular *Tarkasangraha* in several editions; edited also and translated by Dr. Ballantyne (2nd. edit., Calcutta, 1848), who in his preface gives a catalogue of the commentaries which this work has elicited. The reader not acquainted with Sanskrit is, for further information on the subject, referred to these translations, and to the essays on the Vais'eshika system by H. T. Colebrooke (*Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i, Lond. 1837), and Professor M. Müller, in the 6th and 7th volumes of the *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*.

* Dr. Röer's German translation appeared in "Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft," xxi., 309—420, and xxii., 383—442; Professor Gough's translation of text and commentary in vols. iii.—vi. of the "Pandit," also separately at Benares. See also Professor Cowell's notes to his edition of Colebrooke's Essays, i. 280—318, and his translation of ch. x. (Vais'eshikadars'ana) of the Sarvadars'ana-sangraha, in vol. xi. of the "Pandit" (1876), p. 372 ff., 433 ff.

VAISHN'AVAS.

VAISHN'AVAS is the name of one of the three great divisions of Hindu sects. See India, section *Religion*. The word, derived from *Vishn'u* (q. v.), designates the worshippers of this deity, and comprises a great variety of sects; but this variety itself differs according to different periods of the medieval history of India, old divisions becoming extinct, and new ones taking their place. Thus, the account of the Vaishn'avas, as given in a celebrated work of *Ânandagiri*, the *'Sankara-dig-vijaya*, or the victory of the great theologian S'ankara over his religious adversaries, would no longer apply in detail to the present condition of the Vaishn'avas; and even some of those varieties mentioned by the late Professor Wilson in his *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, written in 1832, would seem to have disappeared already in our days. The common link of all the sects comprised under the name of Vaishn'avas, is their belief in the supremacy of Vishn'u over the other gods of the Trimûrti (q. v.). Their difference consists in the character which they assign to this supremacy, and to the god Vishn'u himself, in the religious and other practices founded on the nature of their belief, and in their sectarian marks. The following sects belonging to this category may especially be noticed here.

1. The *Râmânujas*, or *S'rî Vaishn'avas*, or *S'rî-Sampradâyins*. They derive their origin from *Râmânuja*, a celebrated reformer, who was born at Perambur, in the south of India, about the middle of the 12th century, and is considered by his followers as an incarnation of *S'esha*, the serpent of Vishn'u. He studied at Conjeveram, resided afterwards at S'rîranga, and then travelled over different parts of India, where he was especially engaged in combating the professors of different

creeds, particularly the S'aivas. On his return to S'rîranga, he was seized by the king Kerika'la Chola, but effected his escape, and found refuge with the Jain king of Mysore, Vitâla Deva, whom he converted to the Vaishn'ava faith. For twelve years he then remained at Mysore; but at the death of the Chola king, returned to S'rîranga, where he spent the remainder of his life in religious seclusion. The Râmânujas address their worship to Vishn'u and his consort, Lakshmî (q. v.), and their respective incarnations, either singly or conjointly. Hence their sect consists of corresponding subdivisions, according as Nârâyan'a or Lakshmî, or Lakshmî-Nârâyan'a, or Râma, or Sîtâ or Sîtâ-Râma, or any other incarnation of these deities, is the preferential object of the veneration of the votary. Their most striking peculiarity is the preparation and the scrupulous privacy of their meals; for should the meal during its preparation, or while they are eating, attract even the looks of a stranger, the operation is instantly stopped, and the viands buried in the ground. The marks by which they distinguish themselves from other sects are two perpendicular white lines, drawn with a white earth, *Gopîchandana*, from the root of the hair to the commencement of each eyebrow, and a transverse streak connecting them across the root of the nose; in the centre is a perpendicular streak of red, made with red sanders, or a preparation of turmeric and lime; other marks, representing several of the attributes of Vishn'u, they have either painted or impressed on the breast and each upper arm; and, besides, they wear a necklace of the wood of the Tulasî (holy basil), and carry a rosary of the seeds of the same plant, or of the lotus. The sacred formula with which a member of this sect is initiated into it consists merely of the words *Om râmâya namah'*, 'Om, salutation to Râma.' Their principal religious tenet is the belief that Vishn'u is the cause and creator of all worlds; that he and the universe are one, though he is of a twofold form: the supreme spirit or cause, and the gross one, the effect or

matter. In distinction from the Vedânta, with which their doctrine has otherwise many points of contact, they regard their supreme deity as endowed with qualities, all of which are of course excellent; and teach that the universe consists of *chit*, thinking or spirit, *achit*, unthinking or matter, and *îs'wara*, or god; the relation of which is that of enjoyer, the thing enjoyed, and the ruler of both. The deity, they assume, is or has been visibly present in five modifications: in the objects of worship, as images, &c.; in the incarnations (see under Vishn'u); in certain forms called Vyûhas, viz., Vâsudeva or Kr'ishn'a; Balarâma, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha; and in the subtle form which comprises six qualities—absence of passion, immortality, exemption from pain or care, absence of natural wants, love, and practice of truth—and the human soul; all of which have to be worshipped seriatim, as the votary ascends in the scale of perfection. The chief authoritative works, in Sanscrit, of this sect are the *Vedânta Sûtras*, with several commentaries, several works on the Vedânta (q. v.) philosophy, the *Pancharâtra* of Nârada; of Purân'as the *Vishn'u-*, *Nâradîya-*, *Garud'a-*, *Padma-*, *Varâha-*, and *Bhâgavâta-Purân'a*; and besides, the works of *Venkat'a*, and several popular works in the dialects of the south. It is in the south that the followers of Râmânuja, and their temples and establishments, are still numerous; in the north of India, where they are better known as *S'rî Vaishn'avas*, they are not of frequent occurrence.

2. The *Râmânandas*, or *Râmâvats*. They are by far the most numerous class of sectaries, in Gangetic India: in the district of Agra, they alone constitute seven-tenths of the ascetic population. They belong chiefly to the poorer and inferior classes, with the exception of the Rajputs and military Brahmans. The founder of this sect was *Râmânanda*, who, by some, is considered to have been the immediate disciple of Râmânuja; by others, the fifth in descent from that teacher, when

he would have lived about the end of the 13th century; but other more reliable accounts place him toward the end of the 14th, or the beginning of the 15th century. According to common tradition, Râmânanda seceded from the Râmânujas, to whom he originally belonged, because, having spent some time in travelling through various parts of India, and, in consequence, having been suspected by his fellow-disciples not to have conformed to the rule of the Râmânujas in taking his meals, he was condemned to feed in a place apart from the rest of them, but did not acquiesce in the affront thus offered him. His residence was at Benares, at the Pancha Gangâ Ghât', where a *Math*, or monastery, of his followers is said to have existed. The especial object of their worship is Vishn'u, in his incarnation as *Râmachandra*, and his consort *Sîtâ*, and, as amongst the Râmânujas, these deities either singly or jointly. Some members of this sect also pay adoration to other forms of Vishn'u; and the religious mendicants of the sect consider all form of adoration superfluous, being content with the incessant invocation of Kr'ishn'a and Râma. Their practices are less precise than those of the Râmânujas; but the most important difference between them consists in the fact, that Râmânanda abolished the distinction of caste amongst the religious orders, and taught that a *Vairâgin*, or one who quitted the ties of nature and society, shook off at the same time all personal distinction. The initiatory formula of a Râmânanda is *S'rî Râma*, or 'blessed Râma.' Their sectarian marks are the same as those of the Râmânujas; except that the red perpendicular streak on the forehead is varied in shape and extent, and generally narrower than that of the Râmânujas. There are various subdivisions of this sect, believed to have been founded by several eminent disciples of Râmânanda. Their doctrines vary often from that of the latter, but they maintain an amicable intercourse with the Râmânujas and with each other. The twelve chief disciples of Râmânanda were *As'ânand*, *Kabîr*,

Raidâs, Pîpâ, Sursurânând, Sukhânand, Bhavânand, Dhavana, Sena, Mahânand, Paramânand, and *S'rî Ânand;* and besides these *Nâbhâji,* the author of the Bhaktamâlâ, *Sûr-Dâs, Tulasî-Dâs,** the translator in Hindi of the Râmâyan'a, and the author of many popular works which exercise a considerable influence on the Hindu population, and the poet *Jayadeva,* the author of the Gîtagovinda. Many legends of course, are related of these personages, especially in the Bhaktamâlâ, the favourite work of this sect.

3. The *Kabîr Panthîs.* The founder of this sect, one of the most interesting and important in Upper and Central India, except, perhaps, in Bengal itself, was Kabîr, the most celebrated of the twelve disciples of Râmânanda, before mentioned, who, therefore, probably lived about the end of the 14th century. The circumstances connected with his birth, life, and death are all related as miraculous; and so little is certain about his life, that even the Mussulmans claim him as one of their persuasion. But his great conversancy with the Hindu *S'âstras,* and his limited knowledge of the Mohammedan authorities, render such a supposition highly improbable. According to the doctrine of this sect, there is but one God, the creator of the world; but, in opposition to the Vedânta (q. v.), they assert that he has a body formed of the five elements of matter, and a mind endowed with the three *gunas,* or qualities: he is of ineffable purity and irresistible power, eternal, and free from the defects of human nature, but in other respects does not differ from man. The pure man is his living resemblance; and after death, becomes his equal and associate. God and man are therefore not only the same, but both in the same manner everything that exists. For 72 ages, God was alone; he then felt the desire to renew the world, which desire assumed the shape of a female form; and this

* The Râmâyana of Tulsi Dâs, translated by F. S. Growse. Vol. I. (1877), Introduction, p. 4 ff.

form is Mâyâ, or illusion, with whom he begot the triad, Brahman, Vishn'u, and S'iva. He then disappeared, and Mâyâ approached her offspring, in order to frame the universe. Vishn'u hesitated to associate with her, and is therefore more respected by the Kabîr Panthîs than the other two gods of the triad; but the latter were frightened by her, and the result of their submission was the birth of Sarasvatî, Lakshmî, and Umâ, whom she wedded to the three deities to produce the world. To understand the falsehood of Mâyâ is, therefore, the chief aim of man; and so long only as he is ignorant of the source of life, he is doomed to Transmigration, which, according to the belief of this sect, is also extended to the planetary bodies—a falling star or meteor being a proof, for instance, that it undergoes a fresh change. The moral code of the Kabîr Panthîs is, in many respects, creditable to them. Life, they teach, being the gift of God, must not be violated by his creatures. Humanity and truth are two of their cardinal virtues; retirement from the world is deemed desirable; and implicit devotion, in word, act, and thought, to the Guru, or spiritual teacher, a supreme duty. But, as regards the latter point, it is characteristic that the pupil is enjoined first to scrutinize the teacher's doctrine and acts, and to be satisfied that he is the sage he pretends to be, before he resigns himself to his control. It is no part of their faith to worship any deity, or to observe any ceremonies and rites of the Hindus; but they are recommended outwardly to conform to all the usages of tribe and caste, and some even pretend to worship the usual divinities, though this is not considered justifiable. They have no peculiar mode of dress, and though some wear the sectarian marks of the Vaishn'avas, and the necklace and rosary, all these outward signs are considered of no importance. Though, therefore, properly speaking, they can scarcely be included amongst the Vaishn'ava sects, yet their paying more respect to Vishn'u than to any other god of the Trimûrti,

and the fact of Kabîr having been a disciple of Râmânanda, also the friendly intercourse which they maintain with most of the Vaishn'ava sects, cause them always to be looked upon as belonging to them. The doctrines of Kabîr are taught in a great variety of works in different dialects of Hindî, all of which are the acknowledged compositions of his disciples and successors. The principal are the *Sâkhîs*, 5000 in number, consisting of one stanza each; the *Bîjak*, in 654 sections; and the *Sukh Nidhân*. The sect itself is split into a number of subdivisions, and twelve branches of it are traced to the following personages: *S'rutgopâl Dâs*, the author of the Sukh Nidhân—his successors preside over the Chaura at Benares; *Bhago Dâs*, the author of the Bîjak; *Nâyâyan Dâs* and *Churâman' Dâs*, the two sons of a merchant at Jabbalpur; *Jaggo Dâs*, of Kuttack; *Jîvan Dâs*; *Kâmal*, of Bombay; *Tâk Sâlî*, of Baroda; *Jnânî*, of Majjhnî, near Sahâs'ram; *Saheb Dâs*, of Cuttack; *Nityânand*, and *Kamâl Nâd*, in the Dekhan. The principal establishment of the sect is the Kabîr Chaura at Benares.*

4. The *Vallabhâchâryas*, or *Rudra Sampradâyins*. The original teacher of this sect is said to have been *Vishn'u Swâmin:* but it is a later successor of his, *Vallabha Âchârya*, who, from the influence which his teaching and writing exercised on the propagation of his doctrines, must be considered the real founder of this sect. He was born in 1479, in a forest called Champâran'ya, where his parents deserted him on a pilgrimage they had undertaken to Benares. The gods, of course, took care of the infant; and his parents, who recovered him afterwards, took him to Gokula, a village on the left bank of the Jumna, a short distance from Mathura, where he received his first education. In his twelfth year, he left this place, in order to propagate throughout India his tenets, which, at that time, it must be understood, he had already framed. On

* The Adi-granth, translated by E. Trumpp (1877). p. 93, note 1, and p. 126, note 1.

arriving at a certain town in the south of India, he became acquainted with a person of influence, *Dâmodaradâs*, whom he converted to his doctrine. Both of them then proceeded together to the city of Vijayanagar, where the maternal parents of Vallabha resided. He was now introduced to the court of the king of Vijayanagara, Kr'ishn'adeva, and succeeded so well in his disputation with the S'aivas and Smârta Brâhmans, that not only the king bestowed on him rich presents, but the Vaishn'avas elected him as their chief, with the title of Âchârya, or spiritual teacher. He then travelled to Ujjayin, Allahabad, and Benares, and from there, for nine years, through different parts of India, until, on his return to Brindâvan, as a reward for his exertions and faith, he was honoured by a visit from the god *Kr'ishn'a* in person, who enjoined him to introduce his worship, and to found the religion now so widely diffused throughout Western India under the sectarian name of *Rudra Sampradâya*. Vallabha ultimately settled at Benares, and there composed seventeen works in Sanskrit, the most important of which are a commentary on the Vedânta and Mimânsâ Sûtras, and one on the Bhâgavata Purân'a; works, however, only intended for the learned, and now very rare. He died on a hill in the vicinity of Benares, in his fifty-third year, after having made eighty-four devoted disciples. He was succeeded by his second son, *Vithalnâthji*, who was born in 1516, in the village of Parn'ât, and is known amongst the sect by the designation of S'rî Gosâin Jî, his father Vallabha's sectarian name being S'rî Âchârya Jî. Vîthalnâthji died in 1583, and left, besides four daughters, seven sons, who were all teachers, and formed as many communities; viz., *Girdharji* (born 1540), *Govinda Rây* (born 1542), *Bâlkr'ishn'aji* (born 1549), *Gokulnâthji* (born 1551), *Ragunâthji* (born 1554), *Jadunâthji* (born 1556), and *Ghanashyâmji* (born 1561.) It was, however *Gokulnâthji* who became the most celebrated of the descendants of Vithalnâthji, for to him especially is due the vitality of this sect; and even to

the present day the followers of his descendants consider their own Gosâins the only legitimate teachers of their faith, while even the adherents of the other sons of Vithalnâthji pay them the greatest respect. It is about the period when the sons of Vithalnâthji dispersed that they first acquired the title of *Mahârâj*, or "great king," by which the chiefs of this sect are now best known, though besides this proud designation they have other distinctive titles, such as *Vallabha Kulâ*, *Agni Kula*, *Guru*, &c. The heads of the Gokulnâthji division of this sect are usually called *Gokul Gosâins*, or *Gokulastha Gosâins*. The members of this sect are widely diffused throughout Bombay, Cutch, Kattywar, and Central India, and especially the province of Malwa. Their establishments and temples are numerous throughout India; especially at Mathura, Brindâvan, and Benares. The most celebrated of all is at S'rî Nâth Dwâr, in Ajmeer; and the members themselves belong to the better and wealthier classes of the Hindu community. At present, there are about sixty or seventy "Mahârâjas" of this sect dispersed over India; eight or ten of whom reside at Bombay alone, and fifteen or sixteen at Gokul. But so much degenerated are they as a body, that only two or three of them have any knowledge of Sanskrit—the rest, as a distinguished writer on this sect, Mr Karsandâs Mulji, asserts, being grossly ignorant—for, as Wilson remarks, it is a curious feature in the notions of this sect, that the veneration in which the Gosâins are held is paid solely to their descent, and is unconnected with any idea of their sanctity and learning—and that, though they are not unfrequently destitute of all pretensions to individual respectability, they nevertheless enjoy the unlimited homage of their followers.

The chief authority of the sect is the *Bhâgavata Purân'a*, and after it, the works of Vallabha and various books, 74 in number, 39 of which are translations from Sanskrit, and the rest original compositions in the Brijbhâshâ dialect. The object of their adoration is Vishn'u

(q. v.) in his incarnation as Kr'ishn'a, whose residence is Goloka, far above the three worlds. There he originally lived alone, but in meditating on the works of creation, created a female form, which became the primary agent in creation: this was Mâyâ. He then produced crude matter, the five elements, and all the divine beings; the gods of the Trimûrti, their female consorts, and 300 millions of Gopis, or cow-herdesses, who are the especial attendants on Kr'ishn'a. The principles of the sect, as laid down by Vallabha, are the following ten—1. To secure the firm support of Vallabhâchârya; 2. To exercise chiefly the worship of Kr'ishn'a; 3. To forsake the sense of Vaidik opinion, and be a suppliant to Kr'ishn'a; 4. To sing praises with feelings of humility; 5. To believe that Vallabha is a Gopî, or mistress of Kr'ishn'a; 6. To swell the heart with the name of Kr'ishn'a; 7. To forsake his commands not for a moment; 8. To put faith in his words and doings; 9. To adopt the society of the good, knowing them divine; and, 10. To see not the faults, but speak the truth. Out of this code, however, grew up the doctrine, that the Guru or Mahârâj is the impersonation of Kr'ishn'a himself, that God and the Guru are necessarily to be worshipped, and that the sectary is bound to bestow on him "his body, organs of sense, life, heart, and other faculties, and wife, house, family, property, with his own self." The gross abuse which was made of this tenet became apparent in a very remarkable trial, the so-called Mahârâj Libel Case, which took place in 1861 in the Supreme Court of Bombay, and revealed the licentiousness of one of the then Mahârâjas of the sect at Bombay; the defendant sued for libel by this Mahârâj being a highly respected and distinguished member of the sect, Mr. Karsandâs Mulji, who had had the courage of calling, in a native newspaper, on the Mahârâjas to reform, and to return to the Hindu faith, and whose public conduct on that occasion elicited the highest praise of the court, and it is to be hoped initiated a better era of this sect. The temples

of the sect have images of Kr'ishn'a, and Râdhâ, his principal wife; the former representing a chubby boy, of a dark hue, who is richly decorated, and eight times a day receives the homage of his worshippers. The ceremonials, which on those occasions take place are the *mangala*, or morning levee, about half-an-hour after sunrise, when the image is washed and dressed, and presented with refreshments; the *s'r'ingâra*, when the image, having been anointed and perfumed, holds his public court—this takes place about an hour and a-half after the preceding; the *gwâla*, forty-eight minutes after the last, the image being now visited preparatory to its going out; the *râjabhoga*, held at mid-day, when Kr'ishn'a is supposed to have come home from the pastures and sat down to dine—all sorts of delicacies are then placed before the image, and distributed to the votaries present; the *utthâpana*, three hours before sunset, when the god is summoned to get up from his siesta; the *bhoga*, or afternoon meal, about half an hour later; the *sandhyâ*, about sunset, or the evening toilet of the image; and the *s'ayana*, or retiring to repose about seven in the evening; the image then being put upon a bed, and refreshments being placed near it, when the votaries retire, and the temple is shut till the ensuing morning. Besides these ceremonies, there are other annual festivals observed by this sect throughout India; of these, the *Rath Yâtrâ*, or procession of the god in a chair, is the most celebrated in Bengal and Orissa; the most popular at Benares is the *Janmâsh'tamî*, or the nativity of Kr'ishn'a; and the *Râs Yâtrâ*, or annual commemoration of the dance of Kr'ishn'a with sixteen Gopîs—a very popular festival, at which all kind of rejoicings take place. The mark on the forehead of the Vallabhâchâryas consists of two perpendicular lines meeting in a semicircle at the root of the nose, and having a round spot of red between them. On the breasts and arms, they have the same marks as the Râmânujas, made with a black earth called *S'yâmabandi*, or any black metallic substance: their necklace and rosary

are made of the stalk of the Tulasî (holy basil) plant.—For a fuller account of this sect, its authorities, festivals, and worship, and the practices of the Mahârâjas, see the interesting *History of the Sect of Mahârâjas or Vallâbhâchâryas in Western India* (by Karsandâs Mulji—London, 1865), which also contains the history of the "Mahârâj Libel Case," above referred to.

5. The *Mâdhwâchâryas*, or *Brahma Sampradâyins*. This sect occurs especially in the peninsula, and was founded by a Brahman, *Mâdhwâchârya*, who is looked upon by his followers as an incarnation of Vâyu, the god of wind, after having been incarnate in preceding ages as Hânumat and Bhîma. He was born in the year 1199, and educated in a convent at Anantes'war. In his ninth year, he was initiated into the order of Anchorites by Achyuta Pracha, a descendant of Sanaka, a son of Brahman. At that early age he composed a commentary on the Gîtâ; then travelled to the Himâlaya, and when returned, erected at Udipi the image of Kr'ishn'a, which had been originally made by Arjuna, and miraculously recovered by him. In addition to the principal temple at Udipi, he established eight other temples in Tuluva, below the Ghâts; composed, it is related, thirty-seven works, and on a controversial tour, triumphed over various divines. In his seventy-ninth year he went to Badarikâs'rama, where, the legend says, he continues to reside with Vyâsa, the compiler of the Vedas and Purân'as. It seems that he was originally a priest of the S'aiva faith, and one of his names, *Ánanda Tîrtha*, even indicates that he belonged to the class of Das'nâmî Gosâins, who were instituted by *S'ankarâchârya*. He encouraged, therefore, an attempt to form a kind of compromise between the S'aivas and Vaishn'avas; and in the temples of his sect, images of S'iva are allowed to partake of the worship offered to those of Vishn'u. Votaries of the Mâdhwa Gurus and of S'ankarâchârya Gosâins offer also the reverential obeisance to their teachers mutually,

and the latter visit the temple of the former to perform their adoration at the shrine of Kr'ishn'a. The essential dogma of this sect is the identification of Vishn'u with the Supreme Soul, as the pre-existent cause of the universe; and this primeval Vishn'u they affirm to be endowed with real attributes, and although indefinable, to be most excellent and independent. But besides this independent, there is also a dependent principle; for besides the supreme soul, *Paramâtman*, there is a living soul, *Jîvâtman*, which is dependent on the Supreme; and though indissolubly connected with, yet not the same with him. In consequence, they deny the absorption of the human soul into the universal spirit, and the loss of independent existence after death. In this respect, they differ, therefore, on a vital point of doctrine, from the members of other Vaishn'ava and S'aiva sects. The manner in which they conceive the universe to have issued from the Supreme Being, is to a great extent analogous to that of the other Vaishn'avas; and they also receive the legends of the Vaishn'ava Purâṇ'as relating to the birth of Brahman from the lotus, which grew out of the navel of Vishn'u, &c. The modes of worshipping Vishn'u they declare to be three: marking the body with his symbols, especially by means of a hot iron; giving his names to children and objects of interest; and the practice of virtue in word, act, and thought. That in word consists in telling the truth, giving good counsel, mild speaking, and study; that in act comprises liberality, kindness, and protection; and clemency, freedom from envy, and faith, are the practice of virtue in thought. Final liberation, or freedom from future birth, they consider as the reward for having secured the favour of Vishn'u by sedulously worshipping him; and those who have attained it, enjoy felicity in Vishn'u's heaven, under one or all of the four conditions: of being similar to him in form, of remaining in his visible presence or in his proximity, and of sharing equal power with him.

Their worship is not materially different from that of the other Vaishn'avas, except in one peculiarity, which proves that they have a friendly leaning towards the S'aiva sect; for the images of S'iva, Durgâ, and Gan'es'a are placed by them in the same shrine as Vishn'u. The Gurus, or superiors, of this sect are Brahmans and ascetics, or profess cœnobitic observances; the disciples live in their *Mat'hs*, or monasteries, and profess also perpetual celibacy. The lay votaries of these teachers are members of every class of society except the lowest. The Gurus adopt the external appearance of ascetics, laying aside the Brahmanical cord, carrying a staff and water-pot, going bareheaded, and wearing a single wrapper of an orange colour. The marks common to them and the lay votaries are the symbols of Vishn'u upon shoulders and breast, and the frontal mark, consisting of two perpendicular lines made with the white clay *Gopîchandana*, and joined at the root of the nose, like that of the Râmânujas; but instead of a red line down the centre, they make a straight black line with the charcoal from incense offered to Nârâyan'a, terminating in a round mark made with turmeric. The scriptural authorities of this sect are, besides the writings of its founder, the four *Vedas*, the *Mahâbhârata*, the *Pâncharâtra*, and the original *Râmâyan'a*.

6. The *Vaishn'avas of Bengal*, the far greater number of worshippers of Vishn'u, in Bengal, form one-fifth, or, according to another estimate, nearly one-third of the population of this province. Their founder, *Chaitanya*, was the son of a Brahman settled at Nadîya, but originally from Silhet. He was born in 1485, and his birth was accompanied by the usual portentous indications, described in Hindu legends, of a superhuman event. He was, in fact, an incarnation of Kr'ishn'a, who appeared for the purpose of instructing mankind in the true mode of worshipping him in this age. Up to his twenty-fourth year, Chaitanya seems to have lived without any great pretensions to sanctity; he married, it is

said, a daughter of Vallabhâchârya, and supported his mother after the death of his father, which occurred in his childhood. At twenty-four, however, he shook off the obligations of society, and became an ascetic, travelled between Mathurâ and Jagannâth, and taught his doctrine. At the end of his peregrinations, he nominated his two principal disciples, *Adwaitânand* and *Nityânand*, to preside over the Vaishn'avas of Bengal, and *Rûpa* and *Sanâtana* over those of Mathurâ. Chaitanya himself then settled at Cuttack, where he remained twelve years, engaged in teaching and controversy, and in intent meditation on Kr'ishn'a. There he had frequent visions of Kr'ishńa, Râdhâ, and the Gopîs, and, in one of these fits of ecstasy, was nearly drowned in the Jumna. Ultimately, he disappeared—how, is not known—about 1527. Of his two chief disciples, *Adwaitânand* resided at S'ântipur, and seems to have been a man of some property and respectability. *Nityânand* was a resident of Nadîya, and a householder, and his descendants are still in existence. Besides these three Prabhus, or chiefs, the Vaishn'avas of Bengal acknowledge six Gosâins as their original teachers, viz., *Rûpa, Sanâtan, Jiva, Raghunâth Bhat't', Raghunâth Dâs,* and *Gopâl Dâs;* and next to them they hold in veneration *S'rînivâs, Gadâdhar Pan'd'it, S'rî Svarûpa, Râmânand,* and others, including *Haridâs,* who especially obtained almost equal honour with his master Chaitanya. In addition to these chiefs, the sect claims eight eminent poets, amongst whom *Kr'ishn'a Dâs* is the most celebrated. According to the doctrine of the sect, *Kr'ishn'a* is the Supreme Spirit, who, for various purposes, assumed specific shapes, in which he became incarnate (see VISHN'U); and so far there is not much real difference between the tenets of this and other Vaishn'ava sects. But an important innovation, introduced by its founder, is the doctrine of *Bhakti,* or faith, which, he teaches, is infinitely more efficacious than abstraction, than knowledge of the divine nature—as enjoined by the philosophical systems—than the subjugation of the passions, than the

practice of the Yoga, than charity, virtue, or anything deemed most meritorious. A consequence resulting from this doctrine is, that all castes become by such faith equally pure, and therefore that all castes are admissible into the sect; that all are at liberty to sink their social differences in the condition of ascetics, in which character they may live with each other without regard to former distinctions, and that all members of the sect are equally entitled to the food which has been previously presented to the deity. The *Bhakti*, or faith, comprehends five stages:—quietism, as that of sages; servitude, which every votary takes upon himself; friendship for the deity, such as is felt by Bhîma and others honoured with his acquaintance; tender affection for the deity, of the same nature as love of parents for their children; and the highest degree of affection, such passionate attachment as the Gopîs felt for their beloved Kr'ishn'a.

The manner of expressing these feelings in acts of divine worship is about the same as that represented by the ceremonial of the Vallabhâchâryas; but the secular worshippers are generally content with paying their homage twice a day to the idol of Kr'ishn'a. Their chief ritual is a very simple one; it consists of constantly repeating the name of Kr'ishn'a—a practice of which one of their chiefs, Haridâs, set them a remarkable example, as during many years, when he resided in a thicket, he repeated the name of Kr'ishn'a 300,000 times daily. Their other duties are sixty-four, including many moral and many absurd observances, as suppressing anger, avarice, and lust, and singing and dancing in honour of Kr'ishn'a, and fasting every eleventh day. The most important of all their obligations, however, is their servile veneration of the spiritual teacher, whom they are bound to look upon as the deity himself, and even as possessed of more authority; for they are taught that "the prayer is manifest in the Guru, and the Guru is Vishn'u himself;" again: "First, the Guru is to be worshipped, then I (Vishn'u) am to be worshipped;" and,

"When Vishn'u is in anger, the Guru is our protector; but when the Guru is in anger, we have none." In this respect, the doctrine of the Vaishn'avas of Bengal is similar to that of the Vallabhâchâryas, and their practice also agrees in so far as the Vaishn'avas look upon the dignity of their Gurus as hereditary, and not depending on personal capacity or sanctity; but, as in the case of the Vallabhâchâryas, this practice does not appear to have been enjoined by their original teachers. Liberation from terrestrial existence, most votaries of this sect do not conceive in the spirit of the Vedânta, which teaches that final deliverance is the absorption of the human soul into the divine essence; but, in their opinion, it is twofold, either perpetual residence of the soul in Swarga, or paradise, with possession of the divine attributes of power, &c.; or elevation to *Vaikun't'ha*, the heaven of Vishn'u, where they enjoy felicity under one or all of the four conditions, under which also the Madhwâchâryas conceive such felicity to exist. Chaitanya and his two chief disciples did not leave, as it seems, written compositions; the rest of his pupils, however, wrote numerous works in Sanskrit and Bengali. The Vaishn'avas of this sect are distinguished by two white perpendicular streaks of sandal, or *Gopîchandana*, down the forehead, uniting at the root of the nose, and continuing to near the tip; by the names of *Râdhâ-Kr'ishn'a* stamped on the temples, breast, and arms; by a close necklace of Tulasî stalk of three strings, and a rosary of 108 or sometimes 1,000 beads made of the stem of the Tulasî. The sectaries consist of every caste and order, and are governed by the descendants of their Gosâins: some live in a state of celibacy; the teachers, however, are married men.

There are several divisions of this sect, arising from the various forms under which Vishn'u is worshipped; but besides them, there are three which may be looked upon as seceders from the original sect—viz., the *Spasht'a Dâyakas*, the *Kartâ Bhâjas*, and the *Sâhujas*.

The *Spasht'a Dâyakas* deny the divine character and authority of the Guru, and allow the association of male and female cœnobites in one conventional abode, where their relation is that of brothers and sisters, and their common interest the worship of Kr'ishn'a and Chaitanya. The women act also as the spiritual teachers of the females of respectable families, and the consequence is the growing diffusion of the doctrines of this sect in Calcutta, where it is especially established.—The *Kartâ Bhâjas* are of very recent origin, and, as they acknowledge the absolute divinity of the Guru, there would not be much difference between them and the original body of the Vaishn'avas of Bengal, had they not broken through the old line of hereditary teachers, and invested a new family with spiritual power—viz., that of their founder, *Râma-S'aran-Pâl*, who, at the beginning of this century, was successful in his attempt to create this schism.—Of the *Sâhujas*, very little is known, their professions and practices being kept secret. These are suspected not to be of a very moral character. The chief temples of the Vaishn'avas of Bengal are at Dwârakâ, Brindâvan, Jagannâth, Nadîya, Ambikâ, and Agradwîpa.

Besides these Vaishn'ava sects, there are others of less importance, which it must here suffice merely to enumerate by name—viz., the sect of the *Khâkins*, founded by *Kîl*, the disciple of Kr'ishn'adâs, and established chiefly at Hanumângâd'hî, in Oude; the *Mâlûk Dâsas*, founded by *Mâluk Dâs* about 1600, or the end of the Emperor Akbar's reign—their principal establishment is at Kara Manikpur; the *Dâdû Panthîs*, founded by *Kâdû*, a pupil of one of the Kabîr teachers, about the same time, and established especially in Marwar and Ajmeer; the *Rai Kâsas*, founded by *Rai Kâs*, a disciple of Râmânanda, a sect, it is said, confined to the very lowest of the mixed Hindu castes, or the workers in hides and leather; the *Senâ Panthîs*, who derive their origin from *Senâ*, the barber, the third of Râmânanda's disciples; the *Mîrâ Bâîs*, a subdivision of the Vallabhâchâryas, established by *Mîrâ Bâî*, the

daughter of a petty Râjâ of Mertâ, and the wife of the Rân'a of Udayapur; the *Sanakâdi Sampradâyins*, or *Nîmâvats*, throughout Upper India, founded by an ascetic Nimbâditya; the *Râdhâ Vallabhis*, who consider Harivam's' as their founder, a personage who lived about 300 years ago, and established a monastery at Brindâvan; the *Sakhî Bhâvas*, probably owing their origin to the last-named sect—the *Charan' Dâsas*, whose chief seat is at Delhi, founded by *Charan' Dâs*, a merchant of the Dhûsar tribe, who resided at Delhi, in the reign of the second Alemgîr; the *Haris'chandîs*; the *Sadhnâ Panthis*, founded by *Sadhnâ*, a butcher; and the *Mâdhavis*, founded by *Mâdho*.—For a fuller detail, see H. H. Wilson's *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, in Wilson's Works, vol. i. (London, 1862); and on the Vallabhâchâryas, the *History of the Sect of the Mahârâjas* (by Karsandâs Mulji), mentioned above (London, 1865.)

VARUN'A.

VARUN'A (from the Sanskrit *vr'i*, surround; hence, literally, "the surrounder," and kindred with the Greek *Ouranos*) is, in the Vedic Mythology of the ancient Hindus, one of the *Âdityas*, or offsprings of *Aditi*, the deity of space, and amongst these, one of the most prominent. He is often invoked together with *Mitra*, sometimes together with *Agni*, the god of fire, or with *Indra*, or other elementary deities; but frequently he is also separately praised by the poets of the Vedic hymns. The character of Varun'a, as is the case with other Vedic deities, does not appear to have been or remained the same throughout the whole period represented by the Vedic poetry, but, on the contrary, to have varied according as new imaginations were connected with the idea out of which he arose. Originally, *Varun'a* seems to have been conceived as the sun from the time after its setting to that of its rise; while

Mitra probably represented the sun at its rise. The night is therefore said to be Varun'a's, and the day Mitra's; and the "ever-going Varun'a grants a cool place of rest to all moving creatures, on the closing of the eye (of *Savitr'i*, the sun)." As a consequence, the sun, as manifest during its daily course, is spoken of as his infant, and he "prepares a path for the sun;" and the dawn, which is called the golden light of Mitra and Varun'a, "goes before Varuńa." Out of the mysteriousness with which night is easily endowed, and the qualities which imagination may ascribe to the luminous origin of Varuna, then probably grew the moral attributes given to this deity; for he is extolled as the guardian of immortality; as the cherisher of truth; as armed with many nooses, with which he seizes evil-doers; as the forgiver of sins, and as having unlimited control over mankind. "No one rules for the twinkling of an eye apart from him," and he witnesses man's truth and falsehood. The functions of sovereign authority which are then also attributed to him are probably a consequence of his character as protector of the good, and punisher of the wicked; but his kingly might is, in some hymns, also associated with the power, predicated of him, of "setting free the water of the clouds" or of "ruling over the waters that are in heaven and earth." Whether the connection of Varun'a with the element of water arose from the association of moisture with night, or, which is more likely, from the notion, that water (*vâri*, from the same radical, *vr'i*, as Varun'a) envelops or surrounds the earth, as darkness does, may be doubtful; but it is worthy of notice that the passages of the R'igveda in which Varuńa is spoken of as the cause of rain, or as the lord of rivers or the sea, are few, and perhaps do not belong to the earlier portion of R'igveda poetry. See, for more detail, J. Muir's "Contributions to a Knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology," in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for 1864. Compare also the article Vasisht'ha.—It is in this latter character

alone, however, that Varun'a appears in the classical and Purânic mythology; for there he has ceased to impersonate the sun, when invisible, and though, at that period too, he is still mentioned as an Âditya, his real quality is that of the regent of the waters, and more especially of the ocean, personified. As such, he retains, it is true, the Vedic qualities as "lord of punishment," and carries the "noose," to bind the wicked with; these attributes, however, are, then, not the reflex of his solar omniscience and power, but that of his might as the god of water.—Later fiction makes him also the regent of the west, probably in recollection of his Vedic character as the setting sun, and endows him with a wife, *Varun'ânî*, a son, *Pushkara*, and sometimes also with a daughter, *Punjikasthalî*. It further gives him for a residence the fabulous mountain, *Pushpagiri*, "the mountain of flowers," and a marine monster, *Makarâ*, for his vehicle.*

VASISHT'HA.

Vasisht'ha (the superlative of the Sanskrit *vasumat*, wealthy) is the name of one of the most celebrated Vedic R'ishis, the author of several hymns of the R'igveda, and a personage who seems to have played an important part in the early history of the Brâhmanic or priestly caste of the Hindus. In the account given of him, historical events and mythological fictions are so much blended together, that it is scarcely possible to gather more from it, for certain, than that he was a sage of high reputation, and a priest jealous of the privileges and the position of his caste, and ever ready to assert its superiority over the

* Muir, "Sanskrit Texts," v., 58—76. A. Hillebrandt, Varuna und Mitra. Ein Beitrag zur Exegese des Veda. Breslau, 1877.

second or military and royal caste. In one of his R'igveda hymns, he claims to have been enlightened by the god Varun'a; and in another he is called the son of *Mitra* and *Varun'a*, born from the mind of *Urvas'î*. In other Vedic passages, his pre-eminence over other R'ishis, and his acquaintance with sacred and sacrificial knowledge, are extolled. In the Mahâbhârata, which also calls him the son of Mitra and Varun'a—whence his appellation there, *Maitrâvarun'i*—he is mentioned as imparting divine knowledge to king Janaka, and as the family priest of the race of Ikshwâku; and in the Purân'as he is said to have been one of the arrangers of the Vedas in the Dwâpara age. In Manu and the Purân'as he becomes a patriarch, one of the nine mind-born sons of the god Brahman; and according to some, marries Urjâ (Strength); according to others, *Arundhatî*, one of the Pleiades, by whom he has seven sons. Various other legends relating to him always endeavour to impress the Hindu mind with his Brâhmanic power over kings and Kshattriyas generally. Thus, so great was his power, as the Raghuvans'a relates, that when King Dilipa was doomed to remain childless, because he had inadvertently offended the fabulous cow Surabhi, he was released of this curse by faithfully attending on the cow of Vasisht'ha, which was the cow of plenty, and an offspring of Surabhi. But the most interesting episode of his life is that relating to his conflict with *Vis'wâmitra*. A Vasisht'ha is also mentioned as the author of a law-book; but whether he is, or is intended to be, the same personage as the ancient sage, may be doubtful. The name is often written *Vas'isht'ha*, when it would be the superlative of *Vas'a*, meaning "the most humble"—which the epic and Purânic Vasisht'ha certainly was not—or of *Vas'in*, meaning, "the sage who has thoroughly subdued his passions"—which, too, would seem to be a rather strange epithet of the irascible saint. But, though the name of the owner of the cow of plenty, who could obtain anything he desired, is doubtless correctly

spelled Vasisht'ha, the less correct spelling must nevertheless have been current for a considerable time, since so early a poet as Kâlidâsa, in his Raghuvans'a, puns on the words *vas'î vas'isht'ha*, "Vas'ishth'a, the sage with subdued passions."—See, for the legends concerning Vasisht'ha, J. Muir's *Original Sanskrit Texts*, vol. i. (1858.)*

VÂYU.

Vayu (from the Sanskrit *vâ*, blow), the wind, is, in the Vedic Mythology of the Hindus, a deity, which originally seems to have held an equal rank with Indra (q. v.), but much more rarely occupies the imagination of the poets than this god, or Agni, or the sun; for though, according to Yâska (q. v.), ancient commentators of the Vedas hold that there are only three great deities—viz., *Agni*, fire, whose place is on earth; *Sûrya*, the sun, whose place is in heaven; and *Vâyu*, or *Indra* (q. v.), whose place is in the intermediate sphere—only a few hymns, comparatively speaking, are dedicated to Vâyu, whereas the other deities named are the subject of manifold praise. The description given by the R'igveda of the greatness of Vâyu nevertheless answers the position which those ancient commentators assign to him.—See J. Muir's "Contributions to a Knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology," in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for 1864.† In the epic and Purânic mythology, Vâyu occupies but an inferior position, and the legends there related of him have no cosmical character. They give him a wife, *Anjanâ*, by whom he has a son, the monkey *Hanumat*. When represented, Vâyu either rides on an antelope with a sabre in his hand, or he is seated holding his son Hanumat in his arms.

* 2nd. ed., 317—37; 397 ff.; iii., 246 ff. Haug., Brahma und die Brahmanen, p. 14 ff.

† Sanskrit Texts, v., 143 ff.

VEDA.

VEDA (from the Sanskrit *vid*, know; kindred with the Latin *vid-*, Greek *id-*, Gothic *vait-*, Lithuanian *weizd-*; hence, literally, knowledge) is the technical name of those ancient Sanskrit works on which the first period of the religious belief of the Hindus is based. See INDIA, sec. *Religion*. The oldest of these works—and in all probability the oldest literary document still existing—is the *R'igveda*; next to it stand the *Yajurveda* and *Sâmaveda*; and the latest is the *Atharvaveda*. The first three also bear the collective title of *trayî*, or "the threefold" (scil. science); and all four are considered to be of divinely inspired origin. Each of these Vedas consists of two distinct divisions—a *Sanhitâ*, or collection of *mantras*, or hymns; and a portion called *Brâhman'a*. A *mantra* (from *man*, think; hence, literally, the means by which thinking or meditation is effected) is, as Colebrooke, in conformity with the Mîmânsâ writers, defines the word, a prayer, or else a thanksgiving, praise, or adoration addressed to a deity: it declares the purpose of a pious act, or lauds or invokes the object; it asks a question, or returns an answer; either directs, inquires, or deliberates, blesses or imprecates, exults or laments, counts or narrates, &c. Sometimes it is addressed to the deity with a verb in the first person; sometimes it ends with the verb "thou art," or with the word "thee." See Colebrooke, *Miscellaneous Essays*, i., p. 308; Müller, *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 343; Jaiminîyanyâyamâlâvistara, as quoted in Goldstücker's *Pân'ini*, p. 69. If such a *mantra* is metrical, and intended for loud recitation, it is called *R'ich* (from *r'ich*, praise—whence the name *R'igveda*, i.e., the Veda containing such praises)—if it is in prose, and then it must be muttered inaudibly, it is called *Yajus* (from *yaj*, sacrifice; hence, literally, the means by which sacrificing is effected); therefore, *Yajurveda* signifies the Veda containing such *yajus* And if it is metrical, and intended for chanting, it is termed *Sâman*;

whence *Sâmaveda* means the Veda containing such sâmans. (The original meaning of the latter word is obscure. Native grammarians derive it, but without much probability, from *so*, to give pain, because, they say, "it is difficult to utter such mantras." A mystical, but grammatically impossible, account of *sâman* is given in the *S'atapatha-brâhman'a* and *Br'ihadâran'yaka*, where the word is analysed into *sâ* and *ama*, the former being interpreted as implying "speech," and the latter, "breathing forth," since the chanting of the sâman, as the commentator says, is essentially the result of both.)—No special name is given to the mantras of the fourth Veda. The author of the mantra, or, as the Hindus would say, the inspired "seer," who received it from the deity, is termed its *R'ishi;* and the object in which the mantra is concerned is its *devatâ*—a word which generally signifies "deity," but the meaning of which, in its reference to the mantras, must not always be taken literally, as there are hymns, in which not gods or deified beings, but, for instance, a sacrificial post, a remedy against bad dreams, the generosity of princes from whom gifts were received by the authors, or a chariot, a drum, weapons, the charioteer and horses employed in war, and other worldly objects, invoked, are considered as the *devatâ*.—See Colebrooke's *Misc. Essays*, i., p. 22; Wilson's *Rigveda*, vol. i., in the edition of F. E. Hall, p. 347.—*Brâhman'a*—derived from *brahman*, neuter, probably in the sense of prayer or hymn (see concerning this word, J. Muir, "On the Relation of the Priests to the other Classes of Indian Society in the Vedic Age," in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for 1864; and the introduction of M. Haug's edition of the Aitareya Brâhman'a, vol. i., p. 4)*—designates, according to *Mâdhava-Sâyan'a*, the great commentator on the Vedas, that portion, in prose, of the Vedas which contains either commandments or explanations; or, in

* Brahma und die Brahmanen, p. 27 f. Weber, Ind. Literaturgeschichte,[2] p. 12 ff.

other words, which gives injunctions for the performance of sacrificial acts, explains their origin, and the occasions on which the mantras had to be used, by adding sometimes illustrations and legends, and sometimes also mystical and philosophical speculations. The *Brâhman'a* portion of the Vedas is therefore the basis on which the Vedic ritual rests (see KALPA and VEDANGA), and whence the *Upanishads* (q. v.) and the philosophical doctrines (see SANSKRIT LITERATURE) took their development.

Though *Mantras* and *Brâhman'as*—both of which are also termed *S'ruti*—were held at a later period of Hinduism to have existed simultaneously, that is, from eternity, it is certain that the Brâhman'a portion of each Veda is posterior to at least some part of its Sanhitâ, for it refers to it; and it scarcely requires a remark that so great a bulk of works as that represented by both portions must have been the gradual result of a considerable period of time. There is, indeed, sufficient evidence to prove that various conditions of society, various phases of religious belief, and even different periods of language, are reflected by them. The difficulty, however, critically to discern these periods, is enhanced by the losses, probably considerable, which these writings suffered before they were preserved in the shape in which we now possess them. For in tradition, which records that *Vyâsa*, after having compiled and arranged the Vedas, handed each of them to four disciples, and that these disciples taught them to their disciples, and so forth, down to distant ages, there is so much indubitable, that Mantras and Brâhman'as had to pass through a large number of S'âkhâs, or schools, and that the discrepancies which gradually arose between these schools, both as regards the Vedic texts and the interpretation of these texts, cannot have been slight; for, apart from the conclusion yielded by a comparison of the remaining texts of some of these schools, later writers afford us an insight into the animosity which existed between these schools, and must have arisen from very material grounds. Thus, in a commentary

on *Pâraskara's Gr'ihya Sûtras*, it is said: "Vasisht'ha declares that it is wrong to follow the rules of another S'âkhâ. He says: "A wise person will certainly not perform the duties prescribed by another S'âkhâ: he that does is called a traitor to his S'âkhâ. Whosoever leaves the law of his S'âkhâ, and adopts that of another, he sinks into blind darkness, having degraded a sacred R'ishi." And in another law-book it is said: "If a man gives up his own customs, and performs others, whether out of ignorance or covetousness, he will fall, and be destroyed." And again in the *Paris'isht'a* of the *Chhandogas:* "A fool who ceases to follow his own S'âkhâ, wishing to adopt another one, his work will be in vain."—See Müller's *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 61. That each *S'âkhâ* claimed the possession of the only true and genuine Veda, may be already inferred from passages like these. The differences between these S'âkhâs, however, did not consist—as has been believed—in their various readings of the S'ruti alone; it also consisted in considerable variations of their arrangement of the scriptures; in their additions or omissions of texts—as may be seen from still existing S'âkhâs of the Yajurveda—and, as is stated by *Madhusûdana*, and results from a commentator on Pân'ini, in their *different interpretation of the Vedic texts.* How great the number of these S'âkhâs was, may be inferred from the statement of the *Charan'avyûha*, a treatise ascribed to an ancient writer, S'aunaka; for it enumerates five S'âkhâs of the R'igveda; says that there were 86, and names 42 (or in one recension 44), of the Yajurveda; mentions twelve of the Sâmaveda, out of a thousand which, it says, were at one time in existence, and nine of the Atharvaveda.* The *Âtharvan'arahasya*, a modern treatise on the Atharvaveda, while ascribing the same number of S'âkhâs to the Sâmaveda and Atharvaveda, speaks of twenty-one of the R'igveda, and a hundred of the Yajurveda. Of all these schools, however, the *R'igveda* is now extant

* A. Weber, Indische Studien, xiii., 430 ff.

only in one; the *Yajurveda* (both divisions, to be named hereafter, taken collectively) in three, and partially, in four; the *Sâmaveda* in perhaps two; and the *Atharvaveda* in one.*

The character of the Sanhitâ or Mantra portion of the four Vedas—on which their Brâhman'a portion is based—as well as the relation in which these Sanhitâs stand to each other, is intelligible only if it is borne in mind that the ancient Hindu believed to secure the favours of his gods chiefly by the performance of sacrificial rites; that gradually these rites became complicated and manifold, and that special care, therefore, had to be taken to provide for a correct celebration of the sacrifices which had sprung up, and also to guard against the evil consequences which might result from inadvertence, or other causes beyond the sacrificer's control. The original worship seems to have been simple enough (see INDIA, sec. *Religion*)—it probably neither occupied much time, nor required the assistance of a priest. But when sacrifices were instituted which lasted from one day to eleven, nay, to a hundred days —and some works speak of sacrifices which went on for the space of one and even several years—and when the Brahmanic caste found the performance of such sacrifices to be an excellent means of establishing its sway over the other castes, and a convenient source of an easy livelihood, it was laid down as a rule that no sacrifice could be performed without one *R'itwij*, or priest; and that a great sacrifice, such as the Jyotisht'oma, Râjasûya, or other sacrifices which could only be celebrated by wealthy people or kings, required the assistance of not less than sixteen priests, besides a number of menials, who had to slay the sacrificial animals, to chant, or to perform other inferior work. These sixteen priests were then divided into four sections, each headed by one R'itwij, and containing besides him, his three purushas, or assistants. The first

* On another recension see R. Roth, "Der Atharvaveda in Kaschmir." Tübingen, 1875.

section consisted of the *Adhwaryu*, with his three purushas, the Pratiprasthâtr'i, Nesht'r'i, and Unnetr'i; the second, of the *Brahman*, with the three purushas, Brâhmanâchchhansin, Agnîdh (or Agnîdhra), and Potr'i; the third, of the *Udgâtr'i*, with the Prastotr'i, Pratihartr'i, and Subrahman'ya; and the fourth of the *Hotr'i*, whose assistants were the Maitrâvarun'a, Achchhâvâka, and Grâvastut. (In other accounts, the order of these sections varies, and in the section headed by the Brahman, the Potr'i precedes the Agnîdh; see also Müller, *Ancient Sanskrit Lit.*, pp. 450, 468, 469). The principal duties of these priests were further regulated in the following manner. The *Hotr'i* had to perform the rites relating to the R'igveda, the *Adhwaryu* those based on the Yajurveda; the *Udgâtr'i* was concerned in the rites of the Sâmaveda; and the *Brahman* had to possess a knowledge of all these three Vedas, and to set right any mistake that might have occurred in the performance of the ritual acts, or remedy any defect which might vitiate the efficiency of the sacrifice. He was, therefore, the most learned of all the priests; and the R'igveda itself, though perhaps in one of its latest portions, recognises this superiority of the priest Brahman. In the ritual works relating to the first three Vedas, no functions based on the use of the latest or the Atharvaveda are assigned to him, but in the *S'aunaka-Brâhman'a* of the *Atharvaveda*, where Prajâpati is introduced as intending to perform a Soma sacrifice, and asking the Vedas whom he should choose for his Hotr'i, Adhwaryu, Udgâtr'i, and Brahman, the Vedas answer him: "Choose for a Hotr'i (the priest) who knows the R'igveda; for an Adhwaryu (the priest), who knows the Yajurveda; for an Udgâtr'i (the priest), who knows the Sâmaveda; and for a Brahman (the priest), who knows the Atharvaveda;" and to explain the reason for such advice, they add that the R'igveda hymns having the earth for their abode, one who chooses a *Hotr'i* will obtain dominion over the earth; the Yajurveda mantras resting on the intermediate space, one who engages an *Adhwaryu* will obtain the world of

that space; the Sâmaveda hymns dwelling on heaven, one who employs an *Udgâtr'i* will obtain that world; but one who chooses a *Brahman* will encompass the world of (the neuter) Brahman, or the supreme spirit since the hymns of the Atharvaveda have for their abode Brahman.

The most interesting feature of this and similar passages is the tendency of their authors to maintain the greater efficiency of one of the later Vedas in comparison to that of the R'igveda, and consequently the greater practical superiority of these Vedas over the avowedly oldest Veda. And this is intelligible enough, if we compare the contents of these Vedas.

The worship alluded to in many hymns of the R'igveda must have consisted more of isolated sacrificial offerings than of a series of acts strung together so as to form an elaborate sacrifice. There are other hymns, it is true, which betray the existence, at their time, of a ritual, already become complicated, as when three or four, or even seven priests are mentioned by the poet; but though these hymns, as well as the former, bear testimony to the existence, at that early period, of ritual acts, it does not follow that the R'igveda, as such, was composed for the purpose of being recited when they were performed. From the nature of its hymns, it results, on the contrary, that, having been composed, they were at some subsequent period connected with those pious acts which became more and more complicated, and gradually were systematized. But then even there remain verses which would not easily bend to such artificial purposes; and whole hymns, too, which would resist an attempt to force them into a liturgic code for which they were not intended by the poet's mind. A collection of songs, in short, which was the natural growth of time, and, to some extent, at least, the ingenuous outburst of the poet's feelings, became inadequate for a regular liturgy of a highly-developed and throughout artificial ritual. Out of this necessity there arose the *Sâma-* and the *Yajurveda*. The former was

entirely made up of extracts from the R'igveda, put together so as to suit the ritual of the so-called Soma sacrifices. For, as all native authorities agree in stating that the Sâmaveda contains none but R'igveda verses, the absence of seventy-one verses in the recension of this Veda, edited by Professor Benfey, from the recension in which the R'igveda now exists, does not disprove their unanimous statement: it must be accounted for by the circumstance, that these verses belonged to one or the other of the recensions of the R'igveda, which, as mentioned before, are no longer preserved. The origin of the Yajurveda is similar to that of the Sâmaveda; it, too, is chiefly composed of verses taken from the R'igveda; but as the sphere of the ritual for which the compilation of this Veda became necessary is wider than that of the Sâmaveda, and as the poetry of the R'igveda no longer sufficed for certain sacrifices with which this ritual had been enlarged, new mantras were added to it—the so-called Yajus, in prose, which thus became a distinctive feature of this Veda; and it is on the Yajurveda, therefore, that the orthodox Hindu looked with especial predilection, for it could better satisfy his sacrificial wants than the Sâma-, and still more, of course, than the R'igveda. "The Yajurveda," says *Sâyan'a*, in his introduction to the Taittirîya Sanhitâ, "is like a wall, the two other Vedas like paintings (on it.)" The sacredness of the Sâma- and Yajurvedas, and the belief in their inspired character, rest on the assumption that they are of the same origin as the R'igveda, which dates from eternity, and which was "seen" by the R'ishis who uttered it. That, in the case of the Yajurveda, this theory is only partially correct, results already from the description just given of it; for whatever losses the present text of the R'igveda may have suffered, it is admitted by all authorities that its mantras were always metrical, and that it can never, therefore, have possessed passages in prose. But how frail this theory is, and in what sense it is possible to speak of the sameness of origin, even in the case

of those hymns of the Sâma- and Yajurvedas which are composed of R'igveda verses, a comparison of the place occupied by the verses of a few hymns taken from one and the other of these Vedas with the place which the same verses occupy in the R'igveda, will sufficiently show.

The first hymn of the Sâmaveda consists of ten verses, nine of which are contained in the present recension of the R'igveda. If by the side of each of these verses the place is marked which it holds in the R'igveda, the result is this:

			Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
Sâmaveda 1, verse	1, is R'igveda,		6	16	10
,, ,,	2, ,,		6	16	1
,, ,,	3, ,,		1	12	1
,, ,,	4, ,,		6	16	34
,, ,,	5, ,,		8	73	1
,, ,,	6, ,,		8	60	1
,, ,,	7, ,,		6	16	16
,, ,,	8, ,,		8	11	7
,, ,,	9, ,,		6	16	13

The verses of which the hymn of the Sâmaveda 1, verses 370—380, is composed, correspond with the following verses of the R'igveda:

			Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
Sâmaveda 1, verse	370, with R'igveda		8	86	10
,, ,,	371, ,,		10	147	1
,, ,,	372, ,,			absent	
,, ,,	373, ,,		1	57	4
,, ,,	374, ,,		3	51	4
,, ,,	375, ,,		10	43	1
,, ,,	376, ,,		1	51	1
,, ,,	377, ,,		1	52	1
,, ,,	378, ,,		6	70	1
,, ,,	379, ,,		10	134	1
,, ,,	380, ,,		1	101	1

If from the White Yajurveda the mantras, for instance, of the 22nd to the 25th chapter were submitted to a similar test, it would be seen that in chapter 22, which has 34 divisions, only four verses occur in the R'igveda, viz.:

				Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
White Yajurveda	22, verse	10,	in R'igveda	1	22	5
,,	,,	15,	,,	5	14	1
,,	,,	16,	,,	3	11	2
,,	,,	18,	,,	9	110	3

that in chapter 23, with 65 divisions, there correspond:

				Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
White Yajurveda	23, verse	3,	with R'igveda	10	121	5
,,	,,	5,	,,	1	6	1
,,	,,	6,	,,	1	6	2
,,	,,	16,	,,	1	162	21
,,	,,	32,	,,	4	39	6

that chapter 24 being in prose, cannot occur in the R'igveda; and that of chapter 25, with 47 divisions:

				Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
White Yajurveda	25, verse	12,	is R'igveda	10	121	4
,,	,,	13,	,,	10	121	2
,,	,,	14–23,	are ,,	1	89	1–10
,,	,,	24–45,	,,	1	162	1–22
,,	,,	46,	is ,,	10	157	1, 3, 2

(See the article "The Inspired Writings of Hinduism," in the *Westminster Review* for January 1864).

All, therefore, that is left of the oldest Veda in the Sâmaveda and Yajurveda, is a R'igveda piece-meal; its hymns scattered about; verses of the same hymn transposed; verses from different hymns combined, and even the compositions of different poets brought into one and the same hymn, as if they belonged to the same authorship. That, under such treatment, the Yajurveda should have lost all poetical

worth, is but what may be expected; it must be, however, matter of surprise that the Sâmaveda should have saved so much, as it even now possesses, of that genuine beauty which distinguishes the R'igveda poetry. The *Atharvaveda*, too, is made up in a similar manner as the Yajurveda, with this difference only, that the additions in it to the garbled extracts from the R'igveda are more considerable than those in the Yajurveda. It is avowedly the latest Veda, and even its name, "Atharvaveda," as it was current already during the classical period of Sanscrit literature, does not yet occur in the oldest Upanishads, where only the songs and revelations of the *Atharva-Angiras*, or of the *Bhr'igu-Angiras*, apparently denoting this Veda, are spoken of. The Atharvaveda was not used, as Madhusûdana, in his treatise on Sanskrit Literature, says, "for the sacrifice, but merely for appeasing evil influences, for insuring the success of sacrificial acts, for incantations, &c.;" but on this very ground, and perhaps on account of the mysteriousness which pervades its songs, it obtained, amongst certain schools, a degree of sanctity which even surpassed that of the older Vedas.

This being the general character of these four Vedas, a few remarks must here suffice to convey some idea of their special contents.

On the religious ideas expressed in the *R'igveda*, a general account is given in the article *India*, sec. *Religion;* see also, besides the deities mentioned there, and the articles referring to them, Varun'a, Vâyu, and Yama, and J. Muir's "Contributions to a Knowledge of Vedic Theogony and Mythology," in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for 1864.* The social condition of the Hindus, as reflected from the hymns of this Veda, is not that of a pastoral or nomadic people, as is sometimes supposed, but, on the contrary, betrays an advanced stage of civilisation.

* This essay has been expanded in the fifth volume of the author's "Sanskrit Texts." (1870).

Frequent allusion is made in them to towns and cities, to mighty kings, and their prodigious wealth. Besides agriculture, they mention various useful arts which were practised by the people, as the art of weaving, of melting precious metals, of fabricating cars, golden and iron mail, and golden ornaments. The employment of the needle and the use of musical instruments, are known to them. They also prove that the Hindus of that period were not only familiar with the ocean, but sometimes must have engaged in naval expeditions. They had some knowledge of medicine, and must have made some advance in astronomical computation, as mention is made of the adoption of an intercalary month, for the purpose of adjusting the solar and lunar years. Nor were they unacquainted with the vices of civilisation, for we read in these hymns of common women, of secret births, of gamblers and thieves. There is also a curious hymn, from which it would follow that even the complicated law of inheritance, which is one of the peculiarities of the existing Hindu law, was to some extent already in use at one of the periods of the R'igveda hymns. The institution of caste, however, seems at that time to have been unknown, for there is no evidence to prove that the names which at a later period were current for the distinction of caste, were employed in the same sense by the poets of these hymns.—See Wilson's *R'igveda*, vol. i., re-edited by F. E. Hall, vols. ii. iii.; and vol. iv., edited by E. B. Cowell (Lond. 1850—1866).

The only recension in which the Sanhitâ of the R'igveda has been preserved to us, is that of the *S'âkala* school; and the hymns themselves are arranged according to two methods, the one chiefly considering the material bulk, the other the authorship of the hymns. Both divisions, however, run parallel. According to the former, the whole Sanhitâ consists of eight *Asht'akas*, or eights; these, again, are divided into 64 *Adhyâyas*, or lessons; these into 2006 *Vargas*, or sections;

and the Vargas into *R'ichs*, or verses, the actual number of which is 10,417, but, according to the statement of native authorities, seems at some other time to have amounted to 10,616 or 10,622.—According to the other method, the Sanhitâ is divided into ten *Man'd'alas*, or "circles;" the Man'd'alas into 85 *Anuvâkas*, or "sections;" these into 1017, and 11 additional, i. e., into 1028 *Sûktas*, or "hymns," and the hymns into *R'ichs*, or verses, the number of which coincides, of course, with that of the former arrangement. The number of *padas*, or words, in this Sanhitâ is stated as being 153,826.

In eight out of the ten Man'd'alas, the first hymn or hymns are addressed to *Agni;* the next hymn or hymns generally to *Indra;* and after these come hymns to the *Vis'we Devâs*—the deities collectively—or hymns to other special deities. The eighth Man'd'ala begins with hymns to Indra, and the ninth is chiefly devoted to Soma.

As for the authorship of the hymns the second Man'd'ala belongs chiefly to that of *Gr'itsamada*, the third chiefly to that of *Vis'wâmitra*, and the fourth chiefly to that of *Vâmadeva*. The fifth was composed chiefly by *Atri* and members of his family: the sixth by *Bharadvâja* and members of his family; the seventh by *Vasisht'ha* and his kin; the first, eighth, ninth, and tenth by various R'ishis.—The text of the Sanhitâ has been edited in Roman characters by Professor Th. Aufrecht (Berlin, 1861);* and the text with the commentary of Sâyan'a, is published by Professor Max Müller.† Of translations, that by the late Professor H. H. Wilson, which was left by him completed in manuscript, and of which 4 vols. have already appeared in print (see above), follows the commentary of Sâyan'a, based on Hindu tradition; that begun by Professor Benfey in the Journal *Orient und*

* Second edition, Berlin, 1877. 2 vols.

† Also the (Sanhitâ and Pada) text separately, London, 1873, 2 vols. New edition, London, 1877.

Occident, vols. i. and ii. (Gött. 1862—1864), is essentially speculative *

The Brâhman'a portion of the R'igveda is preserved in two works only—the *Aitareya Brahman'a*, which consists of eight *Panchikâs*, or "pentades," each of these comprising five *Adhyâyas*, or "lessons," and all the Adhyâyas together, 285 *Khan'd'as*, or "portions;" and the *S'ânkhâyana*, or *Kaushîtaki-Brâhman'a*, containing thirty *Adhyâyas*, also sub-divided into a number of *Khan'd'as*. The following specimens, selected from the former, may illustrate the manner in which works of this category enjoin sacrificial rites and explain their secret meaning. The first relates to the ceremony of carrying the Soma (q. v.). "The king Soma lived among the Gandharvas. The gods and R'ishis deliberated as to how the king might be induced to return to them. *Vâch*, the goddess of speech, said: "The Gandharvas lust after women. I (therefore) shall transform myself into a woman, and then you sell me to them (in exchange for Soma)." The gods answered: "No! how shall we live without thee?" She said: "Sell me unto them; if you want me, I shall return to you." Thus they did. In the disguise of a big naked woman, she was sold (by the gods to the Gandharvas) in exchange for Soma. In imitation (of this precedent), men drive away an immaculate cow of one year's age, this being the price at which they purchase the king Soma. This cow may, however, be rebought; for *Vâch* returned to the gods. Hence the Mantras, after Soma has been bought, are to be repeated with a low voice. After Soma has been bought, the goddess of speech is with the Gandharvas; but she returns as soon as the ceremony of carrying the sacred fire is performed."

* The first volume of an annotated translation by Prof. M. Müller, containing twelve hymns, appeared in 1869. Two independent German translations, by Grassmann and Ludwig, are in progress.

The following are the speculations of this Brâhman'a on the *Yûpa*, or sacrificial post, and the meaning of the sacrificial animal.

"(The theologians) argue the question: Is the *Yûpa* to remain standing (before the fire); or is it to be thrown (into the fire)? (They answer:) For him who desires cattle, it may remain standing. (About this, the following legend is reported.) Once upon a time, cattle did not stand still to be taken by the gods for food. After having run away, the cattle stood still, and, turning towards the gods, said repeatedly: "You shall not obtain us. No, no!" Thereupon the gods saw that *Yûpa* weapon which they erected. Thus they frightened the animals, which then returned to them. That is the reason that, up to this day, the sacrificial animals are turned towards the *Yûpa* (their head being bent towards the sacrificial post to which they are tied). Then they stood still to be taken by the gods for their food. . . . The man who is initiated (into the sacrificial mysteries) offers himself to all deities. Agni represents all deities, and Soma represents all deities. When the sacrificer offers the animal to Agni and Soma, he releases himself from being offered to all deities. Some say: "The animal to be offered to Agni and Soma must be of two colours, because it belongs to two deities." But this precept should not be attended to. A fat animal is to be sacrificed, because animals (compared to the sacrificer) are fat, and he (compared to them) is lean. When the animal is fat, the sacrificer thrives through its marrow. Some say: "Do not eat of the animal offered to Agni and Soma. Who eats of this animal, eats human flesh, because the sacrificer releases himself (from being sacrificed) by means of the animal." But this precept, too, should not be attended to. The animal offered to Agni and Soma was an offering to Indra, for Indra slew Vr'itra through Agni and Soma. Both then said to him: "Thou hast slain Vr'itra through us; let us choose a boon from thee." "Choose yourselves," answered he.

But they choose this boon from him; and thus they receive (now as their food) the animal which is sacrified the day previous to the Soma feast. This is their everlasting portion chosen by them; hence one ought to take pieces of it, and eat them."—See M. Haug's edition and translation of the *Aitareyâ Brâhman'a* (vol. ii. pp. 59, 78), (Bombay, 1863).

The principal object for which the *Sâmavedâ* was compiled is the performance of those sacrifices of which the juice of the Soma plant is the chief ingredient; and of such sacrifices the most important is the *Jyotisht'oma*, which consists of seven stages: the Agnisht'oma, Atyagnisht'oma, Ukthya, Shod'as'in, Atirâtra, Aptoryâma, and Vâjapeya; but the performance of the Agnisht'oma alone was considered obligatory for those who wished to derive the chief advantage accruing from the celebration of this grand ceremony; while its other six stages, while adding to the merits of the sacrificer, were deemed voluntary. At the performance of such Soma sacrifices, the verses of the Sâmaveda were intoned; and there are special song-books which teach the proper manner how to chant them. The Sanhitâ of the Sâmaveda is preserved in two recensions: in that of the *Rân'âyanîya*, and probably also the *Kauthuma* school. It consists of two parts: the first *Chhandograntha*, also called *Archika*, or *Pûrvârchika*, contains, in the present recension, 585 verses which are arranged into 59 *Das'ati* or decades, these being divided into *Prapât'hakas*, or chapters, and the latter, again, into *Ardhaprapât'hakas*, or half-chapters. The second portion, called *Staubhika*, or *Uttarâgranthâ*, or *Uttarârchika*, consists of 1225 verses, distributed over nine *Prapât'hakas*, which, too, are sub-divided into *Ardhaprapât'hakas*. And there is this peculiarity in the Uttarâgrantha, that being for the most part arranged according to triplets of verses, the first verse of these triplets is frequently one which also occurs in the Archika portion. It is then called the *Yoni*, or parent verse,

because the subsequent two, the *Uttarâ*, are symbolically its children, since they participate of all the modulations, stoppages, and other modifications which may occur in the chanting of the "parent" verse. These modulations, &c., are taught in the *Gânas*, or song-books mentioned before, two of which, the *Veyagâna* and *Âran'yagâna*, relate to the Ârchika; and two others, the *U'hagâna* and *U'hyagâna*, to the Staubhika part. The text of the Sâmaveda-Sanhitâ, in the Rân'âyanîya recension, has been edited and translated by Dr. J. Stevenson (Lond. 1842—1843), and by Professor Th. Benfey (Leip. 1848).

The number of *Brâhman'as* relating to this Veda is, by the native authorities, given as eight; and their names are: the *Praud'ha-*, or *Panchavins'a-*, the *Shad'vins'a-*, the *Sâmavidhi-*, or *Sâmavidhâna-*, the *Ârsheya-*, the *Devatâdhyâya-*, the *Vans'a-*, the *Sanhitopanishad-Brâhman'a*; and the *Upanishad*, which probably is the *Chhândogya-Upanishad*, and thus is ranked amongst the Brâhman'as. A later Brâhman'a, probably of modern date, and which is not mentioned by Sâyan'a, is the *Adbhuta-Brâhman'a*. The latter and the *Van'sa Brâhman'a* have been edited by Professor A. Weber: the former in the *Indische Studien*, vol. iv. (Berlin, 1858); the latter in the *Abhandlungen der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (1858).*

The history of the Yajurveda differs in so far from that of the other Vedas, as it is marked by a dissension between its own schools far more important than the differences which separated the schools of each other Veda. It is known by the distinction between a Yajurveda, called the *Black*, and another, called the *White Yajurveda*. Tradition, especially that of the Purân'as, records a legend to account for it. *Vais'ampâyana*, it says, the disciple of Vyâsa, who had received from him the Yajurveda, once having committed an offence, desired his disciples to assist him in

* See above p. 46, Editions of nearly all of these Brâhman'as, by Dr. A. Burnell, have been published or are in preparation.

the performing of some expiatory act. One of these, however, *Yâjnavalkya*, proposed that he should alone perform the whole rite; upon which, Vais'ampâyana, enraged at what he considered to be the arrogance of Yâjnavalkya, uttered a curse on him, the effect of which was, that Yâjnavalkya disgorged all the Yajus texts he had learned from Vais'ampâyana. The other disciples, having meanwhile been transformed into partridges (*tittiri*), picked up these tainted texts, and retained them. Hence these texts are called *Taittirîyas*. But Yâjnavalkya, desirous of obtaining other Yajus texts, devoutly prayed to the Sun, and had granted to him his wish—"to possess such texts as were not known to his teacher." And because the Sun on that occasion appeared to Yâjnavalkya in the shape of a horse (*vâja*), those who studied these texts were called *Vâjins*. That part of this legend was invented merely to account for the name of the *Taittirîyas*, after whom a Sanhitâ and Brâhman'a of the Black Yajurveda, and for that of the *Vâjasaneyins*, after whom the Sanhitâ of the White Yajurveda is named, is clear enough. Nor is greater faith to be placed on it when it implies that the origin of this dissension ascended to the very oldest period of the Yajurveda; for there is strong reason to assume that the division took place even after the time of the grammarian Pân'ini. See Goldstücker's *Pân'ini*, p. 130, ff. But so much in it is consistent with truth—that the Black Yajurveda is the older of the two; that the White Yajurveda contains texts which are not in the Black; and that, compared to the motley character of the former, it looks "white," or orderly. This motley character of the Black Yajurveda, however, arises from the circumstance, that the distinction between a Mantra and Brâhman'a portion is not so clearly established in it as in the other Vedas; hymns and matter properly belonging to the Brâhman'as there being intermixed. This defect is remedied in the White Yajurveda; and it points, therefore, to a period when the material of the old Yajus

was brought into a system consonant with prevalent theories, literary and ritual.

The contents of both divisions of the Yajurveda are similar in many respects. Two of the principal sacrifices of which they treat are the *Darsapûrn'amâsa*, or the sacrifice to be performed at new and full moon, and the *As'wamedha*, or the horse-sacrifice, at the performance of which 609 animals of various descriptions, domestic and wild, were tied to 21 sacrificial posts. A *Purushamedha*, or man-sacrifice, unknown to the other Vedas, is also mentioned in it; its character, however, is symbolical.

The text of the Black Yajurveda is extant in the recension of two schools—that of *Âpastamba*, to which the *Taittirîya Sanhitâ* belongs, and that of *Châraka*. The former which is in course of publication—the first volume and part of the second having been already published, with the commentary of Mâdhavâchârya (Sâyan'a), by Dr. E. Roer and E. B. Cowell in the *Bibliotheca Indica* (Calcutta, 1860—1864)—consists of seven *Kân'd'a*, or books, which comprise 44 *Prapât'haka*, or chapters, subdivided into 651 *Anuvâka*, or sections, and containing 2198 *Kan'd'ikâs*, or portions.*

The *Vâjasaneyi-Sanhitâ*, or the Sanhitâ of the White Yajurveda, exists in the recension of the *Mâdhyandina* and *Kânva* school. In the former—the text of which, apparently also with the commentary of *Mahîdharâ*, has been edited by Professor A. Weber (Berlin, 1852)—this Sanhitâ has 40 *Adhyâyas*, or books, subdivided into 303 *Anuvâkas*, with 1975 *Kan'd'ikâs*.†

The principal Brâhman'a of the Black Yajurveda is the *Taittirîya-*

* The text, in Roman characters, has also been edited by Prof. Weber, in his "Indische Studien," vols. xii. and xiii.

† Another edition, with Mahîdhara's commentary and a Bengali translation, is in progress in Calcutta.

Brâhman'a, which, with the commentary of (Mâdhava) Sâyan'a, is in the course of publication by Baboo Rajendralâla Mitra—the first volume and part of the second having already appeared in print (Calcutta, 1860—1865) in the *Bibliotheca Indica*. That of the White Yajurveda is the *S'atapatha-Brâhman'a*, the most complete and systematic of all Brâhman'as. Its text, with a semblance of the commentary of *Sâyan'a*, has been edited by Professor A. Weber (Berlin, 1855).

The Atharvaveda has no circle of sacrifices assigned to it. Its object is, as observed before, to teach how to appease, to bless, to curse, &c. "The most prominent characteristic feature of this Veda," Professor Whitney, one of its editors, remarks, "is the multitude of incantations which it contains; these are pronounced either by the person who is himself to be benefitted, or, more often, by the sorcerer for him, and are directed to the procuring of the greatest variety of desirable ends. Most frequently, perhaps, long life, or recovery from grievous sickness, is the object sought; then a talisman, such as a necklace, is sometimes given, or, in very numerous cases, some plant endowed with marvellous virtues is to be the immediate external means of the cure; further, the attainment of wealth or power is aimed at, the downfall of enemies, increase in love or in play, the removal of petty pests, and so on, even down to the growth of hair on a bald pate."—*Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. iii. p. 308. It has been surmised (Müller's *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 447, ff.) that the hymns of the Atharvaveda "formed an additional part of the sacrifice from a very early time, and that they were chiefly intended to counteract the influence of any untoward event that might happen during the sacrifice." This is possible; but the great importance which the adherents of this Veda themselves attach to it, is founded on other considerations than these. They argue, as appears from the treatise *Atharvan'arahasya*, mentioned

above, that the three other Vedas enable a man to fulfil the *dharma*, or religious law, but that the Atharva helps him to attain *moksha*, or eternal bliss. This doctrine is laid down, for instance, in the *Chûlika Upanishad* of this Veda, when it says: "Those Brâhmans and others who know the science of the (neuter) Brâhman contained in the *Brahmaveda*, become merged in Brahman;" and it is likewise inferred from other passages in the *S'aunaka Brâhman'a*. The name of *Brahmaveda* itself, by which this Veda is also frequently called, is therefore explained by them, not as implying the Veda which belongs to the province of the priest Brahman, but the Veda which contains the mysterious doctrine of Brahman, the supreme spirit, into which the human soul becomes finally absorbed. It is probable, therefore, that the very uselessness of the Atharvaveda for sacrificial purposes, and the reluctance which was felt to base its sanctity merely on its incantations and spells, invested it, in the mind of its followers, with a spiritual character, which was then fully developed in the numerous Upanishads now connected with it.

The text of the Atharvaveda is preserved only in the *S'aunaka* school. Its Sanhitâ consists in the present edition of it, of 20 *Kân'd'as*, or books. Of these, the first 18 are subdivided into 34 *Prapât'hakas*, or chapters, with, altogether, 94 *Anuvâkas*, or sections, each containing a number of *mantras* (the 17th Kân'd'a consisting of a single Prapât'haka). The 19th Kân'd'a is not divided into Prapât'hakas, but into *Anuvâkas*, of which it contains seven; and the 20th, likewise divided into *Anuvâkas*, has nine, of which the third is subdivided into three *Paryâyas*.—The text of this Sanhitâ has been edited by Professors R. Roth and W. D. Whitney (Berlin, 1856).

The only existing Brâhman'a of this Veda is the *S'aunaka-* or *Gopatha-Brâhman'a*.* "That this Brâhman'a," Professor Müller

* Edited, with an introductory essay, by Babu Rajendrala Mitra. Calc. 1872.

observes, "was composed after the schism of the Charakas and Vâjasaneyins, and after the completion of the Vâjasaneyi-Sanhitâ, may be gathered from the fact, that where the first lines of the other Vedas are quoted in the Gopatha, the first line of the Yajurveda is taken from the Vâjasaneyins, and not from the Taittiriyas."—*Ancient Sanskrit Lit.*, p. 252. Each of these Vedas received in time *Anukraman'îs*, or indices, which give the first word of each hymn, the number of verses, the names of the deities, the name and family of the poets, and the metre of every verse. The principal treatise of this kind is the *Sarvânukraman'î*, or "The General Index," ascribed to the authorship of *S'aunaka*. For the theosophical works which grew out of these Vedas, see the article Upanishad; and for the works which were composed in order to secure a correct reading and understanding of the Vedic texts, and a correct performing of sacrificial acts, see the article Vedânga.*—At a later period the name of Veda was also bestowed on *Itihâsas*—legends or legendary works—and *Purân'as* (q. v.), collectively; but in this sense it never obtained real currency. *Upavedas*, or minor Vedas, are also mentioned in the *Charan'avyûha* and other works, and explained by them in the following manner. The Upaveda of the R'igveda, they say, is the *Âyurveda*, or the Veda on medicine—probably the well-known works of Charaka and Sus'ruta; the Upaveda of the Yajurveda is the *Dhanurveda*, or the Veda on archery; the Upaveda of the Sâmaveda is the *Gândharvaveda*, on music; and the Upaveda of the Atharvaveda is the *S'ilpas'âstra*, a work on mechanical arts, or, according to others, the *Arthas'âstras*, works on practical subjects, comprising polity, mechanical science, the training of elephants, horses, and fencing.

In the preceding brief outline of the four Vedas, the question as to the date at which they were composed has not been raised, because, in

* Above p. 56 ff.

the present condition of Vedic philology, an answer to it could only be hypothetical. From astronomical facts, based on a statement in a Vaidik calendar, Colebrooke concluded that this calendar was written in the 14th century before the Christian era (*Miscell. Essays*, vol. i., pp. 109, 110); and though subsequent writers have questioned the full correctness of this conclusion, those most reliable nevertheless admit that the error, if any, could not lessen the antiquity of this calendar by more than 100 or 200 years. As this calendar must have been composed after the R'igveda had been arranged, and as such an arrangement itself must be posterior to the date of its last hymn, a full scope is left for imagination to fill up these intervals. But let it be understood that imagination alone would have to perform this task, since scientific research has not yet yielded any means to check it, or prompt it on, as the case may be; nor is there any real prospect that future discoveries in Sanscrit literature will supply this want. A safer basis, however, may be looked for, if future research restricted itself to the question as to the *relative* age of these Vedic writings. Much valuable evidence has already been brought forward in this respect to prove that there are R'ishis ancient, and less ancient (see, for instance, J. Muir's *Original Sanscrit Texts*, vol. ii. p. 205, ff.); that there are R'igveda hymns older than others (for instance, in Müller's *Ancient Sanscrit Literature*; but, on the other hand, much confusion has also been produced by starting a theory, that all the Brâhman'as belong to one period, and all the hymns to another period preceding it, of which, again, two stages were thought to be discernible, and by assigning dates to the Brâhman'a period, as well as to each of the two stages of the Mantra period. For, apart from the circumstance, that no evidence whatever has as yet been brought forward to justify an assumption of only two stages of hymns, each of which would comprise only 200 years, it is clear that the similarity of subject-matter alone—such as it marks the literary

character of the Brâhman'as—cannot be a criterion for determining that *all* the Brâhman'as must be more recent than *all* the Sanhitâs. That a Brâhman'a of the R'igveda must be posterior to those hymns of the R'igveda Sanhitâ which it mentions, but to those alone—again, that a Brâhman'a of the Sâmaveda must be younger than the hymns of the Sâmaveda on which it relies, and so on—cannot be matter of doubt; but as the Sanhitâ of the Sâmaveda, for instance, must be more recent than that of the R'igveda, and as no fact whatever has been adduced to shew why the Aitareya Brâhman'a, or other Brâhman'as of the R'igveda, could not have appeared before a Sâmaveda-Sanhitâ was made, and so forth in the case of the other Vedas, it follows that it would be entirely unsafe to infer that all the Brâhman'as must be later than *all* the hymns of the R'igveda, since not all of them need have existed before the oldest Brâhman'a of this Veda was composed. A result like this is, unhappily, purely negative, but it may have the advantage of counselling caution and stimulating research.

VEDÂNTA.

VEDANTA (from the Sanscrit *veda*, and *anta*, end; hence, literally, "the end or ultimate aim of the Vedas") is the second great division of the *Mîmânsâ* (q. v.) school of Hindu philosophy. It is chiefly concerned in the investigation of *Brahman* (neuter), or the Supreme Spirit, and the relation in which the universe, and especially the human soul, stands to it; and in contradistinction from the *Pûrvamîmânsâ*, or the investigation (*mîmânsâ*) of the former (*pûrva*) part of the Vedas—viz.,

the Sanhitâ, and especially the *Brâhman'as* (see Veda), which contain the *dharma*, or religious law (see Mîmânsâ), it is also called *Uttara-mîmânsâ*, or the investigation (*mîmânsâ*) of the latter (*uttara*) part of the Vedas—viz., *Âran'yakas* and *Upanishads* (q. v.) which treat of (the neuter) *Brahman*, or the Supreme Spirit [not to be confounded with (the masculine) *Brahman*, or the god of the mythological *Trimûrti* (q. v.)]. Sometimes, the name given to it is *S'ârîraka-mîmânsâ*, or the investigation of the soul (s'arîra). In its method, the Vedânta differs from the Nyâya (see Nyâya and Vais'eshika) by endeavouring to explain the universe as a successive development from one ultimate source or principle—whereas the Nyâya, in both its divisions, treats of the objects of human knowledge of which the universe is composed, under different topics, unconcerned about their mutual relation of effect and cause; and from the *Sânkhya* (see Sânkhya and Yoga), it is distinct, inasmuch as that system is based on the assumption of a duality of principles whence the universe derives its origin.

The object-matter of the Vedânta is the proof that the universe emanates in a successive development from a Supreme Spirit or soul, which is called *Brahman*, or *paramâtman;* that the human soul is therefore identical in origin with Brahman; that the worldly existence of the human soul is merely the result of its ignorance of this sameness between itself and the Supreme Spirit; and that its final liberation or freedom from Transmigration is attained by a removal of this ignorance, that is, by a proper understanding of the truth of the Vedânta doctrine.

According to this doctrine, *Brahman* (neuter) is both the efficient and material cause of the world, creator and creation, doer and deed. It is one, self-existent, supreme, as truth, wisdom, intelligence, and happiness; devoid of the three qualities, in the sense in which created beings possess them; and at the consummation of all things, the whole

universe is resolved or absolved into it. From Brahman individual souls emanate, as innumerable sparks issue from a blazing fire. The soul, therefore, is neither born, nor does it die; it is of divine substance, and as such infinite, immortal, intelligent, sentient, true. Its separate existence, as distinct from Brahman, is the cause of its ignorance; and this ignorance, which consists in regarding the world as a reality capable of subsisting without Brahman, has a double power—that of enveloping and projecting. By means of the former, it makes the soul liable to mundane vicissitudes, as to the sensations of pleasure, pain, &c. The projective power of ignorance, when encompassing the soul in its fourth condition, or that of pure intellect (its other conditions are: waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep), produces out of the darkness which then prevails the five subtile elements—viz., *ether*, which is the substratum of the quality sound: *air*, which arises from ether, the substratum of touch; from air, *fire or light*, the substratum of colour; from light, *water*, the substratum of savour; and from water, *earth*, the substratum of smell. From these subtile elements are then produced seventeen subtile bodies and the five gross elements. The former, also called *linga-s'arîra*, because they are bodies (*s'arîra*) which impart to existing beings their individual character (*linga*), are *the five organs of perception*—viz., the organs of hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell, which arise severally from the *pure* or inactive particles of the subtile elements; further, *two intellectual organs*, which are produced from the *mingled pure*, or inactive particles of the subtile elements——viz., *buddhi*, understanding, the function of which is to arrive at a certainty or conclusion, and *manas* (an organ of volition and imagination), the function of which consists in willing and doubting—thinking and referring the external objects to one's own self, being two functions common to both of them; lastly, *the five organs of action*—viz., the voice, hands, the feet, the organ of excretion, and that of generation,

which are severally produced from the *foul* or *active* particles of each of the subtile elements; and *the five vital airs*, which are produced from the *mingled foul* or *active* particles of the subtile elements—viz., the air breathed forth, which has its place in the fore-part of the nose; the air breathed downwards, which has its place in the lower intestines; the air which circulates through the whole body; the ascending air, which has its place in the throat, and the descending air in the middle of the body, which causes assimilation and digestion of food, produces semen, excrements, &c. (Later Vedântists assume ten such vital airs —viz., besides the foregoing, the airs which severally cause retching, winking, hunger, yawning, and fattening.) The five *gross elements* are the five subtile elements, when, according to a theory derived from a scriptural text, they have become so divided and combined that each of them retains a preponderating portion of itself, and consequently of the quality of which it is the substratum—as ether of sound, &c.—and besides smaller portions of the other subtile elements, and the qualities of which they are the substrata. From these gross elements then arise the various (mythological) worlds, and this world too, with bodies which are distinguished as viviparous, or those produced from a womb, as men, beasts, &c.; oviparous, or those produced from an egg, as birds, snakes, &c.; those generated by "sweat" or hot moisture, as lice, gnats, &c.; and those germinating, as creepers, trees, &c. The soul, when existing in the body, is encased in a succession of "sheaths." The first or interior "sheath" consists of *buddhi*, associated with the organs of perception; the second, of *manas*, associated with the organs of action; and the third, of the vital airs together with the organs of action. These three "sheaths" constitute the subtile body of the soul, which attends the soul in its transmigration; and the collective totality of such subtile bodies is the Supreme soul, as regarded in its relation to the world; when it is also called "the soul which is the thread," or

passes like the thread through the universe, or Hiran'yagarbha, or life. The fourth and exterior "sheath" of the soul is composed of the gross elements: and the collective aggregate of such gross bodies is the gross body of the deity. This whole development being the result of ignorance, the soul frees itself from its error by understanding that the different stages in which this development appears, do not represent real or absolute truth; and when its error has completely vanished, it ceases to be re-born, and becomes re-united with Brahman, whence it emanated. But since the means of arriving at a final deliverance can only be the complete mastery of the truths of the Vedânta, other means, such as the performance of sacrifices or other religious acts enjoined by the Vedas, or the practice of Yoga, cannot lead to the same result. They may be meritorious, and are even recommended as such, but can effect only an apparent liberation. Of this, there are two kinds: one liberation which is effected in lifetime, and enable a man to perform supernatural actions or wonders, as the evocation of the shades of progenitors, going anywhere at will, and similar feats; and another which takes place after death, and enables the soul, not divested of its subtile body, to reside in heaven; but after a time its effect ceases, and the soul has to renew its mundane existence. In order to fit the mind for meditating on these truths, various moral duties are enjoined, and various practices are recommended, especially by later Vedânta writers. Thus, the student of the Vedânta is told not to hurt a sentient being, to speak the truth, not to steal, to practise continence, and not to accept gifts; to remain pure and content, to do penance, and to study the Vedas; also to remain in certain postures, to practise various modes of suppressing his breath, and the like. These injunctions, however, are extraneous to the doctrine itself, and appear to be a compromise with the old orthodox faith, which requires the performance of religious acts, and a later stage of it, which favours such austere

practices as are especially known by the name of Yoga (q.v.) The doctrine of *bhakti*, or faith, does not belong to the older Vedânta; it is, however, an interesting feature of the later periods of this philosophy; and the same observation applies to the doctrine of *Mâyâ*, or illusion, according to which the world has no reality whatever, but is merely the product of imagination; for the older Vedânta, as will have been seen, merely teaches that the world is not *the truth*, but does not deny its material reality.

The oldest work on this philosophy is attributed to *Bâdarâyan'a*, or *Vyâsa* (q.v.), and is written in the Sûtra style; it is called the *Brahma-Sûtra;* it consists of four *adhyâyas*, or lectures, each subdivided into four *pâdas*, or chapters; each pâda containing a number of Sûtras. The number of the latter is 558, and that of the *adhikaran'as* or topics treated in them 191. The most important commentary on this work is the *S'ârîrakamîmânsâ-bhâshya*, by *S'ankarâchârya* (q.v.); and this commentary, again, has been commented on by a great variety of writers. The text of the Sûtras and this commentary have been edited at Calc. 1818; and the text with this commentary, and a gloss on the latter, by Govindânanda, in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, by Pandita Râma Nârâyan'a Vidyâratna, Calc. 1863. Of the great number of other commentaries on the Brahma-Sûtras, mention may be made only of that by *Râmânuja** (q.v., under VAISHN'AVAS), and of a short but very lucid one, by *Anûpanârâyan'as'iroman'ibhat't'a* (edited at Calc., without date). Amongst elementary treatises on the Vedânta, the most popular is the *Vedântasâra*, by *Sadânanda*, which, with the commentary of *Râmakr'ishn'a Tîrtha*, has been edited at Calc. 1829, and with this and another commentary by *Nr'isinhasaraswatî*, at Calc. 1849. It has been edited and translated also by the late Dr. J. R. Ballantyne (*A Lecture on the Vedânta, embracing the Text of the Vedânta Sâra*, Allahabad, 1850), who also translated the beginning of the Brahma-

* Printed at Madras in 1868.

Sûtras.—A very useful compendium of the *Adhikaran'as*, or topics, is the *Adhikaran'amâlâ*, by *Bhâratîtîrtha*, which, with the commentary of *S'rî Ânandachandra- Vedântavâgîs'a*, has been edited, Calc. 1862, and as an appendix to the Brahma-Sûtras, with extracts from this commentary, in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1863.

VISHN'U.

VISHN'U is the second god of the Hindu triad, but is considered by his worshippers to be the supreme deity of the Hindu pantheon. See TRIMURTI and VAISHN'AVAS. The word is derived, by *S'ankara*, in his commentary on the thousand names of Vishn'u, and by other commentators after him, from *vish*, encompass, or *vis'*, penetrate; when, according to them, it would imply the deity who encompasses or penetrates the whole universe, both as regards its exterior appearance and its inward essence. A similar etymology is assigned to the word by *Yâska* in his gloss on the R'igveda; but as in this Veda, Vishn'u does not yet embody the notions connected with him at the epic and Purânic period of Hinduism (see INDIA, sec. *Religion*), Yâska does not impart to the name the implied sense given to it by the commentators just mentioned. In the R'igveda, Vishn'u is a representation of the sun, who 'strides through the seven regions of the earth,' and 'in three ways plants his step' (or, as Yâska explains, plants his steps so as to become threefold). And, according to one predecessor of Yâska, these three steps mean the manifestation of the sun at its place of rising, on the meridian, and at its place of setting; or, according to another, its manifestation on earth, in the intermediate space, and in heaven; when—as a later commentator observes—in the first of these

manifestations, Vishn'u represents fire; in the second, lightning; and in the third, the solar light. From this position which Vishn'u holds in the R'igveda (see VEDA), it results that he was not regarded there as supreme, or even as equal, to other deities, who, at the Vedic period, occupied a foremost rank. He is extolled in several hymns as having 'established the heavens and the earth,' as 'being beyond mortal comprehension,' and so forth, but he is there also described as having derived his power of striding over the world from *Indra*, and as celebrating the praises of this god. He is frequently invoked together with the latter, but apparently always as inferior to him; and often, too, he occurs in company with a number of other gods, such as Varun'a, the Maruts, Rudra, Vâyu, the luminous deities called *Âdityas*, and others, without any distinction being drawn in their respective rank. Fewer hymns, moreover, are separately devoted to his praise than to that of Agni, Indra, or other prominent gods of the Vedic period; and it deserves notice, too, that at that period he was not yet included amongst the Âdityas, for only at the epic period, when the number of these deities, orginally varying from six to eight, was raised to twelve, Vishn'u was included in it—he then being named as the foremost of these luminous offsprings of Aditi, or space.*

Although some of the Brâhman'as of the Vedas already shew the progress which the solar Vishn'u had made in the imagination of the people, and although they contain the germ of several legends, which, at a later time, became fully developed, the really mythological character of this god, as the basis of the divine worship now paid him by a large class of the Hindu population, belongs to the epic poems —the *Râmâyan'a* and *Mahâbhârata*—and to the *Purân'as*. In the Mahâbhârata, Vishn'u is often identified with the supreme spirit; but

* Muir, "Sanskrit Texts," iv., 54 ff.; Müller, Transl. of Rigveda, i., 116 ff.; Wurm, "Geschichte der Indischen Religion," 34, 124 f.

while in some portions of this poem—the different parts of which belong to different epochs of Hindu antiquity—he is thus regarded as the most exalted deity; he is again, in others, represented as paying homage to S'iva (q. v.), the third person of the Trimûrti, and as acknowledging the superiority of this god over himself. Taking, therefore, the Mahâbhârata as a whole, he does not occupy, in this epos, the exclusive supremacy which is assigned to him in the Râmâyan'a, and still more in those Purân'as especially devoted to his praise.

The large circle of myths relating to Vishn'u, in the epic poems and Purân'as, is distinguished by a feature which, though not quite absent from the mythological history of S'iva, especially characterises that of Vishn'u. It arose from the idea, that whenever a great disorder, physical or moral, disturbed the world, Vishn'u descended 'in a small portion of his essence' to set it right, to restore the law, and thus to preserve creation. Such descents of the god are called his *Avatâras* (from *ava* and *tr'î*, descend); and they consist in Vishn'u's being supposed to have either assumed the form of some wonderful animal or superhuman being, or to have been born of human parents, in a human form, always, of course, possessed of miraculous properties. Some of these Avatâras are of an entirely cosmical character; others, however, are probably based on historical events, the leading personage of which was gradually endowed with divine attributes, until he was regarded as the incarnation of the deity itself. With the exception of the last, all these Avatâras belong to the past; the last, however, is yet to come. Their number is generally given as ten, and their names in the following order: 1. The fish-; 2. The tortoise-; 3. The boar-; 4. The man-lion-; 5. The dwarf-; 6. The Paras'u-Râma-; 7. The Râmachandra, or, briefly, Râma-; 8. The Kr'ishn'a and Balarâma-; 9. The Buddha-; and 10. The Kalki- or Kalkin-Avatâra. This number and enumeration of Avatâras, however, was not at all times the same.

The Mahâbhârata, though also mentioning ten, names successively the Hansa-, tortoise-, fish-, boar-, man-lion-, dwarf-, Paras'u-Râma-, Râma-, Sâtvata-, and Kalkin-Avatâras. The Bhâgavata-Purân'a speaks of twenty two Avatâras of Vishn'u, which, for instance, also comprise Pr'ithu, Dhanvantari, the god of medicine, and Kapila, the reputed founder of the Sânkhya (q. v.) philosophy. Other works have twenty-four Avatâras, or even call them numberless: but the generally-received Avatâras are those ten mentioned before, an idea of which may be afforded by the following brief account.

1. The *Matsya-* or *fish-Avatâra.*—When, at the end of the last mundane age, the Bhâgavata-Purân'a relates, Brahman, the first god of the Trimûrti, had fallen asleep, a powerful demon, *Hayagrîva*, stole the Vedas which had issued from the mouth of Brahman, and lay by his side. About that time, a royal saint, *Satyavrata*, had by his penance attained the rank of a Manu, and Vishn'u, who had witnessed the deed of Hayagrîva, and intended to slay him, assumed for this purpose the form of a very small fish, and glided into the hand of the saint when the latter made his daily ablutions in the river. Manu, about to release the little fish, was addressed and asked by it not to expose it to the danger that might arise to it from the larger fish in the river, but to place it in his water-jar. The saint complied with its wish; but in one night the fish grew so large, that at its request he had to transfer it to a pond. Yet soon the pond also becoming insufficient to contain the fish, Manu had to choose a larger pond for its abode; and, after successive other changes, he took it to the ocean. Satyavrata now understood that the fish was no other than *Nârâyan'a* or Vishn'u, and, after he had paid his adoration to the god, the latter revealed to him the imminence of a deluge which would destroy the world, and told him that a large vessel would appear to him, in which he was to embark together with the seven Rishis, taking with him all the plants

and all the seeds of created things. Manu obeyed the behest of the god: and when the water covered the surface of the earth, Vishn'u again appeared to him in the shape of a golden fish with a single horn, 10,000 miles long; and to this horn Manu attached the vessel, by means of Vishn'u's serpent serving as a cord. While thus floating in the vessel, Manu was instructed by the fish-god in the philosophical doctrines and the science of the supreme spirit; and after the deluge had subsided, the fish-god killed Hayagrîva, restored the Vedas to Brahman, and taught them to the Manu Satyavrata, who in the present mundane age was born under the name of *S'râddhadeva*, as the son of Vivasvat.—A fuller account of this Avatâra is given in the *Matsya-Purân'a*, where the instruction imparted to Manu by the fish-god includes all the usual detail contained in a Purân'a, that relating to creation, the patriarchs, progenitors, regal dynasties, the duties of the different orders, and so forth. In the Mahâbhârata, where the same legend occurs, but without either that portion concerning Hayagrîva, or the instruction imparted by the fish, there is, besides minor variations, that important difference between its story and that of the Purânas, that the fish is not a personification of Vishn'u, but of Brahman, and that the deluge occurs in the present mundane age, under the reign itself of the Manu, who is the son of Vivasvat.—The origin of this Avatâra is probably a kindred legend, which occurs in the *S'atapatha-brâhman'a*, of the White Yajurveda (see VEDA); but there the fish does not represent any special deity, and the purpose of the legend itself is merely to account for the performance of certain sacrificial ceremonies.

2. The *Kûrma-* or *tortoise-Avatâra*. When, of old, the gods felt their powers impaired, and were desirous of obtaining *Amr'ita*, the beverage of immortality, Vishn'u directed them to churn, together with the demons, the milk-sea, by taking the mountain *Mandara* for their staff, and his serpent *Vâsuki* for their cord, the gods to stand at the tail,

and the demons at the head of the serpent; while he himself consented to support the mountain on his back, after having assumed the shape of a gigantic tortoise. The result of this churning of the sea of milk was, besides the ultimate recovery of the Amr'ita, the appearance of a variety of miraculous things and beings; but it also led to a violent contest between the gods and demons, in which the latter were defeated. See RAHU. The idea of the lord of creation assuming the shape of a tortoise, and that of sacrificial liquids, especially clarified butter, becoming tortoise-shaped (*Kûrma*, the word for tortoise, meaning literally, 'badly or slowly going'), occurs also in the Yajurveda; but the legend on which the tortoise-Avatâra of Vishn'u is based seems to belong entirely to the post-Vedic period of Hinduism.

3. The *Varâha-* or *boar-Avatâra*.—It is supposed to have taken place when, at the period of creation, the earth was immersed in water, and Vishn'u, in order to raise it up, assumed the form of a gigantic boar. In the earlier recension of the *Râmâyan'a* and the *Linga-Purân'a*, it was Brahman, the creator of the universe, who transformed himself into a boar for rescuing the earth from its imperilled position; and in the *Black Yajurveda*, where this idea is first met with, it is likewise said that the lord of creation upheld the earth, assuming the form of a boar. At a later period, however, this Avatâra is generally attributed to Vishn'u. Between both conceptions there is, however, also this great difference, that in the former the transformation of the deity into a boar has apparently a purely cosmical character, whereas in the latter 'it allegorically represents the extrication of the world from a deluge of iniquity, by the rites of religion.' (Wilson's translation of the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, second ed., by F. Hall, vol. i p. 59, note). For the boar, as an incarnation of Vishn'u, is the type of the ritual of the Vedas. He is described as the sacrifice personified; his feet being the Vedas; his tusks, the sacrificial post to which the victim is tied; his teeth, the

sacrificial offerings; his mouth, the altar; his tongue the fire; his hairs, the sacrificial grass; his eyes, days and night; his head, the place of Brahman; his mane, the hymns of the Vedas; his nostrils, all the oblations; his snout, the ladle of oblation; his voice, the chanting of the Sâmaveda; his body, the hall of sacrifice; his joints, the different ceremonies; and his ears as having the properties of voluntary and obligatory rites (*Vishn'u-Purân'a*, vol. i. p. 63); and similar descriptions of the boar occur in the Harivans'a and elsewhere; besides those relating to the immense size and wonderful appearance of the mysterious animal. In the *Bhâgavata-Purân'a*, another legend is also connected with this incarnation of Vishn'u, still more distinctly proving that, at the Purân'ic period, it was viewed in a purely religious light. According to this legend, *Jaya* and *Vijaya*, two doorkeepers of Vishn'u, once offended some Munis who claimed admission to the paradise of Vishn'u, and in consequence were doomed to lose their position in Vishn'u's heaven, and to be reborn on earth. They became thus the sons of *Kas'yapa* and *Diti*, under the names of *Hiran'yakas'ipu* and *Hiran'yâksha*. The former subdued the three worlds, and the latter went straight to heaven, to conquer also the gods. Thus threatened in their existence, the gods implored the assistance of Vishn'u; and Vishn'u, who at that period was the mysterious or primitive boar, slew Hiran'yâksha. A similar contest between Vishn'u as boar and numerous demons, the progeny of Diti, always ending in the defeat of the latter, is also described in the *Mokshadharma*, one of the later portions of the Mahâbhârata; and from this and similar descriptions, it follows that the boar-Avatâra had gradually lost its original character, and assumed that common to the remaining Avatâras, of representing the deity as become incarnate, for the purpose of remedying moral or religious wrong, or of destroying influences hostile to the pretensions of the Brâhmanic caste.

4. The *Nr'isinha-* or *man-lion-Avatâra.* —*Hiran'yakas'ipu*, the brother of the demon Hiran'yâksha just mentioned, had resolved to become a sovereign of the three worlds, and exempt from death and decay. To attain this end, he practised severe austerities, and ultimately received from Brahman, as the desired reward, a promise that he should become a supreme ruler, and death should not accrue to him from any created being, neither within his abode nor without, neither by day nor by night, neither in heaven nor on earth, nor by any kind of weapon. Possessed of the grant of this boon, he now gave course to the hatred he had conceived against Vishn'u for having killed his brother Hiran'yâksha. He oppressed all the gods, robbed them of their shares in the sacrifices, and threatened their destruction. But he had a son, *Prahrâda* or *Prahlâda,* who, through his religious studies and pious conduct, had become a devout worshipper of Vishn'u. When Hiran'yakas'ipu became aware of his son's partiality for this god, he first endeavoured to impart to him his own hostile feelings against Vishn'u, but failing in this, resolved to kill him. All the means, however, he employed to this end remained vain; and when, at last, Hiran'yakas'ipu, about to cut off the head of his son, sneeringly asked him why Vishn'u, who, as he asserted, was everywhere, should not be present also in a pillar in the hall, which he struck with his fist, Vishn'u suddenly made his appearance in the shape of a being neither man nor animal, in that of a man-lion of fearful aspect and size; and after a violent struggle with the demon, killed him in tearing his heart out with his finger-nails. Prahlâda was then installed by him as sovereign over the demons, and, at the end of a pious reign, obtained final liberation.

5. The *Vâmana-* or *dwarf-Avatâra.*—Prahlâda's son was *Virochana,* and his son was *Bali.* The latter, after having conquered Indra, ruled over the three worlds, and filled the gods with dismay for their

future prosperity. They had, in consequence, recourse to Vishn'u; and when, at one time, Bali was celebrating a grand sacrifice, Vishn'u, assuming the shape of a dwarf, humbly approached the demon king. Pleased with the devout and unpretending appearance of the little Brâhman, Bali asked him to demand a boon, however costly it might be. The dwarf, however, merely asked for so much ground as he could measure with three paces. The king smilingly granted so modest a request, though his family priest *Us'anas*, suspecting the true nature of the dwarf, strongly dissuaded him from doing so. But, when the dwarf had obtained what he asked for, he strode with one pace over the earth, with a second over the intermediate space (the atmosphere), and with a third over the sky, thus leaving for Bali only the subterranean regions, which he assigned him for his future abode. The demons endeavoured to frustrate this result, after Vishn'u had taken his first two strides, but they were overcome by the followers of Vishn'u; and Bali, when resigning himself to his fate, in reply to a reproach addressed to him by the dwarf for trying to break his promise, uttered—according to the Bhâgavata-Purân'a—the following words, which may serve as one of many instances to show how sacred a promise was held by the Hindus when once given, and even though artfully obtained: "If, renowned chief of the gods, you consider the word which I uttered to be deceitful, I now do what is sincere, and can be no deception—place your third step on my head. Fallen from my position, I fear not the infernal regions, or binding in bonds, or misfortune difficult to escape, or loss of wealth, or your restraint, so much as I am afflicted by a bad name." (See J. Muir's *Original Sanskrit Texts*, vol. iv., p. 128.) For his righteousness, he was then rewarded by Vishn'u with the promise, that after a temporary residence in one of the most delightful places of Pâtâla (q. v.), he should be born as the Indra, in the reign of the eighth Manu. In this incarnation as dwarf, Vishn'u is considered to have been a son of the same

Kas'yapa, who is also the father of Hiran'yakas'ipu and Hiran'yâksha; but while their mother is Diti, the dwarf's mother is Aditi (space); and since she previously had brought forth Indra, Vishn'u is sometimes called Upendra, or the younger or later Indra. As a son of Aditi, Vishn'u becomes one of the Âdityas (see before.)—The Vedic conception of the three strides of Vishn'u, as mentioned in the beginning of this article, is doubtless the basis of the idea whence this Avatâra arose.

6. The *Paras'u-Râma-Avatâra*, or Vishn'u's incarnation as Râma, the son of Jamadagni, armed with an axe (*paras'u.*) *Arjuna*, a son of *Kr'itavîrya*, and king of the Haihayas, had obtained, as a reward for his piety, a thousand arms, and the sovereignty over the earth. The gods, frightened at his power, had recourse to Vishn'u, and the latter resolved to be born as a son of Jamadagni, that he might slay him. Jamadagni was the son of *R'ichîka*, of the race of Bhr'igu, a pious sage who had married *Ren'ukâ*, the daughter of king *Prasenajit*, and had obtained five sons by her, the last of whom was *Râma*, or Vishn'u incarnate in this form. Ren'ukâ having once, for some supposed impropriety, incurred the anger of her husband, was, at his bidding, killed by her son Râma, but at the request of the latter, again restored to life; and her first four sons were likewise saved from the consequence of the wrath of Jamadagni by the intercession of their brother Râma. After this event had happened, or, as one account goes, previously to it, Arjuna came to the hermitage of Jamadagni, and was there hospitably received by the saint, who could treat him and his followers sumptuously, as he possessed a fabulous cow of plenty, that not merely supplied him with the milk and butter required for his sacrificial offerings, but with everything else he wished for. Struck by the precious qualities of this cow, and in spite of the kind treatment he had met with, Arjuna carried off with him the cow and her calf. When Râma, who, on this occasion, had been absent from home, returned to the hermitage, and learned what had happened,

he took up his axe (or, as the Mahâbhârata says, his bow), and slew Arjuna, together with his army. The sons of the latter, to revenge their father's death, after some time, attacked the hermitage, and succeeded in killing Jamadagni. Thereupon, Râma made a vow to extirpate the whole Kshattriya or military race: and not satisfied with destroying the sons of Arjuna, he killed every Kshattriya whom he encountered afterwards. In this manner, the legend concludes, "he cleared thrice seven times the earth of the Kshattriya caste"—killing the men of so many generations as fast as they grew to adolescence—"and filled with their blood the five large lakes of Samantapanchaka, from which he offered libations to the race of Bhr'igu." He then performed a solemn sacrifice, and distributed the land and many riches amongst the ministering priests. The Mahâbhârata, which on two occasions relates this legend, in one place enumerates the Kshattriyas who escaped the destruction of their caste, and from whom the lines of the kings hereafter were continued; this account, however, is inconsistent with Purânic lists, in which the royal lineages are uninterrupted. There can be little doubt that a real historical conflict between the Brâhman'as and Kshattriyas underlies the conception of this Avatâra; one which has its parallel in the history of Vasisht'ha and Vis'wâmitra (q. v.)

7. The *Râmachandra-* or, briefly, *Râma-Avatâra.—Râvan'a*, a king of *Lankâ*, or Ceylon, a monster with ten heads and twenty arms, had, by dint of austerities, obtained from Brahman the promise that neither gods nor demons should be able to take his life. In consequence, he oppressed the whole universe: the sun dared not shine hot, or the fire burn, or the wind blow, where he stood, and the ocean, when it saw him, became motionless. The gods, thus seeing the world and their own existence endangered, implored Brahman to protect them; and he, remembering that the demon, when asking for the boon he had granted him, omitted to include men among the beings that should not hurt him,

advised the gods to pray to Vishn'u to become incarnate. This they did, and Vishn'u granted their prayer. At that time, *Das'aratha*, a king of Ayodhyâ, of the solar line of Hindu kings, performed the great horse-sacrifice in order to obtain sons: for, though he had three wives, *Kaus'alyâ*, *Sumitrâ*, and *Kaikeyî*, he was without male progeny. This sacrifice became successful, for, when on the point of completion, a supernatural being appeared to him with a divine beverage, one-half of which he was to give to Kaus'alyâ, one-fourth to Sumitrâ, and the remaining fourth to Kaikeyî. And, as this nectar which he gave them contained the divine essence of Vishn'u, *Râma*, the son whom Kaus'alyâ brought forth, became one-half, the twins *Lakshman'a* and *S'atrughna*, born by Sumitrâ, together one-fourth, and *Bharata*, the son of Kaikeyî, another fourth, of the substance of Vishn'u. While Râma and his brothers were still boys, the sage *Vis'wâmitra* came to the court of Das'aratha, requesting him that he should allow Râma to proceed to his hermitage, in order to destroy there the Râkshasas, or fiends, who infested it, and disturbed his sacrificial rites. Though reluctantly, Das'aratha gave his consent to his departure; and Râma, accompanied by his brother Lakshman'a—who, throughout his brother's career, remained his faithful companion and ally—started on his first eventful journey; for it was marked by a number of wonderful exploits which he performed in killing the demons, and which already then revealed his divine mission. Having fulfilled the desire of Vis'wâmitra, he proceeded to Mithilâ, where king *Janaka* held a great assembly of kings, having promised to give in marriage his daughter *Sîtâ* to the prince who would be able to bend the bow with which S'iva once conquered the gods at the sacrifice of Daksha, and which now was in his trust. Yet, so large and heavy was this bow, that not even the strongest of them could so much as move it. But when Râma arrived, and the bow was shown him, he lifted it up and bent it, as it were in

sport, and ultimately even broke it in the middle. Sîtâ became thus the wife of Râma; while Janaka gave *Urmilâ* to Lakshman'a, *Mân'd'avî* to Bharata, and *S'rutakîrtti* to S'atrughna. On his way home, Râma met *Paras'urâma* (see the sixth Avatâra), who, having heard of his namesake's bow-feat at the court of Janaka, challenged him to bend also the bow of Vishn'u, which he had received from his father, Jamadagni, and if he could do so, to a single combat. Râma, displeased with the doubt of Paras'urâma in his strength, immediately seized the bow, bent it, and would have killed the son of Jamadagni, had he not respected his quality as a Brahman: still, he destroyed the worlds which the latter had acquired by his penance, and thus excluded him from heaven. (This account given of the meeting of the two Râmas, in the Râmâyaṅa, would seem to show that at the time when this poem was composed, the *Paras'urâma* was not yet conceived as an incarnation of Vishn'u, since he is represented in it as jealous of the defeat which S'iva's bow had suffered at the hands of the son of Das'aratha.) After this event, Bharata, and his brother S'atrughna, were sent by their father on a visit to Bharata's maternal uncle, *As'wâpati;* and Das'aratha, who was old, and desired to retire from the world, made all preparations for installing his eldest son, Râma, as heir-apparent to the throne of Ayodhyâ. But in this design he was frustrated; for, through the intrigues of *Mantharâ*, the hunchbacked nurse of Bharata, and his queen Kaikeyî, he was, in a weak moment, prevailed upon to grant any wish which the latter would ask of him; and Kaikeyî, availing himself of Das'aratha's rashly-given promise, demanded of him the installation of her own son, Bharata, as heir-apparent, and the banishment to the forest of Râma for a period of fourteen years. A promise once uttered being irrevocable, and Râma having resolved not to cause a word given by his father to remain vain, neither the wishes of the people of Ayodhyâ nor those of Bharata and S'atrughna, who meanwhile had returned, and

were enraged at what had occurred, could shake his determination to submit to his exile. Das'aratha died in consequence heart-broken, and Bharata assumed, till the return of Râma, the government of Ayodhyâ.

The long exile of Râma which now followed, and was shared in by his brother Lakshman'a, became, then, the source of the wonderful events which should hereafter lead to the destruction of the demon Râvan'a. They began with a series of conflicts which he had to sustain with the Râkshasas, who infested his forest abode, and which invariably, of course, ended in the destruction of these beings. One of these conflicts, however, was especially pregnant with the destiny he had come to fulfil. Râvan'a's sister, *S'ûrpan'akhâ* (lit., a female whose finger-nails were like winnowing baskets), was one of those demons who haunted the woods. She fell in love with Râma, but was repelled by him; and when, in a fit of jealousy, she attacked Sîtâ, Lakshman'a cut off her ears and nose. Enraged at this treatment, she repaired to her brother Râvan'a, and in order better to stimulate his revenge, she also excited in him a passion for Sîtâ. Râvan'a therefore started off for the forest Dan'd'aka, where Râma lived; and, aided by another demon, Marîcha, who transformed himself into a golden coloured deer, and thus enticed both brothers away from the hermitage, to chase after it, succeeded in carrying off Sîtâ to his capital. By means of some other supernatural events then happening, Râma discovered the fate of his wife; and the remainder of his exile is now filled up with his preparing for war with Râvan'a, conquering, and destroying him, and recovering Sîtâ, whose honour had remained untarnished during her long and severe trials when kept as a prisoner in the harem of Râvan'a. Some of the incidents of this struggle are of special interest, inasmuch as they are the basis of traditions still prevalent in India. They chiefly relate to the allies of Râma, who were no other than miraculous bears and monkeys, and

by their magic powers mainly brought about the defeat of Râvan'a and his armies, while also helping him to communicate with Sîtâ during her captivity. All these bears and monkeys were of divine origin, produced at the behest of Brahman by the gods for the express purpose of becoming the allies of Râma. Thus, the bear-king, *Jâmbuvat*, issued from the mouth of Brahman himself; *Bâli* was a son of Indra; *Sugrîva*, of the Sun; *Târa*, of Vr'ihaspati; *Gandhamâdana*, of Kuvera; *Nala*, of Vis'wakarman; *Nîla*, of Fire; *Sushen'a*, of Varun'a; *S'arabha*, of Parjanya; and the most renowned of all, *Hanumat*, was a son of the Wind. They overbridged the sea, to carry their armies to Ceylon—whence the line of rocks in the channel is still called *Râmasetu*, or Râma's Bridge—in the English maps, Adam's Bridge; they brought large rocks from the Himâlaya to support the bridge—whence the numerous rocks scattered all over India are supposed to have arisen as they dropped down on their transport to the sea; and they performed similar other feats, still commemorated in festivals performed in honour of Hanumat and his tribe. As is the case in other Avatâras of Vishn'u, there is also in the Râma-Avatâra a personage who, though nearly related to the fiend doomed to destruction, acknowledges the divine nature of the incarnate god, and dissuades his friends from opposing him. In this Avatâra, such a personage is *Vibhîshan'a*, the uncle of Râvan'a, whose counsel, however, is disregarded. Similarly disposed is also *Kumbhakarn'a*, the brother of Râvan'a, who likewise understands that Râma is Vishn'u; but, as he yields to the orders of his brother, his fate is death. Vibhîshan'a, however, in reward of his proper conduct, is, after Râvan'a's death, placed on the throne of Ceylon. When, at the end of this fierce war, the time fixed for Râma's exile had expired, he returned to Ayodhyâ with Sîtâ, whose purity had previously been tested by an ordeal of fire, and there received back from Bharata the sovereign power which, in the meantime, the latter had exercised in his stead; and at the end of a

long and glorious reign, he became reunited with the splendour of Vishn'u. The story of this incarnation is briefly told in an episode of the Mahâbhârata, and in several Purân'as; with the fullest detail, however, in the *Râmâyan'a*. A copious abstract of the latter is given in the poem *Bhat't'ikâvya*. See SANSCRIT LITERATURE. The English reader may consult, for some further detail, an "Analysis of the Râmâyan'a," in Professor Monier Williams's *Indian Epic Poetry* (London, 1863.)

8. The *Kr'ishn'a-Avatâra* and *Balarâma-Avatâra*.—The former of these two, which are generally treated as one, is the most interesting incarnation of Vishn'u, both on account of the opportunity which it affords to trace, in Hindu antiquity, the gradual transformation of mortal heroes into representatives of a god; and on account of the numerous legends connected with it, as well as the influence which it exercised on the Vaishn'ava cult (see Vaishn'avas). In the Mahâbhârata (as Mr. Muir has shown in the fourth volume of his excellent work, *Original Sanskrit Texts*), Kr'ishn'a—which literally means, "the black or dark one"—is sometimes represented as rendering homage to S'iva, and therefore acknowledging his own inferiority to that deity, or as recommending the worship of Umâ, the consort of S'iva, and as receiving boons from both these deities. In some passages, again, he bears merely the character of a hero endowed with extraordinary powers, and, in some, his divine nature is even disputed or denied by his adversaries, though they are ultimately punished for this unbelief. As the intimate ally of the Pân'd'u prince Arjuna, he claims, especially in the philosophical episode, the Bhagavadgîtâ, the rank of the supreme deity; but there are other passages, again, in the Mahâbhârata, in which the same claim of S'iva is admitted, and an attempt is made at compromising their rival claims by declaring both deities one and the same. Sometimes, moreover,

Kr'ishn'a is, in this epos, declared to represent merely a very small portion—"a portion of a portion," as it is called—of the divine essence of Vishn'u. In the Mahâbhârata, therefore, which is silent also regarding many adventures in Kr'ishn'a's life, fully detailed in the Purân'as, the worship of Vishn'u in this incarnation was by no means so generally admitted or settled as it is in many Purân'as of the Vishn'uite sect; nor was there, at the epic period, that consistency in the conception of a K'rishn'a-Avatâra which is traceable in the later works.—The principal legends relating to Kr'ishn'a, as he appears in the Harivans'a and the Purân'as, are the following: A demon king, *Kansa* of Mathurâ, of the race of Yadu, and therefore of the lunar line of kings, who, in a former birth, had been the *Kâlanemi*, had deposed and imprisoned his father *Ugrasena*, and oppressed with his iniquitous hosts, the Earth; and Earth having laid her complaints before an assembly of the gods on Mount Meru, Brahman prayed to Vishn'u to relieve the world of its distress. When he had ended his prayer, Vishn'u plucked off two hairs, one white and one black, and promised the gods that these two hairs should become impersonated as *Balarâma* and *Kr'ishn'a*, sons of Devakî, to fulfil their wishes. Now, Devakî, who, in a former life, had been Aditi (space personified), was a wife of Vasudeva, who was of the race of Yadu, and a relative of Kansa; but as Kansa had been warned by a voice in heaven that their eighth child would be an incarnation of Vishn'u, he placed both husband and wife in confinement, after having obtained, though, from Vasudeva the promise that he would deliver to him every child Devaki would bring forth. Six children of hers were accordingly given up to Kansa, and destroyed; but when Balarâma, the seventh, was about to come into the world, Vishn'u appeared to *Yoganidrâ*, a form of Umâ (q. v.), and directed her to transfer Balarâma before the time of his birth to *Rohin'î*, another wife of Vasudeva, and spread the

report that Devakî had miscarried; enjoining her also to become incarnate as a child of Yas'odâ, the wife of an old cowherd Nanda, at the same time that he would become incarnate, as K'rishn'a, in the eighth conception of Devakî: for at the time of their simultaneous birth, he added, Vasudeva, aided by him, would bring the infant Kr'ishn'a to the bed of Yas'odâ, and her to that of Devakî. In this manner, *Balarâma* and *Kr'ishn'a* were saved, though the infant Durgâ, as soon as born, was dashed by Kansa against a stone, and suffered a temporary death. Kansa having become aware that his design had been frustrated, now ordered the destruction of all young children wherever they might be found, but considering it useless to keep Devakî and Vasudeva any longer in prison, liberated them. Vasudeva, apprehensive of the safety of Balarâma, then took him to Nanda, to be brought up together with Kr'ishn'a; and thus began the earthly career of these two Avatâras of Vishn'u, in which Balarâma always figures as the friend and ally of his more important brother, Kr'ishn'a. The first miraculous act of the latter consisted in causing the death of a female demon, *Pûtanâ*, who suckled and meant to destroy him. Then, as a little boy, he overturned a heavy waggon of the cowherds, and pulled down the trunks of two trees—to the amazement of the cowherds, who did not yet suspect his divine nature, and becoming afraid to remain any longer in Vraja, the place where these events happened, repaired to Vr'indâvana. There Balarâma and Kr'ishn'a remained until they had attained seven years of age. At this time, Kr'ishn'a killed a serpent-monster Kâlîya, in the Yamunâ river, and then returned to Vraja. The next exploit of the brothers, more particularly, however, of Balarâma, consisted in the destruction of two demons, *Dhenuka* and *Pralamba*, who infested the forests; but that which followed, especially established the fame of Kr'ishn'a, and is one still commemorated in their festivals by the worshippers of this god. When sporting in Vraja, he once found all the cowherds busily engaged in preparing for a sacrifice to be offered to

Indra. Seeing this, he dissuaded them from worshipping this god, and directed them to address their prayers and offerings to the mountain *Govardhana*. Indra, however, offended by these proceedings, sent a heavy storm, which inundated the country, and threatened to destroy the cattle. Thereupon, Kr'ishn'a plucked up the mountain Govardhana from its base, and held it up as a large umbrella over the cowpens to shelter the herdsmen and their cattle from the storm. For seven days and nights they were thus protected by the elevation of the mountain; and Indra, at last convinced of the irresistible might of Kr'ishn'a, came to Govardhana, and worshipped him, obtaining on this occasion the promise that Kr'ishn'a would befriend the Pân'd'u prince, Arjuna, in his conflict with the Kurus (see Mahâbhârata). The episode in the life of Kr'ishn'a which now ensued, and is filled up with the pleasures and sports he enjoyed amongst the Gopîs, or cowherdesses, is that commemorated in the Râsa Yâtrâ, an annual festival celebrated in various parts of India in the month of Kârttika (October—November), and dwelt upon in many poetical works. Of these cowherdesses, later poets especially mention *Râdhâ;* and she is sometimes also represented as the divine or mystical love to which Kr'ishn'a returns at the end of his more worldly amours (see the article Jayadeva). After some more miraculous deeds, Kr'ishn'a and Balarâma repaired to Mathurâ, where Kansa, in the hope of effecting their death, had invited them to assist at a solemn rite of the lustration of arms, and to engage in a trial of strength with his chief boxers, *Chân'ûra* and *Mushț'ika*. *Akrûra*, sent by Kansa to convey to them his invitation, had already revealed to them the purpose for which he was despatched; but undaunted by his words, they accomplished their journey, during which they performed several other wonderful deeds, and, arrived at Mathurâ, accepted the challenge of Kansa. The contest ended not only in the death of the two boxers, but in that of Kansa also. Kr'ishn'a now

released *Ugrasena*, Kansa's father, from the confinement in which he was kept, and restored him to the throne of Mathurâ. A number of other miraculous feats now followed in the career of Kr'ishn'a. The principal are his conquering *Jarâsandha*, the father-in-law of Kansa, who came to revenge the death of the latter, and *Kâlayavana*, a king of the *Yavanas*, who also overran Mathurâ with his armies; and his founding the city of Dwârakâ. At the end of these wars, he made a short stay at Vraja, then returned to Dwârakâ, and there married Revatî, by whom he had two sons. But he also carried off violently *Rukmin'î*, the daughter of a king of Vidarbha, who had been betrothed to *S'is'upâla*, and had to wage a hot contest with the latter and his allies, before he conquered them. His next war was that with *Naraka*, a demon king of Prâgjyotisha, who had robbed Aditi of her earrings, and ultimately was put to death by him. He then repaired to Indra's heaven, to restore to Aditi her earrings; but carrying off a wonderful tree from Indra's garden, got into a conflict with this god; ultimately, however, he was allowed by him to take the tree to Dwârakâ. There he married 16,100 maidens, whom he had rescued from Naraka. Other wars followed, in one of which Kr'ishn'a also fought with S'iva, when siding with his enemy Bân'a, who was a son of Bali. The most important, however, of all these contests is the great war between the Kurus and Pân'd'us, in which Kr'ishn'a was the ally of the latter. According to the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, Kr'ishn'a's earthly career was brought to its close by an event which has nothing in it of the miraculous, and is more consistent with the end of a mortal hero than with that of an incarnate god. He was accidentally shot in the sole by a hunter, who thought that he was aiming at a deer. The hunter, it is true, is called *Jarâ*, which is a word in the feminine gender, and means "old age," or decay;" but even if a mere allegory, the story of his end "from old age," or an arrow, barely tallies with the character assigned

him in the Purân'as, and is therefore sometimes also omitted in the accounts of this Avatâra.—For Balarâma, see also the legend in the article Yamunâ.

9. The *Buddha-Avatâra*, or Vishn'u's epiphany as Buddha.—It is originally foreign to the cycle of the Avatâras of Vishn'u, and therefore only briefly alluded to in some Purân'as. Where this is done, the intention must have been to effect a compromise between Brahmanism and Buddhism, by trying to represent the latter religion as not irreconcilably antagonistic to the former. See Buddhism.

10. The *Kalki-* or *Kalkin-Avatâra*.—It is yet to come, 'when the practices taught by the Vedas and the institutes of the law, shall have ceased, and the close of the Kali or present age shall be nigh.' Vishn'u will then be born 'in the family of *Vishn'uyas'as* (possessing the glory of Vishn'u), an eminent Brahman of Sambhala village, endowed with the eight superhuman faculties. He will then destroy all the barbarians and thieves, and all whose minds are devoted to iniquity.'—*Vishn'u-Purân'a*.

Vishn'u's wife is *S'rî*, or *Lakshmî*, and his paradise *Vaikun't'ha*. When represented, he is of a dark hue, with four hands, in which he holds a conch-shell, blown in battle, the *Pânchâjanya;* a disc, the *Sudars'ana*, an emblem of sovereign power; a mace, the *Kaumodakî*, as a symbol of punishment; and either a lotus, as a type of creative power, or a sword, the *Nandaka*. On his breast shines the jewel *Kâustubha*. He is variously represented: sometimes, as *Nârâyan'a** (see the first Avatâra), when floating on the primeval waters, and resting on *S'esha*, his serpent of infinity—the god Brahman coming out of

* 'The waters are called *nâra*, because they were the production of *nara* (or the supreme spirit); and since they were his first *ayana* (or place of rest, when in the form of the god Brahman), he thence is named *Nârâyan'a* (or resting on the waters).'—*Manu*, i. 10.

a lotus that arises from his navel, and Lakshmî being seated at his feet; or riding on *Garud'a*, a being half bird and half man; or seated on a throne, and holding Lakshmî on his lap; or, if he is represented in one of his incarnate forms, as fish, boar, man-lion, &c., he has a human shape, ending in a fish, or a human body with a boar's head, or with a lion's head; or he appears as a dwarf, or (as Paras'urâma) armed with an axe; or (as Balarâma) holding a ploughshare. As Kr'ishn'a, he is generally represented either in a juvenile form, or as an adult, in a dancing posture, and playing on a flute. As Kalki, he has a sword in his hand, and is kneeling before a winged horse. The leading personages or events connected with these Avatâras are likewise frequently associated with the representation of the god: thus, in the representation of the fourth Avatâra, Hiran'yakas'ipu, as being torn open by the man-lion; or, in that of the sixth, the demon Arjuna, fighting with Paras'urâma; or, in that of the seventh, the ten-headed Râvan'a, battling with Râmachandra; or Hanumat and the monkey chiefs, paying adoration to the latter; while his brothers stand at his sides, and Sîtâ is sitting on his lap; or, in the eight Avatâra, the mountain Govardhana, when uplifted by Kr'ishn'a, and the Gopîs sporting with him. Vishn'u is praised under thousand names, which are enumerated in the *Mahâbhârata*, and have been commented upon by S'ankara and other authors—For other myths relating to Vishn'u, the general reader may consult H. H. Wilson's translation of the *Vishn'u-Purân'a*, in the course of re-editing by Fitzedward Hall (vols. i., ii., already published, Lond. 1864—1865);* the first nine books of *le Bhâgavata-Purân'a*, traduit et publié par Eugène Burnouf, vols. i.—iii. (Paris, 1840—1847); *Harivans'a*, traduit par A. Langlois, vols. i., ii. (Paris, 1834—1835); Lassen's *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. i. (2d edition, Leipzig, 1866), vols. ii.—iv. (Bonn and Leipzig, 1852—1861); and the first

* Completed in 1877.

and fourth volumes of John Muir's *Original Sanscrit Texts* (Lond. 1858—1863); see also the representations of Vishn'u in Edward Moor's *Hindu Pantheon* (Lond. 1810).

VIS'WÂMITRA.

VISWAMITRA is one of the most interesting personages in the ancient history of India. According to the Aitareya Brâhman'a (see VEDA), his father was *Gâthin;* and in a remoter degree, Viswâmitra derived his pedigree from the king *Purûravas* who was an ancestor of Kus'ika. In the Mahâbhârata, Râmâyan'a, and the Purân'as, his father is called *Gâdhi*, and the origin of the latter likewise traced up to Purûravas; but the distance between the two latter personages is differently filled up in the genealogies given by some of these works. As, according to several accounts, Viswâmitra's sister was *Satyavatî*, who married *R'ichîka*, and bore to him *Jamadagni*, he was the maternal grand-uncle of *Paras'u-râma* (see VISHN'U, the sixth Avatâra.) He had 100 sons, fifty of whom were, for an offence they committed, degraded by him to become outcasts and the progenitors of the Andhras, Pun'd'ras, S'abaras, Pulindas Mûtibas, and other frontier tribes, which in the Vedas are called Dasyus or robbers. Vis'wamitra is the author of many hymns of the Rigveda (see VEDA), especially of its third, Mańd'ala; but his fame, which pervades all the periods of Sanskrit literature, is chiefly founded on the remarkable fact, that though by birth a Kshattriya, or a man of the military caste—he is also described as a Râja of Canouj—he succeeded in having himself admitted into the Brâhmanic caste, after a long contest, which, for this end, he had to wage with the R'ishi *Vasisht'ha*. That the result of this contest was the elevation of Vis'wâmitra to the rank of a Brâhmańa, is the account given in the epic poems

and the Purâńas; but as the rivalry between Vis'wâmitra and Vasishṭ'ha is already alluded to in several passages of the R'igveda hymns, and as at their time the caste distinction of later periods of Hinduism was not yet established, it is probable that the later traditions relating to this contest rested on the circumstance, that *Sudâs*, a king named in the R'igveda, who, as is there stated, employed Vasishṭ'ha for his house-priest, allowed, for some unknown reason, also Vis'wâmitra to officiate for him at sacrifices, and that the latter, incurring on this ground the jealousy of Vasishṭ'ha, had to maintain, probably by force, the prerogative conferred on him by his royal master. In the epic poems and the Purâńas, the rivalry between these two personages is the subject of several legends, which, considering the relative age of the kings referred to in them, would encompass a period far exceeding that of the lifetime of a human being. A kind of consecutive biography of Vis'wâmitra is given in the first book of the Râmâyan'a, of which it forms one of the most interesting episodes. Its substance is as follows: Once, when roaming over the earth with his armies, Vis'wâmitra came to the hermitage of Vasishṭ'ha, and was there received by the saint in the most sumptuous style. Vasishṭ'ha could afford to entertain the king in this manner, because he possessed a fabulous cow of plenty that yielded him everything he desired. Vis'wâmitra, becoming aware of the source of Vasishṭ'ha's wealth, strongly wished to possess the cow, and asked Vasishṭ'ha to sell her to him. The saint, however, refusing this offer, the king seized her, intending to carry her off by force. But the cow resisted, and ultimately displayed her supernatural powers in producing from different parts of her body numerous peoples, and by their aid destroying the armies of Vis'wâmitra. The king then had recourse to the magical weapons he possessed, but they were defeated by those of Vasishṭ'ha; and to the humiliation thus inflicted on him he then gave vent in exclaiming:

'Contemptible is the might of a Kshattriya; a Brahman's might alone is might.' And reflecting on what he should do in this emergency, he resolved to practise austerities in order to attain the rank of a Brâhman. In consequence, he went to the south, and performed severe penance during a thousand years; when, at the end of this period, the god Brahman appeared, and announced to him that he had become a Râjarshi, or royal R'ishi. But Vis'wâmitra, not satisfied with this degree of holiness, continued his austerities for another such period. During that time, a king, *Tris'anku* of Ayodhyâ (Oudh), of the family of *Ikshwâku*, had conceived the design of performing a sacrifice, that he might bodily ascend to heaven, and solicited for this purpose the assistance of Vasishṭha, who was the family priest of 'all the Ikshwâkus.' This saint, however, having declared the scheme of the king impossible, and his sons, too, to whom the king likewise addressed himself, having refused compliance with his wishes, he told them that he would resort to another priest, and was, in consequence, cursed by them to become a man of the lowest caste. In this condition, he went to Vis'wâmitra; and the latter shewed his power by performing the sacrifice, so much desired by Tris'anku, and accomplishing his object, in spite of the resistance of Vasishṭha and his sons, and that of the gods themselves. (The *Harivâns'a* relates this story with somewhat different detail, but brings it to the same issue. According to the Vishṇu-Purâṇa, which alludes to the version mentioned in the last-named work, Tris'anku was the 28th in descent from Ikshwâku; but in the Râmâyaṇa, there are only five kings between Ikshwâku and Tris'anku). This event having caused a serious interruption in the austerities of Vis'wâmitra, he proceeded to the forest *Pushkara*, in the west, to remain undisturbed. But while he resided there, it so happened that *Ambarîsha*, another king of Ayodhyâ, intending to perform an expiatory sacrifice, and requiring a human victim for this purpose, after a long search, had

bought for immolation from the Brâhman *R'ichîka*, the brother-in-law of Vis'wâmitra, his son *S'unah's'epha*, and was bringing him home to his capital. On his journey, he halted in the forest Pushkara, and when S'unah's'epha there saw his uncle Vis'wâmitra, he implored him to come to his rescue, Vis'wâmitra, first directed 50 of his sons to offer themselves up as a ransom for their cousin, and, on their refusing to do so, cursed them to become outcasts; but afterwards taught S'unah's'epha two hymns, which, as he said, if sung by him at the sacrifice, would save his life. (In the genealogy of the Râmâyaṅa, there are 21 kings between Tris'anku and Ambarîsha; in that of the Vishṅu-Purâṅa, 15 kings; and in the former, between Ikshwâku and Ambarîsha, 27; and in the latter between Ikshwâku and Ambarîsha, the *successor of Tris'anku*, 43 kings.) The liberation of S'unah's'epha having been effected, and Vis'wâmitra having continued his penance for another thousand years, the god Brahman conferred on him the dignity of a *R'ishi*. But not yet satisfied with this distinction, he went on practising still fiercer austerities than those he had practised before. These the gods succeeded in depriving for a time of their spiritual efficacy, by sending him a heavenly nymph, *Menakâ*, who excited his worldly passion; still, in the end, he attained the rank of a *Maharshi*, or great R'ishi. And, after two other thousand years of still more rigorous penance, which for a time was again interrupted by the allurements of a nymph, Rambhâ, whom the gods had sent for the same purpose as previously Menakâ, the gods, headed by Brahman, came to acknowledge that he had now become a Brahmarshi, or Brâhmaṅic R'ishi; and Vasish'tha himself was compelled to express acquiescence in the result he had achieved. For other legends relating to this contest between Vis'wâmitra and Vasish'tha, see vol. i. of John Muir's *Original Sânskrit Texts* (Lond. 1858);* and the article HARIS'CHANDRA. Compare also

* Second edition (1868), p. 317—426.

VISHN'U the 7th Avatâra.—The name of Vis'wâmitra is explained in the Mârkañd'eya-Purâña as representing a compound, *vis'wa*, 'all,' and *amitra*, 'no-friend,' and meaning, 'one who is no-friend of all, *scil.*, the three worlds.' The Mahâbhârata, however, explains it as *vis'wa* with its final vowel lengthened, and *mitra*, friend, when it would imply that Vis'wâmitra was 'the friend of all, *scil.*, the gods;' and *Yâska*, the oldest writer who gives an etymology of this name, likewise renders it 'friend of all.' The former etymology would seem the more regular; but as in Vedic *inseparable* compounds the final vowel of the first part is frequently lengthened, the latter etymology is the preferable of the two.

VYÂSA.

VYASA is the reputed arranger of the Vedas, and the reputed author of the Mahâbhârata, the Purân'as, the Brahmasûtras (see Vedânta), and a Dharmas'âstra. According to tradition, he was a son of the sage *Parâs'ara and Satyavatî*, 'the truthful,' who was a daughter of king Vasu, and a heavenly nymph, Adrikâ. Another tradition makes him also the father of *Dhr'itarâsht'ra*, *Pân'd'u*, and *Vidura*. On account of his dark complexion, he was called *Kr'ishn'a* (black); and because he was born in an island (*dvîpa*) of the Yamunâ (Jumna) river, his second name was *Dvaipâyana*. That the immense bulk of literature comprised by the above-named works, and relating to different periods, cannot belong to the authorship of one and the same personage, is no matter of doubt. But the name itself of the individual

to whom it is attributed conveys the meaning which must be sought for in some of the legends connected with his history. *Vyâsa* (from the Sanscrit *vi* and *as*, literally, 'throw in different directions,' hence 'distribute') means the person who arranges a subject-matter in a diffuse manner, or the act itself of such a diffuse arrangement, and is often contrasted with *samâsa* (from *sam* and *as*, con-tract), the act of making a concise arrangement, or of abridging (compare the Greek *omēro-*, from *om=sam=syn*, and *ar=as*). Vyâsa is, therefore, a symbolical representation of the work of generations, as embodied in the Vedas, the Mahâbhârata, and the Purân'as, and of the order which gradually was brought into this literary mass. When, therefore, the Vishn'u-Purân'a speaks of 28 Vyâsas who in the reign of the present Manu arranged the Vedas, it is not impossible that some historical truth may underlie this statement, implying, as it does, a different arrangement of the Hindu scriptures at various times: and that the Mahâbhârata, and the Purân'as too, may have undergone various arrangements and recensions, until they settled down in their present form, sufficiently results from their contents. Regarding the Brahma-sûtras, tradition itself seems only loosely to connect their author with the Vyâsa of the foregoing works, for it says that he was in a former life a Brâhman, *Apântaratamas*, who, after having attained final beatitude, 'by special command of the deity, resumed a corporeal frame and the human shape, at the period intervening between the third and fourth ages of the present world, and was the compiler of the Vedas.' (See Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i. p. 327, Lond. 1837). As the author of the Dharmas'âstra, Vyâsa is possibly a personage distinct from the legendary individual bearing this name, as is the case with other Vyâsas who occur as authors of other works.

YAMA.

YAMA, the Hindu God, who, at the epic and Purân'ic period of Hinduism (see India, sec. *Religion*), is the sovereign of the Manes, and the judge of the dead, is, in the hymns of the R'igveda, a son of *Vivas'wat* and *Saran'yû*, and twin-brother of *Yamî*, whose desire to become his wife he resists. His father is sometimes also called the *Gandharva;* and he is further represented there as possessing two four-eyed dogs, which guard the road to his abode (see J. Muir, 'Yama and the Doctrine of a Future Life, according to the R'ig-, Yajur-, and Atharva-vedas,' in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, New Series, 1865, vol. i. p. 287, ff.). The idea represented by these mysterious deities has been differently understood. Professor Roth takes Vivas'wat for the light of heaven, Saran'yû for the dark storming cloud, and Yama and Yamî as representing the first human pair—the originators of the race, or the Vedic Adam and Eve produced by the union of the damp vapour of the cloud and the heavenly light. The Vedic hymns, however, do not afford the slightest ground for such a fantastical interpretation of these names; and as regards that of Yama and Yamî, they discountenance it even distinctly by describing Yama as resisting the sexual alliance with his sister. Professor Max Müller understands *Vivas'wat* to represent the sky; *Saran'yû*, the dawn; *Yama*, the day; and *Yamî*, the night (*Lectures on the Science of Language*, 2d Series, Lond. 1864, p. 509, ff.). But this interpretation, too, is open to the strongest doubts, inasmuch as there is no valid ground for identifying the luminous deity Vivas'wat with the sky, or *Saran'yû* (from *saran'a*, going, moving) with the dawn. It seems more probable that the phenomena symbolised by this myth are not of a luminous, but of an aërial character: the kindred myth of a luminous character being that of the *As'wins*, who are likewise the twin progeny of Vivas'wat and Saran'yû, or rather of Vivas'wat and

'a form similar to that of Saran'yû,' and who represent the transition from darkness to light, and the inseparable duality produced by the intermingling of both (see J. Muir, 'Contributions to a Knowledge of the Vedic Theogony and Mythology, No. 2,' in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. ii. 1866).* For as *Vivas'wat*, 'the expanding,' probably implies the firmament 'expanding' to the sight through the approaching light, *Gandharva*, as usual, the solar fire, and *Saran'yû*, the dark and cool 'air' (the moving element), Yama and *Yamî* seem to represent the current of air produced by the effect of the solar heat emanating from the firmament on the cool air of the night, when the antagonism between the warm and cold air of which this current consists would be Yama repelling the union with his sister Yamî, though, at the same time, they are 'husband and wife while yet in the womb' (of the night-air). And since this phenomenon extends over the whole atmosphere, the two four-eyed watch-dogs of Yama are probably the eight or twice-four regions of the compass, either each couple of them taken together with their intermediate regions—whence both dogs are called spotted—or the four regions and the intermediate four taken separately—whence one dog is also called *dark*, and the other *spotted*. Yama being produced by the solar heat, it becomes then intelligible why it is said of Agni, the (solar) fire, that he is born as Yama, and Yama being a phenomenon of the air, why he is also identified with Vâyu, the wind, and why the intermediate space between heaven and earth is assigned to him as his domicile. It is probably a later conception of the Vedic period which describes this abode as having been made for him by the spirits or *Manes*, and Yama as having been the first who found his way to it; and a still later one, which represents him as the first of *mortals* who went to that world, for in passages where these ideas are expressed, there is an association between the moving air and

* "Sanskrit Texts." v. 292 ff.

departed life which is foreign to the oldest notions of the Vedas. It led to the position which subsequently Yama assumed as a luminous king who dwells together with the Manes, and as the lord of Death—death then becoming his messenger. Yet in the R'igveda, he has not yet the office of judge of the dead which is assigned to him in the later mythology of the epic poems and Purân'as, and probably already in some of the Upanishads. At the epic and Purânic period, Yama entirely loses his cosmical character, though he is still called the son of Vivas'wat. He then marries 13 daughters of the patriarch Daksha, is installed as the king of the Manes, becomes the regent of the South, and resides in Yamapura, a town of the infernal regions, where he sits in judgment over the souls of the departed which are brought before him. They are generally fetched by his messengers, who draw them with nooses out of the bodies which they animated; but in the case of very pious persons, he assumes himself the function of separating the soul from the body. After the soul has been brought before him, he orders his recorder, *Chitragupta* or *Chandragupta*, to read to him an account of all the good and bad actions it had done during its life, and which are kept registered in a book called *Agrasandhânî;* and according to their merit or demerit, it is sent to heaven or the infernal regions. The precise knowledge which the Purân'as pretend to possess of all these proceedings, also extends to the description they give of this recorder, and to their enumeration of the assessors who co-operate with Yama at his court.—Yama's sister is *Yamunâ*. Amongst his other names, *Dharma* ('justice'), *Dharmarâja* ('king of justice'), *Antaka* ('the ender'), *Kâla* ('time'), and *S'râddhadeva* ('the god of the S'râddha,') are of usual occurrence.—When represented, he is of grim aspect; his colour is green, his garments red, and he rides on a buffalo with a crown on his head, in one hand holding a club, and in another the noose.

YOGA.

YOGA (from the Sanskrit *yuj*, join; kindred to the Lat. *jung-*, Gr *zeug-*, Gothic, *jiuk;* hence *junction*, and figuratively, "concentration, religious or abstract contemplation") is the name of one of the two divisions of the Sânkhya philosophy of the Hindus. (See Sânkhya). While the first of these divisions, the Sânkhya proper, is chiefly concerned in teaching the *tattwas*, or principles of creation, and the successive development of the latter, the main object of the Yoga is to establish the doctrine of a Supreme Being, and to teach the means by which the human soul may become permanently united with it; and since the Sânkhya proper is silent on the creation of the world by a Supreme Being—whence it was charged, though unjustly, by its opponents, with being atheistical—the Yoga, which is called theistical, is considered to be its complement. According to *Patanjali*, the reputed author of this system, the term *Yoga* means "the hindering of the modifications of thinking;" and by such modifications, which, he says, may be accompanied with afflictions, or be free from them, he understands "the three kinds of evidence—viz., perception, inference, and testimony—misconception or incorreet ascertainment, fancy, sleep, and recollection." The "hindering of these modifications" is, according to him, effected either by a repeated effort to keep the mind in its unmodified state, or by dispassion, which is the consciousness of having overcome all desires for objects that are seen (on earth) or are heard of (in Scripture)." Dispassion is conducive to meditation; this, again, is of different kinds, and is attained either "impetuously"—in adopting various transcendent methods—or "by a devoted reliance on *I's'wara*, the Lord." This Lord, or Supreme Being, Patanjali then defines as a "particular *Purusha*, or

spirit, who is untouched by afflictions, works, the results of works, or deserts; in whom the germ of omniscience reaches its extreme limit; who is the preceptor of even the first, because he is not limited by time; and whose appellation is Om, the term of glory." This word is to be muttered, and its sense is to be reflected upon, for "from it comes the knowledge of I's'wara and the prevention of 'the obstacles' which impede Yoga. These obstacles, Patañjali says, are 'illness, apathy, doubt, listlessness about the accomplishment of meditation, want of exertion, attachment to worldly objects, erroneous perception, failure to attain any stage of meditation, or inability to continue in the state of meditation when it has been reached." There are several other methods to prevent these obstacles from distracting the mind, and impeding its steadiness. One, for instance, consists in pondering over one single accepted truth; another in "practising benevolence, tenderness, complacency, and disregard towards all objects in possession of happiness or grief, virtue or vice;" another, "in forcibly expelling or retaining the breath;" another, in "dwelling on knowledge that presents itself in dream or sleep;" &c. When all these modifications have disappeared, the mind becomes free from "the tingeing" of the exterior world, as the pure crystal is free from the colour that seems to belong to it, when a coloured substance is seen athwart it. After having described the various modes in which the mind may appear changed into the likeness of what it ponders, the author of this system then proceeds to explain the practical Yoga, by which "concentration" may be attained. It comprises, according to him, mortification, the muttering of certain hymns, and a devoted reliance on the Lord. Through it, meditation is established, and *afflictions* are got rid of. By afflictions, again, he understands ignorance, egotism, affection, aversion, and tenacity of life; which terms are then the subject of an especial investigation into the nature of what is to be got rid of, of what is not

desired to be got rid of, of what is constituted by the cause, and of what is the constitutive cause.—There are eight means or stages subservient to the attainment of concentration—viz., forbearance (*yama*), religious observance (*niyama*), postures (*âsana*), regulation of the breath (*prâṅâyâma*), restraint of the senses (*pratyâhâra*), steadying of the mind (*dhâraṅâ*), contemplation (*dhyâna*), and profound meditation (*samâdhi*). —The first stage, *forbearance* (*yama*), consists in not doing injury to living beings, veracity, avoidance of theft, chastity, and non-acceptance of gifts; they are the universal great duty.—The second stage, *religious observance* (*niyama*), comprises purity—external as well as internal—contentment, austerity, muttering of the Vedic hymns, and devoted reliance on the Lord.—The third stage of Yoga, *postures* (*âsana*), is defined by Patanjali as "that which is steady and comfortable" at the same time. The commentators mention several varieties of such postures. According to an interesting treatise on the Yoga philosophy by Navînachandrapâla, one of these, called *Siddhâsana*, is practised by placing the left heel under the anus, and the right heel in front of the genitals, by fixing the sight upon the space between the eyebrows, and, while in this motionless attitude, meditating upon the mysterious syllable *Om*. Of the posture called *Padmâsana* the same treatise says, that it consists in placing the left foot upon the right thigh, and the right foot upon the left thigh, in holding with the right hand the right great toe, and with the left hand the left great toe, the hands coming from behind the back and crossing each other; while the chin rests on the interclavicular space, and the sight is fixed on the tip of the nose. When the command of such postures is attained, Patanjali says, the Yogin does not suffer either from cold or heat, hunger or thirst, or similar afflictions.—The fourth stage, *regulation of the breath* (*prâṅâyâma*) is threefold, according as it concerns exhalation or inhalation, or becomes tantamount to suspension of the breath, the latter also being termed

kumbhaka (from *kumbha*, a jar), because "the vital spirits then are as motionless as water is in a jar." Through such a regulation of the breath, the obscuration of the pure quality of the mind is removed, and the latter becomes fit for acts of attention. Navînachandrapâla describes different processes of the Prân'âyâma as selected from different authorities. One, for instance, consists, according to him, in the act of inhaling through the left nostril for 7·6788 seconds, suspending the breath for 30·7152 seconds, and exhaling through the right nostril for 15·3576 seconds; then inhaling through the right nostril for 30·7152 seconds, exhaling through the right nostril for 7·6788 seconds, suspending the breath for 30·7152 seconds, and exhaling through the left nostril for 15·3576 seconds; lastly, inhaling through the left nostril for 7·6788 seconds, suspending the breath for 30·7152 seconds, and exhaling through the right nostril for 15·3576 seconds. To the *kumbhaka*, of which there are eight varieties, the same author observes, two processes are indispensable: sitting in one of the postures described; and, by means of an incision in the frænum linguæ, and milking, as it were, the tongue, causing it gradually to become so lengthened as to allow the rima glottidis to be shut by pressing back the epiglottis with the point of the retroverted tongue. Such *kumbhakas*, it is supposed, produce the most wonderful effects: some of them cure diseases of the head and lungs, dropsy, &c.; others make proof against all sorts of inflammation and fever; the eighth or last variety of the *kumbhaka*, especially, cures all diseases, purges from all sins, promotes longevity, enlightens the mind, and awakens the soul.—The fifth stage of Yoga, the *restraint of the senses* (*pratyâhâra*), means the withholding of the senses from their respective objects, and the accommodating them entirely to the nature of the mind. According to an authority quoted by Navînachandrapâla, a Yogin's senses are suspended when he can suspend the respiratory movements for 10 minutes and 48

seconds.—This stage is preparatory to the sixth, or *the steadying of the mind* (*dhâraṅâ*), which means the freeing of the mind from any sensual disturbance, by fixing the thoughts on some part of the body, for instance, on the navel or the tip of the nose. This stage, it is supposed, can be accomplished when the Yogin is able to suspend his respiratory movements for 21 minutes and 36 seconds; and, according to Navînachandrapâla, it is effected by different processes—muttering the syllable *Om* 144,000 times, fixing the eyes upon the tip of the nose, or the space between the eyebrows, for two hours, swallowing the tongue for two hours, &c.—*Contemplation* (*dhyâna*), the seventh stage of Yoga, is the fixing of the mind on the one object of knowledge, the Supreme Spirit, so as to exclude all other thoughts. It is practised in consequence of the "steadying of the mind," as defined before; and, according to the authority quoted by Navînachandrapâla, a man can accomplish it when he is able to suspend his respiratory movements for 43 minutes and 12 seconds.—The eighth and last stage of Yoga, *profound meditation* (*samâdhi*), is the perfect absorption of thought into the one object of meditation, the Supreme Spirit: it is devoid, as it were, of any definite character, which would suggest a term as applicable to it. In such a state, Navînachandrapâla says, "a Yogin is insensible to heat and cold, to pleasure and pain: he is insensible to blows and wounds, to the effects of fire; he is the same in prosperity and adversity; he enjoys an ecstatic condition. He is free from lust, fear, and anger; he is disengaged from all works. He is not affected by honour and dishonour. He looks upon gold, iron, and stones with the same unconcerned eyes. He is the same in love and in hatred; he is the same amongst friends and enemies." And according to the authority he quotes, such a state may be attained by a man who can suspend his respiratory movements for 1 hour, 26 minutes, and 24 seconds.—The last three stages are also comprised under one distinctive

name, *Sam'yama*, or "restraining," because it is chiefly on the perfection attained in these three collectively that depend the wonderful results which are promised to a Yogin when he applies them to the contemplation of special objects. Such results are, for instance, a knowledge of the past and future, a knowledge of the sounds of all animals, of all that happened in one's former births, of the thoughts of others, of the time of one's own death, a knowledge of all that exists in the different worlds, of stars and planets, of the structure of one's own body, &c. There are especially, however, eight great powers which a Yogin will acquire when properly regulating and applying the *sam'yama* —viz., the power of shrinking into the form of the minutest atom; that of assuming a gigantic body; that of becoming extremely light; that of becoming extremely heavy; that of unlimited reach of the organs (as touching the moon with the tip of a finger); that of irresistible will; that of obtaining perfect dominion over the inner organs of the body; and that of acquiring mastery over everything. If the Yogin applies *sam'yama* to the contemplation of the smallest divisions of time, and the successive order in which such divisions occur, he obtains a discrimination which enables him to understand the subtle elements, and to see all objects at once. When his intellect has become free from all considerations of self, and his spirit is no longer subject to the result of acts performed, and when both have thus attained the same degree of purity, the Yogin obtains eternal liberation.—In the last chapter of his work, Patanjali then shews that these perfections are not always obtained by Yogins in one birth, but that *Prakr'iti*, or nature (see Sânkhya), generally in a succession of births, brings to maturity the result obtained in a prior birth. He thus makes natures, not actions, the cause of each effect; meritorious actions merely serving, according to him, to remove the obstructions which, from bad actions, would arise to its regular progress, just as water would take its natural course after the husband-

man, who would want to lead it from field to field, had removed the obstructions that lay in its path. After having then taught that the result of actions, in successive births, consists in the recollection of a prior state, and in the obtainment of a special existence (a special duration of life, and special enjoyments); and after having discussed the different influences to which the mind may become subject in its union to different objects, Patanjali winds up with describing the mode in which final liberation gradually takes place. First, he says, when a person has obtained the discrimination conveyed by the Yoga doctrine, all ideas of self—such as, I am different from another—cease. In consequence, thought is turned inward, and this is the commencement of liberation. But, as still recollections, derived from former existences, sometimes prevail in his mind, they must be abandoned by him in the same way as he has to overcome the afflictions, above specified. When he has succeeded in this, his knowledge will have become so infinite, that but little will remain for him to be known. Then the cosmical *gun'as*, or qualities, too (see Sânkhya), having accomplished the main object of spirit, will have gradually arrived at the end of their functions, and, as a consequence, matter will become separated from spirit. This is *kaivalya*, or true liberation, for the mere power of the mind to retain its nature after dissolution has taken place is not yet true liberation.—The practical part of the Yoga was admitted into the later Vedânta. Its ethical portion is especially dwelt upon in the celebrated episode of the Mahâbhârata the *Bhagavadgîtâ*. But the great power it has at all periods exercised on the Hindu mind, is less derived from its philosophical speculations, or its moral injunctions, than from the wonderful effects which the Yoga practices are supposed to produce, and from the countenance they give to the favourite tendency of orthodox Hinduism, the performance of austerities. It is needless, however, to say that frequently these practices were and are merely a cloak for

imposture and hypocrisy, and that the professional Yogins, numbers of whom are met with throughout India, are often nothing but lazy mendicants or jugglers, who, by impressing the vulgar with a belief in their supernatural powers, convert it into a source of an easy livelihood. Such followers of the Yoga pretend, for instance, to foretell future events: they deal in palmistry, and profess to cure diseases. There are instances, too, where, for a handsome consideration, they allow themselves to be buried for a certain time, so as to exhibit the power of the Yoga. Two such cases are related as authentic in the treatise of Navînachandrapâla; and it would appear from them, that a human being, after having undergone certain preparations, such as the Yoga prescribes them, may be shut up in a box without either food or drink, for the space of a month, or even forty days and nights, and yet remain alive. The author of the treatise endeavours, indeed, to shew that the rules laid down by the Yoga regarding the mode of respiration, the postures, and the diet of a Yogin, may have been founded on a careful observation of the nature and habits of hibernating animals; and in support of this view, he enters into a detailed investigation of the effect of the Yoga practices on animal life. If, as it seems, his statements are correct, much of what otherwise would be incredible in the accounts given of the performances of Yogins, could be received as true, because admitting of explanation. The system of *Patanjali* was taught by him in a little work called *Yogasûtra*, which consists of four Pâdas, or chapters, each comprising a number of *Sûtras*. The oldest commentary on it is ascribed to a *Vyâsa;* and this was commented on by *Vâchaspati-Mis'ra*. Of other commentaries, those by *Vijnânabhikshu*, *Bhojadeva*, and *Nâgojibhat't'a* are the most approved.—For a fuller enumeration of the works on the Yoga, see *A Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems*, by Fitzedward Hall (Calcutta, 1859). The first two chapters

of the Sûtras have been translated, with annotations, founded on the commentary of Bhojadeva, by the late J. R. Ballantyne (Allahabad, 1853); and a paraphrase, but somewhat too free, of the same commentary is contained in the 4th vol. of William Ward's *View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindus, &c.*, 4 vols. (London, 1817—1820). For a brief account of the system, see also the 1st vol. of H. T. Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, 2 vols. (London, 1837); and for the practice of the Yoga, *A Treatise on the Yoga Philosophy*—that referred to above—by N. C. Paul (i. e., Navînachandrapâla), Benares, 1851.).

YUGA.

Yuga (from the Sanskrit *yuj*, join; kindred to the Lat. *jung-*, the Gr. *zeug-*, Gothic, *juk;* hence, literally, junction) denotes, in Hindu mythology and astronomy, a long mundane period of years, which is preceded by a period called *Sandhyâ*, 'twilight,' and followed by a similar period called *Sandhyâm's'a*, 'portion of twilight.' Manu, the Mahâbhârata, and the Purân'as name four such periods, three of which have already elapsed,—viz., the *Kr'ita-*, *Tretâ-*, and *Dwâpara-Yuga;* while the fourth, or *Kali-Yuga*, is that in which we live. The Kr'ita-Yuga, according to these works, consists of 4000 divine years, its Sandhy'â of 400, and its Sandhyâm's'a likewise of 400 divine years. The Tretâ-Yuga consists of 3000, and its Sandhyâ and Sandhyâm's'a of 300 divine years each; the Dwâpara-Yuga of 2000 divine years, with 200 such years to its Sandhyâ, and 200 to its Sandhyâm's'a; and the Kali-Yuga of 1000

divine years, with 100 such years to its Sandhyâ, and 100 to its Sandhyâm's'a. And since a divine year comprises 360 solar years of mortals, a year of men being a day of the gods, these Yugas, with their Sandhyâs and Sandhyâm's'as, would severally represent 1,728,000, 1,296,000, 864,000, and 432,000, or in the aggregate, 4,320,000 solar years of mortals—a period called Mahâyuga, or 'a great Yuga;' 4,320,000,000 years being a day and night of Brahmâ. See Kalpa. The notion on which the theory of the Yugas and their Sandhyâs and Sandhyâm's'as is based, as may be easily inferred from the foregoing statement, is that of a descending progression, 4, 3, 2, 1, each of these units multiplied by 1000, and in the case of the periods preceding and following the Yuga, by 100 years. The deteriorating process thus indicated in the succession of these Yugas, is also supposed to characterise the relative physical and moral worth of these mundane ages. 'In the Kr'ita-Yuga,' Manu says, 'men are free from disease, attain all the objects of their desires, and live 400 years; but in the Tretâ and the succeeding Yugas, their life is lessened gradually by one quarter.' . . . 'In the Kr'ita-Yuga, devotion is declared to be the highest object of men; in the Tretâ, spiritual knowledge; in the Dwâpara, sacrifice; in the Kali, liberality alone.' See also for other passages the article Kaliyuga. The present or Kaliyuga of the world commenced in the year 3101 B.C., when in the year 1867, therefore, 4968 years of the Kaliyuga would have expired.—The term Yuga is sometimes also applied to other divisions of time. The Vishn'u-Purân'a, for instance, mentions, besides the Yugas above named, a Yuga which consists of a cycle of five years, called *Sam'vatsara*, *Parivatsara*, *Idvatsara*, *Anuvatsara*, and *Vatsara*, (see Wilson's translation of this Purân'a, 2d ed., by Fitzedward Hall, vol. i. p. 49, ff.; vol. ii. p. 254, ff.); and a Yuga, or cycle of five years, is, as Colebrooke states (*Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i. p. 106, ff.), likewise the cycle described in the astro-

nomical treatises connected with the Vedas. The use of the term Yuga, however, in such a special sense is not frequent, whereas its application to the four mundane ages is that which generally prevails in the classical and medieval Sanskrit literature.—For other works, besides those already referred to, which afford information on these and other divisions of Hindu time, see *Kala Sankalita, a Collection of Memoirs on the various Modes according to which the Nations of the Southern Parts of India divide Time*, &c., by John Warren (Madras, 1825); and *Carnatic Chronology, the Hindu and Mohammedan Method, of reckoning Time explained*, &c., by Charles Philip Brown (Lond. 1863).

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LITERARY REMAINS

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THEODORE GOLDSTÜCKER.

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ARTICLE III.

THE RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTIES OF INDIA.

1. *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy: comprising the Nyâya, Sânkhya, the Vedânt; to which is added a discussion of the authority of the Vedâs.* By Rev. K. M. Banerjea, Second Professor of Bishop's College, Calcutta. London. 1861.

2. *A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems.* By Nehemiah Nilakantha Sastri Gore. Translated from the original Hindi, printed and manuscript, by Fitz-Edward Hall, D.C.L., Oxon., H.M.'s Inspector of Public Instruction for the Central Provinces. Calcutta. 1862.

3. *The Chhândogya Upanishad of the Sâma Veda, with extracts from the Commentary of Sankara Achârya.* Translated from the original Sanskrita, by Rajendralala Mitra. Calcutta. 1862.

Ours is an age of unbelief. Meteors do not warn us; eclipses of sun and moon have lost for us their power of prognostication. We have fowls, like the ancient Romans, but they do not, as Pliny says, "daily govern the minds of our rulers" (hi magistratus nostros quotidie regunt). We kill and roast oxen and sheep, but there is no haruspex or thyoskoos to enlighten us on the mystical properties of their entrails, or on those of the smoke ascending from their flesh. Ants, spiders, and bees,

which had so much to tell in olden times, are silent now about future events; and though the aged portion of our fair sex seems still to adhere to the mysterious rules on omens and portents laid down in the learned works of Atreya, Charaka, Susruta, and other fathers of Hindu medicine, we have still a doubt whether it is powerful enough to arrest the sceptical bias of this age. Nevertheless there are signs which we should do well to dwell upon with the same awe as our forefathers did when a comet made its sudden appearance on their horizon.

Five years have passed since we quelled that untoward rebellion of India. Then, we said, it was the inferior race which dared to feel dissatisfied with the governing wisdom of its superiors. Men, deficient in religious notions, with a literature not worth considering, with institutions not heard of in civilized Europe, with laws of inheritance and adoption so inconvenient to the Indian Exchequer, had the presumption to give vent to a feeling of treasonable uneasiness, utterly unjustified, and therefore deserving the severest punishment. We have grown wiser since. We now remember that vast and wonderful literature of ancient India, which still fertilizes the native mind; we no longer close our ears to the numerous witnesses, dead and living, which testify to the superior intelligence and capacities of the Hindu race; we begin to admit that the institutions and laws dating from immemorial times and outlasting all the vicissitudes of Indian history must be congenial to the nation that reverses and upholds them so tenaciously; nay, humbly mindful of our own religious perplexities, we have thought it the wiser course to allow the Hindus themselves to settle their own mode of attaining eternal bliss.

"We desire," says Her Majesty, in that memorable Proclamation of the 1st November, 1858, which will ever be quoted to the glory of her reign, and to the honour of the Minister who then presided in her Councils of India—

"We desire," says Her Majesty to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India, "no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we permit no aggression on our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of our native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government. . . .

"Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but all shall alike enjoy the equal or impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us, that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.

"And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and partially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity duly to discharge. . . .

"We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that generally in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India."

It would be in vain to deny that these words have become the Magna

Charta of India; and it would be dangerous to misunderstand the signs which have risen on the political horizon of that country since they struck root in the native mind. The Hindus have ceased to look upon themselves as inferior in rights to their fellow-subjects in Europe. Their princes, undeterred by adverse decisions of former governments, firmly renew their claims, and plead them before the people of England; their native associations hold meetings, discuss and issue reports of the acts of Government, which rival in their form and contents the proceedings of the British Parliament; their press, though loyal, has grown manly, and their political agents in this country offer us the novel and instructive spectacle of convening meetings of Englishmen and of enlightening them on the actual position, the wishes, the rights, and the claims of their countrymen. But whereas those who were in the habit of looking down upon native talent and native acquirements may feel surprised when hearing Hindu politicians descant on international law, with quotations from Grotius, Puffenderf, Vattel, Donat, and Wheaton, others will probably find not less ground for reflection when they discover that religious questions also are dealt with now by native writers in a spirit and with an amount of European erudition which hitherto seemed to have been the exclusive privilege of western scholarship.

While contenting ourselves for the present with these general remarks on the important political changes which are shadowed forth by the actual movements in India, we intend in this article to draw the attention of our readers to that remarkable religious feature of Hindu development just alluded to.

Of all problems concerning the future of India the most problematical at all times has been the religious one. No government, whether Mohammedan or Christian, ever approached it without the strongest misgivings; and no government has hitherto been able to

offer any solution of it. We are neither surprised at the attempt nor at the failure. We comprehend that every one who, either through his personal intercourse or through his studies, has become acquainted with the actual religious condition of India, must consider it unsatisfactory in the highest degree; but we understand, too, that neither a foreign government nor foreign zeal apparently possesses the means of improving it. A creed, however objectionable to those who do not share in it, is always congenial to the mental condition of its professor. Beyond all things it is his property; and that property, too, which no oppressor can seize or annihilate. It must be valuable, since it can resist all might; and its value increases in proportion to the strength which oppression gains. No foreign law, no dictatorial force has ever modified the essential aspect of Hindu religion, beyond trifling changes illusory in themselves. Nor need we speak of the result which persuasion has obtained when laws have been ineffectual. Of the various causes which have produced its failure we need mention only one, which, in most instances, has been all-powerful—we mean ignorance. Without inquiring into that which it was intended to substitute for the creed to be removed, we may fairly assert that scarcely any one of those zealous men who have set out on their missionary tasks had ever undertaken to study the rise, the progress, and the decline of Hindu religion. Appearances alone have captivated their minds, and in appearances only have their successes resulted. "Our religion is that of the East India Company," was the satisfactory answer given to one of these successful missionaries when examining his converted flock before the bishop of his diocese; and experience shows that this answer holds practically good in nearly all other cases in which the worshipper of Brahma, Vishnu, or Siva, has learned to adore the Christian Trinity. To show a pious Hindu that he might abandon his rites without forfeiting salvation, required more than a superficial discourse on their

futility; to persuade an orthodox Brahmin that neither Vishnu nor Siva is the creator of the world, necessitated at least a knowledge of what Vishnu and Siva are; and such a knowledge would have compelled the missionary to ascend the height of Hindu antiquity, to study the Vedas and the numerous writings connected with it, to descend from it to the mediæval period of Hindu civilization, and to follow its meandering course through all the intricacies of Sanskrit literature. It is needless to say that the acquirement of such a knowledge was hardly ever dreamt of by any of those who meant to convince the Hindus of the errors of their various creeds.

We consider it therefore a new and remarkable phase in the development of India, not only that researches of the most arduous kind have been commenced in order to pave the way to that knowledge, but that native scholars of position and learning take upon themselves the task which has hitherto engaged the activity of European missionaries. It is a first-fruit we reap from the wisdom of the Royal proclamation. Conversion having ceased to be the means of obtaining or granting favours, the native mind will listen to its indigenous teachers without passion or mistrust, and in their turn English statesmen will have better opportunities for studying the minds of the Hindus by listening to their own scholars, than by learning the views—too often tainted by partiality—of European philanthropists.

We have placed at the head of this article the titles of two works, which illustrate what we have just called the new phase of the religious condition of India. Both works are written by native scholars of great accomplishment, and, though differing in their intrinsic value, tend towards the same goal. The "Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy," by Mr. Banerjea, it is true, is the more learned and the more comprehensive of the two; it is more attractive in its form, and it has the advantage also of having been written in the masterly English in

which it is presented to the public by the author himself, who gives ample proof that he combines in a high degree the erudition of a Hindu Pandit with that of an English Professor. On the other hand, the "Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems," by Mr. Nehemiah Nîlakantha Sâstrî Gore, originally composed in Hindi, and translated by Dr. Hall, not only enjoyed the benefit of the numerous and valuable remarks of this accomplished scholar, but, as it seems to us, addresses itself more to the understanding and the training of the Hindus, than its more refined rival, which, on account of its superior merits, will necessarily be less appreciated in its own country than with us. When we mention, moreover, that both authors—the one tracing his pedigree to the oldest Brahmanic families of ancient India—have embraced the Christian religion in preference to that of their ancestors, we need not add that their conclusions are in favour of the creed they now profess.

It is essential, however, for a proper and due appreciation of their elaborate works, that no misunderstanding should exist in our reader's mind as to what we mean by the creed of their ancestors. As we shall enter more fully on this question in the course of these pages, it will suffice for the present to observe that the ancient religion of India has become gradually changed into the double form of an exoteric and esoteric creed. The worshippers of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva in a great variety of forms in which these deities represent themselves to the native imagination, the adorers of the Saktis or female energies of these gods, of the Sun, Ganesa, and a number of other beings—all pretend that their mode of worship is founded on, and countenanced by, their revealed sacred writings, the Vedas, though its immediate source is to be found in the Purânas. These represent what we may call the creed of the masses, inasmuch as it appeals to the grosser capacities of human understanding. The esoteric creed of the Hindus

likewise appealing to the Vedas, is essentially philosophical. It professes to express the real meaning of these sacred works, by reducing their myths to allegories, and by proving that their essence is the doctrine of one God, the creator of the universe and the source of eternal bliss. Like Sankarâchârya one of the greatest Hindu divines, the professors of this creed admit the utility, and, as the case may be, even the necessity, of a sensual description of worship, as suited to the intellect of those who are not fitted for the unalloyed reception of eternal truth; but their object is gradually to elevate the mind of the masses, to wean it from rites based, as they argue, on the misinterpretation of their holy scriptures, and to prepare it for a pure conception of the deity. Amongst these, the followers of the Vedânta philosophy occupy the foremost rank, and exercise the greatest influence, so much so that this esoteric creed may be identified to a certain degree with the tenets of the Vedânta philosophy.

It is to this philosophical form of Hindu religion that the "Dialogues" and the "Refutations" are addressed. They do not condescend to deal with the worshippers of Vishnu, Siva, and their kin. For as their object is to penetrate to the *root* of Hindu thought, it becomes superfluous for them to lop branches without a stem. Or, to speak in plainer terms: since they endeavour to prove not only that the doctrine of all Hindu philosophies, the Vedânta included, is erroneous, but that the very source whence they profess to flow, the Veda, is devoid of authority and unworthy of belief, the whole Hindu Pantheon according to them loses its prop and tumbles to the ground.

It is the unenviable fate of those who, while dealing with matters of Hindu religion or Hindu literature, claim attention beyond the narrow circle of professional students of Indian antiquity, to have always to fence their statements with precautions which, in kindred and familiar matters, would be tedious and superfluous. Thus we believe that, in

spite of all the encouragement which the study of Sanskrit and Sanskrit literature has of late years received at the hands of the Indian Government, such precaution cannot yet safely be altogether dispensed with when it is necessary to deal freely with such terms as Veda and Hindu philosophies. Veda will no doubt represent to the popular mind some book like the Bible or the Koran, and with an expression like Hindu philosophies, it probably combines ideas like those suggested by the philosophy of Pythagoras, Aristotle, Plato, or to speak in homelier language, of Bacon, Locke, or Hume. Above all things, it will readily imagine some safe or at least some probable date by which we may not only assign a fixed position to these works in Hindu literature, but also determine the relation which they hold to one another, and the influence which the earlier writer exercised on the minds of his successors. We must at the outset, therefore, destroy such illusions wherever they may exist. We shall have to mention that the Veda is no wise comparable to the sacred writings of Jews, Mohammedans, or Christians; and we will at once confess that no one has as yet been able to connect any personage—in the historical sense of the word—with any of these writings, or the text books of modern philosophy, or to prove at which period of Hindu antiquity they were composed. Nor do the materials known to us justify more than theories on the relative position occupied by the three great branches of Hindu philosophy. So antagonistic is this utter mysteriousness of historical data in Indian literature with the matter-of-fact predilections of the European mind, that even conscientious writers on Sanskrit literature thought it indispensable to their task to lay before their readers at least some conjectural date of the antiquarian subject they were treating of; and so easily do personal opinions skilfully expressed become invested with the authority of proof, that authors drawing their information from these writers have transformed their imaginary dates into historical

definitions of time. It is necessary, therefore, for the formation of a proper judgment, to reduce these speculations, however interesting in many respects, to their real value, and to free our notions from the fetters they may impose.

We notice on these grounds with peculiar pleasure the sober and cautious manner in which the reverend professor has dealt with questions like these, and though we differ in various respects from the views he has expressed and the judgment he has passed, we cannot do better than attach our own remarks to the summary and ingenious sketch he has given in the commencement of his "Dialogues" of the rise and progress of Hindu theology and philosophy.

"The division of our Vedas," Mr. Banerjea writes (p. 41), "it is well known, is twofold, into Mantras and Brâhmanas. The former may generally be considered devotional, the latter ceremonial and dogmatic. As for the short treatises called Upanishads, they are, with a few exceptions, appendices to the dogmatic parts, and, like codicils of wills, are held to be the most recent, and therefore the most matured, expositions of the authors' minds. They profess to be repositories of *parâ vidyâ* or superior knowledge, and look down on the great bulk of the Vedas as *aparâ*, or inferior. They contain some rude indications of philosophic thought, and, like the twinklings of stars in a dark night, may occasionally serve as guides in a history of Hindu philosophy. They do not, however, exhibit any great attempt at method, arrangement, classification, or argument. Even there the poetry predominates over the logic. Bold ideas abruptly strike your fancy, but you find no clue to the associations which called them forth in the author's mind, and search in vain for the reasons on which they were based. Sublime thoughts are not wanting, but they resemble sudden flashes, at which you may gaze for a moment, but are imme-

diately after left in deeper darkness than ever. Nor are they free from those irregular flights of the imagination in which poets,, with vitiated tastes, delight to indulge, setting at defiance all rules of decency and morality.

"The Upanishads appear from their language and style to have been the latest, and the Mantras the earliest, of Vedic compositions. It may be a delicate question, but it is one which ought not to be unfairly suppressed, whether the authors of the earliest compositions, the Mantras, profess to have written them down as inspired records. You are fond of saying that they were breathed out by Brahmâ at the time of the Creation, and yet you speak of the *Rishi* of each *Mantra*. The *Mantra* itself is such that its *Rishi* may well be supposed to have composed and chanted it, and there is nothing as to matter and style which could possibly require divine illumination. That our ancestors looked on the Vedas with such reverence is no marvel. The Vedas were the first national efforts in the department of literature. In the infancy of literature, the ignorant, who did not know how to read or write, would naturally look upon those mysterious talents as divine endowments, as especial instances of Saraswati's grace. They would accordingly feel a sort of religious veneration for such gifted and highly favoured persons, and consider their writings as divine inspirations. . . . .

(P. 46): "Between that period and the age of the Darsanas, however, a tremendous revolution had taken place in the opinion of men. From extreme credulity to extreme infidelity the transition is easy. Those who were called upon to render implicit obedience to the Brahminical college, began to question the very foundations of sacerdotal authority. The Brahminical hierarchy had become so powerful as to set the sovereignty of kings and princes at defiance. The fear of incurring their malediction—an anathema the effects of which

would be felt for countless generations—would haunt the priest-ridden minds of Kshetriyas by day and by night, if ever they set themselves in opposition to Brahmins. . . . . At length, however, a prince arose in the royal line of Ikshwâku, determined to dissolve the charm by which the minds of men were held in servitude to the Brahmins. Sâkya Muni imposed on himself the task of reforming the religion of his country. . . . . He pronounced the rites and ceremonies of the Veda to be idle sports, and the exclusive privileges arrogated by the Brahmins to be empty pretensions. He assailed the authority of the very books on which those pretensions were founded. He declared that the division of castes was a mere human invention, and invited all ranks to assemble under his banners on a footing of equality. The Brahmins add that he also denied the immortality of the soul, and pronounced the expectation of a future world to be a vain reverie. Whether Buddhism was really liable to the charge of materialism preferred against it by the Brahmins or not, it certainly had no divine revelation to plead for its support, nor could it appeal to any tradition in its favor. It could only stand on its *rational* pretensions. The study of philosophy and metaphysics was therefore absolutely needed for its very existence. So long as men believed in the infallibility of the Veda, they could appeal to its texts for the decision of controversies and the solution of doubts. But when revelation was ignored, disputes could only be settled by the verdict of *reason*. The necessities of Buddhism rendered the cultivation of logic and metaphysics absolutely indispensable, and thus were the first attempts at philosophy called forth in India. . . . ."

On the obscure question, as to the chronological position of the different systems of Hindu philosophy and on their contents, Mr. Banerjea expresses, amongst others, the following opinion :—

(P. 49): "Of our six *Darsanas* or schools of philosophy, two, those of Jaimini and Vyâsa, are generally considered orthodox; while the other four are looked upon with great suspicion by the Brahmins themselves. I think that the Darsanas of Jaimini and Vyâsa (called the Former and Latter Mîmânsâs, or deciders) were written with a view to correct the errors of their predecessors, and were of more recent date than the rest. The Nyâya and the Sânkhya are in fact a sort of compromise between Brahminism and Buddhism. They contain as much of the Buddhist element as could be held without danger to Brahminical supremacy. The authors *profess* to uphold the Veda because experience had taught them that the dignity of their order could not be maintained without the Veda; and they inculcate the reality of future states of life against the Buddhists. But the spirit of their teaching is quite as hostile to the ritual of the Veda as that of Buddhism. I believe, therefore, that the Nyâya and Sânkhya were amongst the first-fruits of the Brahminical intellect when it sought to enlist the aid of rationalism in the service of the Brahminical order. As to the question of priority between the two systems themselves, the fact of one of the Sânkhya Sûtras making plain reference to the Nyâya, and speaking of its *sixteen* topics, may be considered as decisive proof in favor of the Nyâya. Such evidence, it is true, is far from being conclusive, because there have been many interpolations; but the Nyâya is the least controversial among the systems, and there is no reason of any cogency for rejecting the authenticity of the Sânkhya Sûtra in question. The Nyâya may therefore be considered the first production of Brahminical philosophy after the overthrow of Buddhism in India. The prevalence of Buddhism had convinced the Brahmins of the use of metaphysics in conducting controversies, and expressly in refuting objections; and of the risks they ran of winning the contempt of the community by confining their attention to the simple ritual of the

Vedas. The Nyâya, with its orderly array of scientific terms, its physics, logic, and metaphysics, *was manifestly fitted to train and quicken* the intellectual powers. While heresy had been rampant, the vast majority of the Brahminical order were unable to think for themselves, or unlearn prejudices already instilled into their minds. The reasons for which Sûdras were relieved from the task of intellectual exercises, were becoming more and more applicable to the twice-born classes. Traditional teaching, and the prescribed ritual, received with implicit submission, were fast incapacitating them for vigorous mental labour. If the servile tribes had a routine of duties made ready for them, the higher grades had also *their* routine, not indeed of servile attendance on human superiors, but of endless rites and ceremonies no less enslaving to the mind. As far as intellectual activity is concerned, the distinction between Brahmins and Sûdras had become almost nominal.

"The author of the Nyâya would no doubt have the satisfaction of believing that his new system would arrest the progress of heresy, and prevent the gradual decline of the orthodox intellect. If the Brahmin's mind continued to be stinted by the discipline of the Vedas, in the same manner as the Sûdra's was by the authority of the twice-born, what real difference would here remain between the highest and the lowest tribes? Implicit submission of intellect was exacted from both. Was it at all wonderful, then, that heresy stalked abroad, and that many Brahmins had themselves fallen into the snare? Could minds of any activity acquiesce in the above restrictions? Must they not meditate on the wonders of the creation, except as the antiquated Vedas directed them? And must they always interpret the Vedas in the monotonous way taught by the old Rishis? Orthodox philosophers accordingly came forward to supply the craving of the Brahminical mind, without endangering the stability of the Brahminical order.

They did not seem to think very highly of the Vedas, but were unwilling to renounce those time-honoured compositions. . . . .

(P. 55): "The same desire of humouring the prejudices of the times, led them to promise supreme felicity as the reward of philosophical speculation. Nothing short of the *summum bonum* was considered as sufficient recompense for the trouble it imposed. That the sentiment of religion predominated in the minds of our ancestors, is evident from the spirit of our ancient literature. It indicates a feeling of dependence on supernatural powers, which is equalled only by the contempt the authors expressed for the perishable objects of the world. Philosophers perhaps imagined that whether they treated on the highest truths which could concern human nature, or merely speculated on the quality of earth and water, they could never find an audience, unless they held out hopes of everlasting welfare as the end of their investigations. In the estimation of their contemporaries, no inferior boon was worth the trouble. The offer of such spiritual rewards on the part of philosophers, for investigations chiefly physical, at best metaphysical, though it must be accepted as a pleasing testimony to the religious feelings of our predecessors, was productive of consequences very much to be regretted. Physics, metaphysics, and theology were confounded in one mass. While the most trifling points of inquiry . . . . were prosecuted with some feeling of religious awe, questions of really vital importance, which regarded the existence and attributes of God, and the permanent interests of the soul, were necessarily robbed of their due solemnity. Theology and physics being placed on the same level, the former could challenge no greater degree of attention than was accorded to the latter. The degradation of the one, and the undue exaltation of the other, were the natural consequences." . . .

(P. 58): "Gotama directed the attention of the Brahmins to the

several branches of human knowledge which he thought were calculated to strengthen the intellect, and enable it to conduct polemical discussions with advantage. He classified them under sixteen topics, which he enumerates in his first aphorism." . . .

"Kanâda's system (the *Vaiseshika*) is considered a branch of the Nyâya. His theory is what we call the Atomic—a theory which was simply hinted at by Gotama (the founder of the Nyâya). . . . His categories and his classification of causes bear a similar resemblance to those of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, while his mode of accounting for the origin of the world, by the combination of atoms, is almost identical with that of a sect of ancient European philosophers, the Epicureans, as represented by Lucretius. . . . He does not seem to have entertained the idea of a self-existent Supreme Intelligence existing in the world.

(P. 64): " . . . Kapila came forward next with his remedy for the *threefold evils* of life, which neither the Vedas nor the common sense of mankind had been able to remove. Who this Kapila was, and when he lived, is equally uncertain with the age and personality of Gotama. . . . Kapila went the length of denying outright the existence of the Deity. The wonder is that he is still ranked among orthodox philosophers, and not denounced as a teacher of heresy, like the Buddhists. With Kapila there could be no real freedom if a person were subject to a desire or motive. The soul being essentially free, is, according to his theory, incapable of volition. It is *udâsin*, or perfectly unmindful of the external. It is a simple witness. He accordingly argues that since no thinking agent performs an action without a *motive*, the soul could not be supposed to be the CREATOR without being subject to a motive or desire. Such subjection, however, would imply a *bondage*, and detract from its freedom, and, by necessary consequence, from its power. If it had the desire, it would be wanting in

the *power*—and if it had the *power*, that is to say perfect freedom, it would not have the *will*. Hence a thinking agent *would* not if he could, and *could* not if he would, create the universe. The acuteness displayed in this argument is indisputable, but subtlety and profundity are not synonymous." . . .

(P. 68): "The objects of knowledge are, according to Kapila's arrangement, twenty-five. *Prakriti*, or nature, defined to be the equipoise of the three qualities of *excellence*, *foulness*, and *darkness*, is the first, as *Purusha*, or soul, is the last. The intervening twenty-three are *mahat*, or intelligence; *ahankâra*, or self-consciousness; the five *tanmâtra* or subtle elements, eleven organs inclusive of the mind, and the five gross elements. Of these, Prakriti, the *rootless root*, is the first cause of all things; while *Purusha*, or soul, is a simple witness. Both are eternal: but the former, inanimate and non-sentient, is prolific and active; the latter, intelligent and sentient, is non-productive, because free and indifferent. Prakriti, however, creates *for* the soul and in its vicinity.

"The atheistic part of Kapila's system was rectified by a mystic Rishi of the name of Pâtanjala, who unmistakeably inculcated the existence of *Iswara* or God, and whose system has consequently been called *Seswara* or theistical. It must, however, be confessed, in justice to Kapila, that Pâtanjala does not attribute the creation to his Iswara. His definition of Iswara corresponds exactly to Kapila's idea of the soul, viz., 'untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts.' The only difference is that Pâtanjala considers him to be the Guru, or master, of 'even the elder beings,' merely acknowledging one spirit as supreme over the rest. The non-acknowledgment of some such Supreme Being was a glaring inconsistency in Kapila, when nevertheless he contended for the authority of the Vedas. Who could have inspired the Vedas if there were no Supreme Being? Pâtanjala's is thoroughly a mystical

system. It consists mainly of some vague rules of *yoga*, or a sort of mental and corporeal discipline, which cannot be considered as other than chimerical." . . . . .

(P. 75): "When Jaimini came forward with his *Mîmânsâ*, or decider, he was probably desirous of mediating between the controversalists that preceded him, and hoped to determine questions which had so long agitated the Brahminical mind. He could not fail to see that neither the Vedas, nor the institutions they supported, could stand long if the Nyâya and Sânkhya were to direct the Indian intellect. Barren speculations, he thought, had been abundantly indulged. Topics, categories, and principles had been sufficiently discussed. What was the result? They had introduced some technical terms, and taught some controversial tactics; but they gave little or no assistance in the discovery of the truth which those terms and tactics were intended to guard. . . . . He commenced his *Mîmânsâ* with the enunciation of *Duty*, the only topic he had to propound. . . . . If Jaimini had carried out his proposal of considering the nature of *duty* in a truly philosophical spirit, he might have greatly contributed to the improvement of the Indian mind. . . . . Had Jaimini laboured in a similar way to strengthen those moral principles which the Almighty had implanted in the human mind, he might have met with a success honourable to himself and beneficial to the nation; but a servile adherence to the Vedic ritual had unfitted his mind for such speculations. Jaimini had no other idea of duty than as *an injunction of the Sruti;* and that apart from any notion of its Inspirer, or his Will. We have seen previously how Kapila could admit the Vedas as an authority, without a Supreme Intelligence to inspire it. We observe a similar anomaly in Jaimini. He urges the consideration of DUTY, without caring for any to whom it may be *due*. He contends for the authorized Veda without an *authorizer*, for a law without a *lawgiver*, a revelation without a

GOD. . . . . To say that Dharma (duty) signifies an injunction of the Veda, can only be intelligible in the sense of its involving the will of the AUTHOR of the Veda. Jaimini, however, has said nothing as to its AUTHOR, nor while talking of its eternity, as Sabda, or the word, has he made mention of any co-eternal Intelligence uttering or revealing it. His Sûtras are so vague on this point, and on the existence and providence of God, that, for anything which may be adduced to the contrary, he may be called a *second* Kapila, maintaining the authority of the Veda without admitting His existence, without whom no composition can be produced to be inspired. . . . . That the Mîmânsâ of Jaimini met with no success in settling the questions so long controverted is no marvel. . . . . (p. 80.) *Vyâsa*, the well-known compiler of the Vedas, accordingly put forth a second *decider*, the Uttara Mîmânsâ, or Vedânta, in which the old pantheistic doctrine of the Upanishads was reproduced. Not to give an uncertain sound like Jaimini on such a cardinal point in theology as the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, the Creator and Governor of the Universe, he propounded that as the most prominent, and the only great, idea pervading his system. But if there can be no mistake as to the idea of a GOD in his doctrine, it is neutralized, if not nullified, by the identity of that God with everything else—with the whole visible world. He inculcates the existence of one *sole essence*, manifesting or producing itself in the form of the universe before our eyes. If Brahma is the efficient cause or creator of the world, he is also its *substance*, as the gold is of the bracelet. This identity of the universe with God precludes the idea of duty on the part of the creation towards the Creator quite as effectually as does Jaimini's theory. . . . . The doctrine which Vyâsa brought to light from the depths of the Veda, is no other than the teaching of the Upanishad, that this universe is God—that the things made and their Maker are identical—that the human soul is

one and the same with the Divine spirit. The doctrine is held in two different ways. One way is the *Parinâma Vâda*, which, acknowledging the reality of the visible universe while it identifies it with God, pronounces it to be a formation or development of Himself. The other is the *Vivarta Vâda*, which, maintaining that the one eternal essence, Brahma, manifests himself in various illusory forms, denies the *real* existence of any substance which is not God, and holds the visible world to be a mere shadow or Mâyâ, such as the reflections of the sun and moon in water. . . . . All ideas of duty and responsibility are openly repudiated in the Vedantism of Vyâsa. The human soul and the Divine Spirit being identical, how can there be an obligation on the part of the one to the other? How or whom can one mind or despise? 'Here,' says Sankara, 'there is no admission of even a smell of works.' Good manners and good works are, however, declared to be *useful* for the attainment of true knowledge."

We have made this long quotation from the interesting work of Mr. Banerjea, not only because it contains the nucleus of the ideas developed, explained, and illustrated in his "Dialogues," but because we are not aware that any writer before him has ever attempted to give so continuous and graphic a sketch of the origin and sequence of the various portions of Hindu philosophy as is presented here in the foregoing extracts. But we should fail in doing justice to him did we not add to them at once the views he takes of the authority of the Veda. After having refuted the arguments of several writers who contend for the omniscience and the eternity of the Veda, he asks (p. 485):

"What can the Vedas possibly be in the conception of Brahminical philosophers? Not the word of God, not a revelation of His will—such as is needed for our guidance under bewildering circumstances, but something which, certain of them affirm, mechanically issued from

Brahma; like smoke from burning fuel; something which, others declare, was educed from the elements; something which, others again tell us, is eternal and independent of a cause. But what that thing is it is impossible to gather from them, unless it be a charm or talisman. They talk of it as articulate sound; but what is articulate sound without a sounder or utterer? and they all identify it with Rich, Yajus, Sâman, and Atharvan. Singularly enough they know nothing about the date or circumstances of these compositions. . . . . Again I ask, what are the Vedas? In the Satapatha Brâhmana it is said: "He (Prajapati) brooded, &c. over *i.e.* [infused warmth into] these three worlds. From them, thus brooded over, three lights were produced—fire, this which purifies (*i.e. pavana*, or the air), and the sun. He brooded over these three lights. From them so brooded over, the three seeds were produced." . . . . What were these productions? Mere sounds, or writings on paper or palm-leaf? In either case how could they be generated by brooding over fire and the sun? . . . . The Chhândogya and Manu speak in a similar way of the origin of the Vedas. Kullûka Bhatta, in explanation of the difficulty we have stated, says: "The same Vedas which existed in the previous mundane era (Kalpa) were preserved in the memory of the omniscient Brahma, who was one with the Supreme Spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in the beginning of the present Kalpa, he drew forth from fire, air, and the sun; and this dogma, which is founded upon the Veda, is not to be questioned; for the Veda says: "The Rigveda comes from fire, the Yajurveda from the sun." . . . . Manu adds: "Prajâpati also milked out of the three Vedas the letters a, u, m, together with the words bhûr, bhuvar, and svar.' . . . . What in the name of common sense is the meaning of all this?"

And after having quoted and criticised some other theories of the

origin of the Vedas, Mr. Banerjea winds up with the following words (p. 497):

"The assertion of Jaimini that the Rich, Yajus, Sâman, and Atharvan contain the primitive revelation, is not proved. No one knows when, where, or by whom, these four works were written, and consequently no one can pretend that they are a record of the primeval sound. On the contrary, a critical examination of their contents *disproves* their authority. As to the argument that the Vedas must have proceeded from the divinity, because no human author can be shown to have produced it, it is not of much validity. If a stranger, or a man brought up as a foundling, came to you, and no one was able to give you an account of his paternity, you would not surely conclude that he was coeval with the creation. And there is nothing in the general scope of the Vedas to justify the conclusion that they were revealed in the beginning. It is impossible to fancy what edification our first parents could derive from mere praises of the Sun, Moon, and Fire. If historical narrative were entirely excluded, the residuum would be mere invocations of the elements, and a few ceremonial injunctions."

That the reverend Hindu professor has not failed to support the views we have here adduced with his own arguments, and that he availed himself of his knowledge of the mind of his countrymen to impart to them a far greater power of persuasion than they might have obtained at the hands of a European theologian, it is but justice to state. In omitting, therefore, to quote kindred views and sentiments from the "Rational Refutation" of Mr. Nîlakantha Sâstrî, we do not mean to withhold our acknowledgment of the able and clever manner in which this author also endeavoured to lay bare the weakness of Hindu philosophy and the errors of the actual Hindu creed. The

remarks we intend to offer apply to both of them, indeed to the whole class of those zealous men who expect to solve the religious difficulties of India by refuting the conclusions of Hindu philosophy, and by denouncing the assumed sacredness of the Vedic writings.

We must begin, then, with asking them how it happens that some notions they entertain of those philosophies differ so materially from those expressed by so many other Hindus of ancient and modern times. According to the sketch we have quoted, Kapila, the originator of the Sânkhya philosophy, "went the length of denying outright the existence of the Deity." Kanâda, who started the Vaiseshika, "does not seem to have entertained the idea of a self-existent Supreme Intelligence creating the world." Jaimini, the author of the Mîmânsâ, "may be called a second Kapila, maintaining the authority of the Veda, without the existence of Him, without whom no composition can be pronounced to be inspired." Yet Mr. Banerjea himself, as we have seen, tells us that Patanjali, the author of the Yoga philosophy, "rectified" the system of Kapila "by inculcating the existence of Iswara, or God." It would perhaps have been more correct had he said that Patanjali, by way of completing, added some chapters of his own to the Sânkhya-Sûtras of Kapila, and that both works were intended by him to form in reality only one; so much so, that in our best existing manuscripts—and if we are not mistaken in the very commentary itself which Patanjali wrote on his own doctrine—each of the four chapters of his treatise calls itself part of the Sânkhya-Pravachana, which is the title of Kapila's work. Here we must ask, then, those who speak of the "godless" doctrine of Kapila, how it was possible, at any time, and under any circumstances, to look upon the theistic Patanjali as the completer, or even, as Mr. Banerjea calls him, the rectifier of Kapila? Was theism ever a cap which by being put upon atheism completed or even "rectified" it into theistic respectability? Did it not strike Mr.

Banerjea, when passing his judgment on the Sânkhya doctrine, that had it been what he believes it to be, no theistic philosopher or theologian would ever have thought of attaching his tenets to it? and had he done so, that no one, however unskilled in philosophical speculation, would ever have looked upon him as the maintainer of a Deity? Yet the fact is undeniable, that all India calls Patanjali—and rightly so—"seswara," or the believer in a God. Mr. Banerjea, it is true, confesses to find an exact correspondence between Patanjali's definition of God and Kapila's definition of soul; but when he met with this concordance, did it never occur to him that there must have been something in the Sûtras of Kapila to justify a *theistic* writer to complete and rectify it in his own way? So much is certain, at any rate, that the mode in which Mr. Banerjea and Mr, Nîlakantha Sâstrî view the doctrine of Kapila would never explain the fact of a system acknowledged by all Hindu writers to be a theistical one, having become the appendix, nay, part and parcel of the Sânkhya Pravachana.

Before we explain the reasons which seem to us to have misled the judgment of the learned Hindus who descanted on the atheism of Kapila, it will not be superfluous to advert to the inconsistencies implied by the other charges preferred against Kanâda and Jaimini. Both of them are likewise declared not to have entertained the idea of a creator. But Kanâda's system, as Mr. Banerjea, and indeed all authors engaged in matters of Hindu philosophy admit, "is considered a branch of the Nyâya," and that this system is essentially theistical, is a fact which, we believe, requires no proof, since it has never been controverted before. But we confess that of all assertions the strangest appears to us to be that which turns Jaimini into an atheist. His work, the Pûrva-Mîmânsâ, is chiefly engaged in solving doubtful questions concerning the ritual service of ancient India. These services mainly consist in a series of prayers addressed to, and oblations or ceremonies

performed in honour of, fire, sun, Indra, the Aswins, and other beings, real or imaginary, which engrossed the pious imagination of the ancient Hindus, and were looked upon by them either as gods or as personifications of the supreme soul. Should we then not be fairly surprised when we are told that an author who regulated these ritual acts, denied the existence of a God? Might we not sooner expect to find him saddled with a superfluity of that in which he is represented to us to be utterly deficient? That the Purânas and writers hostile to the Pûrva-Mîmânsâ, indulged in accusations of this kind, cannot concern those who have no other object than that of ascertaining the real character of these philosophies.

The truth is, that the ingenious theory which Mr. Banerjea conceived of the rise and progress of Hindu philosophy, and his desire of filling up the historical blank by a plausible and interesting narrative betrayed him into overlooking the facts as they will present themselves to the mind of every one not biassed in favour of conclusions foreign to the subject-matter itself. We quite admit that neither Kapila, nor Kanâda, nor Jaimini, nay, we will in fairness add, Gotama, satisfy us on the nature of God—we quite admit that they leave us as much in darkness respecting Him as any philosophy, but for the simple reason that they meant to be systems of philosophy and not of theology. Even Mr. Banerjea allows one of the *dramatis personæ* of his Dialogues to say that an author has the right of choosing his own subject. And should not the Hindu framers of philosophy have been allowed to confine their research to the investigation of things which they thought were within the domain of human understanding—without soaring too high into regions probably deemed too lofty by them for human thought? In stating at once that the Nyâya, Vaiseshika, Sânkhya, and in some measure the Pûrva-Mîmânsâ are intended to be philosophies, that the Vedânta is theology, and the mysticism of the Yoga

a dreamy speculation, partly theological and partly physical—we have explained the antagonism which existed between these Darsanas severally, for it existed at all periods when philosophy and theology contested each other's rights to the human mind. The theologian who does not care for disquisitions on the atomic theory, or for speculations on matter, syllogism, and language, will spurn the Nyâya, Vaiseshika, and Sânkhya, and ridicule the researches into the eternity of sound; he will find his consolation in the mystical definitions given of God by the Vedânta, and in the prospect held out to him by the asceticism of the Yoga, to free himself from all fetters of thought and common sense. The philosopher, on the other hand, will have more earthly longings and interests; he will study with more satisfaction the state of physical and linguistic science at the time of Gotama, Kanâda, and Kapila—whose system, we may, in passing, remark, became the scientific foundation of Hindu medicine—than the exalted doctrine of Vyâsa and Patanjali—so edifying because so incomprehensible.

This is, in the shortest compass, the history of the ancient philosophy and theology of India. To confound both is to do injury to both, and injustice too. Whether Kapila's, Gotama's, and Kanâda's interest in mundane matters were stronger than that of Vyâsa and Patanjali, because they stood nearer than these to the time of the oldest Upanishads which satisfied theological curiosity; again, whether Vyâsa and Patanjali were more eager to inculcate their notions of God, than to inquire into the nature of matter and the human mind, because the researches of the Nyâya and Sânkhya were diverting too much the national mind from the mysterious doctrine of the Upanishads, we have of course no means of deciding. It may be that the sequence of the systems took place in the order in which Mr. Banerjea so graphically describes it; though we hold that the Jaimini Sûtras, in their oldest form, were the oldest of all, because, strictly speaking, they are neither philo-

sophical nor theological, and though we hold that Patanjali's Yoga marks the transition from the oldest Vedânta to its more modern type. But whichever of these views be right, there is obviously a vast difference between understanding that a philosopher does not choose to enter into a discussion on the nature of God, and asserting that he denies His existence outright. That philosophy may jump from the premise of not knowing to the conclusion of denying, there is evidence enough in the history of philosophy, both in ancient and modern times; but we maintain that the charge of atheism, levelled against these Hindu systems, is not justified; and we quite conceive therefore that, in spite of the little satisfaction they may afford to the theologian, Hindu antiquity could rank them amongst those Darsanas which are not antagonistic to the Vedic creed.

This is as little the place to enter into the merits or demerits of the philosophical theories of ancient or mediæval India, as it was the object of the learned Hindus whose works we are speaking of, to solve the many problems suggested by the writings of their ancestors. We have followed them thus far, because a charge of atheism against some of the most valued productions of their literature involved a similar charge against the numerous class of those of their countrymen who, we understand, are still adherents of the tenets of the Nyâya and Sânkhya philosophies. But though we regret that space and opportunity do not permit us to say more here on a question so vital for a proper understanding of the Hindu mind, we must draw closer to the practical end for which the Dialogues as well as the Rational Refutation have made their contribution to modern researches on Hindu religion and philosophy.

We observed before that the creed of the learned and enlightened portion of the Hindus is essentially founded on the doctrine of the Vedânta philosophy, which they hold to be the truest exponent of the

spirit of the Vedas, more especially in the sense which Sankara, their greatest Vedânta theologian, elicited from the Sûtras of Vyâsa Dwaipâyana. The Vedânta is not concerned in the logical laws of the human mind, nor do its theories on the development of the world possess any scientific interest after the discussions of the Sânkhya and Nyâya, with which they agree to a certain extent. Its chief object is to explain the nature of God, His mode of creating the world, and the relation between both. It teaches the existence of one Supreme Being, that this Being is the efficient and substantial cause of all things, and "that the universe, therefore, is necessarily co-substantial with Him" (or rather with It). For a scientific appreciation of the gradual development of this doctrine, it is necessary to distinguish between the Sûtras of Vyâsa, the commentary of Sankara, and the more recent treatises which may be called the modern Vedânta. But though Mr. Banerjea, with much learning and accuracy, points out the difference which exists between these various periods of the Vedânta, we nevertheless coincide with the view implied by Dr. Ballantyne's observations in his translation of the Vedântasâra, that this difference does not amount to a schism between the modern and the old doctrine, but that the tenet, for instance, of the illusory existence of the world, taught by the modern Vedânta, is merely an evolution of the tenet of the older doctrine, which maintains that the world is real, but a product of ignorance. For the popular understanding of this doctrine, it is sufficient to adduce the words of Mr. Nîlakantha Sâstrî, which, supported by original texts, summarize it in this way:—

"'Brahma is true, the world is false; the soul is Brahma himself, and nothing other.' As expanded and expounded by the advocates of the Vedânta, this quotation imports as follows:—Brahma alone—a spirit; essentially existent, intelligence, and joy; void of all qualities and of all acts, in whom there is no consciousness, such as is denoted

by 'I,' 'thou,' and 'it,' who apprehends no person, or thing, nor is apprehended of any: who is neither parviscient nor omniscient, neither parvipotent nor omnipotent: who has neither beginning nor end; immutable and indefectible—is the true entity. All besides himself, the entire universe, is false, that is to say, is nothing whatsoever. Neither has it ever existed, nor does it now exist, nor will it exist at any time future; and the soul is one with Brahma. Such is the doctrine of the Vedânta regarding the true state of existence; and it is denominated non-dualistic, as rejecting the notion of any second true entity." (p. 176.)

It may seem surprising, at a first glance, that the professors of a creed so sublime and so meek, should not only have carried on hotter discussions on its merits than the adherents of the other schools of philosophy did on the truth of their theories, but also that they should now be denounced by their own countrymen in terms far stronger than those bestowed by them on the other Darsanas.

But on reflection we shall find the one and the other perfectly obvious. No discussion is more likely to grow warm and passionate than one in which both disputants know nothing, and can know nothing, of the subject of the debate, but are trying hard to persuade each other of the correctness of their views. We humbly submit that a definition of the Creator of the World, and an explanation of the mode in which he created it, is a subject of this kind. It is an innate desire of the human mind to know everything, and as long as human nature remains the same, it is certain that man will not desist from the attempt to penetrate mysteries for ever closed to him. We shall always have, therefore, some kind of Vedânta philosophy, and we shall always also enjoy the satisfaction of meeting with clever men who will explain to us that we know no more by it than we did before. But Mr. Nîlakantha Sâstrî and Professor Banerjea want to prove far more. They infer from

the doctrine of the Vedânta, not only that its Brahma is a "non-entity" or "no-thing," and Vedântism therefore atheism in disguise, but that it is "a libel on God," and "a source of immorality."

Now, in spite of the most careful attention we have paid to the arguments of the two learned Hindu Professors, we must entirely demur to the conclusion they have arrived at. Neither the Sûtras, nor Sankara's commentary, nor the Vedânta treatises which a western barbarian may have the good luck of understanding, would suggest to him the views or the accusations contained in the foregoing words.

All we find is that the Vedânta is the sublimest machinery set into motion by oriental thought, with the result of proving once more that the human mind is incapable of understanding God. All the epithets lavished by the Vedânta on Brahma simply show, that one may exhaust the whole vocabulary of human speech without finding a single word which will enlighten us on what He is. But it is likewise clear that the Vedantists felt the most ardent desire to describe the greatness of God—a greatness so great that it overwhelmed their intellect, and ultimately left it destitute of all thought. There is not the slightest cause to find fault with the confession at which they arrive. That "Brahma is incomprehensible," "beyond thought," is the burden of all their songs—after they have displayed the minutest description of what He is. That He is *nirguna*, or void of qualities, is another of their admissions, apparently strange, after the endless enumeration they give of his attributes. But just as after its unsuccessful attempt of "thinking" of Brahma, the Vedânta owns that "Brahma cannot be thought of," it arrives at the result that whatever qualities it may predicate of Him, He has no qualities, be they material or spiritual, in the sense suggested by this word. In short, we neither believe that the Vedânta in calling Brahma "void of qualities," means to declare God a nonentity, nor can we agree with a distinguished European

scholar who presses *nirguna* so hard that it yields the sense of an "immaterial" God. The Brahma of the Vedânta presents itself as the God whom the pious are certain to understand at the outset, and whom they end in finding "incomprehensible." Hence, He is "pure entity," "pure thought," "pure felicity," which words in reality do not explain anything; hence, He has the qualities of "omniscience, freedom, self-existence," and so forth, which description in reality merely reveals an utter vagueness of thought, without conveying any idea of quality at all. It is neither our fault nor that of the Vedânta, when we say that it has not accomplished an impossibility; but it is fair to admit that it has brought on itself the obloquy of the philosopher, by saying so much while telling nothing, and that of the theologian, by confessing to nothing, after having said so much.

A charge of immorality, however, is a far different thing from a charge of ignorance. If the deduction advanced by Professor Banerjea, that the Vedânta doctrine strikes at the root of duty, were founded on fact, the controversy he entered upon with the most enlightened portion of his countrymen would indeed cease to be one of literary consequence only.

"If you say the universe is of the same substance with God," he makes Satyakâma argue, towards the end of the Dialogues (p. 396), "and that the soul is identical with the Supreme Being in the strict sense of the term (excluding the figurative senses of *sampat*, &c.) then you must either unduly exalt the world or grossly degrade the divinity. In either case you strike at the root of *Dharma*, or duty. You cannot, with any fairness or consistency, impose upon persons duties which on your own theory are impossibilities. Whether you acknowledge the universe to be God, or deny the existence of everything that is not Brahma, you can have no law, no ethics, no discipline." The reply given to this syllogism by the second interlocutor is as follows: "We

allow that a man in a state of ignorance is bound by laws, rules, and duties." Whereupon the first returns to the charge: "You allow that which your better sense contradicts; you hold that in truth there can be neither law nor lawgiver. The bolder spirits among you glory in denying injunctions or prohibitions."

We do not know who these bolder spirits are, whom Mr. Banerjea is alluding to, but we do know that they are not to be found amongst the authorities of the Vedânta writers. We have, then, his own confession, that experience does not bear out the conclusion which, he says, *must* result from a belief in the Vedânta tenets, or we are almost afraid to conclude, *ought* to result from it, if the working of the Vedânta were left at his discretion and will. For, according to him, it is the *better* sense of the Vedantists which contradicts their moral practice, the latter being an inconsistency. That a doctrine, possibly good, may, through perversion or misunderstanding, become the source of evil, is sufficiently shown by the political and religious history of mankind; but that a doctrine essentially wrong and practised in its wrongness, should, out of sheer inconsistency, bear good and moral results, is a novelty we had yet to learn.

But though fully aware of the weak parts of the Vedânta, we are spared the necessity of elucidating the moral and ethical greatness of this system, for this task has been fulfilled by a western system of philosophy which occupies a foremost rank amongst the philosophies of all nations and ages, and which is so exact a representation of the ideas of the Vedânta, that we might have suspected its founder to have borrowed the fundamental principles of his system from the Hindus, did his biography not satisfy us that he was wholly unacquainted with their doctrines. From this philosophy the Vedântists might learn what their philosophy really is, δυνάμει, as Aristotle would have said, and what it might have become, had it been stripped of all its cos-

mogonic vagaries, which, however, do not affect its vital part. We mean the philosophy of *Spinoza*, a man whose very life is a picture of that moral purity and intellectual indifference to the transitory charms of this world, which is the constant longing of the true Vedânta philosopher.

That the philosophy of a scholar who lived two hundred years ago must possess a value different from that of a philosophy of ancient India requires no remark; but comparing the fundamental ideas of both we should have no difficulty in proving that, had Spinoza been a Hindu, his system would in all probability mark a last phase of the Vedânta philosophy.

Without showing that the charges preferred by Mr. Banerjea and Mr. Nîlakantha Sâstrî against the Vedânta have been repeatedly levelled against the philosophy of Spinoza, we content ourselves with quoting a few critical observations on his system which will perhaps best dispose of the cry of atheism, pantheism, and immorality raised against the system of Vyâsa. They are taken from the works of one of the greatest philosophers of our time, of one who was by no means an adherent of Spinoza's philosophy. In his history of philosophy, Hegel says :—

"Spinozism is reproached with being atheism; for God and the world being one, and undivided, Spinoza makes nature God, or God nature, so that God disappears and nature alone remains. Yet Spinoza on the contrary does not *oppose* God to nature, but thinking to existence; and God is the unity, the absolute substance, in which the world disappears. The adversaries of Spinoza assume the air of being very much concerned about God, but in reality they are much concerned about what is perishable, about their own selves. . . . . Atheism is declaring arbitrariness, vanity, the transitoriness of the world to be

the highest principle. Such is not Spinoza's principle. According to him God is the only substance; nature is merely modality. Spinozism is therefore *akosmism*. . . . . Those who charge him with atheism maintain the reverse of that which is true; there is too much of God in his system. 'If God (they may say) is the identity of spirit and nature, nature—the human individual, is God.' Quite right; but they forget that in God they have ceased to exist independently. They can never forget that they are nothing. It follows, therefore, that those who traduce Spinoza in this way, do not mean to preserve God, but that which is perishable, the world. They are offended at the world not being allowed to be a substance. They are offended at their own annihilation. . . . . .

"Spinoza says: 'Our happiness and freedom consist in constant and eternal love of God;' . . . . 'the more man comprehends the nature of God and loves God, the less he is under the influence of evil passions and the less he fears death." Spinoza demands to this end that man should acquire the true mode of comprehension; he wants him to view everything *sub specie æterni*, in absolutely adequate notions; viz., in God. Man should refer everything to God, God being one in all. Thus Spinozism is akosmism. There are no morals more pure and more elevated than those enjoined by Spinoza; for he wants human action to be regulated merely by divine truth. . . . . 'All ideas are true, inasmuch as they are referred to God.'"

We have quoted enough to convince the learned Hindus that every one of Spinoza's sentences might be supposed to have been literally borrowed from the system they charge with degrading God and elevating the world. They will perceive that one of the greatest thinkers of our age judged differently from them on the morality of a system which compels man to view everything in the light of God.

Since the philosophical systems which called forth the foregoing remarks, appeal for the soundness of their doctrine to the theological treatises called Upanishads, which are looked upon by many ancient writers as part of the Vedas, and since these, in their turn, are believed to be inspired by the deity, Mr. Banerjea reviews the arguments brought forward by Jaimini, Vyâsa, Gotama, Sankara, and other Hindu divines, for the purpose of establishing the authority of the Veda on the ground of its divine authorship, and shows that they cannot bear the test of logical reasoning. As the Vedas have not been revealed to us, and as we could have no hope of becoming Brahmins even if we "surrendered our private judgment" in favour of them, we might have fully enjoyed that mental pleasure which is always derived from soundness of logic and readiness of wit, had we not found that the whole controversial journey of the learned Hindu was merely undertaken to end in the haven of another revelation. We must confess, therefore, the disappointment we have felt. It is a political maxim of constitutional bodies, a maxim acquired by dint of long experience and preserved with the utmost care, not to allow the name of the sovereign to be drawn into political debate. For nations have learnt that it is unwise to saddle the sovereign whom they want to make inviolable, with errors and shortcomings that may belong to the acts of his ministers. But though the political animal seems to be capable of an increase in wisdom, the religious man evidently remains stationary. Thousands of years have engraved their religious experience in the annals of history, religion has succeeded religion, the followers of each have invariably maintained theirs to have come from above, and controversialists have mutually picked the most damaging holes in their respective revelations. Prudence alone, one might have supposed, would at last have taught theologians not to expose the God whom they adore to the chance of being held responsible for those errors which our

neighbours are always so much keener than ourselves in discovering. Kings whom nations might if they pleased make answerable, are raised beyond the reach of responsibility; but God, whom no one can make responsible, is constantly dragged down by the theologian into his little debate. If Jaimini and his ancient co-religionists set up an elaborate defence of the *divine* authorship of their Veda, we may excuse them at least for want of that experience which we now possess; we may allege in their favour also that they maintained the inspiration of their sacred books, not against other inspirations, but against unbelief. But Mr. Banerjea is not satisfied with merely enlightening his countrymen on the fact that Brahma did not write or dictate, or brood the Veda, he must on his part step forward, not only with a superior religious work, but with one inspired by God. Were we not deeply convinced that he is in earnest, we should have really thought that he was hitting hard at the pretence of the Vedic inspiration, merely in order to arm his countrymen with the most logical weapons against all the arguments which may be adduced for the inspiration of the Bible. For his attack on the Hindu theories is so wonderfully strong, and his defence of the Biblical revelation so wonderfully weak, that a Hindu by comparing both sides will probably feel farther off than ever from embracing the particular revelation which he recommends. Or does he seriously mean that he can grind the intellect of his nation, blade-like, sharp on the Vedic and obtuse on the Biblical side? Did he not become aware, were it only by criticising the religion of his ancestors, that, just as fire and water require an intervening substance to become harmless to one another, reason and faith can coexist only on the condition that a proper consciousness of the limits of the human intellect is powerful enough to bind them over to keep the peace? Did his method of destroying the Brahminical faith in the divine inspiration of Vedas not prove to his satisfaction that this intervening power

being withdrawn, either reason evaporates faith, or faith extinguishes reason?

We are far from being disposed to enter here into a discussion of that portion of Mr. Banerjea's Dialogues in which he attempts to *prove* to his countrymen the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testament, and, on this score, to recommend it to them as the source of their future creed. But we cannot refrain from a remark which he has forced upon us. Whoever reads for a first time the evidence he brings forward in favour of the inspiration of the Scriptures will necessarily think that his statements concerning the creation of the world, the prophecies, miracles, and so on, are incontrovertible and uncontroverted facts. It would never occur to such a reader that there existed a very voluminous, very learned, and also a very pious description of works amongst them, in which not a single argument of Mr. Banerjea's has been left unobjected to. He would never dream that the subject which the learned Hindu lays before his countrymen with an air, and no doubt with a conviction, of utter finality, is to the minds of a large class of Christians, to say the least, as doubtful as possible, and as unsettled as any question can be. We cannot approve, therefore, of the silence he has kept on this momentous point; for any one who is asked to exchange his creed for another has a right to know all the particulars of the bargain he is desired to make; and his acquisition will most likely prove a very undesirable one if he should find hereafter that the knowledge afforded him was exceedingly incomplete. Mr. Banerjea might have refuted, of course, if he could, all the charges preferred against the inspiration of the Bible, and shown that their extreme similarity to the charges he preferred against the inspiration of the Vedas is purely apparent or accidental; but it is certain that in dealing with this part of his subject as he has done, he has failed both in justice to his countrymen and in prudence as regards the cause he defends.

We will give an instance or two of the method which Mr. Banerjea adopted in persuading the Hindus of the inspiration of the Scriptures, after he had exerted all his energy, and availed himself of all his scholarship, to sharpen their logical powers for the dissection of their philosophical theories and their notions of God.

One of the most delicate points in the Old Testament, it is well known amongst western theologians, is the account given there of the act and process of creation. Science has proved that the latter is contrary to facts; and theological writers who perceive the inexpediency of allegorizing, or the danger of equivocating, have generally the discretion to say as little about the matter as possible, especially in connexion with the topic of inspiration. For as the production of the universe out of nothing is, to say the least, incomprehensible by human reason, while its creation out of pre-existing matter is a position not countenanced by the Bible, the ablest writers generally agree to be silent on the subject, and to avow that they do not understand how the world was called into existence. But Satyakâma, who had triumphantly disposed of the Sânkhya and Vedânta doctrine, expresses himself to Agamika on this subject as follows (p. 11):—

"As regards the external universe, the Bible tells us 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' thus showing that the Nyâya, Sânkhya, and Vedânt were all right and all wrong. They rightly apprehended the truth, as regarded their opposition to each other's systems. The Vedânt was right in its protest against the eternal atoms of the one, and the unintelligent creative *prakriti* of the other; and the Nyâya and Sânkhya were equally right on their part in inveighing against the doctrine of the world's identity with God. But they were all wrong in regard to their positive doctrines—the Nyâya in its theory of eternal atoms, the Sânkhya in that of creative Prakriti,

and the Vedânt in its denial of a duality of substance. The universe is neither an illusion nor self-formed, but was called into being out of nothing by the one only, Eternal, and Supreme Intelligence, the author of all things in heaven and in earth."

And Agamika, who has nothing to say on the "nothing," may well become speechless when he is further told that "*all perplexing difficulties are thus cleared.*"

Another weak point which, in the interest of their faith, is generally surrendered by the most learned, and, we repeat it, by the most pious, writers of Biblical disquisitions, as evidence for the inspiration of the Bible, is the question of prophecies and miracles. It is one of the strongest weapons in the armory of Mr. Banerjea. And after he has ridiculed the idea of the Upanishads—a supposed portion of the Vedas —being invoked by the Brahminical believer in testimony for the authority of the Vedas—since, as Sâyana says, "not even a dexterous man can ride on his own shoulders"—he makes Satyakâma explain to Agamika the mystery of the Trinity in the following manner (p. 522):—

"(The Christian religion speaks) not of three Gods nor a plurality of Gods, but a plurality of persons in the unity of the Godhead. This doctrine you can find no great difficulty in acknowledging, (1) because it is inculcated in the Bible which, as we have seen before, is attested by miracles and prophecies: and (2) because the Brahminical sâstras themselves bear some confirmatory testimony to its truth. (Agamika asks, 'how,' and is told), the Brahminical sâstras speak of a triad of divinities, Brahmâ, Vishnu, and Siva. They speak of it, as *one form and three gods.* They tell us that they are mystically united in One Supreme Being. But the doctrine appears incongruous, and quite out

of place in their system. The gods are frequently represented, not as different personal manifestations of the same Godhead ought to be, but as impure characters and antagonistic gods, wrangling and fighting with one another. Siva fights and punishes Brahmâ, and Vishnu humbles Siva. The votaries of Vishnu anathematize those of Siva, and the votaries of Siva anathematize those of Vishnu. And all three are, again, pronounced to be transient and perishable. The doctrine represents an idea which is quite foreign to the Brahminical system, and we can only unravel the mystery by supposing it to be a relic of some primitive revelation, of which a distorted tradition had probably reached our ancestors."

Here Mr. Banerjea himself allows Agamika, in reply, to exclaim, "These appear to be strange and novel views of things." And we cannot but join with Agamika most heartily in his astonishment, though we might have wished he had known a little more of the triad Brahmâ, Vishnu and Siva, to be spared the confession which he subjoins, that he "certainly cannot gainsay them."

There is another serious perplexity into which our learned authors must be aware that they will throw even those Hindus who may be clever enough to overcome all these difficulties, but it has as little been removed by them as indeed any difficulty which besets the solution of the religious problem in India. Their object, as we have seen, is to persuade their countrymen to embrace the Christian religion; but they have neither explained to them what the Christian religion is, nor where it may be found. Any Hindu who follows the deductions of Mr. Banerjea would simply infer that there is but one Christian religion, which a devout student of the Bible might easily acquire from a perusal of this sacred book. Let him descend, however, from the region of abstraction into that of reality, and he will soon discover the

endless variety of opinions which may be founded on the apparently so intelligible scriptural text, and he will soon learn that so far from this being a mere possibility, hundreds of creeds have sprung up from this same scriptural soil, every one of which claims to be in exclusive possession of true Christianity. And if he be disposed to investigate historically the mutual relation of all these creeds, he will find that their difference is so essential that it was strong enough to perpetuate the most inveterate animosities, and to result in wars the like of which cannot be traced in the history of any other creed.

We have no desire to enlarge upon this theme, for we have said enough to explain why we hold the solution proposed by Mr. Banerjea to be an impossibility. When the Royal proclamation combined with a profession of its reliance in the truth of Christianity, a solemn injunction of toleration for the religions of India, its wisdom, by expressing the result of matured experience and profound thought, showed itself far superior to the zeal, however well intentioned, which believes that human happiness can be fashioned according to one mould. Attempts of conversion are too frequently made without examining the limits within which they are possible, and the result in which their momentary success may end. If a man derives his religious views from his own individual information, or from sources which are void of authoritative influence, he may yield them to the views which are of a higher range without causing injury to the nobler part of himself. But if the creed of an individual is founded on texts held sacred and authoritative, it is a national creed; and no individual can abandon it without severing himself from the national stem; no nation can surrender it without laying the axe to its own root. For a religion based on texts believed sacred, embodies the whole history of the nation which professes it; it is the shortest abbreviation of all that ennobles the nation's mind, is most dear to its memory, and most essential to its life. No religion

has better illustrated this truth than the religion founded on the Bible. It could be, and was, successfully introduced amongst all nations which possessed no texts supposed to be divinely inspired, and therefore of general authority, and whenever a nation possessing merely the semblance of such a text, adopted it, it thereby decreed its own end. The Romans and Greeks when becoming Christians, ceased to be the continuation of the classical Romans and Greeks, in history, in literature, in character. Their political importance, based on the conditions of their past, was brought to a close, and they had to grow into another nationality. Christianity itself is not one single form of religion, for the character of the nations which adopted it compelled it to become English, or German, or Russian, or Italian, or any other Christianity as the case may be; each so different from the other, that only conventional politeness can comprise these various and historical forms under one common name. But the condition under which this religion introduced itself into the countries of Europe, was always the absence of a book ascribed to divine authorship. When Mr. Banerjea speaks of the Jews, he has chosen an exact counter instance which goes far to prove that even a people without land, without any history which, since they are scattered over the world, can be called their own,—that a people exposed to all the horrors of persecution and all the allurements of seduction, did not, and does not, espouse that very religion which exercises the most powerful influence on its actual destinies, and which it even supports and favours amongst those who profess it. The Jews do not become Christians simply because they believe that their Testament is a sacred book.

But the charm which apparently inheres in that word is by no means a mysterious one. There was and there is no book considered sacred, unless it contains a stock of that which the nobler part of human nature, everywhere and at all times, acknowledges to be *good*. It is quite im-

material whether this stock is more developed or less, as long as it is capable of development; for at different periods new branches will proceed from the same stem, and they will enjoy the same reputation of divine origin as the old stock. When Mr. Banerjea discovers that the Hindu Triad resembles the Christian Trinity, his trover may cause the hair of some good Christians to stand on end, but it nevertheless shows that whoever requires a belief in the Trinity, may even as a Brahminical believer gather it from his own sacred texts. And that the Vedas contain sentiments and injunctions as elevated and conducive to the moral excellence of man as the Bible itself, we might learn from the testimony of Mr. Banerjea's Dialogues themselves. He alleges, it is true, that Vedic passages of this kind are sometimes not unalloyed with statements and descriptions which may impair their exalted quality. But he would have been less hard on the Vedas, had he known that there have been many writers who from a feeling of hostility as great towards the Bible, as his is for the Vedic inspiration, have culled from the scriptural texts, narratives and injunctions which Mr. Banerjea would be the last to recommend as typical for that which in our age we define as good, moral, or sublime. The Hansa bird is described by the Hindu poets as possessing the faculty of separating milk from water. A sacred text, whatever it be, requires a just man to be such a Hansa; but it requires him also to be the Hansa of the Upanishads, which being the sun, would be able to discover that all those objectionable passages in the Vedas or in the Bible were never meant, when they were written, to imply those conclusions which now the Christian may turn against the one and the Brahmin against the other.

We have been carried, however, with these remarks to the point where we cannot shrink from expressing the views which we entertain of the duties of the Brahminical Hindus of our days. We need not emphasize more than we have already done, that we reject as unwise

and unpractical any attempt to persuade them to become Christians or to adopt the Biblical Scriptures as their spiritual code. We want them to become a nation worthy of their ancestors and worthy of the great rôle, which in ancient times they have acted in the history of the human race, and we are satisfied that they cannot regain that position by breaking the springs of their life, and by exchanging their own religious uncertainty for that of any other creed. It is necessary, however, to this end, that they should realise the condition in which they are. We need not prove to them that the minds of the enlightened portion of their nation are wholly estranged from the sectarian worship as it is practised now, but we could satisfy them that they are utterly remiss in examining where the root of the evil lies. Every Brahminical believer, if asked, will tell us that the mode of his worship is founded on the Vedas. He refers us, it is true, occasionally to the Purânas and Tantras, but he himself admits that these works have no authoritative power unless they can prove that the tenets they contain are drawn from the Vedic source. This proof is never offered. On the other hand, a recent work, which, from the impartial spirit in which it is composed, and from the vast learning on which it rests, cannot too strongly be recommended to the Brahmin, we mean the Original Sanskrit Texts of Mr. Muir, enables us to say that its contents may enlighten the Hindu worshipper on the real relation between the principal gods of his Pantheon and the Vedic belief.

The pivot, then, on which all religious questions of India turn, is and remains—the Veda. Philosophers and non-philosophers, Vishnuits and Sivaits, all echo the word Veda; and we must once more therefore raise the question, What is the Veda? since the answer we have to give to it—though here necessarily unsatisfactory and incomplete—may induce the learned Hindus to consider whether it may contribute to a solution of their religious difficulties or not. We have quoted above

the short definition which Mr. Banerjea gives in his Dialogues of what is usually meant by Veda. It is, as he says, a collection of "Mantras and Brâhmanas. The former may generally be considered devotional, the latter ceremonial and dogmatic." It is likewise understood now to embrace four distinct works, each called Veda, and each possessing its own Mantras and Brâhmanas, viz., the Rig-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sama-Veda, and the Atharva-Veda: and the term Veda is ultimately applied to the Upanishads which are appendices, as it were, to each of these Vedas respectively, and contain explanations of the nature of God, the creation of the world, and other matter, which for brevity sake may be called theological or theosophical. Thus the Brahmin who speaks of his Vedic religion, means the religion founded on Mantras, Brâhmanas, and Upanishads of these Vedas. This creed, however, is binding on his conscience only because the Veda was inspired by the deity, and existed from eternity; and that such was the case he holds on the statements and arguments of his oldest divines. No Brahmin will dispute therefore the conclusion which follows from these premises, that no tenet or worship would be obligatory on him, which is founded on other works than the Veda, or on passages which cannot be referred to it. Thus, we may adduce, for argument's sake, that though the standard works on medicine, music, and archery are also styled Vedas (Ayur-Veda, Gandharva-Veda, and Dhanur-Veda), no Hindu would dream of looking upon them as sacred records, although they bear this venerable name.

Yet here we have to advert to important inconsistencies. One of the four Vedas, now called canonical, the Atharva-Veda, was wholly unknown to the oldest Hindu divines, probably even to Manu; they merely speak of the "threefold knowledge," viz., the Rig-, Yajur-, and Sâma-Veda. It is obvious therefore, that the Atharva-Veda need not be binding on any Hindu, for it cannot have existed from eternity, in

the sense of their own writers. And the fate of this Veda is, as a consequence, necessarily shared in by the Upanishads attached to it. But there is no necessity, indeed, to single out so prominently the Upanishads of this Veda, for, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ancient authority which ever ascribes any Upanishad to *divine* authorship. These treatises doubtless are looked upon with the greatest reverence and awe: they are held to be the truest exponents of Vedic thought; they are, in short, the standard works of Hindu theology; but just as little as any of the six philosophies is invested by the native mind with superhuman authority, as little are the Upanishads ever placed on the same level with the Mantras and Brâhmanas. Nor can we stop here.

The Yajur- or Ceremonial Veda, emphatically so called, survives now in two different recensions, the one called Black and the other White. There is an ugly legend concerning the origin of this division; but whatever be its worth, it clearly proves that the Black Veda is older than the White, and the researches of a recent work—which might have added other evidence to that given by it—have shown that the White recension of this Veda did not yet exist at the time of the grammarian Pânini. Certain it is that the oldest writers on the Mîmânsâ—the system of philosophy which, as we have seen, is considered so eminently orthodox—take no notice of it. No impartial Brahmin can therefore deny that also the White Yajur-Veda need not, unless he pleases, be binding on him. But is there no evidence at all that, even in the remaining portions of these Vedas, some portions cannot have existed from eternity? In the excellent work we have already mentioned, Mr. Muir has quoted several instances which show that the Rishis or "seers" of the Mantras now and then confess not to have received their hymns from above, but to have "made" or, as the text says, to have "fabricated" them; moreover, that other Rishis speak of "old" and "new" Rig-Veda hymns, thus pointing to a

succession in time which, at any rate, does not bespeak the eternity of the "new" hymns. In short, however orthodox a Hindu may be, he must bow to the fact that the sacred canon of his Veda was not at all times the same. Assuming portions of it to be older than eternity, the evidence tendered by some of his greatest authorities tells him in the plainest manner that some portions at least have a beginning in time, and worse than that, have been written by mortal men. Which of these portions belong to the former and which to the latter category, it is not for us to decide, even if the day of Vedic chronology had already dawned on Sanskrit philology. For not only do we hold that, for their own religious purposes, the Hindus themselves must settle this point, but also that this very chronological uncertainty is providential for their own good. Jews and Christians had not a little to suffer from the inconvenient fact that the canon of their Scriptures was settled at so early a date as to preclude the possibility of adapting them at later periods by a process of elimination to the progress of more enlightened ages. The Brahminical Hindus are better off in this respect than ourselves. That which is deplorable from a scientific point of view, may become a boon to them if viewed in a religious light. Let them decide therefore, according to their own knowledge and requirements, and with the assistance of the results already obtained by western researches, which portion of their Veda dates from eternity, or, to speak in our own language, may be held by them to be canonical and binding on their conscience, and which not. But let them not try to settle so momentous a question privately and individually, for such a course would likely end in no more than a literary controversy. The history of other religious communities points out the mode which they may advantageously adopt. Buddhists and Christians settled their difficulties in synods or councils, composed of their most learned and influential men, and such councils met as often as religious problems had become so

serious or troublesome as to require a solution by common consent. If the Hindus followed their example, they would not only remove interior disorders which exist in their religious body, but by forming a canon of sacred texts, essentially Vedic, prove to the world at large that they may possess one containing doctrines and sentiments as good, moral, and elevated as that of any existing creed.

We do not anticipate that such a result can be obtained at once. The question of representation in such a council might, for instance, be a preliminary problem fraught with much difficulty, which they would have to solve first. But we hold that it may be taken up with much probability of success, seeing that the analogous problem within the sphere of the political representation of India seems to progress towards a solution by means of the energy displayed by their native associations.

But, whatever these difficulties for the moment be, let the end be kept constantly in their mind, and let it be gradually approached by the formation, *for this purpose*, of learned societies in the different Presidencies, with the view of communicating with one another on their religious views, and gradually extending their spiritual influence over the whole nation. By doing so they would also pay a debt to their ancestors, which they have been sadly remiss in discharging for centuries back. As orthodox Hindus they are aware that the sons inherit the property of their fathers only on the condition of their fulfilling the ancestral rites. The modern Hindus claim the spiritual inheritance of their ancestral lore; but with a few honourable exceptions they have discontinued that sacrifice, the performance of which alone would entitle them to this inheritance, the sacrifice which they call themselves "the sacrifice in honour of Brahma," that is to say, the study of their own ancient literature—("adhyayanam brahmayajnah")—a study which not only their oldest lawgiver, but also the Chhândogya-Upanishad, calls one of the three chief duties of man. So slender indeed is the thread by

which the remembrance and the knowledge of their own sacred works is suspended in the minds of the present generation, that they may well compare it to the blades of grass by which, in one of the legends of their Mahâbhârata, the manes of the poor Rishis Yâyâvaras were suspended in a cave, trembling for fear of falling into eternal perdition, through the remissness of Jaratkâru, their undutiful son. But this legend may teach them also that it is never too late to avert even an imminent danger by a proper consciousness of what every individual of a nation owes to his forefathers and to himself. We need not describe to them the deplorable condition into which—if we except a few principal colleges—the study of Sanskrit, their sacred language, and of Sanskrit literature, has been allowed to fall through their own fault. It is impossible to calculate the immense loss which their literature has suffered through the indifference with which it has been treated by them for centuries. A vast number of their most celebrated works are probably lost beyond recovery; and had it not been for the exertions of English scholars this loss would be greater still than it is now. The sense of their religious duty, to which they have become roused by the enlightened portion of their own community and the judgment pronounced on them by the professors of other creeds, we hope will now be strong enough to convince them that it is time to remove this stain from their national dignity. They should take energetic steps to save from destruction all that bears testimony to their intellectual greatness; they should collect all over India the remnants of their ancient, and the products of their modern, literature; they should found libraries, seats of learning, and museums, to show to the world at large that by respecting themselves they have a claim to the respect of others. Synods are the means by which their religious difficulties may be settled; but synods themselves cannot properly do their work unless they are supported by that culture of the mind which bespeaks the vitality of a nation.

ARTICLE IV.

THE INSPIRED WRITINGS OF HINDUISM.

1. *Rig-Veda-Sanhitâ; the Sacred Hymns of the Brahmans, together with the Commentary of Sâyanâchârya.* Edited by MAX MÜLLER, M.A. Volume IV. London: 1862.
2. *Taittirîya Brâhmana of the Black Yajur Veda, with the Commentary of Sâyanâchârya.* Edited by RAJENDRALALA MITRA, with the Assistance of several learned Panditas. Vol. II. (In the "Bibliotheca Indica," published under the Superintendence of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.) Calcutta: 1862.
3. *Original Sanskrit Texts on the Origin and History of the People of India, their Religion and Institutions.* Collected, translated into English, and illustrated by Remarks, by J. MUIR, D.C.L., LL.D. Part IV. London: 1863.
4. *A Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems.* By FITZGERALD HALL, M.A. Calcutta: 1859.
5. *Report of the Mahârâj Libel Case.* Bombay: 1862.
6. *The Mahârajâs.* By KARSANDASS MOOLJEE. Bombay: 1861.

THE beginning of the year 1862 was marked by an occurrence of great importance in the social and religious history of India. Little notice was taken of it by the European press, and, to superficial observation, it has floated away on the current of contemporary events. We will

briefly recall it to the memory of our readers. In a native newspaper, *The Satya Prakâsa*, that is, "the Light of Truth," published at Bombay, there appeared, on the 21st October, 1860, an editorial article headed "The Primitive Religion of the Hindus, and the present Heterodox Opinions." It began with stating that the Purânas and other sacred works of the Hindus predict the rise of false religions and heresies in the Kaliyuga, or the present mundane age, which according to Hindu theory dates from 3101 B.C.; it then went on to relate that the religion of the Vallabhâchâryas is one of these heresies, and wound up by emphatically calling on the Mahârâjas or high priests of that sect to desist from the propagation of their faith until they had renounced the gross immoralities countenanced or directly inculcated by it.

The sect in question, we may remark, was founded by a Brahmin, Vishnu-Swâmin, but derives its name from its principal teacher and saint, Vallabhâchârya (or the spiritual teacher Vallabha), who was supposed to be an incarnation of the god Vishnu, and lived towards the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century of our era. Its doctrinal tenets are a fantastical mixture of pantheism and mysticism, and its worship is that of Krishna, one of the incarnations of the god Vishnu, particularly in his juvenile forms, and commemorating his amorous sports with the cowherdesses amongst whom he passed the earlier stage of his earthly career. There is this remarkable feature, however, about this sect, as compared with other Hindu sects based on Brahminical tradition—that its teachers, rejecting abstemiousness as not conducive to sanctity, enjoin the worship of the Deity, not by means of mortification, or an austere ritual, but by indulging in the pleasures of society and the enjoyment of the world.

The members of this sect are very numerous and opulent, the merchants and bankers, especially those from Gujarat and Malva, belonging to it. Their temples and establishments are scattered all

over India, and their spiritual chiefs are the supposed descendants of Vallabha, veneration being paid to them, not on account of their learning or piety, but for their family connexion with that arch-saint of the sect.*

One of their actual chiefs—now styled Mahârâjas—the Mahârâjas Jadunathjee Brizrattanjee of Bombay, felt highly incensed at the article we have alluded to. The respectable journal in which it was contained had imparted to it more than the ordinary weight of a controversial production of the native press, and the name and position of its author, Karsandâss Mooljee, renowned amongst his countrymen for his undaunted zeal in the cause of their social and religious reform, had impressed on it the stamp of purity of motive and a strong presumption of trustworthiness. Had the Mahârâja vented his indignation by assembling the members of the caste to which the writer of the article belonged, and had he made them excommunicate the obnoxious reformer —as with his social and spiritual influence he could doubtless have done—it is more than probable that the world at large would have heard nothing of the actual state of this Vallabhâchârya creed, and that native apathy—in this case, as in others—would have little heeded the appeal made to their better selves. But the Mahârâja acted otherwise, and India, we hope, will have to thank him for the course he took. He sued the writer of the article in the Supreme Court of Bombay for having "caused to be printed and published a false, scandalous, malicious, infamous, and defamatory libel" on the religion of his sect in general, and on the conduct and character of the Mahârâjas in particular.

Hence ensued a spectacle which is unique in the history of India. An English tribunal had to decide whether the charges made by the editor of the *Satya Prakâsa* were founded in fact and justifiable on public grounds. It was nominally a question whether Mr. Karsandâss Mooljee was a libeller and hould be mulcted in the amount of 5000*l.*, the damages

* See H. H. Wilson's Works, vol. i., p. 119; ff.

laid, but in reality, whether the actual religion of the Vallabhâchârya sect ordained those immoral practices which the defendant had imputed to it, and whether it was, or was not, in keeping with the spirit of the ancient Hindu faith, "one of the different ways," as was alleged in favour of it, "into which the courses of the Vedas and Purânas have diverged, just as some one goes from the gates of the fort to proceed to Walkeshwar and some one to Byculla."

The Spirit of History seems to have had one of his turbulent fits of impatience and weariness. He must have grown tired at the slow pace of reforming benevolence and antiquarian research; for, as we see, he suddenly called upon Justice to engrave with her sword on the skull of a religious community that which science with her pen had not yet been able to write into its intelligence.

The task of Justice was, we must acknowledge, well performed by her substantially acquitting the defendant in the suit: her verdict is recorded in the elaborate and lucid judgment of Sir Matthew Sausse and Sir Joseph Arnould, and it henceforward belongs to the annals of the judicial history of India. But though twenty-four days of a rigidly scrutinizing trial is no mean amount of time to be allotted to the settlement of a legal point, though the light thrown by it on the social and moral condition of a large and interesting portion of the Hindu community will advance our knowledge of modern India, we cannot share in the sanguine hope of those who entertain the belief that this trial has materially advanced the solution of the problem of the religious future of India. That the facts disclosed by it may become a stimulus to rouse the activity of the indolent, and to impress every thinking Hindu with a sense of his personal duty towards his nation at large, we are willing to admit; but we do not believe that it will bring us nearer the desired end, unless the real question at issue in the trial and its true importance be fully understood by the followers of the Sâstras.

That importance does not lie in the startling disclosures which the world has received concerning the doctrinal immoralities of the present Vallabhâchârya sect and its leading priests. Disclosures like these need as little surprise us as attract our attention on behalf of their novelty. Every one, however slightly acquainted with the history of religions in general, knows that there is no religious stem without its parasitical priesthood sucking its sap, if allowed to cling to its bark. Who will denounce Christianity because Mormonism has sprung from its soil? or who will question the morality of its tenets, because, so recently as twenty-seven years ago there existed, at Königsberg, in Prussia, the sect of the *Muckers*, which held its conventicles for the procreation of a new Messiah, and, though yielding nothing in mysticism and lewdness to the sect of the Vallabhâchâryas, was so highly respectable as to count amongst its members some of the first families of the land?

To lay stress on aberrations of this kind would be unjust as well as unwise. But the very comparisons we have alleged involve the point on which we *must* lay stress. Mormonism must hide its profligacy in the deserts of America, and a few Prussian police constables proved strong enough, with the applause of the good people of Königsberg, to check the new Messiah in his career of incarnations.

The Vallabhâchârya creed, however, continues to flourish all over India, and to feed, we believe, its fourscore of saints; no professor of it is looked upon by a Hindu as a heretic, with whom it is not permissible to associate; no Brahmin ceases to be one, though he eat the dust of the feet of the Mahârâja. Do, then, the Hindus really believe that this creed is a true Hindu creed? Or—since there is no necessity for singling out this special-sect from among numerous others, the practices of which would startle us as much as those of the followers of Vallabha—do the Hindus really assume that all these sects are healthy

branches of their original religious stock? and, as to all appearance, their reply is in the affirmative,—on what grounds does the assumption rest?

Some answers to those questions have been given by "The Mahârâja Libel Case;" and because this case, if stripped of its specialities and personalities, is in reality no other than the case of Hinduism itself as it now stands, we will once more cast our eyes on it.

The defendant in that trial had charged the sect of the Mahârâjas and their chiefs—to use his own words—with "perpetrating such shamelessness, subtilty, immodesty, rascality, and deceit," as have never been perpetrated by other sectaries; and, convinced that the committal of such acts could not be countenanced by the true Hindu faith, he accordingly stigmatised the persuasion of the Vallabhâchâryas as a "sham, a delusion, and a heresy." The plaintiff, on the other hand, stoutly denied ever having been "guilty of heterodox opinions in matters connected with his religion, or of the offences or improper conduct imputed to him."

The denial, we may see at once, does not meet the charge. For, supposing the life of the Mahârâja had been as spotless as one could desire, it does not follow from his words that he had abstained from licentious acts, *because* his religion declared them to be sinful; nor, *if* his religion enjoined or encouraged such acts, does it necessarily follow that it must be a heterodox faith; since, for aught we know, it might derive its tenets from the old and authoritative Brahmanic source. It is true that by his evidence the defendant fully proved that acts of the grossest immorality were not only committed by the Mahârâjas, but committed by them with the full knowledge and connivance of their followers; it is likewise true that he proved that "the Mahârâjas are considered by their followers as incarnations of the god Krishna," that "their managers give the sectaries water to drink in which the

Mahârâja had bathed;" and that "drinking the nectar of the feet, swinging, rubbing, and bathing the body with oils, or eating the dust on which they have walked, are not practised towards the Gurus of other sects." But evidence like this obviously does no more than establish the fact, that such customs are the actual practices of a particular sect and of certain individuals professing to be their high priests and chiefs. It will induce no one to charge the faith of these people with inculcating these practices, or to say whether they are or are not in harmony with the ancient religion of the Hindus, the supposed foundation of all present creeds, unless further evidence be produced to that effect from the sacred works of both.

What means, then, did the defendant and the plaintiff possess, the one to denounce the heresy of the Mahârâja sect, the other to vindicate its orthodoxy?

The text-books of the sect are the works of its principal teacher, Vâllabha; they are all written in Sanskrit; and a leading commentary on one of these works, by Gokulnâth, a grandson of Vallabha, is likewise written in Sanskrit. Some of these works are translated in the Brij-Bhâshâ language; but, as the Mahârâja very properly observed, these versions have authority so far only as they exactly render the original; and, for himself, he seemed to scorn the idea of reading his sacred books in such versions at all. That the groundworks of the ancient Hindu faith are likewise written in the sacred language of India, and some in that archaic form of Sanskrit, which differs in many respects from the Sanskrit of the classical literature, it is almost needless to say; but it may perhaps not be superfluous to add that several of those works—the Vedas, for instance—and the principal Purânas, are not accessible to a Hindu except in that language, since no translation of them exists in any of the vernacular tongues.

Now, as to Mr. Kursandâss, the spirited editor of the Bombay

journal, who in this noteworthy case courageously staked his property, and probably his personal liberty, who had to brave not only the obloquy of his countrymen, but an organised conspiracy—what does he say as to his trustiest weapon, this Sanskrit tongue, when he enters the arena to struggle for the restoration of the pure ancient religion of India? He frankly and honestly confesses that he has no knowledge whatever of it. He does his best to supply that defect by resorting to a young native who seems to have a smattering of it, and provides him with the translation of a passage of the commentary of Gokulnâth; but beyond the result of this trifling assistance, given only for the purposes of his defence, his ascertaining the authoritative sense of a Sanskrit work does not go. He had taken up the cause of religious reform, because he had heard, and felt convinced, that the ancient Hindu creed must be pure, and different therefore, from the unclean shape in which it is paraded before his eyes; but it had never occurred to him, when appealing to the Vedas, that the Vedas could not talk to him unless he mastered the language in which they were composed.

And the Mahârâja? When we quote the words of one of the judges, who said—"That the plaintiff has allowed his personal interests to overcome his respect for truth while on his oath in the court," and those of the other judge, who declared "the oath of the plaintiff as utterly valueless," and "the whole framework of his evidence as conceived in a spirit of hypocrisy and falsehood,"—we may be spared the necessity of scrutinizing the knowledge of which he makes profession in regard to the original works of his own and the ancient Hindu faith. Yet some of his own statements are, nevertheless, too curious not to deserve a passing notice. Sanskrit, he says, on one occasion, he knows "for the most part;" and on another, he owns that he "knows more of Sanskrit now than he did before the libel." In his plea he classes the "sacred books of the Hindus" as, first the Purânas, then

the Vedas and Shastras; but, when cross-examined, he can neither give the names of the four Vedas, nor had he any idea whatever as to the number of that part of them called the Brâhmanas. He has heard the name of the Brahma-vaivarta Purâna, but he has not read it. His opinion was that if the Shastras allowed it, remarriages of widows might take place, but not otherwise. He had seen no authority in the Shastras for remarriages, but personally he had no objection thereto; in his sect, indeed, remarriages took place, and he did not prohibit them. He likewise informed the court of a fact which as yet rests on no other authority than his own—viz., that the name of the god Krishna occurs in a portion of the Vedas. Of the other Mahârâjas he cannot say whether a few only can read Sanskrit; but the witness most friendly to him did not hesitate to say that "the plaintiff was an exception amongst them, the rest being ignorant persons."

We have shown enough, we think, of the scholarship of these high priests and preceptors of the Vallabhâchârya sect. Yet, though the specimen of saints introduced to us by this trial is perhaps merely an illustration of the adage that there is but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous, we cannot conceal from ourselves the reality that that step may be an extremely unpleasant one.

In the worst days of Roman Catholicism, when the multitude professing that religion was steeped in ignorance and its worship was no better than idolatry, there was still a considerable portion of its priesthood fully acquainted with the text-book of Christianity. It was, no doubt, with its priests a question of policy whether their flock should be admitted to the knowledge which they possessed, and restored to a purer faith; but that they had the power to work that change is borne out by the history of Protestantism. Yet, without fear of contradiction, we may assert that the vast majority of all Hindu priests are as ignorant of the ancient faith of their nation as the Mahârâja of Bombay;

nay, this Mahârâja himself is not merely a fair average specimen of a Hindu priest, but his knowledge, however miserable, exceeds that of most priests of other Hindu sects. Amongst the hundred million and more who profess Brahmanism, there are perhaps a few thousands who may be able to read an easy Sanskrit book; but those who can master a philosophical or grammatical work are scarcely to be found except at the high seats of learning, such as Benares, Calcutta, and Poona, while as to those who can understand a Vedic text, like the venerable author of the great Cyclopædia, Râjâ Râdhakânt Deb, or the learned editor of one of the Vedas, Babu Rajendralâla Mitra, or like the accomplished Dr. Bhau Dajee, a gentleman whom Sir Joseph Arnould describes as "one who in learning, freedom from prejudice, and general superiority of mind, is among the foremost, if not *the* foremost of the native citizens of Bombay,"—their number is indeed so infinitely small that it disappears in the mass of their co-religionists.

And yet every Hindu, high or low, is eager to persuade himself, that his actual worship is founded on inspired texts: for he knows that it would be worthless unless it could trace its tenets to the "inspired" words of the Vedic hymns; he clings to it because he is penetrated with an instinctive feeling, that if he abandoned a religion based on the Vedas, he would abandon that which is dearest to a man, his nationality. It is this instinctive feeling alone that arms him against any attempt at conversion; for, even though the intelligent native may recognise the superiority of Christianity as taught by the New Testament over the sectarian worship practised by himself, yet, rather than profess a religion foreign to his instincts, habits, and nationality, he will console himself with the hope that he may one day possess in his old faith, when restored, one as good and as pure as any other faith.

Whether that hope be justifiable or not is a question that admits of different answers, according to the mental and social condition of the

inquirer. But Hindu and European must alike agree that a nation which cannot examine and understand the foundation of its own existence, is on the high road to the loss of that existence altogether. And because we are well aware that the intelligent portion of the present generation of India has raised its political aspirations, and has the proud ambition of conquering for its country the same position which is occupied by the other parts of the British Empire, we must remind them that the first and most efficacious means for attaining that end is boldly to attack the deplorable religious condition of their countrymen, and that this is to be done only by imparting to them a knowledge of their own literature, and more especially of those sacred works which mark the brightest epoch of their national life. There are some amongst them, we know, who consider the religious question as insignificant compared to the great political questions of the day, and who judge of the different forms of their present worship by the standard which a celebrated historian applied to the various forms of Paganism in ancient Rome: that they are all alike sublime to the vulgar, all alike useful to the politician, and all alike ridiculous to the philosopher. But these modern Hindu statesmen seem to forget the downfall of ancient Rome, and that masses sunk in religious degradation can never become the political equals of those to whom their sublime is the ridiculous. Nor must they imagine that their favourite appeal to the argument of Sankarâchârya can avail in these days. When that great reformer and philosopher—probably about a thousand years ago—made his crusade against the heresies then rampant all over India, he is said to have himself established several sects, and to have sanctioned the worship of any acknowledged deity, "for the sake of those whose limited understandings rendered them incapable of comprehending and adoring the invisible Supreme Being." Hence they conclude, that if so staunch a defender of "a sole Cause and Supreme Ruler of the universe" considered the worship of Vishnu

and Siva in its various forms compatible with the monotheistic doctrine he was preaching to his countrymen, no objection need be taken to the present creed as answering the same ends.

An appeal to authorities, instead of an argument, is in itself a confession of defeat; but those who are in the habit of using this appeal as their argument do not seem to apprehend that it could be turned against them as one of the strongest condemnations of the practices which they palliate. Sankara, one of the most renowned and influential scholars of mediæval India, was himself one of the most zealous denouncers of all worships if repugnant to the Vedas. His aim was the propagation of a belief in one immaterial Cause. In his chief work, the Commentary on the text-book of the Vedânta philosophy, he endeavours to prove that the celestial beings named in the Vedic writings are but allegorical personifications of that Supreme Being, and in his Commentary on the Upanishads he compares such gods even to demons, or foes of the human race. If tradition therefore be correct, that he tolerated the modern worship of the sectarian gods,—for, let it be remembered, that it is only a vague tradition which ascribes that toleration to him—it is obvious that this admission on his part was, if not an act of weakness and inconsistency, at the best an educational experiment, supposed by him to lead to the end which engrossed his mind. A thousand years, one would think, are a sufficient space of time to prove the error of Sankarâchârya. The experiment has had its test, and it has lamentably failed. Another thousand years of a similar experiment, and we feel convinced that no Brahmanical Hindu will then be found to whom it could be denounced as fallacious and mischievous.

But, let us ask what those writings are which the orthodox Hindu is called upon by his creed to consider as inspired, and what are those other works which in the course of time his priests have foisted as such on his credulity?

The oldest tradition is very precise in the answer it gives to the first of these questions. So far from leaving it to the option of a believer to declare at will any book inspired, and so far from recognising any gifted individual who might at some future period pretend to receive inspirations from divine apparitions or intuitions, it has carefully defined the personages who alone had been favoured by the Deity, and the revelations they had obtained. The former, it says, are the old Vedic Rishis or saints; and the latter are the hymns of the Rigveda, which, dating from eternity, were "*seen*" by them, and the number of which is one thousand and twenty-eight. Passing, then, over the doubts as to the genuine antiquity of some of these hymns—and we could show that even the most orthodox authorities of India looked upon some as spurious—it is certain that the inspired writings of the Hindus do not exceed the limits of those one thousand and twenty-eight hymns.

The Hindu priesthood, however, has managed to demonstrate that one thousand and twenty-eight hymns mean in reality a very ponderous mass of divinely revealed works. "These hymns," it says to the people, "you must be aware, speak of ritual acts which are unintelligible to you, and they make allusion also to events, human and divine, which are shrouded in obscurity; hence you must admit that those works called *Brâhmanas*, which explain the origin and the proper performance of rites—which give illustrations of those events and legendary narratives, and which contain philosophical speculations to boot—are a necessary complement of the inspired Rigveda hymns. And," say the priests, "there are three other Vedas besides the Rigveda, viz., the Yajur-, Sâma- and Atharva-Veda; but, as the contents of these Vedas," they continue, "are bodily taken from the Rigveda, their inspiration can as little be gainsayed as that of these hymns themselves;" and as the Brâhmana portion of these Vedas stands in the same relation to *their* hymnic part as the corresponding portion of the Rigveda stands to the hymns of the

latter, the Brahmins conclude that the inspired works of the Hindu religion are the hymns of the four Vedas and the Brâhmana works attached to each of them. The theologian, moreover, adds:—"And because in the hymns, as well as in the Brâhmanas, there are many hints of extreme mysteriousness—allusions to the production of the world, to the qualities of a supreme God, and to the nature of the human soul—those works which contain the authoritative explanation of these mysteries, the *Upanishads*, cannot be disconnected from the inspiration of the hymns and Brâhmanas.

Those who have followed the course of the religious development of mankind in general will not feel surprised at this luxuriance of inspired texts: the instincts and the history of a priesthood are alike everywhere. One thousand and twenty-eight hymns, of a few verses each, are but a poor livelihood for a fast-increasing number of holy and idle men: but expand these hymns into a host of works which even the most diligent student could not master in less than several years; apply to their teaching the rule that the pupil must never study them from a manuscript, but receive them orally from his spiritual guide; make them the basis of a complicated ritual, which no one is allowed to perform without a host of priests, and handsome presents to each of them—and what a bright perspective opens itself to a member of the Brahminical caste, and to those who follow in his track!

That the Brâhmana portion of the Vedas, which is entirely ritual and legendary, has no claim whatever to be considered by an orthodox Hindu as dating from eternity, like the hymns of the Rigveda, and as supernaturally composed, results from the tradition to which we have referred; for, though the doctrine of their divine origin has been current in India for more than two thousand years, no Rishi has ever been mentioned into whom they were divinely inspired, except, perhaps, in the case of one, the Satapatha-Brâhmana. But the sanctity of this very Brâhmana

was so little acknowledged by common consent when it was composed, that it marks, on the contrary, a great schism in the ancient religion of India; in fact, when compared with the hymns of the Rigveda, it is so late that there is strong reason to surmise that it did not exist in Pânini's time. This grammarian himself, when teaching the names of some Brâhmanas, gives us rules for distinguishing between ancient and modern Brâhmanas; and even if, contrary to the evidence supplied by him, a single one of those ancient Brâhmanas had come down to us, his rules would bear testimony to the fact that in his time the authors of those works were not yet looked upon as inspired. A very learned writer on Sanskrit literature, indeed, has asserted, on the authority of those rules, that the affix *in* which terminates the name of such ancient Brâhmanas as the Sailâlin, Karmandin, &c., is "a mark that the name to which it is added is that of an author considered as a Rishi, or inspired writer." But such is not the case; for, Pânini, who distinguishes between works that were "seen" or are inspired, between works that were "made" or composed, and works that were "promulgated" or taught, states in the clearest possible manner that those "ancient" Brâhmanas were not "seen," but only "promulgated" by the personages after whom they are named.

Of the inspired character of the Upanishads still less need be said. It is, in India itself, upheld only either by those theologians who—like their commentator, the celebrated Sankarâchârya, or the translator of some of these theosophical works, the late Ram Mohun Roy—endeavoured to give a stamp of sacredness to the Vedânta philosophy founded on them, or by those adherents of other philosophical schools, which appeal for the truth of their axioms to passages from these works. At the time when the priests had succeeded in laying down the law that instruction in sacred works could be imparted only by them, and was to be "heard," or orally received by the pupil from the teacher, they gave

currency to a term, "*Sruti*"—"hearing"—implying by it that the texts which the pupil heard from their mouth were inspired works; but in the early literature even this term comprises merely hymns and Brâhmanas. It is only at a late period of Hinduism that we meet with "Sruti" as applied also to the Upanishad literature.

The inspired network of the hymnic portion of the three Vedas, called the Yajur-, Sâma-, and Atharva-Veda, is apparently closer drawn than that of the other writings just named: but now that it is laid open before the investigating mind of modern Europe and India; now that the spell is broken which made the study of the Veda consist of intonating its verses to the melody of the Guru, and mechanically committing them to memory; now that native and European industry has given us in print not merely the obscure words of the hymns, but also the commentaries which lead us into their inner meaning, no Hindu can shrink from the duty of examining the grounds on which the inspiration of these three Vedas rests.

He will probably not offer much resistance when he is asked to reject that of the Atharvaveda. He possesses abundant evidence that no Atharvaveda was known at an early period of Hindu life. The old and orthodox authorities of India speak of three Vedas only—the Rig-, Yajur-, and Sâma-Veda; even late commentators, though the Atharvaveda existed at their time, pay little attention to it; it is ignored by the ritual-philosophers, the Mîmânsists, whose influence is felt wherever a sacrificial fire receives pious offerings. *Trayî vidyâ*, "the *threefold*," not the fourfold, "wisdom" is in the mouth of every learned Hindu. Will he then contend for the inspired origin and the eternal existence of those incantations and charms which aim at "the attainment of wealth, the destruction of evil influences, the downfall of enemies, success in love or play, the removal of petty pests, recovery from sickness, and even the growth of hair on a bald pate?" Yet, though the character of

the hymns of this Veda differs from that of the Yajur- and Sâma-Veda, the causes whence all these three Vedas arose, are similar; and the test by which a Hindu may judge of the claims to inspiration of one of them, is the test which he may apply to the claims of the remaining two.

The hymns of the Rigveda are essentially poetical: they make frequent allusion, it is true, to pious and sacrificial acts; but so far only as the latter are the concomitants of the pious and poetical feelings of the poet, or as they are connected with events in his personal life. We meet, therefore, with many hymns which have nothing to do with religious performances: thus, some describe the grandeur of natural phenomena; here a gambler "laments over the passion that beguiles him into sin," and there a Rishi even ridicules the worship performed by the priests. In short, these hymns, if taken as a whole, are the genuine product of the poets' minds: they reflect the gradual growth of a nation's life; they were not composed for any ritual purposes. On the other hand, there is nothing genuine in the Yajur- and Sâma-Vedas. These Vedas are arranged and written merely to serve as prayer-books at various sacrificial acts. The collection of the Rigveda hymns, as one may *a priori* conclude from their very character, did not admit of any arrangement answering systematically the order of an elaborate ceremonial; the arrangement of the two other Vedas, on the contrary, is entirely adapted to it, and therefore throughout artificial. Thus, the verses of the Sâmaveda were intoned at the sacrifices performed with the juice of the Soma plant, and the order in which these verses occur is that of the sacrificial acts of which the Soma sacrifices consist. Again, those of the Yajurveda are arranged according to the rites of a great variety of sacrifices, at which the officiating priests had to mutter them inaudibly.

Now, so firmly rooted is the belief in the divine origin of these Vedas, that it seems almost to have overshadowed the belief in the sanctity of the Rigveda itself; not indeed in spite of their unpoetical

character, but on account of it. For, judging from the opinions met with in the most orthodox writers, the Brahmins seem to have concluded that the Rigveda, however beautiful from an æsthetical point of view, was, after all, more an ornamental than a useful book; that its real destiny is fulfilled in those two other Vedas, taken from it, which a contingent of sixteen officiating priests, supported by butchers, ladle-holders, and choristers, could turn to practical account at ceremonies regulated in their minutest detail, and some of them lasting as many as a hundred days. And, as the sacrifices requiring the muttering of the Yajurveda were even more imposing and more elaborate than those which fall within the range of the Sâmaveda rites, we find that the sanctity of the Yajurveda ultimately outstripped that of the rival Veda too. "The Yajurveda," says Sâyana, the great commentator on the Vedas, "is like a wall, the two other Vedas like paintings [on it]." Yet, as we before observed, the inspired character of these later Vedas rests on the assumption that their verses are borrowed from the Rigveda; that they are, in fact, portions of it. So far as the Sâmaveda is concerned, this assumption is justified; for, though in the present edition of this Veda there are some verses which do not occur in the present text of the Rigveda, we must remember that this text is but one of the recensions of the principal Veda, and that the missing verses may have existed, and probably did exist, in some other recension of it. But a comparison of the Yajurveda with the Rigveda does not allow us to stretch probabilities to this extent. There are portions of the Yajurveda which can at no time have belonged to any recension of the Rich, —we mean those passages in prose, called Yajus, whence the Yajurveda derives its name; for, there is no hymn in the Rigveda that is not composed in verse. Here then this question obtrudes itself—Who are the Rishis who "saw" these passages in prose? Tradition, so far as we know it, is just as silent respecting them as it is respecting the

authors of the Brâhmanas. But as little as these latter works can become inspired because they are tacked to the hymnic collection which was "seen" by the Rishis of old, so little can inspiration pass like the electric fluid from the Rigveda verses, found in the Yajus, to those passages in prose which, from ritual reasons, had been joined to them. Yet, setting aside these pseudo-revealed passages, and those verses of the Yajurveda, too, which do not occur in the actual recension of the Rigveda, we shall be at once enabled to judge, by even a superficial glance, at how the inspired poetry of the Rigveda found its way into the Sâma- and Yajurveda, on what grounds the Brahmins invite the nation to recognise the last two Vedas as inspired texts.

We open at random two hymns which form part of the first book of the Sâmaveda and three chapters of one recension of the Yajurveda. The first hymn of the Sâmaveda which meets our eyes consists of eleven verses (370—380); and with the exception of its third verse (372), every one occurs amongst the verses of the Rigveda; but what is the mutual relation of the verses in both Vedas?

			Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
Sâmav., verse	370	is Rigveda ...	8	86	10
„ „	371	„	10	147	1
„ „	373	„	1	57	4
„ „	374	„	3	51	1
„ „	375	„	10	43	1
„ „	376	„	1	51	1
„ „	377	„	1	52	1
„ „	378	„	6	70	1
„ „	379	„	10	134	1
„ „	380	„	1	101	1

The second hymn we happen to choose is the opening one of the Sâmaveda. It consists of ten verses, nine of which are likewise con-

tained in the present recension of the Rigveda, but those nine verses correspond respectively with the following Rigveda verses:—

			Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
Sâmav., verse	1	with Rigveda...	6	16	10
„ „	2	„	6	16	11
„ „	3	„	1	12	1
„ „	4	„	6	16	34
„ „	5	„	8	73	1
„ „	6	„	8	60	1
„ „	7	„	6	16	16
„ „	8	„	8	11	7
„ „	9	„	6	16	13

We turn to any chapters of the Yajurveda, say the 22nd to the 25th. They contain verses and passages in prose, which were muttered at the horse sacrifice. Of chapter 22, which has 34 divisions, only four verses occur in the Rigveda, viz.:—

			Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
Yajurveda, verse	10	in Rigveda ...	1	22	2
„ „	15	„	5	14	1
„ „	16	„	3	11	2
„ „	18	„	9	110	3

Of chapter 23, which consists of 65 divisions, there correspond:—

			Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
Yajurveda, verse	3	with Rigveda...	10	121	4
„ „	5	„	1	6	1
„ „	6	„	1	6	2
„ „	16	„	1	162	21
„ „	32	„	4	39	6

Chapter 24, being entirely in prose, is foreign to the Rigveda; and of chapter 25, with 47 divisions—

	Book.	Hymn.	Verse.
Yajurveda, verse 12 is Rigveda ...	10	121	4
„ „ 13 „	10	121	2
„ verses 14—23 are	1	89	1—10
„ „ 24—45 „	1	162	1—22

and „ verse 46 is the first half of the Rigveda verse 10, 157, 1, the first half of 10, 157 2, and the latter half of 10, 157, 1.

There is unhappily nothing so irreverent as statistical prose. A Brahmin will tell his nation that the verses of the Sâma- and Yajurveda are the same as those of the Rigveda, and, if need be, he may perhaps show that a good number of them do really occur in the original Veda. We, however, are impertinent enough to test that sameness by book, chapter, and verse; we marshal side by side the figures which mark the position of these verses in their respective Vedas—and what do these figures reveal? A Rigveda piecemeal: verses of the same hymn transposed, verses of different hymns shuffled about, and even verses of different authors strung together, as if they had proceeded from the same mind. We expected to find in the later Vedas, the feelings and thoughts of the ancient poets, but we hear only the sounds of their words; we were promised possession, in these Vedas, of a living portion of the Rigveda, but we discover there only its scattered remains. In short, the Brahmin juggles before our eyes what he calls an identity of these Vedas with the Rigveda, yet what we really obtain is but a miserable counterfeit of it.

Well may the disciples of Loyala feel humiliated when they look at the consummate skill with which this Brahminical legerdemain was performed, long before their master had taught them how to govern the world by obfuscating its intellect; for there is no priesthood in the universe which, by a stratagem like that we have described, can boast

of so splendid a success in metamorphosing its most sacred book into a dull attendant on artificial rites, and in diverting the stream of the national life from its original course.

While acknowledging, however, the intellectual capacity of those Brahmins who fashioned the hymns of the Rigveda in a series of "inspired" texts, we ought not to forget that they were powerfully assisted in their task by an invention which, though some may imagine to be of recent date, those Hindu priests are fully entitled to claim as theirs—we mean the invention of writings without a writer—anonymousness. Pride in his personality is the natural feeling of a man whose work proceeds from the promptings of his own genius and will; and nations likewise have the instinctive feeling that they uphold their own individuality by guarding from oblivion the memory of their deserving men. Unless, therefore, this innate feeling be intentionally subdued, it is merely an accident—political or literary—when works that merit to be remembered go down to posterity without the names of their authors, since so many names of authors survive without their works. We do not know, it is true, the authors of the Nibelungen and of the Kutrun; we can speak only of the compiler of the Edda; but it is exceptions like these that prove the rule; for even a name like Homer —probably devoid of a personal reality—shows that the nation which put it forward was eager to possess an individuality in the poet of the Iliad and Odyssey.

But, when man is not the agent of his own acts, or if, for good or evil purposes, he wishes or is forced to personate more than his own self, he sinks his individuality into a brotherhood, he becomes anonymous. To assume it to be a pure accident that the authors of the Yajus and of the Brâhmanas have remained unknown, would be assuming that all those artificial and elaborate works were of unintentional origin, and that the Hindu mind is an exception to the general

law. But that the proud feeling of individuality was as strong in India as it is everywhere else, and at all times too, is evidenced by the long list of proper names which represent the authors of her greatest poetical, philosophical, grammatical, and other works; and it is borne out by the fact that the Hindus remember the names of their oldest Rishis, the "inspired seers" of the Rigveda hymns: for, whether these personages existed or not, whether they *were* the authors of the works or hymns ascribed to them, matters not. To the Hindu mind they are realities: and since, on the other hand, Hindu tradition supplies us with a full account of the names of those who "collected" or arranged the Vedas, and who "promulgated" or taught the Brâhmanas and Upanishads, the very jealousy it betrays in perpetuating the memory of merits inferior certainly to those of authorship, proves that the names of their "inspired" authors cannot have remained unknown through chance or carelessness.

The anonymousness of these Vedic writings is, however, up to this day the staple argument in proof of their sanctity. In a spirited drama, written probably six hundred years ago, a Jaina mendicant apostrophizes a follower of Buddha who intends to persuade him of the superiority of his creed over that of the Jaina sect, in the following terms:—"But who has laid down these laws?" "The omniscient, sacred Buddha," is the reply. "And whence know ye that Buddha is all-wise?" "Why," says the Buddhist, "because it is written so in his sacred books." The Brahminical author of this satire is obviously alive to the more solid basis on which the sanctity of his own revelations rest. The belief in *their* genuineness does not depend on the testimony of those by whom they were composed. Public opinion has never heard of any author of them: hence they must be of superhuman workmanship.

In surveying the origin of the three later Vedas and that of their liturgic and theosophical appendages, we stand, as it were, on the

heights of Hinduism; but the descent from them to the region of its actual condition is easy, and scarcely requires a guide. For, once acquainted with the spirit that engendered these Vedas and Brâhmanas, with its method of fabricating inspired texts, and the conclusion wrought by its powerful engine, anonymousness, we may feel curiosity as to the turnings and byways of the road; but the journey itself is monotonous. There is one reflection, however, which may arrest our steps.

It must seem a matter of course that so fertile a soil as the sacrificial Vedas, and the ritual, legendary, and mystical Brâhmanas could not remain without an abundant crop of works;—human works, to be sure, with their authors' name duly recorded and recognised, but works as indispensable to a proper use of those "inspired" texts, as they were indispensable to turn the ornamental Rigveda into a book of practical utility. They are the Kalpa works. But even these writings could not do justice to the store of services that might be rendered by a Brahmin to his countrymen. The Kalpa works merely treat of those great and public ceremonies which, for a time, may handsomely stock the budget of the officiating priests, but which are too sporadic and too select to be a permanent and solid livelihood. A number of daily and household ceremonies was evidently needed to bring the whole life of a believer under the control and into the grasp of his spiritual master, the priest. These ceremonies, then, were regulated by the Grihya books; but as the life of even the most pious society cannot be entirely filled up with rites that take place at conception and birth, tonsure and investiture, marriage and the like, it was prudent to impart a religious stamp also to habits and customs—in one word, to the whole organism of society. A special class of works—the Sâmayâchârika rules—was therefore devoted to the ordinary practices; and from these resulted ultimately the so-called legal works, amongst which Manu's law-book is known as the most prominent. Everything now was as complete as it

could be. Social and religious duties are henceforward synonymous; *dharma* is the word which designates both. All the institutions of society have now become of Vedic origin; for the laws of Manu and others are founded on the habits and customs laid down in the works complimentary to the Grihya works; these complete the Kalpa works; and without the Kalpa works the practical Vedas would be unpractical. The chain which links religion and politics together is, on several occasions, brought home to the Hindu mind by a reasoning like this:—Society cannot perform the duties prescribed in these sacred books unless it possesses a king, who watches over the safety of the people; but a king cannot exist without the produce of the land; land, however, yields no produce without rain; rain is sent down by the favour of the gods; such favour is obtained by means of sacrificial acts; but where there is no Brahmin there is no sacrificial act: king and Brahmin thus close the circle within which the people has to obey the behests of both.

There is, then, that difference between the Vedic works and those which are the present foundation of the Brahmanic belief—that the former were inspired for the exclusive interests of priests, whereas the latter were inspired for the combined benefit of the priests and kings. But the latter, the *Purânas*, have this in common with the three "practical" Vedas and the Brâhmanas—that they are likewise "inspired," because they are anonymous; for tradition, which knows all about Vyâsa, their wonderful compiler, has concealed the names of the holy personages who received them direct from the Deity. If comparison wants to go beyond this, it must hold the Vedic texts before a mirror which reflects a caricature. There is no trace of Vedic poetry or of Vedic thought in all those Purâna works composed in glorification of the epical Pantheon of India, and more especially in that of the Hindu triad—Brahmâ, Vishnu, and Siva. There is scarcely a legend

or myth narrated by them which can claim the remotest connexion with a Vedic myth. There is no ceremony they teach which, put even against the ceremonial of the Brâhmana and Kalpa works, does not appear devoid of all that may please the imagination or elevate the mind; and with the exception of a few of them, their style even is tedious, slovenly, and to some extent ungrammatical. Considered as a whole, these Purânas contain cosmogonies, which are a superstructure of epical and modern legends on the creative theories propounded in some of the systems of philosophy; theogonies, which expand the myths of the great epos, the Mahâbhârata, in favour of the particular god whom it was the intention of the writer to place at the top of the Pantheon; they profess to know the genealogies of patriarchs and the chief dynasties of kings; they are bits of law-books in imitation of Manu and Yâjnavalkya; they pretend to explain ancient ceremonies, and abound in the description of rites which vie with one another in the absurdest detail; they prophesy. And as it is plain, from this summary of their contents, that they aimed at being the books that teach everything, and with the weight of religious authority, we cannot feel surprised that some of them considered it necessary also to expatiate on sacred geography or the description of places where there is a special chance of attaining to eternal bliss, on medicine and astronomy, on archery, rhetoric, prosody, and grammar. But the low position which these works occupy in the household of Sanskrit literature, is nowhere more manifest than when they attempt to meddle with those scientific branches of human knowledge, where every student can test the kind of omniscience by which they were inspired.

The modern date of the existing Purânas has long ceased to be matter of doubt to any one who reads them without prejudice; but even an orthodox Hindu must shut his eyes to all evidence, literary, historical, and grammatical, if he attempt to assert their antiquity. From

the abundance of disproof which is open to him, we need, for curiosity's sake, only point to one. That works called Purânas—*i.e.*, "old,"—may have existed at ancient times, and that they may have combined some portion of the matter embodied in the actual works bearing this name, is not improbable; for, the word itself, as designating a class of writings, occurs as early as in the law-book of Manu, though this book itself, as we have seen, may be called recent when compared with the Vedic texts. A definition, however, of what such Purânas are, does not occur before the beginning of the Christian era, when the lexicographer Amarasinha says, that a Purâna is a work which has "five characteristic marks." This definition is again explained by the commentators on the glossary of Amarasinha; and the oldest of them did not live earlier than about four hundred years ago. He says that these five characteristic portions of a Purâna are—primary creation; secondary creation, or the destruction and renovation of the world; genealogy—viz., of gods and patriarchs; reigns of the Manus; and history—viz., of the princes supposed to derive their pedigree from the sun or moon. Now, in applying this definition to the actual Purânas, Professor Wilson, the distinguished Sanskrit scholar, who translated the whole Vishnu Purâna, and was thoroughly conversant with these works, observes, "that not in any one instance do they exactly conform to it; that to some of them it is wholly inapplicable; whereas to others it only partially applies."* Whatever, therefore, may have been the nature of the original Purânas, and whatever scope

* A translation into English of the most interesting portion of these works was made in India many years ago, under the personal direction of this celebrated and learned scholar. With the consent of his widow, and by the liberality of Government, this important MS. collection—the only one which enables the English student, not conversant with Sanskrit, to examine the principal contents of the Purânas—forms now part of the library of the India Office.

one may give to the assumption that the actual Purânas have borrowed part of their contents from some older works of the same name, it is obvious that, in their present shape, they cannot reckon their age by many centuries.

When, by priestcraft and ignorance, a nation has lost itself so far as to look upon writings like these as divinely inspired, there is but one conclusion to be drawn: it has arrived at the turning-point of its destinies. Hinduism stands at this point, and we anxiously pause to see which way it will direct its steps. For several centuries, it is true, its position has seemed stationary; but the power of present circumstances, social and political, is such that it can no longer continue so. All barriers to religious imposition having broken down since the modern Purânas were received by the masses as the source of their faith, sects have sprung up which not merely endanger religion, but society itself; tenets have been propounded, which are an insult to the human mind; practices have been introduced, which must fill every true Hindu with confusion and shame. There is no necessity for examining them in detail, by unveiling, for instance, the secrets of the Tantra literature; nor need we be at the pains of convincing the intelligent portion of the Hindu community; for, the excellent works which it sent forth from Calcutta, Benares, and Bombay, and the enlightened views which it propagates through its periodical press, fully prove that, equal in mental accomplishments to the advanced European mind, it requires no evidence of the gulf which separates the present state of the nation from its remote past.

But what we do hold is, that all the activity of that learned portion will not avert the danger which threatens the future destiny of Hinduism, unless it boldly grapples with the very root of the disease. The causes of the gradual degeneracy of Hinduism, are, indeed, not different from those to which other religions are subject, when

allowed to grow in the dark, In Europe, religious depravity received its check when the art of printing allowed the light of publicity to enter into the book whence her nations derive their faith; and no other means will check it in India than the admission of the masses to that original book which is always on their lips, but which now is the monopoly of that infinitesimal fraction of the Brahminical caste able to understand its sense; and admission, also, to that other and important literature which has at all periods of Hinduism striven to prove to the people that their real faith is neither founded on the Brâhmana portion of the Vedas, nor on the Purânas, but on the Rigveda hymns.

If those intelligent Hindus of whom we are speaking have the will and the energy to throw open that book, and the literature connected with it, to the people at large, without caring for the trammels imposed on caste by the politicians of late ages, we have no misgivings as to the new vitality which they will impart to its decaying life, The result is foreshadowed, indeed, by what their forefathers attempted to do, but did not succeed in accomplishing, because they had not the courage to break through the artificial bonds which had already in their day enslaved Hindu society. We will briefly advert therefore to their views and to the light in which they must have read their most ancient text.

The hymns of the Rigveda, as we observed before, are of an entirely poetical stamp. "They almost invariably combine," as Professor Wilson writes, "the attributes of prayer and praise. The power, the vastness, the generosity, the goodness, and even the personal beauty of the deity addressed, are described in highly laudatory strains; and his past bounties or exploits rehearsed or glorified; in requital of which commendations, and of the libations or oblations which he is solicited to accept, and in approval of the rite in his honour, at which his presence is invoked, he is implored to bestow blessings on the person

who has instituted the ceremony, and sometimes, but not so commonly, also on the author or writer of the prayer. The blessings prayed for are, for the most part, of a temporal and personal description,—wealth, food, life, posterity, cattle, cows, and horses. . . . There are a few indications of a hope of immortality and of future happiness, but they are neither frequent nor, in general, distinctly announced, although the immortality of the gods is recognised." The following verses taken from the second Octade of the Rigveda—in the literal translation of it by Professor Wilson—may afford an idea of the general tenor of these hymns. They are addressed, the first four to Pûshan, the nourishing Sun; the five latter to Heaven and Earth:—

"1. The greatness of the strength of the many-worshipped Pûshan is universally lauded; no one detracts (from his praise): his praise displeases no one. Desirous of happiness I adore him, whose protection is ever nigh: who is the source of felicity; who, when devoutly worshipped, blends with the thought of all (his worshippers); who, though a Deity, is united with the sacrifice.

"2. I exalt thee, Pûshan, with praises, that thou mayest hasten (to the sacrifice), like a rapid (courser) to the battle; that thou mayest bear us across the combat, like a camel; therefore do I, a mortal, invoke thee, the divine bestower of happiness, for thy friendship; and do thou render our invocations productive (of benefit); render them productive (of success) in battles.

"3. Through thy friendship, Pûshan, they who are diligent in thy praise and assiduous in thy worship, enjoy (abundance), through thy protection; by (assiduous) worship they enjoy (abundance); as consequent upon the recent favour, we solicit infinite riches; free from anger, and entitled to ample praise, be ever accessible to us; be our leader in every encounter.

"4. Free from anger, and liberal of gifts, be nigh to us, for the

acceptance of this our (offering); be nigh to those who solicit food: we have recourse to thee, destroyer of enemies, with pious hymns. I never cease, Pûshan, acceptor of offerings, to think of thee; I never disregard thy friendship."

"1. Those two, the divine Heaven and Earth, are the diffusers of happiness on all, encouragers of truth, able to sustain the water (of the rains), auspicious of birth, and energetic (in action); in the interval between whom proceeds the pure and divine Sun for (the discharge of his) duties.

"2. Wide-spreading, vast, unconnected, the father and mother (of all beings), they two preserve the worlds. Resolute, as if (for good) of embodied (beings), are Heaven and Earth, and the father has invested everything with (visible) forms.

"3. The pure and the resolute son of (these) parents, the bearer (of rewards) [the sun], sanctifies the world by his intelligence; as well as the milch cow (the earth), and the vigorous bull (the heaven), and daily milks the pellucid milk (of the sky).

"4. He it is, amongst gods (the most divine), amongst (pious) works the most pious, who gave birth to the all-delighting heaven and earth: who measured them both, and, for the sake of holy rites, propped them up with undecaying pillars.

"5. Glorified by us, grant to us, Heaven and Earth, abundant food and great strength, whereby we may daily multiply mankind; bestow upon us commendable vigour."

As with the exception of a few hymns which have no reference to the praise or worship of the elementary gods, the scope and tenor of all the lays of the Rigveda are similar to those we have quoted, the first question suggested by them is whether they contain any laws or injunctions concerning sacrificial rites. The answer is in the negative. They allude to such rites, some with less, and others with more detail;

but these allusions are no more than a record or a narrative of the practices of the poets of the hymns. We are told, it is true, that the practices of those holy men are tantamount to a law ordaining them; but it is clear that such an inference is purely arbitrary. That it was strenuously opposed, moreover, by the highest authorities of ancient and mediæval India is borne out by the works and efforts of that influential school which professes the Vedânta tenets, and which counts Sankaràchârya amongst its teachers and divines. No Hindu doubts of the thoroughly orthodoxy of that school, and yet all its writings reject "work," that is, the observance of the sacrificial rites, as a means conducive to eternal bliss. It rejects, therefore, implicitly, the sanctity or authority of those "sacrificial" Vedas, the only object of which is the institution of such rites; and with them, as a matter of consequence, the binding power of the Brâhmanas and the worship founded on them.

The next important question relates to the doctrine professed by those poets who are supposed to have received the Rigveda hymns from a deity. The answer to it is complicated from a European, but simple from a Hindu, point of view. To the European inquirer the hymns of the Rigveda represent the product of various epochs of Hindu antiquity: in some he will recognise a simple, in others a complex, ritual; some will reflect to his mind a pastoral and, as it were, primitive life, others a people skilled in several arts and engaged in mercantile and maritime pursuits. And, in investigating the religious views expressed by these hymns, he will find accordingly, in some, the worship of the physical powers, whereas he will discover in others the idea of a Supreme Creator of the universe. He will perceive in them, in short, a progressive religious thought, beginning, as everywhere religion began, with the adoration of the elements, proceeding to an attempt at understanding their origin, and ending with the idea, more

or less clear, of one creative cause. The last stage of this development is indicated, for instance, by a hymn which has already acquired some celebrity, as attention was drawn to it by so early a Sanskritist as the illustrious Colebrooke, and as it has found its way into several European works. It runs as follows:—

"Then was there no entity nor nonentity; no world, nor sky, nor aught above it; nothing anywhere in the happiness of any one, involving or involved; nor water, deep or dangerous. Death was not; nor then was immortality: nor distinction of day or night. But THAT breathed without affiation, single with (Swadhâ) her who is sustained within him. Other than him, nothing existed (which) since (has been). Darkness there was; (for) this universe was enveloped with darkness, and was undistinguishable (like fluids mixed in) waters; but that mass, which was covered by the husk, was (at length) produced by the power of contemplation. First, desire was formed in his mind, and that became the original productive seed; which the wise, recognising it by the intellect in their hearts, distinguish, in nonentity, as the bond of entity. Did the luminous ray of these (creative acts) expand in the middle? or above? or below? That productive seed at once became providence (or sentient souls) and matter (or the elements): she, who is sustained within himself, was inferior; and he, who heeds, was superior. Who knows exactly, and who shall in this world declare, whence and why this creation took place? The gods are subsequent to the production of this world; then who can know whence it proceeded; or whence this varied world arose? or whether it upheld itself or not? He who in the highest heaven is the Ruler of this universe does indeed know; but not another can possess that knowledge."

The orthodox Hindu mind does not admit in these hymns of a successive development, like that which we must assert. It considers, as mentioned before, all the hymns of the Rigveda as being of the

same age; as dating from eternity. The Upanishads, and still more explicitly the Vedânta writers, cannot therefore allow any real discord to exist between the adoration of the phenomena of nature and the belief in one Supreme God. They solve the difficulty by concluding that the elementary gods are but allegorical personifications of the great soul, the primitive cause of the universe. And even Upanishads and Vedântists were already preceded in this view by Yâska, the oldest exegete of the Vedic hymns, who, on one occasion, says:—"There are three deities (Devatâs): Agni (Fire), who resides on earth; Vâyu (Wind), or Indra (Firmament) who resides in the intermediate region (between heaven and earth); and Sûrya (Sun), who resides in heaven. . . . . Of the Devatâ there is but one soul; but the Devatâ having a variety of attributes, it is praised in many ways: other gods are merely portions of *the one Soul.*"

Upanishads, therefore, and Vedânta, the type of Hindu orthodoxy, will by no means allow that Hinduism, represented by the Rigveda, was at any period idolatry; they maintain that all the Rishis intended to inculcate the standard tenet of Monotheism. Whether they are justified in this theory does not affect the practical conclusion at which we aim. For, this much is certain, that they interpret the Vedic hymns so as to derive from them the belief in one God, and that they quote numerous passages by which they intend to invalidate all doubts to the contrary.

But, what is remarkable, too: during the long period of Hindu theology which is comprised by the Upanishad and Vedânta literature, there is no attempt on its part at expanding this tenet of Monotheism into any doctrinal mysticism. They abound in the most pious phraseology: they show that the Vedic text inculcates the idea of the immateriality, the infiniteness, and the eternity of the Supreme Spirit; they expatiate on its qualities of goodness, thought, and beatitude; but they are

entirely free from any tendency to justify the notion of a mystical incarnation of that Spirit such as is taught, for instance, by the votaries of Brahmâ, Vishnu, and Siva. From the words of the Veda, it must be granted, they endeavour to prove that the human soul having been created by that One Spirit, it is bound to maintain its original purity, and if it lose it by its acts in the world, it must renew its earthly existence until it is capable of commingling with the divine source whence it sprang. But beyond this doctrine of transmigration—which is incidental to all the Monotheistic religions of mankind—it does not even try to found any religious dogma on the Rigveda hymns. In one word, the pre-eminently orthodox schools demonstrate that *the* Veda imposes no observance of a superstitious ritual; that it enjoins no law regulating for all eternity social or political life, no dogma except the belief in One God, no duty except that of living in conformity with the nature of that God from whom the human soul has emanated.

The bane of the social edifice within which these schools had to live and to teach *Vedânta*, that is, the "purport (*anta*) of the Veda," thwarted their full success, which would have stopped the degeneracy of Hinduism they foresaw; but, however powerful, it could never entirely crush their existence, or completely stifle the influence which they exercised on the nation. The adherents of these schools always fostered a spirit of investigation, and by it threw doubts, at least, into the mind of the masses as to the authority of those law-books which profess to regulate society for all eternity. To their influence, in our days, we must ascribe the quiet disappearance of the practice of Satî after they were shown that the injunction of burning the surviving widow on the funeral pile of her husband had arisen from a misreading of a Rigveda verse. Their learning is active in convincing the masses that the remarriage of widows is not prohibited by the Vedic text; and

to them are due the progressive changes which mark, for instance, the laws of inheritance, propounded by the existing legal authorities, as compared with those presented by Manu.

We may, therefore, still entertain the hope that the regeneration of Hinduism will proceed from these schools, provided that they possess the energy to refuse any compromise with the sectarian worship, which has brought Hinduism into contempt and ridicule. The means which they possess for combating that enemy is as simple as it is irresistible; a proper instruction of the growing generation in its ancient literature, an instruction, however wholly different from that now constituting the education of a Hindu youth; to whom reading the Veda is jabbering thoughtlessly the words of the verse, or intoning it to the melody of a teacher as ignorant as himself of its sense; who, by studying grammar, understands cramming his memory with some grammatical forms, without any notion as to the linguistic laws that regulate them; who believes that he can master philosophy or science by sticking to the textbook of one school and disregarding its connexion with all the rest of the literature. That such a method and such a division of labour do not benefit the mind is amply evidenced by the crippled results they have brought to light. The instruction which India requires, though adapted to her peculiar wants—religious, scientific, and political—must be based on the system which has invigorated the European mind; which, free from the restrictions of rank or caste, tends to impart to it independence of thought and solidity of character.

ARTICLE V.

HINDU EPIC POETRY: THE MAHÂBHÂRATA.

1.—*Indische Alterthumskunde.* Vols. I.—IV. By CHR. LASSEN. Bonn and Leipzig: 1847—1861. (Vol. I., 2nd edition. 1867.)

2.—*The History of India from the Earliest Ages.* By J. TALBOYS WHEELER. Vol. I. London. 1867.

3.—*Original Sanskrit Texts; on the Origin and History of the People of India, their Religion and Institutions.* By JOHN MUIR. Vol. I.—IV. London: 1858—1863; (Vol. I., 2nd edition, 1868.)

4.—*Le Mahâbhârata. . . . Traduit en Français.* Par HIPPOLYTE FAUCHE. Vols. I.—VII. Paris: 1863—1867.

WHEN the late Professor H. H. Wilson had completed the first volume of his—now celebrated—translation of the Rigveda he felt sure that his long and laborious work was about to satisfy an eager desire of every literary man, and relieve the anxiety which, he supposed, was generally evinced to get at the remotest source of the religious creed of India. Proud, therefore, of the service he was about to render to the world at large, and to this country in particular, and free from all vanity or

selfishness—as none ever entered the heart of this truly scientific and noble-minded man—he felt especially happy when at last he was able to offer his work for publication to one of the most renowned publishers of England. The offer was unconditional; the importance of the work beyond the possibility of a doubt, and the interest it would create, as he at least thought, so universal, that the greatest reward for the moment, as he pictured it to himself, was the delight with which the publisher of his choice would receive his proposal to open to the public the Hindu book of seven seals—the oldest Veda.

He had finished his little speech to the publisher, and the reply he received was not a refusal. It was only a question; but a question compared to which a hundred refusals would have been nectar and ambrosia to the feelings of the venerable translator of the Veda: it was the question, "What in the world, sir, *is* the Veda?"

Hindu mythology sometimes tells us of gods who have dropped from their heavens. This great event was then generally caused by the severe austerities of some powerful saint, by his stern insensibility to worldly demands. Here it was insensibility too, though of another kind, that sent the enthusiastic professor down from his heaven to the realities of this world. He folded up his precious parcel, and to the question, "What, sir, is the Veda?" the Royal Asiatic Society was indebted for one of the most interesting lectures, which towards the close of his long and meritorious career he delivered within its walls, and in which he narrated the incident of which we are reminded in proposing to approach another chapter of the theme of so many mysteries still unsolved—ancient India.

The Veda, indeed—or, as we should say, the Vedas—have since been especially fortunate. For the last eighteen years and more they have almost exclusively engaged the attention and energy of the best Sanskrit scholars in India, Europe, and America, not to speak of the precursor

of all modern Sanskrit scholarship, the great H. T. Colebrooke, whose essays on the Vedas, though written in the beginning of this century, still shine in their brightest lustre. Thanks to the efforts of such eminent men as H. H. Wilson, Max Müller, Benfey, Haug, John Muir, Cowell, Whitney, Râjendralâl Mitra, and others, no question will be further raised as to what are the Vedas. The contents, it is true, of these oldest records of Hindu civilization, and still more those of the vast literature connected with them, are as yet far from being fathomed to their full depth; but their surface, at least, has been extensively explored, and, though it cannot be said that every explorer has proved a reliable guide, the busy life which for many years has marked these Vedic expeditions bears witness to the interest with which they were followed by scientific research and amateur curiosity. Nor would it be just to regard even their aberrations as the result of mere conceit, and as altogether devoid of utility; for if by the side of such an understanding of the Vedas as is handed down to us by native scholarship and native tradition, and as is considered authoritative by the Hindus themselves, as well as by many scholars in Europe, we shall in some years hence, as we are given to hope, also possess an interpretation of these works such as was never heard of before in India, or elsewhere, the opportunity of comparing the results attained by the more serious of these various explorations can only tend to further the ends of truth, just as the mere prospect of these adventurous enterprises has already called new forces into the field, roused new combatants to the fight, and even produced the hornblowers and the clown to afford recreation and amusement on a long and perhaps tedious march.

The more, however, Vedic studies have of late engrossed the best energies of the present staff of Sanskrit scholars, the more, necessarily, have other fields of Sanskrit philology remained, comparatively speaking, fallow. It is especially the gigantic epos of ancient India, the Mahâ-

bhârata, which has suffered under this flux and reflux of Sanskrit studies in Europe. When, in 1819, by one of his happy hits, the late illustrious founder of comparative philology made known Nala and Damayantî, one of the most charming episodes of the Mahâbhârata, and a few years later followed it up by his edition of some other portions of the same epos, less poetical, but still of considerable merit, the hope was justified that we might get hold of a knowledge of the whole wonderful fabric from which these fragments had come to light. Translations of these episodes which also made their appearance rather increased than satisfied the curiosity that had been roused. Nor was it appeased by other and larger extracts from the great poem which subsequently followed, both in the original Sanskrit and in various European versions. Native industry and scholarship, it is true, were in the meantime hard at work. Under the patronage of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, which, while now doing its best work, through the efforts of such scholars as Râjendralâl Mitra, Nârayâna Vidyâratna, K. M. Banerjea, and other eminent natives, was at that time guided by the counsel of men like H. H. Wilson and James Prinsep, the whole text of the Mahâbhârata was prepared for the press and afterwards printed at Calcutta in four portly quartos; and we may here add, it has been followed of late years by another edition of great value, which, together with a paraphrase in Bengali, owes its existence to the munificence of the enlightened Maharâja of Burdwan. And even so recently as five years ago a third splendid edition of the great poem, together with an important commentary on it, was sent forth from a Bombay press, its appearance being chiefly indebted to the advice and liberality of a distinguished native scholar, whose name has for many years been in the foremost rank wherever literary, scientific, and philanthropic work required the assistance of sound knowledge, a clear intellect, and a generous heart—we need not say, Dr. Bhâu Dâji.

Ever since 1839, therefore—when the last volume of the first edition of the Mahâbhârata was completed in print—there has been no lack of material for studying even in Europe this wonderful book; nevertheless, the public at large, and probably many a Sanskritist, would still pause in having to answer the question, "What is the Mahâbhârata?" Judging from printed evidence, there is only one scholar in Europe who seems to have mastered the great epos in all its varied details. True, it is no less a scholar than Lassen, one of those rare minds who combine critical judgment with a vast and profound scholarship. Yet a monography of the Mahâbhârata did not enter into the plan of Lassen's works, and more especially into that of the greatest monument he has raised to his fame—his "Indische Alterthumskunde." That he explored every corner of the great epos is borne out by the use he has made of it in the last-named work for his special purposes; but these purposes themselves were chiefly limited to showing the importance which the Hindu poem has for an investigation of the history and geography of ancient India, and the numerous other problems raised by it did not therefore receive in his masterly work that minute attention which no one was so well qualified as himself to give to it. A consideration of a few of these problems fortunately belonged more especially to the province of Dr. John Muir's "Original Sanskrit Texts," a work which, under the most modest title, has contributed more trustworthy materials to the elucidation of some of the obscurest points of Hindu antiquity than many a pretentious book professing the same aim; and, in spite of its extreme cautiousness in arriving at settled conclusions, by its thorough impartiality, and judicious treatment of the subject-matter, it will have done more to establish correct ideas than the bold assertions and solemn affirmations with which some other writers on Sanskrit matters are wont to represent the unreliable result of their speculations. But the "Original

Sanskrit Texts," like the work just referred to, merely touches upon *some* of the religious and antiquarian questions connected with the Mahâbhârata, upon such questions as lay within the scope of Dr. Muir's own plan. They neither profess nor intend to supply a knowledge of the whole of the Mahâbhârata. A little and very useful book, published by Professor Monier Williams, in 1863, would seem to be more directly concerned with this task, for it bears the title of "Indian Epic Poetry," and, besides a popular and interesting introduction, gives what it calls an analysis of the Râmâyana,—the second great Hindu epos—and of the Mahâbhârata. Unfortunately, however, it omits to speak at all of the episodical matter treasured up in this poem, and filling not less than three-fourths of the whole work: and the "summary" itself of the rest—as he probably meant to convey by the word "summary"—has so completely assumed the character of a skeleton that it would be in vain to seek in it any of the life of the Mahâbhârata. Still, though the living Mahâbhârata does not seem to have been the subject of Professor Williams's inquiry, even his diligent gathering of its bones and his earnest attempt to give a correct outline of its external features, is a good service, for which the humbler class of Sanskrit students must be thoroughly grateful to him.

Two other works mark the last visible phase which may be assigned to Mahâbhârata studies as ventured upon by European scholars. The one is—in course of publication—the translation of the Mahâbhârata in French, by M. Hippolyte Fauche; the other the first volume of "the History of India from the Earliest Ages," by Mr. Talboys Wheeler, which, from its page 42 to 521, is exclusively devoted to the great poem.

A literal translation of the Mahâbhârata in any of the generally known languages of Europe would be, of course, a first desideratum to any one who, though unacquainted with Sanskrit, yet would wish to

form for himself an opinion of the nature and contents of the great works. He would certainly be well-informed enough not to expect that, however excellent such a translation might be, it could replace the worth of the original, or that from it he could collect the strain of ideas which only the words of the poet himself are able to rouse, or the thoughts which lie hidden in the very sounds in which they came first to light. Nevertheless, a good and literal translation of the Mahâbhârata would be a great literary boon, and its importance may be well realized if one remembers the effects which, in Germany, for instance, the translation of Homer's poetry by Voss produced on the education of the people. The difficulties, however, which beset a good translation of the Mahâbhârata in our days are not to be compared to those which Voss had to encounter when he increased German literature with another national work. We do not speak of difficulties essentially æsthetical, we merely refer to those purely philological; for, in spite of the excellent work done in the three editions of the Mahâbhârata already mentioned, we venture to say that a comparison of the existing manuscripts of the epos—and we can here only speak of those to be found in Europe—would show that a good deal of additional critical labour must be performed before we can hope to possess a thoroughly genuine text of the poem. It does not seem that M. Fauche was troubled by any anxiety of this kind. To him the first and naturally least critical edition was the genuine text; but we fear that even to this he did not always conform, and that his imagination had too often a more powerful sway over him than a submissive adherence to grammar would allow. His translation is often neither literal nor correct, and when we add that it is in prose, without the pretension of affording an æsthetical equivalent for the poetry of the original, we must necessarily conclude that it does not reach the beau ideal of a version of the Mahâbhârata. Still, though justice has to be severe, it must be equitable. Had M. Fauche laboured

under the full weight of the difficulties to which we have already alluded, his present translation would probably not have come to the world so soon, if indeed it had ever come, and those whom Sanskrit philology does not count amongst its working men, but wishes to enlist as its patrons and friends, would have lost the considerable advantages which, in spite of its imperfections, they may derive from his very laborious work; for as it follows the original verse for verse, and as its failings do not affect the general tenor of the contents it renders, it is, for the present at least, the best guide we could recommend to those who, without the aid of the original, may wish to obtain an insight into this wonderful product of the Hindu mind. And the objections here raised, we will hope, may even be lessened the more M. Fauche's translation progresses on its road; for though it has already reached its seventh volume, the ground passed over is not more than about a third of the entire journey to be accomplished; and doubtless every succeeding step towards its goal will enable its meritorious author, whose enthusiasm and industry cannot be sufficiently praised, to travel with greater safety than before, and thus will still more ensure to him the gratitude of the literary world.

Mr. Talboys Wheeler's investigation of the Mahâbhârata is, in one sense, perhaps the most curious that as yet has seen the light of publicity. For, when we say that Mr. Wheeler is no Sanskritist, and that he has not availed himself either of Lassen's researches or M. Fauche's translation—even so far as it goes—it might well be wondered out of what materials he built his comprehensive sketch of the leading story of the Mahâbhârata and the inferences he drew from it. And the wonder might seem the greater when we add that with some restrictions his sketch is the best we know of in print, and his reasoning very often to the point. The mystery is lessened, however, by the account which he himself gives of the foundation on which his structure was

raised. In the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal there was lodged, he relates, "many years ago, a manuscript translation of the more important portions of the Mahâbhârata, which there is reason to believe was drawn up by the late Professor H. H. Wilson. The manuscript was very illegibly written upon paper much embrowned by age, and seems to have been at least fifty years in existence. The whole has now been copied and indexed, and forms nine volumes folio. The original was, by some mistake put away in the Calcutta library under the head of Bhagavadgîtâ, and was not discovered by Mr. Wheeler until four years ago, when he accidentally sent for the Bhagavadgîtâ, and to his surprise and gratification found that the manuscript contained the bulk of the Mahâbhârata." Unless we are much mistaken, some additional information might be added to that given us by Mr. Wheeler regarding his lucky discovery. When living in India, the late Professor H. H. Wilson had under his superintendence translations prepared—and some of them he probably himself made—of nearly all the chief contents of the Purânas, the Mahâbhârata and the Râmâyana; and these were, after his death, found to have been preserved for the most part in a rough and by him revised draught, and at the same time in a fair copy; some, however, were only in the former condition. A complete set of these translations was hereafter, with the consent of his widow, acquired by the library of the India Office, and the remaining incomplete portion representing the original draughts of which fair copies had been taken, by the Bodleian library at Oxford. A third set, then, of these same translations seems, therefore, to be that of which Mr. Wheeler speaks, and to him certainly the great merit is due of being the first who turned them to good account. In the first volume of his "History of India" he only utilised that part of these translations which bears upon the political history of ancient India. But, according to the comprehensive plan on which his work is laid out, there is a strong hope that we shall

at last possess a full account of what the Mahâbhârata is, and an account too, rendered not only in a clear and attractive, but in some respects also in an original manner. For the method of Mr. Wheeler consists in premising his own remarks on the story of the epos under review with a narrative of the story itself, but told in his own fashion and words. The original itself thus appears before us, not in the form of a translation, but in that garb which it would assume if, irrespectively of poetical considerations, a modern European had to convey, to a European audience of average education, the general impression produced by the Sanskrit story on the Hindu mind. To effect this end he would have to sacrifice all such details as without much comment would probably remain unintelligible, and he would otherwise, also, have to curtail the original narrative so as not to overtax the patience of an European public.

"Large masses of supernatural matter," Mr. Wheeler says, in reference to the plan of his work (p 39), "have been either briefly indicated or cut away altogether. Brahmanical discourses and religious myths have been generally eliminated, to be reconsidered subsequently in connection with the religious ideas and belief of the people. Many episodes have been excluded . . . but a sufficient number have been exhibited in outline; whilst three favourite stories, which are apparently types of three different epochs of Hindu history, have been preserved by themselves under a separate head. Finally, the residue has been re-cast in English prose in such a condensed form as would preserve the life and spirit of the ancient traditions without oppressing the reader with needless repetitions and unmeaning dialogue; and has been interspersed with such explanations and commentary, and such indications of the inferences to be derived from different phases in the traditions, as might serve to render the whole acceptable to the general reader."

All this Mr. Wheeler has done with considerable tact and skill, and the result of his labour is an English account of the leading story of the great epos, tastefully drawn and attractive from the beginning to the end, but above all very accurate, too, in the main. For when (p. 84) he gives us a little bit of a legend which is to explain why the Bhils "shoot the bow with their middle finger until this day," or when (p. 88) he appends in a foot-note a description of "weapons of a supernatural character;" or when (p. 351) he has a pretty story about Duryodhana's squeezing what he first imagined to be the heads of the five Pându Princes,—all of which incidents are not to be found in the printed text of the Mahâbhârata, there is, after all, not much harm done by these and a few similar embellishments, which must have somehow crept into the translations he used. A mishap of perhaps more—yet by no means vital—consequence is that which occurred to him in his description of the horse sacrifice of Râja Yudhishthira (p. 377—433); since his whole description does not form part of the Mahâbhârata. It is a very condensed extract from a more recent work, the *Jaiminîya-Asvamedha*, or "The Horse Sacrifice," ascribed to the authorship of Jaimini. And to the same work likewise belongs, as an episode, the beautiful little romance of *Chandrahâsa* and *Vishayâ*, which is one of "the three favourite stories" (p. 522—534) referred to by him before. These materials too, therefore, must by accident have been mixed up with the translation of the real Mahâbhârata at his command.

We will now proceed to give a brief outline of the character and the contents of the Mahâbhârata—so far as it has hitherto come within the scope of Professor Lassen's and Mr. Wheeler's works—with an indication, also, of what a future account of it would have to tell were it to do full justice to the gigantic work.

Bhârata it is called because its leading story is devoted to the history

of some descendants of an ancient king of India, called Bharata, and more especially to a fratricidal war which was waged between two branches of his family, the Kauravas or sons of Dhritarâshtra, and the Pândavas, or sons of Pându; *Mahâ*-Bhârata. or the *great* Bhârata, is its name, because it comprises not less than about 100,000 verses, each verse consisting of thirty-two syllables, or, to speak in more homely phrase, above seven times the bulk of Homer's poems combined, or more than twenty times the extent of the Nibelungenlied. There is recorded indeed, in the beginning of the work, a tradition that there are three other versions of the poem, which had a still higher claim to the title of "great," for one of them, it is said, was fourteen, another fifteen, and a third even thirty times as large as the present Mahâbhârata; but as these versions are happily only to be found among the heavenly bards, the manes of the deceased ancestors, and the gods, and as the passage, moreover, containing this tradition is not even contained in all the MSS. of the poem, there is no occasion to mourn the loss of a poem of still more Himalayan dimensions than the actual Mahâbhârata; though, as will presently be seen, there is no reason why on the plan on which the latter, the Mahâbhârata intended for the human race, grew into its present size, it might not have assumed even the bulk which courtesy would consider only fitted for the use of the gods.

This plan may be easily understood. The groundwork of the poem, as mentioned before, is the great war between two rival families of the same kin; it occupies the contents of about 24,000 verses. This, however, was overlaid with episodical matter of the most heterogeneous kind; and the latter became so exuberant that it ultimately exceeded in extent three times over the edifice to which it was attached. Nor was this merely matter of accident in the sense in which such a term might vaguely be used. A record of the greatest martial event of ancient India would have emphatically been claimed as the property of

the second or military caste, the Kshattriyas. It was recited, as tradition tells us, by men of a special caste, the *Sûtras*, or bards, at great public festivals instituted by powerful kings. The heroism of ancient warriors, who were the ancestors of these kings, their wonderful deeds, their royal virtues, their connexion with the gods—all these and kindred themes would naturally tend, in the people's mind, to strengthen their power, and increase the lustre of their dignity. But such an exaltation of the kingly splendour and of the importance of the military caste, would as naturally threaten to depress that of the first or Brahmanical caste. Brahmans, therefore, would endeavour to become the arrangers of the national epos; and as the keepers of the ancestral lore, as the spiritual teachers and guides, as priestly diplomatists, too, they would easily succeed in subjecting it to their censorship. The personage to which this task is by tradition assigned is called *Vyâsa*, a word which literally means "distributor, arranger," and is kindred to the Greek word Homeros, which, from ἁμ and ἁρ, conveys a similar sense, that of "joining together." But Hindu tradition also takes care to say that Vyâsa belonged to the Brahmanical caste. It became thus the aim of the Brâhmanas to transform the original legend of the great war into a testimony to the superiority of their caste over that of the Kshattriyas. And this aim was effected not only by the manner in which the chief story was told, but also by adding to the narrative all such matter as would show that the position and might of a Kshattriya depends on the divine nature and the favour of the Brâhmana caste. Legends relating to the actions of gods and men, to the origin, development, and destruction of the worlds, exposition of matters concerning the moral and religious duties of men, especially the duties of kings, political discourses, essays on philosophy and theosophy, even fables—every subject in fact that could serve this end, was worked into the leading story by priestly skill. Here and there an old legend or myth

might be found in the epos, apparently not betraying such a set purpose. Whether it found its way into it at the time when its general object was already fulfilled, or whether it was a stroke of policy on the part of the oldest compilers, to veil their intentions by also incorporating into their work matters of, politically speaking, an indifferent nature, is of course difficult, if at all possible, now to decide. That their object, however, was to make the Mahâbhârata a *Brahmanical* encyclopædia for the military caste, and a powerful means in the hands of the Brahmans of swaying the Kshattriya mind, is unquestionable. One of several passages taken from the first book of the great poem may afford an insight into the importance which they themselves attached to their work. It runs as follows :—

"This hundred thousand of Slokas, relating holy acts, told in this world by Vyâsa of unbounded splendour—whoever the wise man be who recites it, or whoever those men be who hear it, they will reach the abode of Brahman and obtain the rank of a deity. For this poem is equal to the Vedas; it is pure and excellent, it is the best of all things to be heard, it is the Purâna praised by the saints. In it whatever is conducive to worldly interest and pleasure is fully taught, and the mind that reposes on this holy epos fits itself for final liberation. The wise man who recites this Veda of Krishna to others, provided they are liberal, truthful, not low and not unbelievers, obtains the accomplishment of his worldly interests; and even a wicked man when hearing this epos would get rid of his sin, be it even incurred by the destruction of an unborn child. He becomes liberated from all sins, like as moon is liberated from the (grasp of the) dragon. This poem is victory indeed, and should be heard by every one desirous of conquest. (By its aid) a king conquers the earth and vanquishes his enemies. . . . This poem related by Vyâsa of unbounded intellect, is a sacred code of religious and civil duties; it is an eminent code of all

that relates to worldly interest, and it is a sacred code of final liberation. Some recite it to-day and others will hear it; sons who do so will become obedient (to their parents), and servants will please (their masters). Whosoever hears it, becomes at once free from all sin, whether committed by his body, or his speech, or his mind. . . . He who reads the Bhârata, it must be known, understands fully the Vedas; for there the gods and the kingly saints and the holy Brahmanical saints—all of them free from sin—are extolled, and there Krishna is extolled, and also the holy Siva and his consort, and the birth of the war-god, effected by several mothers, and there is praised the eminence of the Brahmans and the cows. It is a collection of all sacred traditions, and should be heard by those whose mind is given to the law. . . . Whatever there is stated in this Bhârata in regard to religious and civil duties, to worldly interests, to what is conducive to pleasure and leads to final liberation (the Commentary adds: or the reverse of these) that *is*; on the other hand, whatever there is not stated in this poem (in regard to these topics) that can be found nowhere."

The Mahâbhârata may thus be regarded under a threefold aspect; as a work relating events of an historical character; as a record of mythological and legendary lore; and as the source whence especially the military caste was to obtain its instruction in all matters concerning their welfare in this, and their bliss in a future life. Some such aim as the great epos has was also taken by a kindred and later class of works, the Purânas. They are in a great measure modelled on the Mahâbhârata, which is their prototype. But they have remained far inferior to it both as regards the quantity and the quality of their contents. They are moreover works of a sectarian stamp, each of them composed to establish the superiority of a particular god over the rest of the Pantheon; whereas such a purpose, though it may seem to loom

in the distance, cannot yet be ascribed to the framers of the Mahâbhârâta. In this poem there is certainly a special predilection for Krishna whom the present Hindu canon looks upon as an incarnation of the god Vishnu; it is called, as we have seen before, 'the Veda of Krishna.' but in those portions of the great epos which in all probability are its oldest, Krishna is only the hero who by his exploits engrossed the national mind; he is treated there as a personage above the ordinary mortal stamp, and as such we may say he is the chrysalis of the future god, but he is not yet there the real unquestionable god of the later period of Hindu worship. Again, though there are passages in the Mahâbhârata, probably of a later date than the former, where Krishna or Vishnu *is* spoken of as the most powerful and even supreme god, there are others too where the same honour is allotted to Siva and his consort, and others where Krishna pays adoration even to the Sun and Fire, or where Agni, the god of fire, is distinctly praised as the universal deity. It is clear therefore that the compilers of the Mahâbhârata were by no means the narrow-minded sectarians of later ages. Impressed, we should conclude, with the philosophical creed of the Vedas, they could, at the behests of policy, bestow their compliments on any god and any form of worship capable of receiving the Brahmanical stamp; but in the pursuit of their policy they must have been aided also, on the part of the people, by a spirit of toleration which could allow each worshipper to look upon his neighbour's god as a god who, too, had its vested rights and some claims to a supremacy which he might not be able to gainsay with certainty. It must have been in their time as it was in the age of the Antonines, which Gibbon describes when saying, "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful."

The Mahâbhâṛata is therefore the source of all the Purânas, *the* Purâna emphatically so called, and as a document for antiquity unrivalled for religious statesmanship.

There, however, the momentous problem interposes: how far did this Brahmanical diplomacy affect its worth as an historical work, as a source of mythology, and a code of moral, religious, and political law? It is the first of these questions which chiefly engaged the investigations of Professor Lassen and Mr. Wheeler; and we will pause to see how they answered it.

But to appreciate their reasoning we must first take a passing glance at the leading story of the Mahâbhârata.

Atri, a great saint of the Vedic period, who afterwards became one of the lords of creation, produced by a flash of light from his eye the moon, and the moon again (in Sanskrit, a male being) became the ancestor of a line of kings, who therefore are called the kings of the lunar dynasty. One of these was *Purûravas*, whose love for the heavenly nymph Urvasî has become familiar to us through one of the finest productions of the genius of Kâlidâsa, his drama Vikramorvasî. His descendants were in a direct line successively Ayus, Nahusha, and Yayâti, the latter becoming the father of Puru and Yadu. The line of Yadu acquired celebrity through *Vâsudeva*, whose sister was *Kuntî or Prithâ*, but especially through his sons Krishna and Balarâma, the reputed incarnations of the god Vishnu. Puru's son was Dushyanta, the husband of Sakuntalâ, and their son, *Bharata*. From Bharata descended successively Hastin, *Kuru*, and Sântanu. The latter married *Satyavatî*, who, by a previous informal marriage with an impetuous saint, had already borne a son, the celebrated *Vyâsa*, whose specific name was Krishna Dvaipâyana. Sântanu's sons by Satyavatî were Chitrângada and Vichitravîrya; and his son by another wife, the river Ganges, was *Bhîshma*. He adopted moreover a son whose name was *Kripa*. The

two former died childless; but as according to Hindu law the eternal happiness of a man is jeopardised unless the funeral ceremonies are performed for his soul, and at that period children begot by a brother-in-law and the widow of a man who died childless became the lawful children of the deceased, and thus could perform those ceremonies, Satyavatî asked her son Vyâsa to provide a male progeny for the manes of Vichitravîrya. By one of his widows he therefore begot a son, *Dhritarâshtra*, and by another a second son, *Pându*. But as the former was born blind, and the latter with a pale complexion, which was objectionable, *Vyâsa* was induced to become the father of a third son, who should be blemishless. *Ambikâ*, however, the second widow of Vichitravîrya, who was intended for the mother of this child, did not fancy the powerful saint, for his aspect was horrifying; she therefore substituted for herself a slave girl, and the latter became the mother of *Vidura*, surnamed Kshattri. Now the progeny of *Dhritarâshtra*, who married Gândhârî, consisted, besides a daughter, in a hundred and one sons, the most prominent of whom were *Duryodhana*, "the one with whom it is difficult to fight," also called *Suyodhana*, or "the upright fighter," and *Duhsâsana*. *Pându*, again, had two wives, *Prithâ*, the sister of Vasudeva and aunt of Krishna, and Mâdrî. By the former he had three sons, *Yudhishthira*, *Bhîma*, and *Arjuna;* by the latter, twins, *Nakula* and *Sahadeva*. Prithâ, it should be added, had previously to her marriage with Pându borne a son, *Karna;* but as his birth had been miraculous, and could have been misrepresented as objectionable, it was concealed by her both from her husband and her sons, who thus remained for a long time unacquainted with their relationship to Karna. It will have been seen from this pedigree that *Duryodhana* and his brother on the one side, as well as *Yudhisthira*, *Bhîma*, *Arjuna*, *Nakula*, and *Sahadeva*, on the other, were descendants of Kuru; in tradition, however, the name of *Kauravas*, the Sanskrit word for these descendants,

is exclusively reserved for the former, the sons of Dhritarâshtra; whereas the name of *Pândavas*, or descendants of Pându, there always designates only the five princes, the eldest of whom is *Yudhishthira*. Both lines, as will have been likewise seen, were on their father's side remotely related to *Krishna;* but a near relationship between this great hero and the *Pândavas* was established through Pându's marrying their mother, Prithâ, who was the paternal aunt of Krishna. It will have been noticed, too, that *Vyâsa*, the compiler of the Mahâbhârata, is at the same time the reputed grandfather of both the Kauravas and the Pândavas; and as he is constantly represented as taking some part or other in the events recorded by him, tradition must have considered him as especially fitted to preserve a reliable account of the great war.

The events, then, which happened in the life of the Kauravas and Pândavas are the historical groundwork of the great epos. They may be briefly adverted to as follows:—

After the demise of Sântanu, who resided in Hâstinapur, the ancient Delhi, Dhritarâshtra was by seniority entitled to succeed. But as he was blind he resigned the throne in favour of his brother *Pându*. The latter became a powerful monarch, but after a time, feeling tired of his regal duties, preferred to retire to the forests of the Himalaya, and to indulge in his favourite sport, the chase. Dhritarâshtra had thus to resume the reins of government, but on account of his affliction it was his uncle Bhîshma who governed for him, and also conducted the education of his sons, who had been born in the meantime, and attained to boyhood. After a while Pându died in his mountainous retreat, and his widow Prithâ was in consequence invited by the old king to take up her residence at his court, with her five sons, so that they might be brought up together with his own. The two families thus became united, but as the education of the boys progressed, and it became

manifest that the Pândavas were superior in qualities and attainments to their cousins, the jealousy of Duryodhana was roused, and his wickedness assumed a first tangible shape in an attempt he made to poison and then to drown Bhîma. This attempt failed, like several others which succeeded it, to destroy the whole of the Pându princes, but his jealousy soon found even a stronger inducement than before to urge on his sinister designs against the cousins. A Brâhmana of miraculous origin, *Drona*, who had obtained from a still more wonderful saint a knowledge of the most mysterious and powerful weapons, and was skilled in the art of war, had on one occasion been slighted by *Drupada*, the king of Pânchâla, and resolved to take his revenge on him. To effect his purpose he repaired to Hâstinapur, and offered the king to instruct the princes in the martial arts in which he excelled. This offer was gladly accepted, and when he had completed their military education it was arranged that the princes should exhibit their skill at a public tournament, where every one was allowed to enter the arena against them. It came off, but entirely to the advantage of the Pândavas, whose valour and dexterity by far surpassed those of Duryodhana. Here it was that Karna made his first public appearance, for after the defeat of Duryodhana he offered to challenge Arjuna; and the hopes of the Kaurava princes were set on him. Yet as Karna, who was believed to be the son of a charioteer, and whom his mother Pritha alone knew to be the son of the Sun, could not comply with the rules of the tournament, in showing that his was a noble pedigree, he himself being ignorant of his illustrious descent, he was excluded from the lists of the sham combatants. And from that time dated his enmity against the Pândavas, as he considered them to be the cause of his public disgrace. The interposition of Drona, on that occasion, prevented the outbreak of serious hostilities between the rival princes; and he even united them for a time in the acceptance of his proposal to wage war against Drupada,

who had offended him, since as the fee for his instruction he now claimed the kingdom of Pânchâla, which they would have first to wrest from king Drupada. The princes accordingly went to attack Drupada; but he defeated the Kauravas, and only yielded to the superior strength of the Pândavas. The Brâhman Drona, having attained his object, then graciously made over half of the kingdom to Drupada, and merely kept the remaining half to himself. In consequence of these events, however, the renown of the Kaurava princes having become entirely eclipsed by that of the Pândavas, and their father Dhritarâshtra even intending to install as heir-apparent to his kingdom Yudhishthira, his cousin Duryodhana planned another scheme to get rid of the obnoxious rivals. He prevailed upon his father to send the Pându princes, with their mother, on an excursion to a town, Vâranâvata, the ancient Allahabad, the pretext being a festival which was to be held there; and before them he despatched a confidant with the instruction to have a house constructed for them out of highly inflammable materials, and when they were installed in it, to set it on fire, so that they might perish in the conflagration. But this scheme also failed. Having had an intimation of it, they contrived to lodge in the doomed house a woman of low caste, with her five sons, and while these were burned they succeeded in saving their lives through a subterranean passage which previously had been made for them.

Nevertheless, to be safe from further machinations they considered it prudent to conceal their escape, and it was given out that they had been destroyed in the flames. They now assumed the garb of mendicant Brâhmans, and went to the forests, where they performed a number of miraculous feats. Bhîma had there an encounter with a giant demon, Hidimba, killed him, but married his sister Hidimbâ, by whom he had a son. They then went to a town, Ekachakrâ, where Bhîma freed the country from a cannibal, Vaka, who was the terror of the pious

anchorites. When staying there Vyâsa paid them a visit, and through him the princes were informed that Drupada would shortly institute a solemn festival, at which his daughter Draupadî from amongst the princes assembled would choose for her husband the prince who would perform the most wonderful feats. From the west and east, from the north and south, the royal suitors flocked in; and, at the advice of Vyâsa, the Pândavas, also, in their guise as Brâhmans, joined the multitude. None of the kings, however, could perform the task that had been set them as a condition of the prize, the hand of Draupadî. Karna, too, wanted to try his fortune, but he was prevented from entering the lists on account of his being, or appearing to be, the son of a charioteer. To the astonishment of the assembly, then Arjuna came forward, and by his deeds won Draupadî. An uproar ensued, since the royal suitors did not acknowledge the right of a Brâhman—as whom they took Arjuna—to compete with them, and in the fight which was the consequence Drupada would have lost his life had not Arjuna saved him, and Krishna, who had come from Dvârakâ, and seen through the disguise of the Pândavas, declared that Draupadî was his legitimate prize. Arjuna now repaired with his bride and his brothers to their mother; and the epos tells us that Draupadî was hereafter solemnly wedded first to the eldest, Yudhishthira, and, according to seniority, successively also to his other four brothers. She became, in short, at the same time the wife of all the five Pândavas, who, in order to obviate domestic conflicts, laid down certain rules, stipulating that their violation should be visited on the offender by banishment into the forests for a period of twelve years.

The Pândavas now dissembled no longer their existence and real character, and when it had become known at Hâstinapur that they were not only alive, but had for their ally the powerful Drupada, the

Kauravas resolved to make peace with them. The terms agreed upon were, that the former should continue to reign at Hâstinapur, while the latter should have the sovereignty over Khândavaprastha, the modern Delhi. At that period it so happened, unfortunately, that Arjuna entered the house of Yudhishthira when Draupadî was staying with him; and, as this was a breach of the compact they had concluded, he banished himself to the forest for twelve years, though Yudhishthira readily condoned the offence of his brother. During the period of his exile a great many events are recorded to glorify the power of this prince. The most important, however, seem to have been various love adventures, in the course of which he married Ulûpi, a serpent princess; Chitrângadâ, a daughter of the king of Manipur; and Subhadrâ, Krishna's sister, whom he carried off forcibly against the will of Krishna's brother, Balarâma, and by whom he afterwards had a son, Abhimanyu.

The reign of his brother Yudhishthira at Khândavaprastha in the meantime prospered so wonderfully, and after the return of Arjuna from his exile became so much more strengthened by a series of successful conquests which he accomplished, that he resolved upon celebrating the Râjasûya sacrifice, a ceremony which only a king could perform who had conquered all his enemies, and the attendance at which involved on the part of those who joined in it an acknowledgment of the sovereign power of the king who instituted this sacrifice. After the defeat of a last enemy, king Jarâsandha of Magadha, Yudhishthira had the satisfaction of gratifying his wish. The most powerful monarchs assembled from all parts of India to be witnesses of his greatness and splendour; and the festival would have come off without any jarring incident had not the *Argha*, or respectful offering, which had to be made to the worthiest of those present, provoked the jealousy of *Sisupâla*, the king of Chedi; for when by common consent this offering

was voted to Krishna, the king of Chedi disputed his claim to it, and by his unmeasured abuse of Krishna at last provoked the latter into a combat, in which he was slain. The very power and splendour, however, displayed on this occasion by king Yudhishthira soon became disastrous to him, for when Duryodhana, who, together with his brothers, was also among the invited guests, had become aware of the greatness which his rival had obtained, he could no longer suppress his envy, and the desire he felt to deprive him of his possessions and his wealth. As soon, therefore, as he had returned to Hâstinapur, he planned a new scheme for attaining this object. As he could not hope to be a match for the forces of the Pândavas in open warfare, and as they had already proved equal to him in cunning, he resolved to try what could be done by means of a game at hazard. Playing at dice was in the oldest time part of several sacrificial ceremonies; it had afterwards become a favourite sport of royal personages, and even special officers were attached to their courts for the arrangement and superintendence of such games. That Yudhishthira, though described as a pattern of piety and virtue, was especially fond of playing at dice was known to Duryodhana, and the latter conspired, therefore, with his uncle *Sakuni* to defeat him in such a game. The Pândavas and their wife Draupadî were accordingly invited by their relatives to be present at a banquet to be given by the old king at Hâstinapur, and when they had come a game was proposed by Sakuni to Yudhishthira. The greater skill of the former, and foul play besides, soon accomplished the evil purposes of Duryodhâna. Yudhishthira lost everything he staked,—his wealth, his kingdom, at last Draupadî too. He had even to witness the indignity which was inflicted npon his wife when *Duhsâsana*, the brother of Duryodhana, seized her by her hair and dragged her as a slave into the presence of all the assembled guests. Ultimately, however, Duryodhana consented to liberate her, and even to restore to his

cousins their territory, on the condition that they became exiles for thirteen years, and, during the thirteenth year, kept so strict an incognito that no one should be able to recognise them, or even ascertain the place of their retreat.

The Pândavas accepted these terms, and accordingly entered upon their exile, twelve years of which they spent in the forests of India. The events which happened during this long period are full of stirring incidents, and form the subject of many episodes. It must here suffice to advert only to one of them. When one day they were out hunting, and their wife was left at home alone with their domestic priest, a king of Sindhu, *Jayadratha*, passed through the forest with a large retinue on his way to the south, whither he went to obtain in marriage a princess of Chedi. But seeing Draupadî, he was so much struck with her beauty that he at once entertained the desire of possessing her. He sent, in consequence, a messenger to her hermitage to ascertain her name and lineage, and to get himself introduced to her as a guest. Draupadî, unaware of the danger which threatened her, received him hospitably according to the laws of her religion, and the more so as she recognised in him a distant kinsman. Jayadratha, however, soon disclosed his disloyal intentions, and when Draupadî indignantly repelled them, he carried her off forcibly. Soon afterwards the Pându princes returned home from their hunting excursion, and learned the outrage that had been committed on them. Off they started in pursuit of Jayadratha. He was soon overtaken and his army routed. Draupadî was released, and, after an unsuccessful flight, Jayadratha himself made a prisoner. In the end, however, Draupadî, out of regard for their relationship, interposed in his favour with her husbands, and he was allowed to depart to his own country.

The thirteenth year had now come, during which the Pândavas were pledged to assume an incognito beyond discovery. To carry out this

last part of their agreement, they resolved to assume different disguises, and to enter the service of a king *Virâta* of Matsya. When they came near his city they went accordingly to a burial-ground, concealed there their weapons and garments, and took garbs suitable to the characters in which they meant to offer their services to the king. This being done they presented themselves, together with Draupadî, at the court of Virâta, under fictitious names, and giving out that they were a party of travellers who had met with great vicissitudes in life, and now were anxious to get a livelihood in various menial capacities. Yudhishthira said he was a Brahman, and especially versed in the art of playing at dice; his word was taken, and he was engaged as teacher and superintendent of the game. Bhîma was dressed like a cook, and held a wooden ladle and a long knife in his hands. He professed to be versed in all culinary arts, and was made the head of the royal kitchen. Arjuna appeared in the garb of a eunuch, with earrings, bracelets, and the other attire of a person of that kind, and stated that he could give instruction in singing, playing, and dancing; he was, consequently, appointed companion and teacher of the royal ladies. Again, on the faith of their professions, Nakula was made master of the horse, and Sahadeva superintendent of the cattle. Lastly, Draupadî, who, from her beauty and gait, could least dissemble her real nature, but also gave a plausible account of her assumed character, was engaged as servant to the queen of king Virâta. The five brothers soon became the favourites of the royal household, for they excelled in their respective occupations. The giant Bhîma especially, who, in his power of eating and fighting, was not surpassed by any one, had an opportunity of showing himself off in a wrestling match, in which he conquered a powerful wrestler of the day who had put every one else to shame. Draupadî's beauty, however, was fated to be the cause of disturbing for a while their happiness. At the court of Virâta

there lived a mighty warrior, *Kîchaka*, who was the brother of the queen, and the commander of the king's forces. His passions were roused towards Draupadî, and he resorted to various stratagems to become possessed of her. The virtuous Draupadî resisted, of course, his advances, and after an indignity she had suffered in open court, resolved to accomplish his destruction. She simulated, therefore, compliance with the wishes which Kîchaka soon again repeated to her, and made an appointment with him during the darkness of midnight in the dancing room. Her husbands were apprised of the scheme she had planned, and which consisted in Bhîma's putting on female attire, and while personating her, dealing with Kîchaka as he deserved. When the appointed hour had arrived Kîchaka came; but Bhîma meeting him, a fight between them ensued, in which Bhîma put his adversary to death. As in the morning his dead body was discovered, and in a fearful condition, too, every one thought that no human power could have effected the destruction of so powerful a man as Kîchaka, and it was generally assumed that some Gandharvas, under whose divine protection Draupadî professed to be, had avenged her on Kîchaka for his illicit desires. Nevertheless, the followers of Kîchaka made an attempt to burn Draupadî with his body, as if she had been his legitimate wife, and it required another effort on the part of Bhîma to avert this danger from the Pândavas. Virâta and his court now held Draupadî in especial awe; but the death of Kîchaka proved of consequence also in other respects. While he lived the renown of his prowess was so great that it held in check all the enemies of his brother-in-law, the king. As soon, therefore, as spies from the city of Virâta had spread the tidings of his death, their former designs and hopes revived. Among these enemies were especially *Susarman*, a king of Trigarta, and *Duryodhana*. As the former happened to be on a visit at the court of Hâstinapur when the news of Kîchaka's death

arrived, he at once planned with Duryodhana a campaign against his old rival and foe. Accordingly Susarman broke into the territory of Virâta, and so successful was his inroad that he even made Virâta his prisoner. But when Yudhishthira and his brother learned the misfortune that had befallen their protector, he, together with Bhîma and the younger brothers, at once set out in pursuit of Susarman, who had gone to the north, and they not only liberated Virâta, but completely defeated his enemy. While these events, however, passed in the north of Matsya, Duryodhana invaded from the south the territory of Virâta. The forces of this king having gone out to meet Susarman, the country was deprived of all its defenders, Uttara alone, the son of Virâta, and Arjuna, the supposed eunuch, with some servants, being left to offer resistance to the hostile force. Uttara was merely a boy, and Arjuna therefore undertook the defence of the country, first in acting as charioteer to the young prince, and afterwards, when the latter despaired, as principal in a combat with Duryodhana. In spite of their greater numbers, the Kauravas were completely defeated, but allowed to depart to Hâstinapur.

At the time when these events occurred, the thirteenth year of the exile of the Pândavas had expired. Soon after the return of Arjuna to the capital of Virâta they disclosed, therefore, as they were now free to do, their real character to the king, and made an alliance with him, which was still more strengthened by Virâta giving his daughter Uttarâ in marriage to Abhimanyu, the son of Arjuna by Subhadrâ.

By virtue of their compact with the Kauravas, the Pândavas had now regained their title to the kingdom, which they had been temporarily obliged to quit. But they well foresaw that their cousins would not of their own accord reinstate them into their territories. They convened therefore a council to deliberate on the steps they should take. It was attended by all the allies of the Pândavas, especially by king Drupada,

their father-in-law, king Virâta, and the two mighty brothers Krishna and Balarâma, who had come from Dvârakâ; and there it was resolved that the Pândavas and their allies should fully prepare themselves for battle, but, before declaring war, try the effect of peaceable negotiations first. For this purpose, then, the family priest of king Drupada was despatched to the Kauravas, but without result; and in return an embassy was sent by Dhritarâshtra to the Pândavas. This also proved of no avail, for though the Pândavas were willing to declare themselves satisfied even with the cession, on the part of the Kauravas, of five small towns, the latter remained obstinate in not yielding up any portion of the territory claimed by their cousins. A last attempt at reconciliation, made by Krishna himself at Hâstinapur, was also unsuccessful, and the great war between the two rival families became henceforth unavoidable.

The two parties, with their respective allies, now chose for the battle-field the large plain of Kurukshetra, which seems to have been situated to the north-west of the modern city of Delhi, and there entrenched their camps. The Kauravas then appointed for their commander-in-chief their uncle, the veteran *Bhîshma*. Challenges preceded the outbreak of the regular hostilities, and both the Kauravas and the Pândavas agreed on certain rules which they promised to keep, that on both sides the war should remain an honest war. Thus they stipulated to fight each other without treachery, not to slay any one who would run away or throw down his arms, not to take up arms against any one without giving him warning; no third man should interfere when two combatants were engaged with each other, horsemen should only fight with horsemen, footmen with footmen, warriors in chariots with warriors in chariots, and riders on elephants with riders on elephants. By these and similar rules it was thus intended to conduct this war according to the notions which the military caste at that period entertained of military honour.

There now ensued a series of battles—chiefly consisting of single fights—which lasted for eighteen days. For the first ten days the command-in-chief belonged to the aged and wise Bhîshma; yet however great his valour, he at last succumbed. Pierced by arrows he fell from his chariot upon the ground, and Arjuna and the other chiefs of the Pândavas comforted their dying relative. But Bhîshma did not yet give up the ghost; he lingered on for fifty-eight days, when his soul went to heaven. The generalissimo of the Kaurava army who succeeded him was *Drona*. He fell five days after he had assumed the command; and this interval was especially marked by the death of Abhimanyu, the son of Arjuna, who, contrary to the rules agreed upon, was attacked and slain by Duhsâsana and four other warriors, while the wicked Jayadratha, known already for his attempt at ravishing Draupadî, prevented the Pândavas from rescuing the luckless youth. Duhsâsana escaped this time the consequences of his ill deed, but Jayadratha was killed by Arjuna. Drona, too, however, was the victim of a stratagem on the part of the Pândavas, who thus likewise violated the rules of the war. For when Bhîma fought without avail against the warrior Brahman, the Pândavas spread the rumour that *Âsvatthâman* was dead; and Drona, not knowing that the Pândavas had on purpose called an elephant Asvatthâman and allowed him to be slain, but believing that his own son bearing this name had fallen in battle,—Drona, disheartened by this news, laid down his arms, and suffered his head to be cut off by *Dhrishtadyumna*, a brother of Draupadî. Drona's successor was *Karna;* but his command only lasted two days, for at the end of this short period he was slain by Arjuna. His successor was *Salya*, who commanded but one, the eighteenth day of these battles, which terminated in the complete defeat of the Kaurava forces. This last day, however, was marked by an act which again proved that the Pândavas also could depart from the rules of honourable warfare.

When Duryodhana had fled and hid himself in a safe retreat, he was discovered by the Pândavas, and, after a time, prevailed upon to fight again. His condition, however, was that he should be allowed to fight with his mace, and according to the received rules of such a duel. The challenge was accepted by Bhîma, who was a great adept in the use of the mace; but when he found that even his great skill failed against the superiority of Duryodhana, he struck the latter such a violent blow on his right thigh, that it smashed the bone and felled him to the ground. Yet in fighting with the mace it was contrary to all rule to strike below the waist, and the victory of Bhîma over Duryodhana was thus merely due to foul play. Bhîma was called, therefore, the "foul-fighter," while Duryodhana on that occasion earned the epithet of the "fair-fighter."

The Kaurava army was now completely destroyed, and only three warriors of it survived, *Asvatthâman*, the son of Drona, *Kripa*, the adopted son of Sântanu, and *Kritavarman*. When they found Duryodhana on the point of death, and heard of the treachery of Bhîma, they vowed to take their revenge on the Pândavas. These had meanwhile after the defeat of the hostile forces, taken possession of the Kaurava camp, and installed themselves there, while Draupadî and her sons, together with the remnant of their army, had been ordered to occupy their own camp. Now, when the night had come, and all were sleeping in apparently the most perfect security, the three surviving warriors of the Kauravas entered the camp of the Pândavas, and there murdered the five sons of the Pândavas, the whole family of Drupada, and every male belonging to the army of the Pândavas. After this they hurried off to Duryodhana, who was still alive, to bring him the news of the manner in which they had fulfilled their horrible vow, and then fled for their lives to their respective countries. Duryodhana now died, and the Pându princes, after the fate that had befallen them, wished

to effect a reconciliation with Dhritarâshtra and his wife Gândhârî, to whom they were now left as the nearest relatives. The old blind king came to the battle field, and apparently forgave them; but he could not forget the foul play of Bhîma towards his son Duryodhana, and by a ruse would have killed him had not the foresight of Krishna saved Bhîma's life.

The next care of Yudhishthira and his brothers was the performance of the funeral ceremonies in honour of the fallen dead, and when this duty on their part was fulfilled he entered the city of Hâstinapur, where, under the nominal sovereignty of Dhritarâshtra, he was installed junior king. His heart remained, nevertheless, filled with sorrow, and he felt a strong wish to pay a parting visit to his uncle Bhîshma, who lay still alive on his bed of arrows, as he hoped to obtain from him consolation in his grief. He repaired to him, and Bhîshma, agreeably to his wishes, instructed him in all his duties. This was the last, and by no means least wonderful performance of Bhîshma's; for the instruction in all matters relating to this and the future world which he conveyed to Yudhishthira, while transfixed with arrows, and his head resting on a pillow of arrows, does not occupy less than above 20,000 verses in the Mahâbhârata.

The reign of Yudhishthira now having been securely established, his next desire was to obtain its acknowledgment by the other kings of India, and to effect this he performed the great sacrificial ceremony known as the Asvamedha, or horse sacrifice. Hitherto that portion of the family which had survived the great war lived together, and in apparent happiness. Dhritarâshtra alone could never forget the treacherous conduct of Bhîma in his club fight with Duryodhana, and Bhîma, too, lost no opportunity of slighting the old king. The latter, therefore, resolved upon renouncing the throne and retiring to the forest, where he intended to pass the remainder of his life as an

anchorite. He therefore left Hâstinapur, together with his wife Gândhârî, with Prithâ, the mother of the Pândavas, and their uncle Vidura, and proceeded to the woods. There first Vidura died, and later the rest of the royal exiles perished in a forest conflagration. When the news of their death reached the Pândavas they were deeply afflicted by it; but when some time later they also received the tidings of Krishna's death, and the destruction of his town, Dvârakâ, their heart was so much overcome with grief that they, too, became determined upon renouncing their royal position and the world. Accordingly they set out on a long journey towards mount Meru, where they hoped to obtain admission into Indra's heaven. Through many countries they wandered, Yudhishthira walking on foot, followed by Bhîma; then came Arjuna; then, in order, the twins Nakula and Sahadeva, and last of all came Draupadî. Behind them walked a faithful dog. By degrees they reached the shore of the sea, and here Arjuna cast into the waves his bow and quivers. Gradually, however, the strength of the royal pilgrims failed. Draupadî sank first, and the others successively, until Yudhishthira alone and the faithful dog remained. At last Yudhishthira reached the heaven of Indra, but the dog was refused admittance to it by the god. The king insisted, nevertheless, on remaining with his faithful companion, and it then turned out that Indra, by his resistance, had merely tried Yudhishthira's constancy, since the dog was no other than the god of justice himself, and the real father of king Yudhishthira. To his surprise, however, Yudhishthira found in Indra's heaven Duryodhana and his other cousins, but not his own brothers or Draupadî. And when he was told that these were confined in one of the hells to expiate their sins, Yudhishthira resolved to share in their fate, instead of remaining alone in heaven. He proceeded, therefore, to the fearful hell where they were, and was about to undergo the miseries to which his brothers were doomed, when it

became manifest that all had been an illusion, and this his last trial. For Indra, to test his attachment for his relatives, had created a vision, which now vanished away, and after Yudhishthira had bathed in the heavenly Ganges he found himself re-united with his whole family in the heaven of Indra. And thus ends the story of the great war and the reign of the most virtuous of the Pândavas.

In giving this bare outline of what may be called the historical portion of the Mahâbhârata, we have had to be ruled by considerations of space, and an estimate of what we thought might be the amount of forbearance possibly granted by an indulgent reader who, in a weak moment, professing an interest in Hindu epic poetry, had suddenly found himself taken at his word. We therefore at once confess some remorse at the havoc which such a rapid sketch has had to make of the contents of the great poem. But lest, by dint of condensing and curtailing, it might even cause a doubt as to how such a simple narrative could have been worked into a bulk of verses like that described, and into one though of unequal yet great poetical worth, we must come to the aid of the reader's imagination with at least a few additional remarks.

We need not dwell on the chance which was given to the poet when he had to describe the battles of eighteen days, each of which was a series of single combats, nor on the eloquence he could display when giving a picture of the great councils held both at the court of Dhritarâshtra and that of Virâta previously to the first battle, or of the messages exchanged between the Pândavas and Kauravas. We need likewise not point to the wide scope for poetical embellishment where the amours of Arjuna during his exile, or kindred subjects, are told, or where the scene is described when the mothers and wives of the fallen warriors visit the battle-field, and give themselves up to the expression of their grief. Themes like these will always be a fertile source for the

poet's muse, whether he be Vyâsa or Homer, Valmîki or the author of the Niebelungenlied. But another field, and a large one too, in which the Hindu poet could travel at his ease, might not so readily appear from the meagre narrative just offered. The personages that have been named in it, their pedigrees and their lives, have been represented there as if we were writing history. But in the Mahâbhârata all the leading characters are raised beyond the sphere of ordinary human life. Their birth is miraculous, and their acts defy the standard of human acts. They constantly associate with gods: their palaces are of divine grandeur; their armies count by millions; their wealth is inexhaustible; time and distance vanish before their deeds. In epic poetry there must always be fictions of a kindred character, or else it would no longer be epic poetry. But in Homer, for instance, such fictions are rather hinted at than dwelt upon at length; as a rule, where dealing with mortal heroes he allows us to feel at home in the sphere of human possibilities. In Hindu epic poetry, on the contrary, the supernatural halo which surrounds every personage of consequence becomes a heavy reality, which forcibly, and for a considerable time, arrests our attention, and withdraws it from the main story, which it originally was intended merely to brighten up. Thus the miraculous births of Vyâsa, Pându, Drona, of Prithâ, and Draupadî, not to speak of Krishna, and of many more leading characters, become centres of interest for themselves, though this interest is foreign to the main story of the great war. All, in short, that lies on its bye-roads assumes an importance of its own, and these bye-roads themselves multiply the farther we advance. Nor by adverting to this difference which distinguishes the character of the epic poetry of the Mahâbhârata from that of ancient Greece do we as yet allude to what is purely episodical in the Hindu epos. By the latter we here understand all that could be easily cut out from the main story without in the least affecting its

mechanism or even its poetical worth—all, in short, that, at first sight as it were, proves to be an extraneous addition, whatever the motive be for which it was made. Thus, when the divine sage Nârada pays a visit to the Pându princes after their marriage with Draupadî, and in order to warn them against the conflicts that might arise from their polyandric arrangement, relates to them a story of two giant brothers, who from love to a beautiful woman became deadly enemies, and ultimately perished by their own hands—the whole incident, visit, and story, merely intrude into the midst of the main narrative, and may readily be eliminated from it. Or when the same sage pays another visit to Yudhishthira before he performed the Râjasûya sacrifice, and gives him an account of the divine palaces of the different gods, which in his roamings through the heavens he had seen, the account itself is interesting, and even poetical, but to the main story entirely superfluous. In a similar manner, after Yudhishthira had lost everything in the game at dice, and when he was living in his forest exile, his grief is soothed by a Saint Vrihadasva, who arrives *à propos*, and tells him the story of Nala and Damayantî, which in several respects was similar to his own. Again, another great saint, who likewise turns up as a *deus ex machina*, when Jayadratha had been frustrated in his attempt at ravishing Draupadî, consoles Yudhishthira by reminding him that in times of yore another hero, Râma, had met with a similar fate to his; and as the king becomes curious, he gratifies him with the whole story of the Râmâyana in the condensed shape of about 750 verses. Or to give an instance or two of episodes of another character, which are readily recognized as such. When Arjuna went into exile, and lived the life of a penitent addicted to meditation and practising severe austerities, his brothers became saddened by the loss of his company, and Yudhishthira especially felt deeply aggrieved by it. Happily for them, Nârada arrived again, and delivered to them a long

discourse on the results of piety, and the boons that accrue to a man who visits holy places of pilgrimage. The description of these, together with numerous legends connected with them, occupies about 7400 verses. On the first day of the great war, when both armies were drawn up and ready for battle, Arjuna felt troubled in his mind at the prospect of causing the destruction of so many human lives, and communicated his scruples to Krishna, who promised to act for him as charioteer. Krishna at once allayed his conscience with the celebrated discourse on the Yoga philosophy, the Bhagavadgîtâ, in about 1000 verses; and, as allusion has already been made to the more than 20,000 verses in which Bhîshma, wounded to death, conveyed consolation and instruction to Yudhishthira when he paid him a parting visit, they, too, may be recalled as a last instance of that episodical matter which, as already mentioned, fills about three-fourths of the Mahâbhârata, and may readily be separated from the leading story, that of the great war.

The task, however, of separating the main story from all that matter, which though now closely interwoven with it, may not originally have belonged to it, is one beset with far greater difficulty than that of distinguishing between the story itself and its episodical exuberance. Whether every personage whose name is recorded in the eighteen days' war performed the acts with which he was credited: whether the speeches were delivered as they are reported: whether the women were as beautiful as they are described, and the kings as wealthy and powerful as they are represented to be—all these and similar subjects might seem of comparative indifference, if poetical and antiquarian interests are set aside, for which even such material has a significance. But by disallowing the historical reliability of such material, the question is not yet settled whether it may not have belonged to the oldest account of the great war, and whether, therefore, it may not represent the oldest portions of the Mahâbhârata. Again, supposing

this question had been satisfactorily solved, there remains the further problem of determining what portion of the story may lay a claim to historical authenticity, for in the shape in which it is handed down to us, no portion of it is without its mythical and legendary alloy.

The position taken by Professor Lassen in dealing with the latter of these problems is that of considering the leading characters of the story, not as persons, but symbolical representations of conditions and events. Names and facts thus assume to his mind a different value to what they would seem to have. *Pându*, for instance, the father of the Pândavas, he interprets as the first appearance in history of the Pândavas, and *Dhritarâshtra*—"by whom the kingdom is upheld"—as he survived the great war, is to him the continuance of the power of the Kauravas till the return of the Pândavas. *Arjuna*, again, a word which literally means "light," and *Krishna* "the black," as well as Draupadî, who is also surnamed *Krishnâ*, "the black," would, according to him, designate the second and third periods of the history of the Pândavas. Their marrying Draupadî, the daughter of Drupada, would be a symbolical indication of their political alliance with this king of Panchâla, when their "unnatural" relation to Draupadî would lose its offensiveness. And that there were five Pându princes would follow from there also being five tribes of the people of Panchâla. Moreover, their connexion with Krishna—originally a hero of the Yadu race, and identified by Professor Lassen with the Herakles of Megasthenes, who gives him a daughter, Pandaia,—would symbolically indicate the extension of the dominion of the Pândavas to the south; and this view he finds also confirmed in a tradition which connects Arjuna by marriage with Subhadrâ, the sister of Krishna,—Subhadrâ meaning "the woman who brings much prosperity." Bhîma, who in the epos is the brother of Arjuna, and is represented as the special enemy of Duryodhana, Professor Lassen looks upon as a successor of Yudhish-

thira, and as having been made, at a later period, a contemporary of Arjuna; and as for the twins, Nakula and Sahadeva, the sons of Mâdrî, he assigns to them a still more remote period in the history of this family, in considering them as the founders of an empire in the Eastern Punjab. The Pândavas would thus, according to Professor Lassen, be properly speaking a symbolical personification of the Aryan conquests, pushing on from the northwest to the east, and gradually extending all over India, and the individuals bearing this name would therefore symbolically represent the various periods which might be assigned to these conquests. The final battles, too, would then likewise not be so much the combats between two rival families, as the end of a great national struggle, in which the fate of the principal peoples of India was concerned.

We cannot, of course, here follow in detail the results of this most ingenious method, by which Professor Lassen endeavours to reconcile discrepancies in the narrative of the great epos, and to transform the improbable stories recorded in it into plausible and real events. It may be inferred, however, even from this meagre statement, that there are very few facts indeed which, as related by the epos, he would accept as real. For, according to his reasoning, the legendary element would have so strongly and so constantly vitiated the historical basis of the story, that without a special process of interpretation this basis could never be reached.

Mr. Wheeler is also inclined to view the history of the Pândavas as embodying events belonging to different epochs of the ancient history of India.

"If the Pândavas," he says (p. 104) "may be accepted as the representatives of the Aryan race, it would appear from the story that they had advanced far away to the eastward of the Aryan outpost at Hâstinapur, and had almost reached the centre of the land of the aborigines.

This direction was undoubtedly the very one which was eventually taken by the Aryan invaders; that is, they pushed their way from the Punjab towards the south-east, along the fertile valleys of the Ganges and Jumnâ, until they arrived at the junction of the two rivers at Allahabad. Probably, as already indicated, this migration occupied a vast period of unrecorded time, and the Aryans may not have reached Allahabad until ages after the Kauravas and Pândavas had fought their famous battle for the little Râj at Hâstinapur. But when the story of the war of the Mahâbhârata had been converted into a national tradition, it seems not unlikely that the legends of the later wars waged by the Aryans against the aborigines, during their progress towards the south-east, would be tacked on to the original narrative. This process appears to have been carried out by the compilers of the Mahâbhârata, and although . . . . the adventures of the Pândavas in the jungle, and their encounters with Asuras and Râkshasas are all palpable fictions, still they are valuable as traces which have been left in the minds of the people of the primitive wars of the Aryans against the aborigines."

In spite, however, of the coincidence of these general views of Mr. Wheeler with those of Professor Lassen, the former recognises in the story of the great epos far more solid historical ground than the latter. Not only does he accept the tradition of the five Pândava brothers as being contemporaries; but he also accepts as historical their polyandric marriage with Draupadî, who thus to him is a real personage. And the great war he takes, what it purports to be, for a contest between two rival families, ending in the destruction of the one and the victory of the other; not for a national war, embodying in its events different epochs of ancient India. Mr. Wheeler's process of separating fiction from truth is, therefore, wholly different from that of Professor Lassen. While the latter accepts the grand dimensions which the epos assigns to the events narrated in it, and adapts its principal personages to these

dimensions, in raising men beyond what they would be as simple individuals, Mr. Wheeler, on the contrary, accepts the leading personages as real, and lessens the dimensions so as to fit the reality of these characters. Thus, while Professor Lassen lays stress on the names of the peoples which are recorded as having been arrayed against each other in the eighteen days' battle, and endeavours to show that the battle-field could not have been merely the limited plain of Kurukshetra, but must have extended over an area which had for its boundaries in the west the Indus, in the east the Ganges, in the north the Himâlaya, and in the south the sea—to Mr. Wheeler's mind all these innumerable armies are merely exaggerations, and all that is told of their deeds is past credibility. According to him, no such war in all probability took place.

"The contest," he says (p. 292), "did not depend upon the engagements of armies, but upon the combats of individual warriors; and indeed, so much stress is laid upon these single combats, that the innumerable hosts, which are said to have been led upon the field, dwindle down into mere companies of friends and retainers. Again, it will be seen that whilst the Brahmanical compilers love to dwell upon combats with magical darts and arrows, which could only have been carried on when the enemy was at a certain distance; yet the decisive combats were those in which the rude warriors on either side came to close quarters. Then they fought each other with clubs, knives, and clenched fists; and cut, and hacked, and hewed, and wrestled, and kicked, until the conqueror threw down his adversary and severed his head from his body, and carried away the bleeding trophy in savage triumph."

From the same point of view, Mr. Wheeler disenchants us in regard to the extent of the royal power ascribed to the Kauravas and Pândavas. While their kingdoms are described as extending over a vast country, he

reduces the Râj of Hâstinapur to a certain area of cultivated lands and pastures, which furnished subsistence for a band of Aryan settlers; and the Pândavas founding a glorious kingdom at Khândavaprastha and conquering the earth, would mean, according to him, their proceeding from the banks of the Ganges to those of the Jumnâ; thus clearing the jungle, founding a new Râj, and establishing a supremacy over every bordering enemy. In perfect consistency with his line of argumentation, Mr. Wheeler therefore also discards as historical those traditional connexions between the Pândava family and other princes which would seem to be opposed by geographical difficulties; or he assigns to those princes localities different from those which the epos would allow them to occupy. He disbelieves, for instance, the tradition which marries king Vichitravîrya, the son of Sântanu, to two daughters of the king of Kâsî or Benares; for this tradition allows Bhîshma to drive to Benares in his chariot and back again with these young damsels; but as Benares, he says, is five hundred miles from Hâstinapur, as the crow flies, the whole story is improbable and the result of a later manipulation. Or since Panchâla, if identified with Kanouj, as it generally is, would be at least two hundred miles from Hâstinapur, Mr. Wheeler concludes that the country of that name governed by Drupada—against whom Drona and the Pândavas waged war—cannot have been Kanouj, but probably was "a little territory in the more immediate neighbourhood of Hâstinapur" (p. 97). Again, the frequent and easy intercourse between Krishna and the Pândavas, as described in the Mahâbhârata, becomes, for a similar reason, also a matter of doubt.

"At the time," Mr. Wheeler argues (p. 459), "when Krishna is said to have first come into contact with the Pândavas, he and his tribe had already migrated to Dvârakâ, on the western coast of the peninsula of Guzerat, which is at least seven hundred miles from Hâstinapur, as the crow flies. Accordingly, it seems impossible that such relations as

those said to have subsisted between Krishna and the Pândavas could really have existed; and this suspicion is confirmed by the mythical character of every event which apparently connects the Yâdava chieftains of Dvârakâ with the royal house of Hâstinapur."

It is with regret that we must here arrest our desire to afford more illustrations of the critical method which Mr. Wheeler pursues in scanning the leading story of the Mahâbhârata; for the more consistently he applies it to every event of special consequence as narrated in the epos, and the more attractive the manner in which he puts forward his arguments, the less are we able, within these limits, to do justice to his criticisms; but, however valuable they are, and however much we agree with many conclusions at which he has arrived, we nevertheless believe that the time is as yet distant when a final verdict can be pronounced on what is really historical in the great epos, or when it will even be safe to decide on the critical method by which such a verdict is to be obtained.

We would, for instance, be as little inclined to submit the events of the great war to Mr. Wheeler's geographical test, as to look with Professor Lassen upon Draupadî as a mere allegorical expression of the link which connected the Pândavas with king Drupada. It is quite true that, considering the political and social condition of ancient India, visits at a distance could not be paid, nor armies transferred, or expeditions made, without much loss of time. When in the epos, therefore, the most distant places are reached as it were instantaneously, such occurrences might be declared impossible. But that which is really impossible in the account of them is merely the disregard of time, not the fact itself. Time, however, as will be conceded by everyone familiar with Sanskrit literature, is a category apparently foreign to the ancient Hindu mind. In Sanskrit poetry, therefore, a test of time ceases to be a test. Hindu epic poetry is, for this very reason, not

amenable to the Aristotelian canon of epic poetry, because the Hindu mind, unlike the European, did not obey the laws of time. An episode of twenty thousand verses, as that of Bhîshma's instructing Yudhishthira when lying on his bed of arrows, would in European literature be an impossibility, not on æsthetical grounds alone, but because no European mind could realize the possibility of a narrative being stayed for such an amount of time as the delivery of so many incidental verses would occupy. In Hindu epic poetry, however, such an interruption is regarded as none; it is received as the legitimate fate of a narrative, and no Hindu critic ever objected to it as antagonistic to probabilities based on considerations of time. So little, indeed, has any native critic ever objected to the massing up of all the other episodical matter of the great epos, though it entirely destroys that unity which we would require in it, and a demand for which is based on a due conformance to the law of time. Such, however, being the characteristic feature of the Hindu mind, as shown by its national poetry, it would follow that no credence whatever can attach to any statement in regard to time recorded in it, unless supported by interior or collateral evidence. We should on this ground, therefore, see no objection to the theory of Professor Lassen, which assumes that various periods of ancient Hindu life are in the history of the Pândavas blended into one, did not the tradition of their polyandric marriage with Draupadî, as we hold, throw a considerable doubt on it; for this marriage, which implies the coevalness of the Pândavas, we believe to be a historical reality, and one which might also become a guide in the search for a critical standard to test other facts related in the Mahâbhârata; but as such a standard may afford some light, however dim, in the dark chronology of the ancient epos, we will briefly explain what we understand by it.

We take it for granted that the Mahâbhârata is a traditional record of an early period of Hindu history, compiled, however, by eminent

men of the Brahmanical caste, and modelled by them to suit a special purpose of their own, that of imposing their own law on the Kshattriya, or military caste. The fabric of the great epos was not built up at once. Different times supplied different materials for it, and with the importance of the object the greatness of the task increased. These materials, as Professor Lassen himself has in several instances shown, sometimes underwent the treatment of various editors; but the chief object of all these editors, arrangers, and modellers, always remained the same—to demonstrate the necessity and sanctity of the Brahmanical law. In dealing, then, with the traditional lore of the military caste, the Brâhmanas would have to meet three categories of facts. One category would comprise those facts which were more or less in accordance with the religious and political system to be established or consolidated by them; another would comprise facts, if not in harmony with, yet not antagonistic to it; a third category, however, would be absolutely opposed to it, since not all the ancestors of the Kshattriyas, who had to be represented as belonging to the common stock, were of Aryan origin, or professed the orthodox faith. The most, of course, would be made of the Brahmanical compilers of the first of these categories of facts; it would naturally become the basis on which they would proceed. The second category might appear inconvenient, but it could be tolerated by them; or since, in the work of different ages and different minds, even inattention is not impossible, we could imagine that it might escape a close scrutiny. But the third category could admit of no compromise; it had to be suppressed or to be explained away. And we should conclude that if parts of this category *were* explained away, this was merely done because they could not be suppressed, as being too deeply rooted in tradition, and consequently, as having the strongest presumption in favour of their authenticity. Now, of all traditions related in the Mahâbhârata, there is, on the face of them, none more opposed to the

spirit of the Brahmanical religion than this "five-maled" marriage of Draupadî. Polyandry, it is unnecessary to say, never found any place in the Brahmanical code, or in the habits of the Hindus, as we know them from their literature; and if, in spite of its thorough offensiveness, it nevertheless was imputed to the very heroes of the ancient epos, there seems to have been no alternative but to admit it as a real piece of history. Professor Lassen, as we have seen, assumes that this tradition involves an allegory. But either polyandry existed as an institution when this allegory was made—in that case there is no ground for considering a polyandric marriage as an improbable event in the history of the Pândavas themselves—or it as little existed in their time as in the later history of India. In that case, however, it would have offended the national sentiment, and no allegory of this kind could have entered a poet's mind, or obtained currency. The Brahmanical compilers not being able to suppress this fact, endeavoured therefore to explain it away; but the very manner in which they strove to make it acceptable, shows the difficulty they experienced, and the stubbornness of the fact. When Drupada is apprised by Yudhishthira that he and his four brothers have resolved to make his daughter their common wife, he is represented by the Brahmanical compiler as shocked at the idea of such a proposal, and says to him, "It is lawful for one man to take unto him many wives, but it is unheard of that many men should become the husbands of one wife. You who know the law, and are pure, must not commit an unlawful act, which is contrary to usage and the Vedas. How can you conceive such a thought?" When Yudhishthira replies, "The law, O king, is subtle; we do not know its way. *We follow the path which has been trodden by our ancestors in succession.*" But the king not being satisfied with this answer, Yudhishthira pleads precedents:—"In an old tradition it is recorded that Jatilâ, of the family of Gotama, that most excellent of moral women, dwelt with

seven saints; and that Vârkshî, the daughter of a Muni, cohabited with ten brothers, all of them called Prachetas, whose souls had been purified by penance." Then Vyâsa interferes; and in order to explain to the king the lawfulness of polyandry, relates a legend, which consists of two parts. From its first part, however, we merely learn that the gods, at a sacrifice celebrated by them, expressed to Brahmâ their fear at seeing mankind multiplying excessively, and not dying; when Brahmâ assures them that Death, being much engaged just now, would soon resume his office, and put an end to men. In the second portion of this legend, Vyâsa shows that the five Pândavas are incarnations of Indra, that Draupadî is an incarnation of Vishnu's consort, Lakshmî, and consequently, that though apparently married to five men, she would in reality become the wife of one husband only.

The last of these explanations is a Brahmanical one; that which one would expect to receive from a Hindu priest. The third may be thought suggestive, but the first two are full of significance. The story of the god of death being busy sacrificing, and therefore neglectful of his duties, and of Brahmâ's consoling the other gods in their perplexity, is so loosely tacked on to the legend of the incarnation of Indra and Lakshmî, that as a justification of polyandry it would seem meaningless. But the fear of an excessive increase of mankind, as expressed by the gods, is suggestive, perhaps, of the real cause of polyandry. The two arguments, however, brought forward by Yudhishthira, can leave no doubt that polyandry was an institution in India, though in pre-Brahmanical times, and that instances of it were still in the memory of men.

But if this marriage of Draupadî *is* a real event, it throws at once the life of the Pândavas into such a remote period of Hindu antiquity as to leave behind not only Manu, the oldest representative of Hindu

law, but even those Vedic writings of Âsvalâyana and others, on which the ancient law of India is based.

It remains to be seen, however, whether there are not other facts recorded in the history of the war which likewise are at variance with this law, but were not, or could not, be suppressed by the compilers of the Mahâbhârata. For if there are, they would still more strongly corroborate the conclusion we have drawn, and indicate a standard by which to test the age and the historical reliability of the record itself.

We will point to a few such facts which would seem to belong to this category.

The institution of caste, as Mr. Muir, in his excellent work, has proved, did not exist at the earliest Vedic period. It was fully established, however, and circumscribed with stringent rules at the time when the code of Manu was composed. At the Vedic period a warrior, like Visvâmitra, for instance, could aspire to the occupation of a Brâhmana, and a Brâhmana, like Vasishtha, or the son of Jamadagni, could be engaged in military pursuits. At the time of Manu such a confusion of occupations, as an orthodox Hindu would say, was no longer allowed; it recurs only at the latest period of Hinduism. Yet in the history of the great war we find the Brâhmana Drona not only as the military instructor of the Kauravas and Pândavas, but actively engaged in a war against Drupada; we find him, too, as king over half the kingdom of Pânchâla, and finally, as one of the commanders-in-chief of the Kauravas. Nor do the compilers of the Mahâbhârata even try to explain this anomaly; for when in the third book of the epos it is said that Drona and some others joined Duryodhana "because their mind was possessed by the demons," such a remark might seem to imply that Drona, having become impious, would also be capable of violating the rules of his caste; but even if it did, it could, at the utmost, only refer to the part

he took in the hostilities of the Kauravas against the Pândavas; it would not palliate the facts of his previous history, as told in the first book of the Mahâbhârata, where he is described as a Brâhmana. The case of his son, Asvatthâman, is even worse: he is not only an active combatant in the great war, but it is he who conceives and carries out the terrible revenge which ends in the treacherous slaughter at midnight of the Pândava forces. In the tenth book, which describes the wicked proceedings of this Brâhmana, he is made to descant on the duties of the castes, which he then describes in perfect conformity with the law of Manu, and to express a regret that his "ill-luck" caused him to follow the pursuits of a Kshattriya. But the only attempt at an excuse for his conduct which the compilers put into his mouth, is contained in the words, "As I have now at will taken upon myself the duties of a soldier, I shall enter upon the path of a king, and that of my high-minded father."

Another fact which, after the establishment of caste, must have been highly objectionable, but could not be eliminated from the epos, is the disguise of the Pândavas. "False boasting of a higher caste," is an offence which Manu considers so grave that he ranks it together with the killing of a Brâhmana; and there could certainly be no greater danger to the preservation of caste than the possible success of false pretenders. We have seen, however, that the chief personages of the great epos, the Pândavas, though Kshattriyas, assume the character of Brâhmanas, and even retain it at the tournament of Drupada: that Yudhishthira, too, resorts to the same "false boasting of a higher caste" a second time when he offers his services to King Virâta. Had it been possible to suppress such a dangerous precedent, there is little doubt that the Brahmanical arrangers of the national tradition would not have held up their military heroes as successful violators of the law which they were bent on inculcating to the Kshattriyas.

We will allude to another *class* of passages in the Mahâbhârata, which, perhaps, still more forcibly prove that the events to which they relate must have been historical, and anterior to the classical state of Hindu society. We mean those events which bear on the law of marriage and inheritance. There are portions of the great epos where the statements made in regard to these important laws are in perfect harmony with the ruling of Manu or later lawgivers; but there are other passages, too, where the discrepancy between their contents and the law books is palpable. Nor is it possible to assume that the occurrences mentioned in those passages are innovations on Manu and the lawgivers: the contrary is the case. It is Manu who criticises them, and rejects their authoritativeness. A few instances will indicate the direction in which the reader of the epos might trace the facts of which we speak.

In the brief outline given above of the contents of the epos, mention has been already made of the circumstance, that king Vichitravîrya died childless, and to provide for the salvation of his soul his half-brother, Vyâsa, begot for him two sons by his two widows, and at the time, believed that he was begetting for him even a third son when he approached the slave girl, who personated Ambikâ. Now, in regard to this practice to raise children for a deceased relative who died childless, Manu expresses himself in these terms:

"On failure of issue by the husband the desired offspring may be procreated either by his brother or some other near relative, called Sapinda, on the wife who had been duly authorised. Anointed with clarified butter, silent, in the night, let the (kinsman thus) authorized beget one son on the widow, but a second by no means. Some who understand this (law), and hold that the object of their authorization might remain unaccomplished, are of opinion that it might be lawful

to beget a second offspring on women. . . . By twice born men (*i.e.*, Brâhmanas, Kshattriyas, and Vaisyas) no widow must be authorized (to conceive) by any other (than her own lord); for they who authorize her (to conceive) by any other violate the primeval law. (Such) an authority (given to her) is nowhere mentioned in the nuptial hymns of the Veda, nor is the remarriage of a widow named in the laws concerning marriage. The practice, fit only for cattle, is reprehended by the learned twice-born men. Amongst men it is mentioned while Vena had sovereign power; (but this king) of yore possessing the whole earth, and therefore (not on account of his piety) called the best of royal saints, gave rise to a confusion of castes, his intellect having been impaired through lust."

Thus Manu admits that the practice in question existed; he condemns it, however, as strongly as possible, in the case of the first three castes, allowing, though not recommending it, as might be inferred from his words—and has been inferred by the commentators—in the case of the fourth or servile caste. But even in regard to this caste he lays down the law that the authorized kinsmen should by no means procreate more than one son, though he states that lawgivers anterior to him thought the procreation of a second son was lawful. Both these stipulations must have been unknown to Vyâsa in the narrative to which we referred; for Vichitravîrya was a Kshattriya, and Vyâsa—himself a Brâhmana, though of a doubtful origin—procreated not only more than one child for the benefit of his relative, but, so far as his own belief went, three. And Pându, too, when lamenting his childlessness, says to Prithâ: "In distress men desire a son from their oldest brother-in-law." It is certainly curious that Manu, in illustrating the historical occurrence of this practice, should allude to a lustful King Vena, and pass over in silence the example of Vyâsa. But whilst

on the one hand it is intelligible that Manu could not associate the name of the holy compiler of the Vedas with a practice "fit only for cattle," it would seem incredible that Vyâsa could have been guilty of it had there existed in his time a code of law invested, like that of Manu, with undisputed authority, and strongly condemning it.

A comparison between the marriage law as mentioned by Manu, and alluded to in *some* passages of the Mahâbhârata, leads to an analogous inference. Regarding the manner in which a husband is chosen Manu says:—

"To an excellent and handsome suitor of the same let every man give his daughter in marriage according to law. . . . Three years let a damsel wait, though she be marriageable, but after that term let her choose for herself a husband of equal rank. If not being given in marriage she obtain a husband, neither she nor the husband whom she obtains commits any offence."

Hence Manu limits the right of a girl to choose herself a husband to the condition that her father did not give her away in marriage at the proper time. In those portions of the Mahâbhârata, however, to which we allude, a girl often chooses her husband before her father gives her away, and while she thus has a perfect freedom of choice, the right of the father is merely that of assent. This mode of a girl's choosing her husband was called the *Svayamvara*, or "self-choice." We see it observed in the marriage of Pându with Prithâ, of Yudhishthira with Devikâ, of Sahadeva with Vijayâ, of Sini with Devakî, Nala with Damayantî, &c.; and we have a full description of it when Draupadî chose Arjuna. This greater freedom of women is consonant with the position which, to judge from some Vedic hymns, they must have held in society during the Vedic time, but it is foreign to the period of

Manu. In the narrative of Draupadî's "self-choice" we are even distinctly told that this mode of electing a husband was a peculiar privilege of the Kshattriya caste, to which a Brâhmana had no claim. But no such privilege is mentioned in the code of Manu, who in regard to the subject of marriage gives the following rules:—

"Now learn compendiously the eight modes of marriage (for the acquisition) of wives by the four castes (some of which modes are productive of) good and some of evil in this world and the next, They are the modes called *Brâhma, Daiva, Ârsha, Prâjâpatya, Âsura, Gândharva, Râkshasa,* and the eighth and worst, the *Paisâcha*. . . . Let mankind know that the six first in direct order are valid in the case of a Brâhmana: the four last in that of a warrior: and the same (four) except the Râkshasa mode in the cases of a man of the third and fourth castes. The wise consider the four first forms as most approved in the case of a Brâhmana, and only the Râkshasa mode in that of a Kshattriya, and the Âsura in that of a man of the third and fourth castes. But among these, three of the five last, viz., the Prâjâpatya, Gândharva, and Râkshasa, are held legal, and two illegal; the Paisâcha and Âsura marriages must never be contracted by any caste. Whether separate or mixed, the before-mentioned Gândharva and Râkshasa modes are declared legal for a man of the military caste. The mode of marriage is called *Brâhma* (1) when, having voluntarily invited a man versed in the Vedas, and of good character, a daughter is given away to him, after clothing both of them, and honouring them with ornaments, &c. The mode called *Daiva* (2) is the giving away of a daughter, after having decked her with ornaments, to the priest officiating at a properly conducted sacrifice. When, after receiving from the bridegroom one pair of kine (a bull and a cow), or two pairs, for religious purposes a daughter is given away in due form, that mode

of marriage is called *Ârsha* (3), It is called *Prâjâpatya* (4) when a daughter is given away with due honour after having uttered this injunction: 'May both of you perform your duty.' When the bridegroom, having given as much wealth as he can afford to the damsel and her kinsmen, takes her according to his own pleasure, that mode is called Âsura (5). The reciprocal connexion of a damsel and her lover, from mutual desire, is called the *Gândharva* mode (6); it proceeds from sensual desire, and is intended for amorous embraces. The seizure of a maiden by force from her home, after slaying or wounding her kinsmen, and breaking into their houses, while she weeps and calls for assistance, is the mode called *Râkshasa* (7). When the lover secretly embraces the damsel while she sleeps or is intoxicated, or disordered in her mind, such a mode—the eighth—is called *Paisâcha* (8); it is the most wicked and the basest."

No "self-choice" mode, as we see, occurs in this detailed description by Manu of the eight marriage modes, six of which he declares legal. But Svayamvara is not only mentioned in the description of Draupadî's marriage, as a privilege of the Kshattriyas, it is asserted also by the patriarch Bhîshma to be the best of all modes of marriage for a man of his caste, besides a still better one, that of forcibly carrying off a bride. The occasion on which Bhîshma makes mention of the marriage notions of his time is that of his choosing in the last-mentioned fashion as intended wives for his brother Vichitravîrya, the beautiful daughters of a king of Benares; and since his words are remarkable, inasmuch as they afford the means of comparing these notions with those expressed in the code of Manu, we will quote the passage in which they occur. It runs as follows:—

"When Bhîshma, the best of combatants, had put the damsels on

his chariot, he said, with a voice like thunder, to the assembled kings: (1) Giving away a damsel to men of distinguished qualities, after having invited them, and after having decked her with ornaments, and given her as much property as possible, is one mode of marriage mentioned by the wise. (2) Some give a damsel away for a pair of kine. (3) Others again acquire her for a named amount of wealth; (4) some by force, and (5) others having made her consent; (6) some again approach a damsel when she is disordered in her mind; (7) others marry her of their own accord; (8) and some marry wives in doing honour to the Ârsha mode. This you should know is the eighth mode chosen by the wise. But men of the military caste exalt and practice the 'self-choice' mode, and those who declare the law call the choicest of all wives the wife who has been carried off by force."

It may be conceded—as Nîlakantha, the only commentator who appends any remarks to these words, suggests—that Bhîshma's first mode is Manu's Brâhma mode, his second that which Manu first calls Ârsha, his third Manu's Âsura mode, his fourth that which in Manu is the Râkshasa, his fifth the Gândharva, and his sixth the Paisâcha mode. But when the same commentator identifies Bhîshma's seventh mode with Manu's Prâjâpatya, and says that his eighth is Manu's Daiva mode, his interpretation is plainly arbitrary, as there is nothing in Manu's explanation of these two modes to warrant an inference of this kind. We must, on the contrary, conclude that Bhîshma alludes to two other modes unknown to Manu, just as he extols two special Kshattriya kinds of nuptials, one of which is not mentioned by Manu at all—the Svayamvara—whereas the other is merely declared by him to be a legal mode, but nothing else. It is interesting, moreover, to notice that in the long instruction which Bhîshma imparts to Yudhishthira when on his death-bed of arrows—in the thirteenth book

of the Mahâbhârata—he gives another account of the marriage law. There he does not enumerate *all* the modes of marriage; but so far as it goes his account is in perfect harmony with the statement of the old law-giver, and to a certain extent delivered in the very words of Manu himself. But the thirteenth book, there is sufficient evidence to prove, does not belong to the oldest portions of the great epos; it is a later addition to it, and was modelled on the received and standard law. A discrepancy of a similar character is that between the law of inheritance as stated in some portion of the great epos and the code of Manu, and later codes of law. In speaking of the twelve descriptions of sons which a man may have, Manu says:—

"Of the twelve sons of men whom Manu the son of Brahmâ has named six are kinsmen and heirs, six *not heirs, but kinsmen.* The son begotten by a man (in lawful wedlock), the son of his wife (by a kinsman authorised to procreate a son for her husband), one given to him (by his parents), one adopted, one of concealed birth, one abandoned (by his natural parents), are the six kinsmen and heirs. The son of a damsel (who is unmarried), the son of a pregnant bride, a son bought, a son by a twice-married woman (or by a woman betrothed to one man and given in marriage to another), one who offers himself up as a son, and a son by a woman of the servile caste—are the six *kinsmen, but not heirs.*"

Pându, however, gives to his wife Prithâ the following account of these different kinds of sons;—

"In the code of law six sons are mentioned who are kinsmen and heirs, and (after these) six sons who are *neither kinsmen, nor heirs*—the son begotten by a man himself, the son of his wife (by a kinsman authorised to procreate a child for her husband), the son bought (accord-

ing to one version; according to another, the son begotten for money), the son by a twice-married woman (or by a woman betrothed to one and given in marriage to another), the son of a damsel (who is unmarried), and the son of an adulterous woman, the son given (by his parents), the son bartered away, the son adopted, one who offers himself up as a son, the son of a pregnant bride, the son of a relative, and the son by a woman of the servile caste."

Enough has been adduced to indicate that there are portions in the Mahâbhârata—and we may add that they occupy a considerable part of it—in which a state of Hindu society is pictured that is anterior to the code of Manu; and an investigation of those portions would show that this society differs from the society mirrored by this ancient code not only in regard to positive laws, but also in customs and morality. Whether the account of that state of society, too, as we possess it in the actual Mahâbhârata, is anterior to Manu is another problem, and one perhaps more difficult to solve. Yet, after the observations made before, we would venture to say that such a solution is not impossible. Where the Brahmanical arrangers of the great epos endeavour to palliate or to explain away obnoxious facts or doctrines which they could not suppress, it is probable that their account of these facts or doctrines belongs to a later of the several recensions, which, as Professor Lassen has proved, the epos had to undergo. But where such facts are related, without any attempt at harmonizing them with the object the compilers had in view, there is a strong presumption that they have been preserved in the oldest recension of the epos, and that this recension was likewise anterior to the standard codes of law. Later recensions may have, and in some cases unquestionably have, obscured the antiquity of this oldest recension by mixing up with it legends and other matter foreign to it—such legends, for instance, as relate to Siva, whom, like the *god*, not

the hero, Krishna, we consider as an intruder into the oldest portions of the Mahâbhârata. But in many cases it is easy even now to distinguish these interpolations from the original story into which they were forced. We cannot agree, therefore, with Mr. Wheeler when he is inclined to assign, even to those oldest portions of the Mahâbhârata, a period at which Buddhism had already made its appearance in India; we on the contrary fully concur with Professor Lassen, who considers Buddhism posterior to them. That there are portions of the epos which are post-Buddhistic cannot be matter of doubt, but even these we see no reason to ascribe to a date subsequent to the rise of Christianity. Some years ago an opinion of this kind was volunteered on the ground that there was a similarity between some legends relating to Krishna, and some connected with the life of Christ. But apart from the circumstance that it would be begging the question to consider those Hindu legends as borrowed from the legends of the Bible; coincidences of this nature are so frequent in history that an attempt at basing on them inferences of a chronological bearing seems almost ludicrous. It is probably a similarity between certain scenes described in the poems of Homer and the Mahâbhârata which gave rise to the rumour, told by Dio Chrysostomus, that the Hindus had translated and sang the poetry of Homer; but it would be just as critical to base chronological conclusions on this rumour and on that similarity, as it would be to base them on the faint resemblance which the mythological history of Krishna bears to some Christian legends.

Before, however, Sanskrit philology has established with as much probability as its critical means will permit at least the relative chronological position of the immense material which constitutes the actual Mahâbhârata, it must remain hazardous to decide which portion of it has preserved intact the historical lore of Hindu antiquity, and which has not; but legends and myths, customs and laws, religious

doctrines and philosophical speculations—in short, the vast episodical vegetation which has overgrown the stem of the great epos—they likewise, and as much as the main story of the epos itself, are concerned in this critical labour; for they have, too, their problems and their history. We therefore sincerely wish that the learned works which called forth these cursory remarks may speed on this labour, and lead it to a satisfactory result.

ON THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION OF HINDU LAW.

The attention of the East India Association having lately been drawn by Mr. W. Tayler to some urgent wants in the administration of justice, in so far as Indian litigants in general are concerned, it may not be inexpedient to bring under your notice the difficulties which beset the course of justice in reference to a particular class of cases which it did not enter into the scope of Mr. Tayler's able paper to deal with, viz. of those cases which are governed by Hindu law.

This law, I need not explain, concerns two topics of litigation only —that of inheritance and that of adoption—topics intimately connected with Hindu religious belief, and therefore allowed to remain free from the touch of foreign legislation.

The Hindu law, it is likewise unnecessary for me to add, is laid down in the ancient and mediæval works of the Hindus, all of which are written in Sanskrit. It is contained in the code of Manu, in that of Yâjnavalkya, in the codes of numerous legislators, which are intermediate between, or posterior to, both these great authorities, and in a number of subsequent, but very important commentaries and digests, which have developed the ancient law, and ultimately, because latest in time, have become first in authority.* Amongst these, one of the most

* See 'Yâjnavalkya-Dharmasâstra,' I., 4, 5; H. T. Colebrooke's Preface to 'Two Treatises on the Hindu Law of Inheritance;' A. F. Stenzler, 'Zur Literatur der Indischen Gesetzbücher,' in A. Weber's 'Indische Studien,' vol. i., pp. 232 ff.; Standish Grove Grady, 'A Treatise on the Hindoo Law of Inheritance,' pp. lix.—lxxiv.

important in all matters relating to the law of inheritance is the *Mitâkharâ* of *Vijnânes'vara*, which, as Colebrooke says, is, with the exception of Bengal, "received in all the schools of Hindu law, from Benares to the southern extremity of the peninsula of India, as the chief groundwork of the doctrines which they follow, and as an authority from which they rarely dissent."* The Mitâkharâ was expanded in subsequent digests, and, in consequence, the Vivâdachintâmaṅi, the Ratnâkara, and Vivâdachandra, became the first legal authorities, on matters of inheritance, in Mithilâ (Tirhut); the Vîramitrodaya and the works of Kamalâkara became so at Benares; the Vyavahâramayûkha amongst the Mahrattas, and the Smr'itichandrikâ and Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya at Madras.

In Bengal the paramount authority on the law of inheritance is Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga, which in several important respects differs from the ruling of the Mitâkharâ; and in agreement with it are Raghunandana's Dâyatattva, S'rîkrishna-Tarkâlankâra's Dâyakramasangraha, besides various other works, which it is not necessary here to enumerate.†

The best authorities on the law of adoption are the Dattakamîmânsâ, by Nanda Pand'ita; the Dattakachandrikâ, by Devand'a Bhat't'a; and after them, the Dattakanirṅaya, Dattakatilaka, Dattakadarpaṅa, Dattakakaumudî, Dattakadîdhiti, and Dattakasiddhântamanjarî. All these commentaries and digests derive their authority from, and profess to be based on, the codes of Manu and Yâjnavalkya and the other lawgivers already alluded to. They do not admit that there is any real difference between the laws laid down in the ancient works; and wherever any such differences seem to exist, they either endeavour to reconcile them by the interpretations they put on their texts, or explain them away by

* 'Two Treatises,' Pref., p. iv.

† Compare the works mentioned in the note of the preceding page.

the assumption of accidental omissions which they supply. And it is in consequence of such interpretations or additions that different conclusions have obtained in the Mitâkshará- and the Bengal-schools, though both profess to derive their opinions from a correct and authoritative understanding of the same ancient texts.

That all these commentaries and digests, whenever it suits their line of argument, occasionally also refer to other non-legal works of Sanskrit literature, such as the vedic Gr'ihyasûtras, the Mahâbhârata, Râmâyaṅa, the Purâṅas, and even the grammar of Pâṅini, need not surprise us, for their object is to convey the impression that a harmonious spirit pervades the whole antiquity of India, and that their ruling, therefore, is in accordance with all that is sacred to the Hindu mind.

Now, from the facts I have been able to gather, it would appear that, with scarcely any exception, the English judges who are entrusted with the administration of the Hindu law of inheritance and adoption, are not acquainted with the Sanskrit language, and are unable therefore to found their decisions on a direct and immediate knowledge and examination of the original law sources just mentioned.* They must resort, therefore, to second-hand information which they derive from translations, and the assistance afforded them by the pleadings of counsel and otherwise. But as I am probably not very wrong in assuming that for the most part the counsel, too, are indebted for their knowledge of the Hindu law, not to the original texts, but to translations of them, these translations are the real basis on which the administration of the Hindu law at present rests, and it will, therefore, be necessary to give a brief account of them.

* 'The Law of Partition and Succession, from the Vyavahâranirn'aya,' by A. C. Burnell. Mangalore, 1872. Preface, p. x. 'Dâyadas'as'lokî,' by the same. Ibid., 1875, p. 5.

Of the code of Manu there exists the well-known complete translation of Sir W. Jones, first published in 1794, then in 1796, and reprinted by Haughton in 1825. It was translated into German by Hüttner in 1797. A French translation of the original by Loiseleur Deslongchamps, mainly agreeing with that of his predecessor, appeared in 1133.* A complete translation in German of the code of Yâjnavalkya was published by Professor Stenzler in 1849; and some portions of the same code, translated into English by Dr. Röer and Mr. Montriou, appeared in 1859.

The Mitâkshará of Vijnánes'vara is a running commentary on each verse of Yâjnavalkya's Institutes. The latter consists of three parts. The first treats of *áchára*, or established rules of conduct, comprising such subjects as education and marriage, funeral rites, &c. The second

* About thirty years ago, I believe, there appeared at Calcutta a few parts of a new edition and translation of Manu, which seem to have remained almost unknown in Europe. The quarto volume in question, when opened, contains on the left side in one column the text of Manu in Devanâgarî, and in Bengal characters; and in another, a Bengali translation of the corresponding verses, a few notes in Bengali being generally added to the page; on the right side it contains in one column Sir W. Jones's translation, and parallel to it, in another column, a new English translation, which may be looked upon as a running criticism on the former. For though it repeats as much as it approves of Sir W. Jones's translation, in the very words of the latter, this is apparently done in order to make its divergence from it still more prominent; and this divergence is not inconsiderable, and very often marks a decided improvement on the rendering of Sir W. Jones. Foot-notes in English, moreover, are frequently added to justify the discrepancies. Unfortunately—for there is no doubt that the author of the new translation was a very competent scholar—in the two copies of it known to me, the text breaks off at verse 40, and the translation at verse 33, of Book 3, while these two copies do not contain the name of the author or a date; and since all my endeavours to learn more about the progress of the work have been unsuccessful, I apprehend that no more of it, than the portions I have seen, has appeared in print. The name of the editor and translator, as I learn from a friend, is Tarachund Chuckerbutt.

part treats of *vyavahâra*, or the business of life, including amongst many other topics judicature and inheritance; the third part treats of *prâyas'chitta*, and comprises penance, purification, transmigration, and kindred subjects. Of the Vyavahâra part of the Mitâksharâ eight chapters translated by W. H. Macnaghten first appeared in 1829; and that portion of it which strictly relates to inheritance, about the fourteenth part of the whole work, exists in the well-known translation by Colebrooke, first published in 1810, and then edited in his Hindu law books by Mr. Whitley Stokes in 1865. Of the Vyavahâramayûkha, Harry Borradaile published a translation in 1827, which likewise reappeared in Mr. Stokes's Hindu law books in 1865.

The Vivâdachintâmani, translated into English by Prosonno Coomar Tagore, was published in 1863; the Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya, by Mr. A. C. Burnell, in 1868, and—through the medium of Tamul sources, as I am informed—the Smritichandrikâ, by Mr. T. Kristnasawmy Iyer, in 1867. Of Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga we possess the translation of Colebrooke, first published in 1810, and in his law books by Mr. Stokes in 1865; and of the Dâyakramasangraha—also edited in the same collection by the same distinguished scholar—the translation of Wynch, first published in 1818.

Lastly, the Dattakamîmânsâ and Dattakachandrikâ exist in a translation by Sutherland, first published in 1821, then in 1825, and also embodied in Mr. Stokes's Hindu law books.

Besides these few translations, nothing whatever worth mentioning, out of the large bulk of Hindu law literature, is accessible to the English judge, if unacquainted with Sanskrit, except a few disconnected verses of the ancient lawgivers, put together, without any reference to the context in which they stand, in the Digest of Hindu law prepared by Jagannâtha under the directions of Sir W. Jones.*

* Colebrooke's opinion of this Digest is contained in the following passage

The question, then, which I have to raise is this: Do these translations—a mere fraction, I need not say, of the large mass of Hindu law literature—suffice both in quality and quantity for ensuring to litigants a proper and satisfactory administration of the Hindu law of inheritance and adoption?

Before giving my opinion on this point, I will place myself in the position of a judge who has no means of examining for himself the original text of a statute, and I should then have to assume that the question asked must be answered by him in the affirmative. For on what grounds could he decide that the translations enumerated above were insufficient in quantity, and how could he undertake to say that any objection mooted against their reliability was valid or not? It would be a dangerous and, I hold, an arbitrary proceeding on his part were he to overrule, for instance, the translation of a passage by Tagore or Burnell, merely because the translation of the same passage by Colebrooke did not agree with it, and because the authority of Colebrooke stands higher than that of the scholars differing from him. For however high the authority of anyone, a doubt of this kind cannot be finally settled by it; and a mere consideration of the immense progress made

from his preface to the 'Two Treatises,' &c., p. ii.:—"In the preface to the translation of the Digest, I hinted an opinion unfavourable to the arrangement of it, as it has been executed by the native compiler. I have been confirmed in that opinion of the compilation, since its publication; and indeed the author's method of discussing together the discordant opinions maintained by the lawyers of the several schools, without distinguishing in an intelligible manner which of them is the received doctrine of each school, but on the contrary leaving it uncertain whether any of the opinions stated by him do actually prevail, or which doctrine must now be considered to be in force and which obsolete, renders his work of little utility to persons conversant with the law, and of still less service to those who are not versed in *Indian* jurisprudence; especially to the *English* reader, for whose use, through the medium of translation, the work was particularly intended."

by Sanskrit studies since the time when the great Colebrooke wrote, of the large quantity of new materials that have since come to light, of all the advantages in short, which, in consequence of the very labours of Colebrooke, later workers in the same field must have over him, would naturally make a judge hesitate in disposing of such doubts simply on the ground of tradition and authority.

Yet instances of such conflicting translations are by no means rare; and where therefore for his final opinion the judge would have to rely on third parties, his position would at any rate not be safe.

To illustrate this uncertainty I will choose at random a few examples as they occur to me.

The Mitâkshará and the digests, as I have already observed, constantly support their statements by quotations from Manu, Yâjnavalkya, and the other lawgivers; but as every disputed case has not been foreseen by them, these very quotations sometimes become the principal basis on which the judgment in a particular case has to rest.

In dealing with the rights of brothers, a verse of Yâjnavalkya is quoted by the Dâyabhâga of Jîmûtavâhana, which Colebrooke translates as follows:—

"A half-brother, being again associated, may take the succession; not a *half-brother*,* though not re-united: but one united [by blood, *though not by coparcenary*] may obtain the property; and not [*exclusively*] the son of a different mother."†

In the Vivâdachintâmaṇi, Tagore translates this verse thus:—

"Re-united step-brothers, but not *brothers* who live separated, shall take each other's property. A uterine brother *even when he is separated*, shall have the property. But a *separated* step-brother cannot get it."‡

* The *italics* in this and the following quotations are intended to facilitate a comparison of the discrepancies.

† XI., 5, 13. ‡ P. 306.

Again, in the Vyavahâramayûkha we find Borradaile translating this verse:—

"One of a different womb, being again associated, may take the succession; not one of a different womb, if not re-united: but [a whole brother *if*] *re-united*, obtains the property; and not [*exclusively*] the son of a different mother."*

Hence, according to Colebrooke, a brother united by blood; according to Tagore, a uterine brother, *even when he is separated*, may obtain the property; while according to Borradaile a whole brother may obtain it, but only on the condition of being *re-united*. Again, Colebrooke and Borradaile say that the son of a different mother cannot get the succession *exclusively*, while Tagore says, that a step-brother cannot get it, if *separated*.

Or, under the heading of effects not liable to partition, the Mitâkshará cites a verse from Nârada, which Colebrooke translates:—

"He who maintains the family of a brother studying science, shall take, be he ever so ignorant, a share of the wealth gained by science."†

In the Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya, Mr. Burnell renders the same verse:—

"A member of a family though he be ignorant, who supports his brother while learning science, shall get a share of the wealth acquired by that brother by learning."‡

And Tagore, in the Vivâdachintâmaṅi:—

"Wealth, acquired by a learned man, whose family was supported, *during his absence from home* to acquire learning, by a brother, shall be shared with the latter, even if he be ignorant."§

Hence, according to Tagore's version a brother acquires this right only when he supports his brother's family during his absence from

* IV., 9, 10. I., 4, 8. ‡ P. 49. § P. 253.

home—a restriction not contained in Colebrooke's and Burnell's translation of the same passage.*

Again, when treating of the succession to a woman's peculiar property, Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga quotes a verse of Devala, which according to Colebrooke says:—

"Her subsistence, her ornaments, her perquisites, and *her gains*, are the separate property of a woman. She herself exclusively enjoys it; and her husband has no right to use it, unless in distress."†

But in the Vivâdachintâmaṅi, Tagore renders the same verse thus:—

"Food and vesture, ornaments, perquisites, and *wealth received by a woman from a kinsman*, are her own property;" &c.‡

Hence in Colebrooke's translation the *stridhana* applies to all the gains of a woman; while in that of Tagore—and he italicizes the words "from a kinsman"—it applies solely to the wealth which a woman receives *from a kinsman*.

The word perquisite (sometimes also called "fee") in the foregoing quotations is the Sanskrit *s'ulka*, and as an item of *stridhana* it is defined in Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga by a reference to Kâtyâyana, which Colebrooke translates as follows:—

"Whatever has been received, as a price, of workmen on houses, furniture, and carriages, milking vessels and ornaments, is denominated a fee" (S'ulka).§

In the Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya Mr. Burnell renders this verse as follows:—

"What is received as the price of utensils for the house, or cattle, or milch cows, for personal ornaments or for work, that is called *Sulka*."‖

* Jolly's translation of 'Nârada's Institutes," xiii., 10. Mayr, 'Das Indische Erbrecht,' p. 26. Burnell, 'Vyavahâranirn'aya,' p. 29.

† IV., 1. 15. ‡ P. 263 § IV., 3, 19. ‖ P. 41.

And Tagore, in the Vivâdachintâmaṅi:—

"The small sums which are received by a woman as the price or rewards of household duties, using household utensils, tending beasts of burden, looking after milch cattle, taking care of ornaments of dress, or superintending servants, are called her perquisites."*

The claims of a woman on the ground of S'ulka would therefore be greatly different according to the rendering of Colebrooke, Burnell, or Tagore, of the same authoritative passage.†

An outcast, it is well known, is subject to legal disabilities; he is not allowed to testify, and he is excluded from inheritance. Now Sir W. Jones, and after him Tagore,‡ render the verse of Manu, IX., 202, in the following way:—

"But it is just that the heir who knows his duty should give all of them [viz. relatives who are excluded from inheritance] food and raiment for life without stint, according to the best of his power: he who gives them nothing *sinks assuredly to a region of punishment.*"

But in the *Mitâkshará*,§ where this passage from Manu is quoted, Colebrooke renders it:—

"But it is fit, that a wise man should give all of them food and raiment without stint to the best of his power: for he, who gives it not, shall be deemed *an outcast.*"

According to Sir W. Jones and Tagore, such a dereliction of duty would therefore entail a spiritual consequence only, but according to Colebrooke serious legal penalties too.‖

Without multiplying instances like these, I may now ask how could a judge, without a knowledge of Sanskrit, decide which of these scholars

* P. 258.

† Jolly, 'Die rechtliche Stellung der Frauen bei den alten Indern,' p. 23 ff. Mayr, l.l., p. 167. Burnell, l.l., p. 45 ff.

‡ 'Vivâdach.' p. 243. § II., 10, 5. ‖ Burnell, l.l., p. 13.

is right, or whether their difference of translation is based on a different reading of the same text, and if so, which of these different readings has a claim to greater authority than the rest? And if he cannot decide this question, what is to become of justice in all those cases that are governed by the law contained in these conflicting versions?

But as a Hindu has clearly a right to have justice done to him according to what are *his* real authorities, it is impossible to forego the question whether the present English translation of the law books can be implicitly relied upon as an equivalent for the originals.

On the whole, I have no doubt they may; and of all translations from Sanskrit into a European language I know of none to which, in my opinion, greater admiration is due than to the translation of Jîmûtavâhana's and Vijnânes'vara's law of inheritance by Colebrooke. So great, indeed, was the conscientiousness of that scholar, so thorough his understanding of the Hindu mind, and so vast and accurate his Sanskrit learning, that there is always the strongest reason for hesitation whenever one might feel disposed to question a rendering of his. And as Colebrooke's authority is still paramount in all law courts which have to deal with Hindu law, the aid afforded by his works to English judges cannot be too highly valued.

But, in the first place, the same high opinion cannot be entertained of all the translations already mentioned, for, with the exception of the version of the Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya by Mr. Burnell, most of them are often too free and vague to be thoroughly reliable; and even the translation of the Vivâdachintâmaṅi by the late Prosonno C. Tagore, is often more paraphrastic than is compatible with an accurate rendering of the text.

And in the second place, it should also be remembered that, apart from Burnell's, Tagore's, and Kristnasawmy's translations which appeared a few years ago, and those of Loiseleur Deslongchamps, Stenzler,

and Röer, which may likewise be looked upon as relating to our own period, the remaining important works date from the end of the last and the earlier part of the present century, when there was not a single critical edition of any of their originals. Hence, with the MS. materials which have since come to light, with the numerous good editions of law texts to which it is now easy to refer,—I may here only name the admirable edition, by Bharatachandras'iromaṇi, of Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga, with seven commentaries, published under the patronage of P. C. Tagore, the various editions of Yâjnavalkya, with the whole Mitâksharâ, published at Calcutta, Benares, and Bombay, and several editions of Manu, with the commentary of Kullûkabhaṭṭa, —in a word, with the immense progress which Sanskrit studies have made for the last thirty years, both in India and Europe, it would be much more surprising if these translations were still found to stand the test of modern scholarship, than if they were found to fail.

And from this point of view alone must we judge of imperfections which occur, not only in Borradaile, Wynch, and Sutherland, but also in Sir W. Jones's translation of Manu, and even in Colebrooke's translations of the two treatises of Vijnânes'vara and Jîmûtavâhana. Yet that such imperfections exist, whatever the cause may be, is undeniable; and as even the accomplished work of Colebrooke is not entirely exempt from them, it may easily be inferred that they call for the attention of those who are answerable for the administration of the Hindu law.

To illustrate the nature of the imperfections of which I here speak, and which have a material bearing on the law of succession, I will choose some instances from Colebrooke's 'Two Treatises.'

In Jîmûtavâhana,* the right to the female line of succession is laid down in an important text from Vr'ihaspati. According to Colebrooke this text runs thus :—

* IV., 3, 31.

"The mother's sister, *the maternal uncle*, the father's sister, the mother-in-law, and the wife of an elder brother, are pronounced similar to mothers. If they leave no issue of their bodies, nor son [of a rival wife], nor daughter's son, nor son of those persons, the sister's son and the rest shall take their property."

That in a series of female relatives the "*maternal uncle*" should occur, and be declared to be similar to a mother, would in itself be improbable; nor is he really mentioned there; and the mistake seems to have been caused by an omission in the MS. used by Colebrooke; for according to the correct text the passage reads:—

"The mother's sister, *the wife of a maternal uncle, the paternal uncle's wife*, the father's sister, the mother-in-law, and the wife of an elder brother are pronounced similar to mothers. If they leave no issue of their body, nor son, nor daughter's son, nor son of those persons, the sister's son and the rest shall take their property."*

Hence the maternal uncle cannot claim on the ground of this passage, but in his stead the wife of a maternal uncle and the paternal uncle's wife can so claim.†

In the same chapter, where the son's prior right to inheritance is mentioned,‡ a quotation from Vr'iddha-S'âtâtapa is made at the same time to show in what order the succession of other persons is regulated in accordance with the benefits which, through the S'râddha rites, they may confer on the soul of the deceased. Colebrooke renders the passage as follows:—

"The son's preferable right too appears to rest on his presenting the greatest number of beneficial oblations, and on his rescuing his parent

* Calc. 8vo. ed., 1829 (p. 154); Bharatach.'s ed. (p. 172): mâtuh' svasâ mâtulâni, pitr'ivyastrî pitr'isvasâ, s'vas'rûh' pûrvajapatnî cha mâtr'itulyâh' prakîrtitâh'; yad âsâm auraso na syât suto dauhitra eva vâ, tatsuto vâ dhanam' tâsâm' svasrîyâdyâh' samâpnuyuh'.

† Burnell, l.l., p. 51. ‡ IV., 3, 36.

from hell. And a passage of Vr'iddha-S'âtâtapa expressly provides for the funeral oblations of *these women:* 'For the wife of a maternal uncle or of a sister's son, of a father-in-law and of a spiritual-parent, of a friend and of a maternal grandfather, as well as for the sister of the mother or of the father, the oblation of food at obsequies must be performed. Such is the settled rule among those who are conversant with the Vedas.'"

The drift of the quotation from Vr'iddha-S'âtâtapa as it stands would not be intelligible, for Jîmûtavâhana alleges his words, not in order to state *for* whom the S'râddha should be performed, but *by whom* the benefits are conferred, and thus the title to inheritance in succession is acquired. But according to the words of the correct text, and the interpretation of them in the Dâyanirṅaya, the passage from Vr'iddha-S'âtâtapa would have to be rendered thus:—

". . . . And a passage of Vr'iddha-S'âtâtapa expressly provides for the funeral oblations of the following persons (*masc.*): the maternal uncle (performs the S'râddha) for a sister's son, and a sister's son for his maternal uncle, (a son-in-law) for a father-in-law; a (pupil) for a spiritual teacher, (a friend) for a friend, and (a daughter's son) for a maternal grandfather. And also for the wives of these persons, and the sister of a mother and father, the oblation of food at obsequies must be performed. Such, &c."*

* The original passage, according to the text published in Calc. 1829 (p. 157), and Bharatach.'s edition (p. 175), is as follows:—Mâtulo bhâgineyasya svasrîyo mâtulasya cha, s'vas'urasya guros' chaiva sakhyur mâtâmahasya cha, eteshâm' chaiva bhâryâbhyah' svasur mâtuh' pitus tathâ, s'râddhadânam' tu kartavyam iti vedavidâm' sthitir iti Vr'iddha-S'âtâtapa-vachanât. Amîshâm pin'd'adatva-pratipâdanâd ayam pin'd'adânavis'eshâd adhikârakramah'.

In the *Dâyakaumudî*, where this passage from S'âtâtapa is quoted (ed. Calc., p. 155), the following comment from the *Dâyan'irnaya* is appended to it: Mâtulo bhâgineyasya pin'd'adah'; evam' svasrîyo mâtulasya pin'd'adah'; s'vas'urasya

The importance of this passage had a recent illustration in the case of Grihadi Lall Roy *v.* the Government of Bengal. Gridhari was the maternal uncle of the father of a deceased Zemindar, whose inheritance he claimed, no other heirs claiming; but as the Bengal Government maintained that there was no law-text under which a maternal uncle could succeed to the property of a sister's son, it held that this was a case of escheat, and the High Court at Calcutta actually delivered a judgment in favour of the Crown. Now, since it has never been denied that a clear duty to perform the S'râddha implies a right to succeed, there can be no doubt that the judgment of the High Court must have been different, had it been able to avail itself of the correct translation of the passage quoted, proving as that does, the maternal uncle's duty to perform the S'râddha for a sister's son.

In Jîmûtavâhana,* according to Colebrooke, a grandmother and great grandmother would seem to have no right to succeed, inasmuch as they take no part in the Srâddha. It is true that the passage alluded to would stand in direct contradiction with others in the same work, where the grandmother's and great-grandmother's right is distinctly admitted, but the fact is that no such contradiction results from the original text. Colebrooke's words are:—

"Nor can it be pretended that the stepmother, grandmother and great-grandmother take their places at the funeral repast, in consequence of [ancestors being deified] with their wives."

Whereas the correct original text would in the translation run:—

"Nor can it be pretended that a stepmother, a stepmother of a father, and a stepmother of a paternal grandfather, take their places at

jâmâtâ pin'd'adah'; guroh' pin'd'adâtâ s'ishyah'; mâtâmahasya pin'd'adâtâ dauhitrah. Eteshâm mâtulâdînâm bhâryâbhyah' strîbhyah s'râddhadânam' kartavyam iti vedârthopanibandhr'în'âm' nisht'hâ; iti Dâyan'irn'ayah'.

* XI., 6, 3.

the funeral repast, in consequence of [ancestors being deified] with their wives."*

In the translation of the Mitâksharâ†—for I will also add an instance or two from this treatise—a curious mistake has been caused by Colebrooke's adopting part of the translation by Sir W. Jones of a passage of Manu, quoted by Vijnânes'vara in support of his rule regarding effects not liable to partition.

"If the horses or the like," Vijnânes'vara says, "be numerous, they must be distributed among coheirs who live by the sale of them. If they cannot be divided, the number being unequal, they belong to the eldest brother, as ordained by Manu." And now follows the quotation from the latter,‡ which Colebrooke has rendered thus:—

"Let them never divide a single goat or sheep, or a single beast with uncloven hoofs: a single goat or sheep belongs to the first-born."

How, on the ground of such a text from Manu, the Mitâksharâ could forbid the division of an unequal number of cattle, would be unintelligible. But what Manu really says is:—

"If goats and sheep, together with beasts that have uncloven feet, are of an unequal number, let no division be made of them; but let such an unequal number of goats and sheep (*v.l.* let such goats and sheep, with beasts that have uncloven feet), go to the first-born."

The error arose from the translators mistaking the import of the singular number which is required by Sanskrit compounds to express collectiveness, and which in the case of the Dvandva compound *ajâvikam*

* Calc. ed. 1829 (p. 323), Bharatach.'s ed. (p. 332): Na cha sapatnîkatvena sapatnîmâtuh' sapatnîpitâmahyâh' sapatnîprapitâmahyâs' cha s'râddhe 'nupraves'ah'. Compare the analogous passage in the *Vîramitrodaya*, f. 208, *b*, ll. 1 ff.

In this instance a printer's mistake perhaps caused the inaccuracy in Colebrooke's rendering; for if we read in it "the step- mother, -grand- mother." &c., the chief discrepany would be removed.

† I., 4, 18. ‡ IX., 119. [Mayr, l.l l., p. 34.]

"goats and sheep" is also interpreted in this sense by the commentator Kullûkabhaṭṭa, with a reference to the grammar of Pâṇini.*

In the chapter which treats of the right of a widow to inherit the estate of one who leaves no male issue, the Mitâksharâ† says:—

"In the first place, the wife shares the estate. 'Wife' (patnî) signifies a woman espoused in lawful wedlock; conformably with the etymology of the term as implying a connexion with religious rites. *The singular number 'wife' (in the text of Yâjnavalkya) signifies the kind; hence if there are several wives belonging to the same or different castes, they divide the property according to the shares (prescribed to them), and take it.*"

The italicized words are entirely omitted in Colebrooke's translation, and as there is no other passage in the Mitâksharâ which relates to the emergency of several wives surviving a man who leaves no male issue, it is needless to point out how important they are in a disputed case of this nature. The omission, I may add, has already been noticed by Mr. Stokes in a note to page 53 of his 'Hindu Law Books,' where he comments on a passage of Borradaile's Vyavahâramayûkha.

I need not enlarge any further on mistakes of this nature, which, as I have already observed, may chiefly have arisen from the imperfect condition of MSS. which were used for the translations; but it is clear that they may become a serious impediment to rightful claims, and obstruct the course of justice.

Apart however from the question, whether a judge could entirely rely on these translations of Sanskrit law texts, it remains to be seen

* *Mit.* (I., 4, 18): Ajâvikam' saikas'apham' na jâtu vishamam bhajet, ajâvikam' tu vishamam (*a. l.* saikas'apham') jyesht'hasyaiva vidhîyate, iti Manu-smaran'ât.—*Kullûkabhaṭṭa* to *Manu*, IX., 119: ajâvikam iti pas'udvandvâd vibhâshayaikavadbhâvah' (comp. Pân. II., 4, 11).

† II., 1, 5.

whether, even in their most perfect condition, the existing translations of the Hindu law books could be held to suffice for the settlement of the numerous cases that arise from disputes in matters of Hindu inheritance and adoption.

No one, I think, acquainted with the works enumerated at the commencement of this paper, and with works of Sanskrit literature quoted by them, would affirm that they *do* suffice. He would, on the contrary, have to own that many law-books, as yet untranslated are sometimes a material aid, and sometimes even indispensable, for a correct understanding of the Mitâkharâ and the digest of Jîmûtavâhana.

The *Vîramitrodaya*, for instance, is to a large extent a full commentary on the Mitâkharâ, which it copiously quotes; and the same may be said of the *Smr'itichandrikâ*, of which a few years ago not a line had appeared in print, and of which even now a trustworthy translation cannot be said to exist. Again, the seven commentaries on Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga, Raghunandana's Smr'ititattva, the treatises of Kamalâkara, the Dâyakaumudî, and kindred works, are in numerous instances the best, if not the only, means for arriving at the precise meaning of its text. And so long as all these works remain untranslated, justice to the Hindus in matters of inheritance must remain uncertain, because it would often have to depend on the reasoning of the European mind, which failing to appreciate the historical facts and the religious ground on which Hindu reasoning proceeds, must necessarily often become fallacious. In a recent case tried in the High Court at Fort William, the Chief Justice gave the advice, not to introduce English notions into cases governed by Hindu law. "The Hindu law of inheritance," he very justly observed, "is based upon the Hindu religion, and we must be cautious that in administering Hindu law we do not, by acting upon our notions derived from English law, inadvertently wound or offend the religious feelings of those who may be affected by our deci-

sions; or lay down principles at variance with the religions of those whose law we are administering."—(In the High Court of Judicature at Fort William. Ordinary original civil jurisdiction, 1st September, 1869, Gannendro Mohun Tagore *v.* Opendro Mohun Tagore, &c., p. 23.)

Yet how much even judges of the highest standing are liable to err, if, for a knowledge of the positive Hindu law, they substitute that which from an English point of view may appear to be the most logical and faultless reasoning, will be seen by the instance of a Privy Council judgment which, if relied upon as a precedent, would materially alter the whole Hindu law of inheritance in one of its vital points.

The judgment I am here alluding to is that delivered on the 30th of November, 1863, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council upon the appeal of Kattama Nauchear *v.* the Râjâ of Sivaganga, from the Sudder Devanny Adawlut at Madras.

The object of the litigation was the Zemindary of Sivaganga, situated in the Madras Presidency. Its last owner, who was in undisputed possession of it, had died in 1829, leaving no male issue, but several wives by whom he had daughters; and the daughter of one of those wives was the appellant in the case; for the Sudder Court at Madras had decided against her claims, and pronounced in favour of the respondent, a nephew of the deceased, who at the time of the appeal was in possession of the Zemindary.

The issues of the case, as stated in the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, were these:—

1. Were Gaurivallabha (the deceased Râjâ) and his brother (for the grandson of the latter was the respondent, the Râjâ in possession) undivided in estate, or had a partition taken place between them?

2. If they were undivided, was the Zemindary the self-acquired and separate property of Gaurivallabha (the deceased Râjâ)? And if so—

3. What is the course of succession according to the Hindu law of

the south of India of such an acquisition, where the family is in other respects an undivided family?

The first of these questions, the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council answered in the sense that the deceased Râjâ and his brother were *undivided* in estate; and this being a question of fact, we have simply to accept their Lordships' finding.

In regard to the second question, the judgment held that the Zemindary was not the ancestral, but the self-acquired and separate property of the late Râjâ; and this, too, being a question of fact, no remark has to be added to it.

Concerning the third, however, which is a question of law, the judgment went on to say, that according to the law in the south of India, as affecting members of an undivided family, the Zemindary would have passed to the nephew had it been ancestral property, but being self-acquired property, the daughter of one of the widows—the appellant in the case—was entitled to it.

Now, in the first place, I must here observe that this judgment is exclusively based on what their Lordships consider to be the law of the Mitâkshará. That the Mitâkshará is *one* of the law authorities in the south of India is unquestionable; but it is likewise an undisputed fact that it is not the *primary* authority in that part of India. As before stated, the Mitâkshará, which is merely a running commentary on the text of Yâjnavalkya, is incomplete in many respects; and amongst the later works which enlarged on it and supplied its defects, the digests called *Smr'itichandrikâ* and *Vyavahâra Mâdhavîya* became the chief authorities in the south. At the time when the Sivaganga case was pending, Mr. Burnell's translation of the Mâdhavîya did not exist, nor even the imperfect version of the Smr'itichandrikâ by Mr. Kristnasawmy Iyer. These works were then accessible only in Sanskrit MSS. Hence not so much as an allusion to them occurs in the judgment of the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and while it is not denied that the respondent had a right to have his claims dealt with according to the recognised *primary* law of his country, we here meet with the anomalous circumstance that they were decided upon according to what in the south of India is only considered as a secondary source of law.

And that this distinction is not merely a fortuitous one is proved by the case itself. For there is no text in the Mitâksharâ which clearly provides for it, whereas there are passages in the *Smr'itichandrikâ* and the *Mâdhavîya* which, I have no doubt, would have proved to their Lordships' minds that the second question they had raised was irrelevant to the case, and that their final decision was even contrary to the very spirit of the law of the Mitâksharâ.

But as they were not acquainted with the two Digests which, while in perfect accordance with the Mitâksharâ, elucidate its obscurities, their Lordships supplied the apparent defect of the Mitâksharâ with arguments which, from a European point of reasoning, might bear out the conclusion at which they arrived, but from a Hindu point of view do not.

I have already mentioned that the family of the appellant and the respondent were admittedly undivided in estate. Yet in a family of *this* description the judgment of the Judicial Committee raised the question as to what was in it ancestral, and what was self-acquired, property. Such a question, however, cannot judicially occur in an *undivided* family, so long as it remains undivided, which was here the case. The translated text of the Mitâksharâ itself is silent on the law of succession in reference to an undivided family, for the text of Yâjnavalkya, which this commentary follows verse by verse, does not deal with it; and in the first section of its second chapter, which treats of the right of widows to inherit in default of male issue, and on which the judgment in this case is exclusively based, nothing is stated affect-

ing the rights of any member of an undivided family. On the other hand, the *Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya*, and especially the *Smr'itichandrikâ*, very distinctly regulate the succession rights in an undivided family: it results from them that only a male member of such a family can be heir, and that *so long as the family remains undivided*, the whole of the property, whether ancestral or self-acquired, is vested in him.* The reasons of such a law are likewise clear. In an undivided family the principal religious duties are undivided, and the benefits, therefore, to be bestowed on the soul of the deceased ancestor—benefits on which the right of succession rests—can be conferred only by one single member of the family, its actual head.†

Not having before them this distinct law, which is quite in harmony with the law of Manu and all other legislators, and being left in doubt by a section of the Mitâksharâ, which having nothing whatever to do with the case in question could of course not enlighten them, the Lords of the Judicial Committee laid down a perfectly novel proposition which, if adopted, would alter the basis of the whole Hindu law.

"There are two principles," the judgment says,‡ "on which the rule of succession, according to the Hindu law, appears to depend: the first is that which determines the right to offer the funeral oblation, and the degree in which the person making the offering is supposed to minister to the spiritual benefit of the deceased; the other is an assumed right of survivorship."

But the fact is, that there is only *one* principle, that stated by the Report in the first proposition, and that the second does not exist at all. Of the first, Sir W. Jones had already said that it contains the key to the *whole* Hindu law of inheritance; and even the single text which

* The question, therefore, what is ancestral and what is self-acquired property can judicially only occur at the time when division takes place.

† See Appendix. ‡ Page 18.

the judgment adduces in support of its theory of a right of survivorship, had it been quoted in full, and with the remarks attached to it by the Smr'itichandrikâ, would have shown that no such right can be inferred from it.*

* After the words above quoted ("there are two principles . . . . right of survivorship") the Report continues:—"Most of the authorities rest the uncontested right of widows to inherit the estates of their husbands, dying separated from their kindred, on the first of these principles (1 Strange, 135). But some ancient authorities also invoke the other principle (viz. that of survivorship). Vr'ihaspati (3 Dig. 458, tit. cccxcix; see also Sir W. Jones' paper cited 2 Strange, 250) says:—'Of him whose wife is not deceased half the body survives; how should another take the property, while half the body of the owner lives?'" The text here quoted by the judgment reads, however, in full, as quoted by the Smr'iti-chandrikâ, thus:—"In Scripture, in the traditional code, and in popular practice, a wife (*patnî*) is declared by the wise to be half the body (of her husband), *equally sharing the fruit of (his) pure and impure acts* (*i.e.* of virtue and vice). Of him whose wife is not deceased, half the body lives; how then should another take his property while half the body of the owner lives? Although Sakulyas (distant kinsmen), although his father, his mother, and uterine brothers be present, the wife of him who died, leaving no male issue, shall take his share." (The same passage also occurs in Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga, XI., 1, 2, and in Sir W. Jones' paper, 2 Strange, 250, mentioned by the Report). The Smr'itichandrikâ (Calc. ed., p. 58) *introduces* this passage with the following words:—"Accordingly, after having pronounced that compared to other (relatives) a wife has a nearer claim *on account of the circumstance that she has the property of conferring visible and spiritual benefits* (on the deceased), Vr'ihaspati has shown that the wife has the share of her husband's property, if there are no secondary (or adopted) sons, though father and other heirs as far downwards as the Sakulyas may be alive." Again, after having explained the import of the word "wife (*patnî*)" in the passage quoted, the same law authority says:—"Accordingly, the term *patnî* gives us to understand that *her fitness to perform such religious acts, as the rites in honour of the manes, is the reason that she is entitled to take the share of her husband.*" It is clear, therefore, that though "acting upon our notions derived from English law," we might feel induced to infer from the word "lives," in the alleged passage, a right of survivorship, the Hindu mind, and especially the very law authority on which the judgment should have been based, was far from following such a course of reasoning. It looked, on the contrary, upon this passage as confirming the *spiritual* principle, and this principle alone.

The judgment further asks :—" If the first of these principles (the spiritual principle) were the only one involved, it would not be easy to see why the widow's right of inheritance should not extend to her husband's share in an undivided estate."

This question is perfectly pertinent, but it is one of the great points of difference between the Dâyabhâga- and the Mitâkshará schools. The former assuming that under any conditions the widow would confer the greatest spiritual benefits on the soul of a deceased husband, provided he leaves no male issue, in consequence rules that, in such an emergency, she is *always* entitled to succeed to the property of the husband whether the latter be divided or not. The Mitâkshará school, on the contrary, not admitting this superior spiritual power of a widow in an *undivided family*, excludes her from the position she holds in the Dâyabhâga school. But the Sivaganga case fell under the law of the Mitâkshará school, and it is not for *us* to decide whether the view of the latter regarding the *spiritual* power of a wife is, or is not, more correct than that of the Dâyabhâga school.

In short, " there being no positive text governing the case before the Judicial Committee "*—simply because their Lordships could not refer to the very law authorities conformably to which alone the case should have been decided—they relied on an irrelevant text of the Mitâkshará, and in applying the law of succession which is applicable only to a divided family, to an undivided one, even mistook this text itself.

That this judgment, if accepted as an authoritative interpretation of the Hindu law, would introduce a second principle, hitherto unknown, into the Hindu right of inheritance, and would entirely alter this law so far as undivided Hindu families are concerned, requires no further remark. But it seems equally clear that such a result could never have

* Page 16.

occurred if the Lords of the Judicial Committee had been in possession of more law texts than at the time were accessible to them.*

Another instance of the insufficiency of the law texts as hitherto translated, is afforded by the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in the matter Gridhari Lall Roy *v.* the Government of Bengal, to which I have already had occasion to refer. And as it implies a large class of cases which may equally suffer from the same cause, it will not be deemed superfluous to draw attention to it.

I have just pointed out the great principle on which the Hindu law of inheritance is based. A kind of spiritual bargain is at the root of it. For the *direct* or *indirect* benefit of his future life, a person requires after his death certain religious ceremonies—the S'râddha—to be performed for him; and since these ceremonies entail expense, his property is supposed to be the equivalent for such expense. A *direct* benefit from the S'râddha is derived, for instance, by a father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, to whom the funeral cakes are offered by a son, grandson, or great-grandson; and an indirect benefit, by a deceased whose relatives present the funeral cakes to his *maternal*, grandfather, great-grandfather, and great-great-grandfather; for by doing so, they perform for him that duty which, when alive, he would have been bound to perform.† Since, however, the nearer a person is related to the deceased, the greater is the direct or indirect benefit which he is able to confer on the latter's soul, the nearer, too, are his claims to the inheritance. But in the same degree as a person owes the S'râddha to a relative, the purity of his body is also affected by the death of that relative; and the time within which the impurity he suffers in consequence can be removed by certain religious acts, depends therefore on the degree of relationship in which he stood to the deceased. Again, the right of

* Burnell, l.l., p. vii.

† See *e. g. Jîmûtavâhana*, XI., 1, 34; XI., 6, 13.

marriage is affected by the degree of relationship, for within certain degrees marriage is strictly forbidden by the Hindu law.

To obtain, therefore, an authoritative explanation of what, to a Hindu, are the degrees of relationship—and on these degrees, again, depends the *order* of succession—we have especially to look to those portions of the codes of law, and those separate treatises, which relate to the performance of the S'râddha, to the laws concerning impurity and the removal of it, and to the laws of marriage. All that occurs in regard to these important topics under the head of inheritance is but incidentally stated there, as serving the argument in point, but not with a view of being an exhaustive treatment of the matter. On the whole, there is but little to be gathered from the chapter of inheritance regarding the *relative* rights of heirs; and if the number of such heirs is large, and the degrees of their affinity are intricate, there would be a considerable difficulty in deducing, from the general argument merely, the precise right of a particular heir.

Now, in a complete code of law like that of Manu or Yâjnavalkya, the subject of S'râddha, impurity and marriage, is dealt with in the *âchâra* and *prâyas'chitta* (the first and third) portions of the work, not in the second, a portion of which is devoted to inheritance. But as of the commentatorial works on Manu, of the whole Mitâkshará on the first and third books of Yâjnavalkya, of the great work of Raghunandana, and of the numerous important works and treatises dealing with these topics, such as the Nirńayasindhu, Dharmasindhusâra, S'râddhaviveka, S'râddhanirńaya, Âchârâdars'a, and many others, nothing whatever as yet exists in translation, it may easily be surmised that judges unable to read these works in the original language are deprived of a very important means of deciding on the relative rights of claimants to successions, and that in many instances their decisions may be at fault; for I do not think that, without a positive knowledge of the Hindu

religion in its greatest detail, any European could undertake to say whether, for instance, a brother confers more or less benefit on the soul of a brother than his daughter's son; or whether a maternal grandmother on the father's side enjoys that privilege in a higher or lower degree than a paternal grandmother on the mother's side. In the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta, on the case to which I am about to attach some remarks, the learned judges indeed say; "It would be difficult for a person at the present day to give a clear and intelligible reason for many of the eccentricities and anomalies which characterize Hindu law of all schools, and this notwithstanding the encomium of the Pleader on its stern logic and uncompromising adherence to principles once laid down."* But what in this passage is called "eccentricities and anomalies," is nothing but the consequence of the religious views on which the S'râddha ceremonies rest. It is certainly difficult—nay, impossible—to understand this consequence without a knowledge of its cause, but the latter once mastered in its detail, I believe that "the encomium of the Pleader" would not be found an exaggerated one.

The case in question is the one already alluded to, and the judgment which the High Court at Calcutta passed on it is highly instructive in several respects, for it tells us that a maternal uncle is to a Hindu no heir at all, even if no other relatives of the deceased dispute his claim. To understand this extraordinary finding, it is necessary to see from what premises it was deduced.

According to the degrees of relationship, the old lawgivers divided heirs into three categories, the first being that of the *Sapin'd'as*, or kindred connected by the *Pin'd'a* or the funeral cake offered at the S'râddha, and extending to the seventh degree (including the survivor)

* Gridhari Lall Roy *v.* the Bengal Government. 'Record,' p. 98.

in the ascending and descending male line; the second, consisting of the *Samânodakas*, or kindred connected by the libation of (udaka) water only offered at the S'râddha, who extend to the fourteenth degree; and the third comprising the so-called *Bandhus* or *Bândhavas*, who, in the chapter of the Mïtâksharâ and the Dâyabhâga treating of them, Colebrooke generally renders *cognates*. It was as one of the last category that Gridhari claimed as the maternal uncle of the father of a deceased Zemindar. But the judges of the High Court of Bengal did not allow the claim, on the ground that he was excluded from the right of inheritance by the definition given of the term *bandhu*, in the sixth section of the second chapter of the Mitâksharâ. The passage on which the judgment relied runs thus :—

"*Bandhus* (cognates) are of three kinds; related to the person himself, to his father, or to his mother: as is declared by the following text. 'The sons of his own father's sister, the sons of his own mother's sister, and the sons of his own maternal uncle, must be considered as *his own Bandhus*. The sons of his father's paternal aunt, the sons of his father's maternal aunt, and the sons of his father's maternal uncle, must be deemed *his father's Bandhus*. The sons of his mother's paternal aunt, the sons of his mother's maternal aunt, and the sons of his mother's maternal uncle, must be reckoned *his mother's Bandhus*.'"*

Now, as in this list the *sons* of a father's maternal uncle are called *Bandhu*, but not the father's maternal uncle himself, and as Gridhari did not pretend that he was either a *Sapin'ḍa* or a *Samânodaka*, he was nowhere.

His plea was, that the enumeration contained in the quoted text was *not an exhaustive one*, but merely an illustration of the line in which relatives called *Bandhu* must be sought for; that a father's maternal

* Two Treatises, &c., p. 352. Burnell, l.l., p. 37. Mayr, l.l., p. 140.

uncle stood in the same position to *his* son (named in that list) as a maternal uncle to *his* (also named there); and since a maternal uncle, he argued, was clearly intended to be included in the list, a father's maternal uncle belonged to the relatives of the Bandhu category. The correctness of the analogy was admitted by the judgment,* but it still denied that a maternal uncle *was* intended to be included in the list. The Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, admitting the appellant's plea, reinstated him in his right, and there can be no question that they did justice to his claim; but as the arguments on which their judgment was based would have been stronger, and would have been less hypothetical, than they now are, had their Lordships been able to avail themselves of more and of safer texts than were at their disposal, and as neither the Bengal Government could ever have claimed the inheritance of Woopendro, nor the High Court of Calcutta pronounced against the Bandhu quality of a "maternal uncle," had they possessed the same advantage, it falls within the scope of this paper to illustrate by this case the serious deficiencies which in the present administration of the Hindu law must be unavoidable.

There were several ways of ascertaining whether the list of Bandhus relied upon by the Bengal Government, was an exhaustive one or not; or in other words, whether a father's maternal uncle and a maternal uncle were included in, or excluded from, it.

The first was to consult any of the works authoritatively treating of the duty of persons to perform the S'râddha, or of impurity which would affect relatives in consequence of a death, for as all such persons are eventually heirs, it would have been seen at once whether the few individuals named in the quoted text could possibly have been intended for an *exhaustive* definition of the Bandhu category. Now, in all such works, *e. g.* the Dharmasindhusâra, the Nirṅayasindhu, Raghunandana's

* Record, p. 96, line 62.

S'uddhitattva, &c,, this category comprises all the connections on the mother's side up to the seventh degree in the ascending and descending line; and I may almost say, as a matter of course, the maternal uncle is distinctly mentioned by them. Even the passage from Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga, adduced above, might of itself have proved that in the absence of nearer relatives the "maternal uncle" has the right of performing the funeral rites for a sister's son, and it would have confirmed a similar conclusion resulting from the same Digest,* for in regard to a question like this there is no difference between the various schools. The judgment of the Judicial Committee says :†—"Mr. Forsyth, indeed, argued strongly against the right of the appellant to inherit, on the assumption that he was not entitled to offer the funeral oblations. But is this assumption well founded? There is evidence, the uncontradicted evidence of the family priest and others, that the appellant did, in point of fact, perform the shradh of Woopendro; and he seems, in the judgment of the priest, properly to have performed that function in the absence of any nearer kinsman." But the judgment adds:—"It is, however, unnecessary to determine whether this act of the appellant was regular or not. The issue in this case is not between two competing kinsmen, but between a kinsman of the deceased and the Crown." Yet on the *regularity* of this act all really depends, since the right of performing the S'râddha and that of succeeding are convertible terms, and, in the extreme case of an escheat to the Crown, even the king inherits on the condition that he provides for the funeral rites of the person to whom he succeeds, and the king is debarred from succession to a Brâhman's property, because a man of the second or an inferior caste cannot minister to the soul of one of the first. That the family priest allowed the appellant to perform the

* XI., 6, 12 and 13. † P. 3.

S'râddha for his nephew, certainly raised a strong presumption in favour of the maternal uncle's right to do so; but the *certainty* whether he really possessed this right could be established only on the ground of authoritative texts.

The second mode of settling the doubt consisted in referring to the decision of other authorities of the Mitâksharâ school; and of these, it would have been found that, for instance, the *Vivâdachintâmaṅi*, after quoting the same passage describing the three categories of Bandhus, as the Mitâksharâ, sums up its discussion by giving a list of heirs, amongst whom "the *maternal uncle and the rest*" correspond with the Bandhus of the Mitâksharâ.* The Lords of the Judicial Committee had the advantage of being able to resort to this method, since an important passage from the *Viramitrodaya*—a digest which, as already observed, is often a full commentary on the Mitâksharâ—was accessible to them in a translation given at p. 15 of the Record; and they very justly referred to it in order to show that this authority included "the maternal uncle" in the Bandhu list alleged by the Mitâksharâ. But it so happened that they had ground to suspect the correctness of the translation of this passage in one particular, and in consequence amended it hypothetically where it appeared to them to be at fault. Their conjecture was perfectly right; but as this was the only passage of the kind from works of the Mitâksharâ school, on which they had to rely for *this* argument, it would doubtless have been much more satisfactory had they been in possession of an authoritative translation of the work to which the passage belongs.†

*. See Tagore, pp. 298, 299; Sanskrit text, Calc. 1837, pp. 155, 156: . . . vyavahitasakulyas tadabhâve mâtulâdih'.

† The judgment says (p. 7):—"After stating that the term 'Sakulya' or distant kinsman found in the text of Manu, comprehends the three kinds of cognates, the commentator goes on to say,—'The term cognates (*Bandhus*) in the text of Jogishwara must comprehend also the maternal uncles and the rest, other-

The third and most accurate course of all was to ascertain whether the author of the Mitâkshará himself, by whose law the case was governed, elsewhere gave a definition of the term used by him, since, according to the first principle of interpretation, such a definition would necessarily remove all doubts. That the Lords of the Judicial Committee and the learned judges below endeavoured to adopt this course also, it is needless to say: but for the reasons already explained, the materials at their disposal did not enable them to arrive at anything like a safe conclusion.

One obstacle that lay in their way arose from the fact, that Colebrooke in his 'Two Treatises' had accidentally varied the translation of the term Bandhu, and therefore made its identification in several places impossible. Thus in the *Mitâkshará*, II., 1, 2; 5, 3; 6, 1 and 2, and in *Jímútaváhana*, XI., 1, 4; and 6, 12, he had rendered *bandhu* 'cognate," or 'cognate kindred': but in *Mitâkshará*, II., 7, 1, 'relations'; and in *Jîmûtaváhana*, XI., 1, 5, 'kinsmen.' Had he not done so, the learned judges at Calcutta and the Lords of the Judicial Com-

wise the maternal uncles and the rest would be omitted, and their sons would be entitled to inherit, and not they themselves, though nearer in the degree of affinity, a doctrine highly objectionable.' The passage as translated at p. 15 of the Record has '*then* they themselves,' in place of '*not* they themselves.' If this be the correct reading, it would follow that even if the exclusion of the maternal uncle and others not mentioned in the text relied upon by the respondents from the list of Bandhus were established, they would still, as relations, be heirs, whose title would be preferable to that of a king." But oddly enough, at p. 24 of the Record where a translation of the same passage from the Vîramitrodaya occurs, the last words read: "and *then* they themselves, though *never* in the degree of affinity. A doctrine highly objectionable. Quoted from the Beermithodoya." According to the Sanskrit text of the Vîramitrodaya (Calc. 1815, 209, *b*. l. 8) there can be no doubt that "not they themselves" is the correct rendering; and that "*never*" is probably a misprint for "*nearer*"; yet as it is a common occurrence in the Indian courts that Pan'd'its consulted by the litigants differ in their rendering of the same text (compare also the note to p. 178) how is a judge, not knowing Sanskrit, to decide which rendering is legitimate?

mittee would have found that in its commentary on the verse where Yâjnavalkya says that "in a case of disputed partition the truth should be ascertained by the evidence of relatives called *jnâti*, relatives called *bandhu*, by (other) witnesses, written proof or separate possession of house or field," the Mitâksharâ* explains relatives called jnâti, "bandhus on the father's side"; relatives called *bandhu*, "bandhus on the mother's side, viz. the maternal uncle and the rest."† And this

* II., 12, 2.

† *Yâjn.*, II., 150: vibhâganihnave jnâtibandhusâkshyabhilekhitaih', vibhâgabhâvanâ jneyâ gr'ihakshetrais' cha yautukaih'; whereupon the *Mit.* in both *Calcutta* editions (1815 and 1829) remarks: vibhâgasya nihnave 'palâpe, jnâtibhih' pitr'ibandhubhih' sâkshibhir mâtulâdibhir mâtr'ibandhubhih' pûrvoktalakshan'aih', &c.; in the *Benares* ed. (1853), vibhâgasya nihnave 'palâpe, jnâtibhih' pitr'ibandhubhir mâtulâdibhih' sâkshibhih' pûrvoktalakshan'aih', &c.; in the *Bombay* ed. (1863), vibhâgasya nihnave 'palâpe jnâtibhih' pitr'ibandhubhir mâtr'ibandhubhir mâtulâdibhih' sâkshibhih' pûrvoktalakshan'aih', &c. In the *Benares* edition the word *mâtr'ibandhubhih'* is evidently by mistake omitted before mâtulâdibhih'; and in the *Bombay* edition the order of the text-words of Yâjnav., *jnâti, bandhu, sâkshin*, is more closely followed than in the Calcutta editions, where the order is *jnâti, sâkshin, bandhu*. But unless in the latter editions this inversion is the printer's mistake only—which is very possible on account of the severing of sâkshibhih' and pûrvoktalakshan'aih'—it may have been intended to show that *pitr'ibandhubhih'* is the explanation of *jnâtibhih'*, and *mâtulâdibhih', mâtr'ibandhubhih'*, that of *bandhubhih'*, whereas otherwise it might be supposed (as Colebrooke did), that *jnâtibhih'* had been left unexplained, and pitr'ibandhubhir mâtulâdibhir mâtr'ibandhubhih' were the words explaining *bandhubhih'*. That the former view, however, is the correct one, results from the following parallel passages in which the text of Yâjn. is commented upon: *Vîramitrodaya* (p. 223 *a*, l. 4, 5), vibhâgasya nihnave 'palâpe vibhaktamadhye kenachit kr'ite jnâtibhih' pitr'ibandhubhih' bandhubhir, mâtulâdibhih', sâkshibhih', &c., *Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya* (MSS), jnâtayah' pitr'ibândhavâh', bândhavâs tu mâtulâdayah' (*v. l.* mâtr'ibândhavâs cha; or without *cha*); *Jîmûtavâhana* (p. 359), prathamam' jnâtayah' sapin'd'âh' sâkshin'ah', tadabhâve bandhupadopanîtâh' sambandhinah', tadabhâva udâsînâ apisâkshin'ah' (comp. 'Two Treatises,' p. 237; ch. xiv., § 3). Hence Colebrooke's rendering of Mit. II., 12 § 2, "if partition be denied or disputed, the fact may be known and certainty be obtained by the testimony of kinsmen, relatives of the father or of the mother such as maternal uncles and the rest, being competent witnesses as before

definition of *bandhu* is substantially therefore the same as that given by the Mitâksharâ,* where it defines *bandhu* as "a Sapin'd'a of a different family,† that is a Sapin'd'a on the mother's side. Nor does Jîmûtavâhana differ on this point from the Mitâksharâ school, for when speaking of the sense in which Yâjnavalkya understood the word *bandhu*, he says,‡ "to intimate that the *maternal uncle* shall inherit in consequence of the proximity of oblations, as presenting offerings to the maternal grandfather and the rest, which the deceased was bound to offer, Yâjnavalkya employs the term *bandhu*."

But there are other passages, also, in the Mitâksharâ which clearly show that its author did not intend to quote the list of the three categories of Bandhus as an exhaustive one. They are contained, however, in that portion of the Mitâksharâ not translated by Colebrooke. One of these had been supplied to the High Court at Calcutta for the purposes of the suit, but was singularly misunderstood by it. In Book II., v. 264, Yâjnavalkya where speaking of co-traders lays down this rule; "if one (of them) having gone to a foreign country, dies, let the heirs, the *bândhavas*, *jnâtis*, or those who have come, take the property; and in their default the king." Whereupon the Mitâksharâ comments: "When of partners 'one who has gone to a foreign country dies,' then let 'the heirs,' that is, his son or other lineal descendants; 'the *bândhavas*,' that is, *the relatives on the mother's side*, viz. *the maternal uncle and the rest*; 'the *jnâtis*,' that is Sapin'd'as, except the

described"—has to be altered into: "if partition be denied or disputed, the fact may be known and certainty be obtained by (the testimony of) relatives called *jnâti*, viz. the bandhus on the father's side; or (that of) relatives called *bandhu*, viz. the bandhus on the mother's side, such as maternal uncles and the rest, or (other) witnesses, as before described."

* II., 5, 3.

† Bhinnagotrân'âm' sapin'd'ânâm bandhus'abdena grahan'ât.

‡ XI., 6, 12.

lineal descendants; 'or those who have come,' that is, the partners in business who have come from the foreign country, take his share; and 'in their default,' that is in default of 'the heirs,' &c., let the king take it."*

* The translation of this passage as given by me above differs from that which the Bengal Government had laid before the High Court, and it also differs from that tendered by the Appellant to the Court. The Record (p. 97) says:

"The words are, as translated by the Defendant, Respondent [*i.e.* the Bengal Government]:—

"*Text.*—'When one dies in a foreign country, let the descendants (Bundhoos), cognates, gentiles, or his companions, take the goods, or, in their default, the king.'

"*Commentary.*—'When he who is gone to a foreign country, of those who are associated in trade, dies, then his share should be inherited by his heirs, *i. e.* the son and other descendants, *viz.* (Bundhoos) cognates, *i.e.*, those on the mother's side, the maternal uncle, and others, *viz.*, the gentiles, *i.e.* the Sapindahs, besides the son and other descendants, and those who are come, *i.e.*, those among them associated in trade, from a foreign country, or in their default, the king shall take.'"

No wonder that the Appellant objected to this jumble of words, where in the '*Text*,' 'Bundhoos' would be an explanation of 'descendants,' instead of 'cognates'; and in the *Commentary*, too, 'Bundhoos' and 'gentiles' are made to explain the same word 'descendants'; and the word 'besides' is intended for '*except*.' But neither is the Appellant's version unobjectionable. It is given after the foregoing quotation, by the Record, in these words:

"*Text.*—A person having gone to a foreign country, his goods would be taken by his heir, and those related *through a Bundhoo, or to a Bundhoo* or agnatic relation, or person returning from that country. In default of heirs, the king will take." And his translation of the Commentary of the Mitâhsharâ is as follows:

"When a person from amongst the persons trading in fellowship, or common stock, goes to a foreign country and dies there, his share will be taken by his heir, *i. e.* offspring, *i. e.* son and other offspring, Bundhoos, relations on the mother's side, maternal uncles, and the rest, or others, agnatic relations, that is to say, Sapindas, other than offspring, or by those coming back. Those who amongst the co-traders return from a foreign country, shall take; in default of them, the king."

If this version were correct (I am not here alluding to the last sentence which is perhaps misprinted for " . . . . coming back; *viz.* those who . . . ."), the

In this passage the High Court at Calcutta declared "The words, maternal uncle and the rest," to be "an insertion over and above what is contained in the principal text as to Bundhoos"; and added: "Under these circumstances, as the translated passage refers to an exceptional state of things, it may be that the ordinary succession has been interfered with in a particular other than that above suggested, though the succession professes to follow the ordinary course in all particulars save one."*

It need scarcely be observed that there is not the slightest ground for such a theory; and the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council very justly remarks (p. 7): "Their Lordships cannot admit the reasonableness of this hypothesis, and think that even on the Mitâksharâ the question under consideration is at least uncertain." Yet instead of affording *absolute* proof that the definition here given by the Mitâksharâ of the term *bândhava* or *bandhu* is in accordance with the definition which the same work *everywhere* gives when it thinks proper to paraphrase the word *bandhu*, and that consequently no new definition was here intended for an "exceptional state of things," the

text of Yâjnavalkya would treat of persons who are "related *through a Bandhu*, or *to a Bandhu*," while the *commentary* of the Mitâksharâ would speak of Bandhus only; and as the words "related through a Bandhu, or to a Bandhu" are meant for Yâjnavalkya's word *bândhava*, it would follow that relatives called *bândhava* are more distant heirs than those called *bandhu*. Nor should I feel surprised if possibly a doubt of this kind had some influence on the High Court, when, as we shall see, it founded a very strange theory on this passage. But *bândhava*, though a derivative of *bandhu*, has absolutely the same sense as the latter, as results, not only from all the law-commentaries, but also from the grammatical Gan'a prajnâdi to *Pân'ini* V. 4, 38.—Here then are two litigants, both differently rendering the same important text to which they appeal; and a Law Court, unable to examine this text in the original, is to decide which of them is right, or whether both are wrong!

* Record, p. 98.

judgment of the Judicial Committee proceeds to fortify its position by the passage, above alleged, from the Vîramitrodaya, and therefore does *not* remove the doubt whether the Mitâksharâ itself countenanced the theory objected to or not.

Yet one such definition of *bandhu*, literally agreeing with that in the passage just quoted, might have been found in the passage mentioned before;* and another, occurring in another, untranslated portion of the Mitâksharâ, is still more explicit: for it distinctly refers to the very passage in question, which contains the Bandhu list, and settles therefore even the last remnant of uncertainty.

In Book III., v. 24, Yâjnavalkya, treating of the season of impurity caused by the death of friends, says: "Purification lasts a day when a guru dies, or a boarder, a vedic teacher, a *maternal uncle* or a Brâhman versed in one vedic school." On which words the Mitâksharâ remarks: "'Guru' means a spiritual teacher; 'boarder,' a pupil; 'vedic teacher,' him who explains the Vedângas. By the word '*maternal uncle*,' the relatives on the female side, viz. the bandhus of one's self, the mother's bandhus, and the father's bandhus are implied; and who these are has been shown in (the commentary on) the verse of Yâjnavalkya, which begins with the words, 'the wife and the daughters,'"† that is, on the very same verse, II., 135 (Coleb., p. 324), to which the whole commentary of Sects. 1–7 of ch. ii. of the Mitâksharâ, and consequently also that of Sect. 6 (Coleb., p. 352) belongs.

In short, the maternal uncle, so far from being *excluded* from the *Bandhus*, is almost invariably named as the very type of the whole category; and what relative indeed on the mother's side could have a nearer claim to that title than he?

* P. 27, l. 7.

† Mâtulagrahan'enâtmabandhavo mâtr'ibandhavah' pitr'ibandhavas' cha yonisambaddhâ upalakshyante, te cha patnî duhitara ity atra dars'itâh'.

Now that in spite of such overwhelming evidence, even in one of the clearest cases possible, any law-court could nonsuit a claimant simply because the mass of proof which could have supported his right, was not accessible in English to the judge, appears to involve so anomalous a state of things that its continuance must be thought to be very undesirable.

The best and most efficient means of remedying it would of course be a thorough acquaintance of the Indian judges with the *original* text of the Hindu law literature, and their ability to examine for themselves in the original language all the texts which may have a bearing on a case before them. Nor need such a remedy be looked upon as chimerical; for the study of Sanskrit required for a legal training to this end would not imply more than the labour of a few years.

But as some time might have to elapse before this object could be attained, it is at least to be hoped that the most immediate wants pointed out in this paper will be provided for by the competent authorities.

A thorough revision of all the translations of Hindu law texts hitherto used in the Indian Courts should be undertaken at once, not in order to set them completely aside, but with a view of correcting their mistakes while preserving all that is good in them, and of harmonising their quotation of the same texts so as to render the identification of the latter possible.

And, besides, the most important works, as yet accessible only in Sanskrit, should be translated into English, so that at least the whole of Yâjnavalkya's Code, with the Mitâksharâ, the Viramitrodaya, some commentaries of Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga, some of Raghunandana's Tattvas, the Nirńayasindhu, the Dharmasindhusâra, the principal treatises on S'râddha, impurity, and marriage, and those on adoption, should soon be within the reach of an English judge.

The study of Sanskrit is now so successfully pursued in India, and native scholarship has already given such excellent proof of its mastery both of Sanskrit and English, that with united efforts in India itself, there would be no difficulty, within a few years' time, in accomplishing this greatly needed work.

APPENDIX TO PAGE 166.

The oldest Hindu lawgivers lay down the rule that members of a united family have a joint community of worldly and spiritual interests. Hence, according to them, their income and expenditure is conjoint; they cannot individually accept or bestow gifts, or make loans; nor can they reciprocally bear testimony, or become sureties for one another; moreover, certain of their religious duties being undivided, one member of the family only is entitled and obliged to perform them for the rest. Accordingly, in doubtful cases it was held that partition of a family was proved, if it could be shown that all or any of these criteria of union were wanting. The requirements of an advancing civilization, however, led to a more definite explanation of this general rule. Trade, commerce, or similar causes, often compelling co-parceners to live away from home, or in different houses, the whole of their affairs could not be managed conjointly, nor could *all* their religious duties be performed in common. The difficulties, therefore, of determining from the criteria already alluded to whether a family was a divided or a united one, multiplied in time, and the works of Colebrooke, Strange, Macnaghten, and Grady very justly dwell on them.* A more recent work, however,

* See Mr. Standish Grove Grady's 'Treatise on the Hindu Law of Inheritance' (1869), where, in Sec. ix., pp. 415 ff., on 'Evidence of Partition,' all that relates to this subject is very carefully collected. See also the 'Manual of Hindu Law,' by the same learned author (1871), Sec. ix., pp, 273 ff.

that by Mr. R. West and Dr. J. G. Bühler,* is not satisfied with admitting, as its predecessors had done, that there are difficulties which must be dealt with according to their merits and as they arise; it summarily rejects *all* the criteria or 'signs of separation,' mentioned by the native authorities, as inconclusive, and consequently as devoid of value in a legal sense.

"The will of the united co-parceners to effect a separation," the Editors of this Digest say,† "may be (1) stated explicitly; (2) or implied. As to express will it may be evidenced by documents or by declarations before witnesses . . . ." And "as to implied will," they continue,‡ "the Hindu authors are prolix in their discussions of the circumstances, from which separation or union may be inferred. According to them the 'signs' of separation are:—(*a*) the possession of separate shares; (*b*) living and dining apart; (*c*) commission of acts incompatible with a state of union, such as trading with or lending money to each other, or separately to third parties, mutual gifts or suretyship, They add also giving evidence for each other, but from this in the present day no inference can be deduced. (*d*) The separate performance of religious ceremonies, *i.e.* of the daily Vais'vadeva, or food-oblation in the fire preceding the morning meal; of the Naivedya, or food-oblation placed before the tutelary deity; of the two daily morning and evening burnt-offerings; of the S'râddhas, or funeral oblations to the parent's manes, &c." The Editors then add: "None of these signs of

* A Digest of Hindu Law; from the replies of the Shastris in the several Courts of the Bombay Presidency. Book II. Partition. Bombay, 1869. As this work reached me after the foregoing paper had been read to the East India Association, the translation of the chapter of the Vîramitrodaya "On a woman's separate property," contained in its Appendix (pp. 67 ff.), was then unknown to me, and has to be added to the translations of Hindu Law Texts enumerated at pp. 5 and 6.

† Introduction, p. xii. ‡ P. xiii.

separation can be regarded as, by itself, conclusive"; and again they say:* "As no one of the marks of partition above enumerated can be considered conclusive, so nether can it be said that any particular assemblage of these alone will prove partition. It is in every case a question of fact to be determined like other questions of fact, upon the whole of the evidence adduced, circumstantial evidence being sufficient."

But here it must first be asked what the Editors of this Digest call "evidence" in addition to that admitted by them as such under the head of "express will"? For, if none of the evidence afforded by the "signs of separation,"—whether this evidence be taken by itself or combined,—can, as they assert, establish a proof of partition, what evidence is there left but "documents" or "declarations before witnesses"?† Yet as denial of separation, and litigation ensuing on it, will rarely occur, when the party interested in the denial knows that his opponent is in possession of a partition deed, or can produce witnesses before whom the intention to separate has been formally declared, and as under such circumstances it will offer no difficulty to a judge, while, on the other hand, the cases presenting a real difficulty will just be those in which no documentary or other evidence of a similar nature exists,—it is hard to appreciate the value of the advice which the Editors afford in their last quoted words. But as the most striking part of their statement consists in the summary rejection, as legal proof, of all and each of the "signs of separation,"—whereas some of these are so strongly relied upon by the native authorities, and have been so cautiously spoken of by Colebrooke, Strange, Grady, and other European writers of eminence,—it will not be inexpedient to inquire whether in this matter a judge may henceforth feel entitled to dispense with a knowledge of all that is stated on this point in Hindu works, and simply

* Introduction, p. xv. † P. xii.

content himself with endorsing the opinion of the Editors of the Bombay Digest.

One of the most prominent "signs of separation," as we have seen, is based on religious grounds. It concerns the joint or separate performance of certain religious rites, some of which are mentioned in the quotation just given from the Bombay Digest. In regard to the legal irrelevance of these, the Editors of this Digest even grow emphatic. "The separate performance of the Vais'vadeva sacrifice, of S'râddhas and other religious rites," they say,* "is still less conclusive," viz. than the "living and dining apart" previously spoken of and declared by them to be "not conclusive of the fact" of separation. They seem to arrive at this inference from the interrogatory connected with a case to which they refer, and from a passage of a native authority to which they point, as forming part of their remarks on this case.

The case is that reported by them at p. 58. It gave rise, on the part of the Court, to the following amongst other questions: "He [viz. the son of an elder wife] was in the habit of performing the sacrifice called Vais'vadeva on his own account. Should he be considered a separated member of the family? and can any man whose food is cooked separately perform the ceremony, or is it a sign of separation?" Upon which the Pan'd'it so questioned replied: "Those members of a family who individually perform the ceremonies of Vais'vadeva and Kuladharma, and have signed a Fârikhat, may be considered separated. It does not appear from the Shastras that the elder son of a person is obliged to perform the Vais'vadeva on his own account, although his father and step-brother are united in interests and he himself lives and cooks his food separately in the same town without receiving the share of his ancestral property. A person may, however, perform the ceremony by the permision of his father."

* P. xiv. † P. 59.

On this reply of the Pan'd'it the Editors again observe:* "The Shastri is right in not considering the separate performance of the Vais'vadeva as a certain sign of 'partition,' though it is enumerated in the Smr'itis among these signs. The general custom is, in the present day, that even undivided coparceners, who take their meals separately, perform this ceremony, at least once every day, each for himself, because it is considered to purify the food." But here it may be observed that, all the Pan'd'it really said was, that when a man lives and cooks his food apart from his father and stepbrother who are united, it does not appear from the Shastras that he is *obliged* to perform the Vais'vadeva on his own account; and what follows therefore from his words is, that if, living apart from his relatives, he *were* obliged to perform the Vais'vadeva, such an *obligation* would prove that there was *no union* between him and the relatives named. The real drift of his answer, therefore, was not to show, as the Editors suppose, that the separate performance of the Vais'vadeva was *in no case* a "certain sign of partition," but to recommend to the Court the investigation of the fact whether the person in question was or was not "*obliged*" to perform this ceremony separately from his relatives.

In a note on the word Vais'vadeva the Editors had previously said† that "this ceremony is performed for the sanctification of food before dinner," and after the words above quoted (" . . . . because it is considered to purify the food "), they continue: "We subjoin a passage on this point from the *Dharmasindhu*:‡ (Dharm. f. 90, p. 2, l. 3 and 6 Bombay lith. ed.): *juhuyât sarpishâbhyaktair gr'ihye 'gnau laukike 'pi vâ, yasminn agnau pached annam' tasmin homo vidhîyate. Avibhaktânâm pâkabhede pr'ithag vais'vadevah' kr'itâkr'ita iti bhat't'ojîye;* 'Rice mixed

* P. 60. † P. 59.

‡ An abbreviation, by the Editors, of *Dharmasindhusâra*, which is the full name of the work meant, by *Kâs'inâtha*.

with clarified butter should be offered in the sacred domestic fire, or in a common fire. The oblations (at the Vais'vadeva) should be made in that fire with which the food is cooked . . . . . Bhat't'ojîdîkshita declares that, if members of an undivided family prepare their food separately, the Vais'vadeva-offering may be performed separately (in each household) or not."

Their remark, however, regarding the purpose of the Vais'vadeva, as well as their quotation from the Dharmasindhusâra and their translation of it, are very inaccurate. For, as will presently be seen, the Dharmasindhusâra states that the object of the Vais'vadeva is the consecration of one's self *and* of the food; whereas the Mitâksharâ, in commenting on Yâjnavalkya, I., v. 103, altogether contests the doctrine that the V. is intended for the consecration of the food, and after some discussion on this theory, arrives at the conclusion that it solely concerns the (spiritual) benefit of the person performing it. And as in quoting from the Dharmasindhusâra the Editors in the beginning of the passage alleged have left out half a verse which *essentially* belongs to it, while before the words ascribed to Bhat't'oji they have omitted another *material* portion of the text, their translation is not only incorrect, but the very ground on which the author of the Dharmasindhusâra adduced Bhat't'oji, has been misunderstood by them.* But even supposing that all the remarks of the Editors on the Vais'vadeva were correct, they would still not prove anything in respect of the legal inconclusiveness of "S'râddhas and other religious rites," all of which

* The essential words omitted before '*juhuyât*' are: gr'ihapakvahavishyânnais tailakshârâdivarjitaih', (*juhuyât*, &c.); and those which should have preceded and are absolutely required at the quotation '*avibhaktânâm*, &c.,' from Bhat't'oji, read: sa châyam' vais'vadeva âtmasam'skârârtho 'nnasam'skârârthas' cha; tenâvibhaktânâm pâkaikye pr'ithag vais'vadevo na, vibhaktânâm' tu pâkaikye' pi havishyântaren'a pr'ithag eva, (*avibhaktânâm*. &c.) For the translation of the whole passage, see p. 191, ll. 7 ff.

are included in their sweeping assertion which sets these rights aside for the purpose of legal evidence.

As the object of this paper, however, is not to correct the mistakes of an individual writer, but to show how necessary it is that a judge should examine for himself all that the native authorities teach in regard to questions that may come before him, and how the very replies of even the most learned Pańdits may be conducive to fallacies —since the correctness of a reply mainly depends on the correctness and pertinence of the question put,—I will, as an illustration of the difficulties which beset this subject, add a translation of a few passages from three works only, since even these will clearly prove that the bearing of the performance of certain religious ceremonies on the question of union or division cannot be dispatched in the offhand manner implied in the ruling of the Bombay Digest.

In treating of the daily religious duties of a Hindu the *Dharmasindhusâra* under the heading 'on the duty of the fifth division' (of a day divided into eight parts) contains the following passage: *

"The Vais'vadeva is to be performed for the removal of (sins committed in) the five *Sûnâs*. The five *Sûnâs* are the five places where injury may be done (to living beings); viz. the wooden mortar in which grain is threshed; the stone slab on which condiments, &c., are ground with a muller; a fire-place; a water-jar, and a broom.† The commencement of the Vais'vadeva is early (*i.e.* in the morning), not like that of the Agnihotra, late (*i.e.* in the evening); accordingly they resolve to perform it, as expressed in the words: "early and late, the Vais'va-

* Dharmas., ed. Bombay (1861), III., A., fol. 95 *b*, ll. 7 ff.

† The object of the Vais'vadeva is similarly defined in a passage of S'âtâtapa quoted in Raghunandana's Ahnikatattva (ed. Calc. 1834, vol. i., 251); and the five Sûnâs are frequently alluded to, *e.g.* in Manu, III., 61, S'ankarâchârya's comm. on the Bhagavadgîtâ, III., 13, and they are also defined in Anandagiri's and S'rîdharasvâmin's gloss on the latter.

deva (should be performed").* The five great sacraments are to be performed day by day; and these are the sacrament of the Veda, that of the gods, that of created beings, that of the manes, and that of men.† The sacrament of the Veda has been already explained.‡ Those who follow the ritual of the Rigveda consider that the Vais'vadeva consists of the three sacraments of the gods, created beings, and manes. The sacrament of men is the giving food to men. An oblation of food cooked in the house and fit for sacrificial purposes,§ free from sesamum-

* From *Raghunandana* (vol. i. p. 250) and similar works it results that the proper time for the performance of the V. is always during the day, and that the evening performance of this ceremony is permitted only under special conditions, as for instance when 'cooking' takes place for the entertainment of a guest. Some authorities, moreover, absolutely forbid the *repetition* of the ceremony on the same day, whether by day time or in the evening. But compare p. 193.

† These five *mahâyajnâs*, 'great sacrifices' or 'great sacraments,' are mentioned in the oldest works, *e.g.* in the S'atapatha-Brâhman'a (XI., 5, 6, 1)—also quoted from this Brâhman'a in S'rîdatta's Achârâdars'a—; in Manu, I., 112, &c., Yâjnavalkya, I., 102, &c.—*Manu* (III., 70) defines them as follows: "teaching (which, according to Kullûka, includes reading, viz. the Vedas) is the sacrament of the Veda; offering rice, &c., or water is the sacrament of the manes; an oblation (of food) in fire is the sacrament of the gods; presentation of food (viz. throwing ghee or rice, or the like, in the open air) to created beings, is the sacrament of created beings; hospitality is the sacrament of men."

‡ Viz. in the preceding portion of the text, here not translated.

§ Substances, called *havishya*, or fit for sacrificial purposes, are frequently mentioned in ritual works, as in the Kâtyâyana S'rauta Sûtras (VII., 2, 2), or in works dealing with ritual matters, as in Manu, Yâjnavalkya, &c. The *Mitâkshará* in its comment on *Yâjn.*, I., 239, names as such: rice of different varieties, barley, wheat, kidney-beans of two varieties (phaseolus mungo and phaseolus radiatus), wild grain (wild roots, or in general such food as forms the diet of an ascetic), a black potherb *kálas'áka*, *makás'alka* [explained as a kind of fish; Wils.; a prawn or shrimp], cardamons, ginger, black pepper, asafœtida, molasses, candied sugar, camphor, rock-salt, sea-salt, bread fruit, cocoanut, the plants called *kadalí* and *badara*, the produce of a cow,—viz. milk, curds, butter, or other preparations made of her milk,—honey, flesh, &c. On the other hand, as substances unfit for, sacrificial oblations the *Mitâkshará* names: *kodrava* (paspalum kora), *masúra*

oil, factitious salt, and such like (unsacrificial substances), and dressed with ghee, one should make in the (sacred) domestic fire, or the ordinary fire; (for) the law ordains that such an oblation (should be made) in the fire with which a man cooks his food.* Since the S'râddha occurring at fixed periods, is performed by (performing) the sacrament of the manes included in the Vais'vadeva ceremony, no entertainment of Brâhmans takes place (as it would) on behalf of the S'râddha occurring at fixed periods. And since also the S'râddha, (due) on the day of new-moon, is performed by (performing) it (viz. the sacrament of the manes), Bhattoji says, that those who are unable to perform the Srâddha, due on the day of new-moon (regularly), should do so once (at least) in the course of a year. In the case of (impurity arising from) childbirth, the rule is that the five great sacraments are dropped. And this Vais'vadeva is performed for the sake of one's own consecration and that of the food.† Therefore amongst members of a united family when they cook (their food) in common, a separate performance of the Vais'vadeva (by each member) is not (allowed); but amongst members of a divided family, even when they cook (their food in com-

(ervum hirsutum), chick-pea, *kulattha* (dolichos biflorus), pulâka, a legume called *nishpâva*, a kind of bean called *râjamâsha* (dolichos catjang), the white pumpkin gourd, two kinds of the egg-plant (*vârttâku* and *vr'ihatî*), *upodikâ* (basella rubra), the shoot of a bamboo, longpepper, orris root, *S'atapushpâ* (anethum sowa), saline earth, ordure, factitious salt, a buffalo's-chounri, her milk,—curds,—butter, or other produce of buffalo's milk; &c.—Compare also on the same subject Manu, III.. vv. 226 ff., the Vishn'u-Purân'a, Book III., ch. 16; the *Nirn'ayasindhu*, I., fol. 13; *Raghunandana*, vol. i., pp. 70, 142 and 250; *S'rîdatta's Achârâdars'a* (Benares, 1864), fol. 56 *a*; &c.

* The Achârâdars'a (fol. 56 *a*) which quotes a passage to the same effect from Angiras, regarding the sacred and ordinary fire, adds: "the sense of this passage is: a man who maintains a sacred fire should cook his food and make the oblation, in this (sacred) domestic fire; one who does not maintain such a fire, in the ordinary fire."

† See p. 189, ll. 15 ff.

mon, the Vais'vadeva (must be performed) separately (by each of them) with some sort of substance fit for sacrificial purposes. According to Bhat't'oji, amongst members of a united family, when the cooking (of their food) does not take place in common, the Vais'vadeva may be performed separately or not.* When no cooking (of food) takes place on the eleventh and similar days (of abstinence), the Vais'vadeva should be performed with grain (esp. of rice), milk, curds, ghee, fruits, water, and the like substances. Let a man perform it with rice and so on, (throwing such substances) with his hand,—or with water, (throwing the latter) with his hollowed palms, into water; but let him at the performance of the Vais'vadeva avoid *kodrava* (paspalum kora), chick-pea, the kidney-bean (phaseolus radiatus), *masûra* (ervum hirsutum), *kulattha* (dolichos biflorus), and all factitious salt called *kshâra* and *lavaña*. When a man lives abroad, the Vais'vadeva should be performed at his house by the instrumentality of his son, priest, or other (proper substitute); and should there not be at his house such other (proper) agent he himself must perform it abroad. Those who conform to the ritual of the R'ig- and Black- Yajur-Vedas should perform it

* The words "*an oblation of food cooked in the house*, &c." (p. 191, ll. 7 ff.) to "*performed separately or not*," are the complete passage, represented in the Bombay Digest by the words "*rice mixed*" to "performed *separately (in each household) or not*" (see above, p. 188, last l. ff). The correctness of the last words "performed separately or not" might at first sight seem doubtful, since their value in Sanskrit is the compound *kr'itâkr'ita*, and this word (according to Pân'., II., 1, 60, not a Dvandva, but a Karmadhâraya) would literally mean 'done —not done,' *i.e.* 'imperfectly done,' or 'done as if not done,' *i.e.* 'done in vain.' That in the quotation from Bhat't'oji, however, the word has not this sense, but the one given it in the translation of the Bombay Digest, and in that above, follows not only from the sense in which the word *kr'itâkr'ita* is unmistakably used in other passages of the *Dharmasindhusâra* and *Nirn'ayasindhu* (since its meaning there becomes clear from the interpretations following it), but also from the injunction of *As'valâyana*, which is analogous to that of *Bhat't'oji* (see p. 196, ll. 24 ff.).

twice (a-day), according to the text which says: 'it should be performed by day and by night.' But if unable to do so, they may, at the same time, repeat it or perform (the day and night Vais'vadeva) together.* The usual practice of followers of these two Vedas is to cook their food and perform the Vais'vadeva, in the ordinary fire."†

In the chapter treating of the religious duties of the sons *whose father is alive*, the same work contains the following statement:‡

"Sons not separated from their father should not perform the Vais'vadeva separately; for it is stated that 'one who lives upon the cooking of (*i. e.* the food cooked by) his brother, is (like) one who lives upon the cooking of (*i.e.* the food cooked by) his father.' Hence, if the father maintains a sacred fire, even when the cooking and the Vais'vadeva are effected with the sacred fire, his unseparated sons, although they, too, maintain a sacred fire, should not perform the Vais'vadeva separately. Those who think that, in the absence of cooking, a fire becomes an ordinary one, may cook merely in order to consecrate their fire. But by members of a divided family the Vais'vadeva should be performed separately (by each of them). And since (according to the followers of the R'igveda-ritual)§ the Vais'vadeva consists of the three daily sacraments, viz, those of the gods, created beings and manes, those (who entertain this doctrine regarding the Vais'vadeva), even if their father is alive, will perform the (daily) sacrament of the manes, forming part of the five great (daily) sacraments. To the followers of the Black-Yajurveda, however, the five great (daily) sacraments are distinct from the Vais'vadeva: they (consequently) perform the (daily) sacrament of

* See note * of page 191.

† There follows a description of the manner in which the V. is performed by members of the Vaishn'ava and other sects, of the rules relating to the *Naivedya* ceremony, and other detail which it is not requisite here to enter into.

‡ Bombay ed. (1861) III. B., fol. 3 *a*, ll. 8 ff.

§ See p. 194, ll. 4 ff.

the manes, if their father is alive, (only) when they are members of a divided family."

In the chapter treating of those entitled to perform the *S'râddha*, the same work says;*

"The son of one's own body has the preferential duty (and right) to perform the annual and other S'râddhas and the funeral ceremonies which take place immediately after death. If there are several such sons, the *eldest* has this duty (and right); on failure of him, or if he is not present, or if his right has lapsed through having become an outcast or similar (disqualifications), the eldest after him. The statement, however, (made elsewhere) that in the absence of the eldest the youngest has always this right, not the sons between them, is without authority. Hence, if sons live in a state of division, the *eldest*, after having received from the younger (brother) the (necessary) property, should perform all the funeral rites up to that called Sapin'd'ana.† But the annual and other S'râddhas each of them must perform separately. If, however, sons live in a state of union, even the annual and other S'râddhas must be performed by one of them only. (Still) since what is done by one (member of a united family) accrues to the benefit of the rest, all the sons should keep such rules as the observance of chastity, the not touching another person's food,‡ and similar ones. If sons do not live in the same place, whether they stay in different countries or in different houses, each of them should perform the annual and other

* III. B., fol. 4, *a*, ll. 10 ff.

† That is, inclusive of the first sixteen S'râddhas which end with the *Sapin'd'ana*, also called *Sapin'd'îkaran'a*.

‡ *Yâjnavalkya*, III., 241, classes 'feeding on others' amongst the crimes, called *upapâtaka*, which are only a degree less than the *mahâpâtaka*, or most heinous offences. *Manu*, III, 104, foretells parasites that, after death, they will become the cattle of their hosts.

S'râddhas separately, even if they are members of an undivided family."*

In the important chapter on the S'râddha itself, under the head of "*settled rules relating to members of a divided and an undivided family*," the same work, after a general reference to previous statements, has the following:†

" Of brothers and other members of a family, divided in property, all the (religious) duties are separate. But that the funeral ceremonies and the sixteen S'râddhas up to the Sapin'd'ana (which are performed during the first year after a death) should be performed by one of them only, has been already stated.‡ Yet if members of a family are undivided, all such acts as may be done without (spending any) property, *e. g.* bathing, the Sandhyâ-devotion, the sacrament (*i.e.* reading) of the Vedas, muttering of prayers, fasting, reading the Purân'as, are done (by each of them) separately; whether such acts recur at regular periods, or are occasional, or (purely) voluntary; separately, also, such ceremonies of regular recurrence, enjoined by vedic or traditional works, as are performed with fire. Another view founded on the teaching of Kâtyâyana and others is, that 'one who lives on the cooking of a brother is (like) one who lives on that of a father.' Of the five great (daily) sacraments those of the gods, created beings, manes, and men§ should be performed by the *eldest* (brother) only. If the cooking is done separately (by members of a united family) those who conform to the rules of Âs'valâyana, say that the separate performance of the Vais'vadeva (by

* The rest of this chapter regulates the rights of younger sons in the absence of the eldest, and in their absence those of other members of a family successively to perform the S'râddhas. Its importance regarding the rights of inheritance, requires no remark; but as these rights do not concern the present paper, no further extract on this point is here given.

† III. B., fol. 37 *b*, ll. 5 ff.

‡ See p. 195, ll. 13 ff.

§ See p. 191, ll. 1 ff.

each member of such a family) is optional.* Since, if the eldest (brother) does not perform the Vais'vadeva, it is (the duty) of a younger (brother) to perfect the cooking (of the food by means of this ceremony), some enjoin that before eating, some of the food should be thrown by him into the fire, and some given to a Brâhman. The worship of the (tutelary) gods may be performed (by each of them) separately, or (by all of them) conjointly. The annual S'râddhas, those performed on the day of new-moon, at the sun's entrance into a new sign, eclipses and similar S'râddhas should be performed by the eldest only. The S'râddhas, also, performed in holy places (*e. g.* of the Ganges) and those of the same category should be performed by one member only of an undivided family, if all the members happen to be together (in the place), but separately, (by each member) if they happen to be in different places. The same rule applies to the S'ràddha, which is performed at (the holy city of) Gayâ (in Behar). As regards sacrificial ceremonies, at which voluntary gifts are made, and which can be effected only by means of (spending some of the family) property, the right of performing them depends on the assent of the brothers and other (members of the united family). The S'râddha on the 13th day of the dark fortnight of the month Bhâdra, which is under the asterism Maghâ, it is stated, should be performed separately by each member (of an undivided family)."†

* Compare p. 193, ll. 3 ff.

† Compare for the S'râddhas to be performed at holy places and on the 13th of the dark fortnight of the month Bhâdra, also the following passages from Wilson's translation of the *Vishnu-Purâna* (III., 14, vv. 17-19). "He who, after having offered food and libations to the Pitr'is, [manes] bathes in the Ganges, Satlaj, Vipâs'â (Beas), Sarasvatî, or the Gomatî at Naimisha, expiates all his sins. The Pitr'is also say: 'after having received satisfaction for a twelvemonth, we shall further derive gratification by libations offered, by our descendants, at some place of pilgrimage, at the end of the dark fortnight of Mâgha'"; and (*ibid.*, III., 16, vv. 17 ff): "In former times, O king of the earth, this song of the Pitr'is was

The work from which these passages are taken is a compilation from other works, among which it prominently names the *Nirn'ayasindhu*, composed by *Kamalâkara*, in the year 1611, A. D.* As the latter is held in especial esteem by the Mahrattas for whose benefit, it seems, the Bombay Digest was chiefly intended, I will add a translation of its chapter: "*On the settled rules relating to members of a divided and undivided family*," which likewise forms part of its section on the S'râddha.† It runs thus:

heard by Ikshwâku, the son of Manu, in the groves of Kalâpa: 'Those of our descendants shall follow a righteous path, who shall reverently present us with cakes at Gayâ. May he be born in our race who shall give us, on the thirteenth of Bhâdrapada and Mâgha, milk, honey, and clarified butter." (Wilson's Works vol. viii., pp. 170 and 197.) As pointed out by the editor, the phrase "for a twelvemonth" is in the Sanskrit text represented by *varshâmaghâ;* and the phrase "on the thirteenth of Bhâdrapada and Mâgha" by *trayodas'îm. ..... varshâsu cha maghâsu cha.* But the former being rendered by S'rîratnagarbha: *aparapakshamaghâtrayodas'î*, and the latter: *varshâsu, bhâdrapade, maghânakshatre trayodas'îm*, it would be better to substitute for them: "on the 13th day of the dark fortnight of the month Bhâdra, which is under the asterism Maghâ."—The sanctity of this day and its appropriateness for the performance of the S'râddha already result from Manu, III., 273 and 274, where the *same* expression—*trayodas'îm.....varshâsu cha maghâsu cha*' occurs, and is interpreted by Kullûka to v. 273: *varshâkâle maghâtrayodas'yâm.* and to v. 274 *bhâdrakr'ishn'atrayodas'î;* also from *Yâjnavalkya*, I., v. 260: where the words *varshâtrayodas'yâm maghâsu* are explained in the same manner by Vijnânes'vara: *bhâdrapadakr'ishn'atrayodas'yâm maghâyuktâyâm.*—Compare also Sir W. Jones. on the lunar year of the Hindus, As. Res., vol. iii. p. 292. Besides these verses, other quotations relating to the same subject, from *S'ankha*, *S'âtâtapa*, and others, occur in Jîmût., III., 1, 18, in Raghunandana's Tithitattva (Calc. ed. 1834, vol. i. pp. 75, 160), in the Nirnayasindhu (II., fol. 42 *a*, *b*), Dharmas. (II., fol. 31 *b*.), &c., which also show that each member of a family, whether divided or undivided, must for himself perform this particular S'râddha.

* This date is given by the author himself at the end of his work, in the words: vasu (= 8) ritu (= 6) ritu (= 6) bhû (1) *i.e.* 1668 of the era of Vikramâditya.

† Ed. Bombay (1857) III. B., fol. 65 *a*, ll. 4 ff.

"The *Pr'ithvîchandrodaya* quotes these words of *Marîchi:* 'If there are many sons of a father who live together, all that is done with the undivided (family-) property, by the eldest, the rest consenting, must be (considered as) done by all of them.' These words mean that, though the eldest is the agent, all of them share in the result (of his acts). Therefore such religious rules, as the observance of chastity, &c., must be kept by every one of them, since they consecrate the persons who obtain the result. And this applies also to re-united members of a family, on account of the analogy (that exists between them and members of a united family).*

The *Mitâ'kshará* quotes these words of *Nârada:* 'The religious duty of unseparated brethren is single; when partition has been made, even the religious duties become separate for each of them.'† *Vr'ihaspati* also says: 'Of members of a family who live (together and) cook (their food) in common, the sacraments of the manes, gods and twice-born should be single; of those who are divided, they should be performed in each house separately.'‡ Though in this last text, no exception being mentioned, the prohibition of a separate performance (of religious acts) in an undivided family would also (seem to) obtain for such acts as the reading of the Vedas, the Sandhyâ devotion and the like, it (nevertheless) merely relates to the performance of the S'râddha, Vais'vadeva and the ceremonies which can be effected only by (spending some of the

* This passage also occurs in the same chapter, fol. 8 *b*, ll. 11 ff.

† Mit. ch. ii., sec. xii., § 3.—The same quotation also occurs in the *Vîramitrodaya*, Calc. ed., p. 169 *b*, 223 *a*; the *Vivâdachintâmaṇi* (ed. Calc. 1837), p. 162 (Colebrooke's translation of this passage in the Mit., and of Tagore p. 311 in the Viv. materially differ from one another); in the *Smr'itichandrikâ* (Calc. 1107) p. 8, *Vyavahâramayûkha*, ch. iv., sec. vii., § 28 (Borradaile's translation being the same as Colebrooke's), and in other Digests.

‡ This quotation also occurs in the *Vivâdach.*, p. 125 (Tagore, p. 227); *Vîramitrodaya*, f. 172 *a*, 222 *b*; *Kullûka* to *Manu*, IX, 111; *Dâyakaumudî* (Calc, 1827), ff. 28; *Smr'itichandrikâ*, p. 8; &c.

family) property; for such property having more than one owner, one (member of the family alone) would not be entitled to spend it. All such acts, however, as may be done without (spending any) property, *e. g.* muttering prayers, fasting, the Sandhyâ devotion, reading the Vedas and Purân'as, whether such acts recur at regular periods, or are occasional, or (purely) voluntary, each member is competent to perform separately (for himself). For there being no expenditure of property, no consent (of the rest) is required; and consequently the words (before quoted) 'with the undivided (family-) property' cannot apply to such acts. And this conclusion also results from the following text of *Âs'valâyana* as quoted in the *Prayogapârijâta:* 'Amongst twice-born men who cook (their food) in common there should always be separate the sacrament (or reading) of the Vedas, the Agnihotra, the worship of the gods, and the Sandhyâ devotion.' (In this passage) Agnihotra signifies such ceremonies of regular recurrence, enjoined by vedic or traditional works, as are performed with fire. For (the right of each member of a family to fulfil) these duties (separately) is logically analogous to the right acquired by the consent of the rest. The S'râddha of the father, and other acts of regular recurrence which have the same consequence (for all the members of a family) a single (member) is entitled to perform even without the consent of the rest; for it is said:* 'Even a single (member) of a family may conclude a donation, mortgage, or sale, of immovable property, during a season of distress, for the sake of the family, and especially for pious purposes.' 'For pious purposes,' means, according to Vijnânes'vara,† for the performance of indispensable duties, viz. the S'râddha of the father, or the like.

"But some maintain that even of members of an undivided family, if

* By *Vr'ihaspati*, according to the Ratnâkara (as quoted by Colebrooke) on the *Mit.*, ch. i., sec. i., § 28. Comp. also the *Viram.*, f. 181 *a*; *Vivâdach.*, p. 161.

† Mit., ch. i., sec. i., § 29.

they cook (their food) separately, and if they stay in different countries, each has to perform separately (for himself) the S'râddhas on the day of new-moon and the annual S'râddhas; for *Hârîta* has said: 'If undivided brethren cook their food separately, each of them should also perform separately the Vais'vadeva and the other S'râddhas'; and *Yama:* 'If a son who is not separated (from the family) stays in a foreign country, he should perform (for himself) separately the S'râddha of the father on the anniversary of his death, and the S'râddha on the day of new-moon.'

" If (the drift of) these texts is properly considered, their sense (will be found to be) this: Of the five great (daily) sacraments, the eldest should with the consent of the other (members) of the family perform the sacraments of the gods, created beings, manes and men; for also *Vyâsa* has said: 'Food should never be eaten without previously making a sacrificial offering and presenting a first (portion) of it (to a Brâhman); amongst members of an undivided or re-united family what is done even by a single (member) *is* done (by all).' But if one's food has been prepared without the eldest (member) having performed the Vais'vadeva, he may eat it after having silently thrown some of it into the fire. For, where treating of the rights of members of an undivided family the *Pr'ithvîchandrodaya* quotes this passage from *Gobhila:* 'Whose food in the family is first ready, he may eat it after having put a certain portion of it into the fire, and given a first (portion) of it to a Brâhman.' Again, *Âs'valâyana* mentions the ceremonies which (members of a divided family) should perform separately when they cook their food separately; and also separately when they cook it in common; (his words are):* 'Of members even of a divided family, if they live (together and) cook (their food) in common, one, the master (of the

* Compare the same passage in the subsequent extract from the Vyavahâramayûkha; p. 205, ll. 6 ff.

household), should perform the four (daily) sacraments which (in the order of the five*) are preceded by the sacrament of speech. But men of the twice-born classes, whether members of an undivided or a divided family, if they cook (their food) separately, should, previous to taking it, each separately perform these sacraments day by day.' The sacrament of the Veda, the Sandhyâ devotion, bathing, the sacrament of the manes, and the like ceremonies are for the reason stated, performed separately (by each member); but on account of the two texts quoted, the worship of the gods either in common (by one) or separately (by each member); the S'râddhas on the day of new moon, at eclipses, &c., by one member only; the S'râddha at holy places, and similar S'râddhas by one only, if all the members of the undivided family happen to be together (in the place), but separately (by each member), if they happen to be in different places. And so likewise the S'râddha which is performed at Gayâ. For *Hemâdri* quotes this passage from the *Kûrma-Purâṇa*: 'Many well conducted and excellent sons must be wished for; (for) if one of their number goes to Gayâ, we are saved by him, and he enters upon the highest path.'†

"As regards voluntary acts, such as sacrificial offerings connected with the making of gifts, and the like, the right of performing them depends on the assent of the other (members of the family); that of muttering prayers and performing similar acts which entail no expenditure of property exists without (such) assent. *Aparârka* quotes these words of *Paiṭhînasi*. 'The annual and similar S'râddhas should be performed separately by each member of a divided family; but if performed by one member of an undivided family, it is as good as if

* See p. 191, ll. 1 ff.

† The first portion of this quotation ('many' to 'Gayâ') occurs with some variation in the Râmâyaṇa (ed. Bombay, 1861), II. 107, v. 13; and is quoted also by several treatises on adoption, the Dattakakaumudî, Dattakasiddhântamanjarî, &c.

they were performed by all of them.' That the monthly S'râddhas, which precede the annual S'râddha, must be performed conjointly (by the whole family), *Laghu-Harîta* has declared in these words; 'The sixteen S'râddhas, which end with the Sapin'd'ana, sons should not perform (each of them) separately; nor ever, even when divided in property.' The Sapin'd'ana here implies a monthly S'râddha; for this results from the words of *Vyâsa:* 'After the year (following the death of the father) the eldest (son) should perform the S'râddha before the assembled family; but after the Sapin'd'ana (has been accomplished) each son should perform it separately.' And *Us'anas* says: 'The 'new' *S'râddha*,* the Sapin'd'ana, and the sixteen S'râddhas should be performed by one member of the family only, even if the latter is divided in property; but the S'râddha on the 13th day of the dark fortnight of Bhâdra, which is under the asterism Maghâ† should be performed separately by each member even of an undivided family'; as has been already mentioned.‡ But when *V'riddha-Vasisht'ha* says, 'the monthly S'râddha, the ceremony of setting a bull free, and the Sapin'd'ana should be performed by the eldest, as well as the first annual S'râddha';—his injunction is without authority. In the Paris'isht'ha of the R'igveda ritual (it is said that members of a family) should perform the 'new' S'râddha conjointly."

With these extracts from the Dharmasindhusârâ and its predecessor, the Nirn'ayasindhu, it will now be expedient to compare the law on this matter as laid down by the principal authority of the Mahrattas, the *Vyavahâramayûkha.* It is contained in the following passage.§

* The 'new' S'râddha (navas'râddha) is the collective name of the ceremonies which begin on the first day after a death, and end on the tenth (comp. Dharmas. III. B., fol. 7 *b*, 1, 9).

† *Maghâtrayodas'î*; see † of page 197.

‡ Viz. III. B., f. 8 *b*, and f. 9 *a*, where the same quotations from *Laghu-Harîta* and *Us'anas* occurs.

§ Ch. iv., sec. vii., § 28–§ 33. Consistently with the opinion expressed at p. 182,

"*Nârada* says:* 'The religious duty of unseparated brethren is single; when partition has been made, even the religious duties become separated for each of them.' Here the term 'unseparated' is intended to denote the chief topic (treated of), whilst 'brethren,' on account of its (merely) qualifying the former, is not to be taken in its literal sense. Therefore in an unseparated family, even if it consists of a father, grandfather, son, son's son, paternal uncle, brother, brother's son or other (relatives), their religious duty is single.

"Here again, though conjointness of an act, in regard to its various stages, follows as a logical consequence if there is sameness of place, time, agency, and so on, an express text would cause such conjointness to cease, if the agency is not the same, though (it is) that of members of an undivided family. Hence all those religious duties, enjoined by vedic and traditional works, which are fulfilled by means of fire, even of unseparated (brethren) are separate for each (of them), since they are different according as different kinds of fire would be connected (with the ceremony). Even so the S'râddha of the paternal uncle, brother's son, &c., at the day of new moon and other (seasons) is separate by reason of the separation of the deified person (from the *pârvan'a* rite); but the S'râddha of brothers (dying) without (maintenance of) a sacred fire is performed by one and the same act, because all the deified persons are conjoint. Again, by residence abroad and the like (causes), there being a difference in the places (where members of a family live, the S'râddhas are to be performed) separately (by each member); the ceremonies also performed with fire are separate for those who maintain a sacred fire. But the worship of the household deities, the Vais'vadeva and similar ceremonies are performed (conjointly) by one and the same

in the translation that follows, as much as possible has been retained of Borradaile's version; several portions of the latter, however, had necessarily to be altered, as not correctly rendering the sense of the original.

* See p. 199, ll. 11 ff.

act. Hence *S'âkala* says: 'Of those who live (together and) cook (their food) in common, there is but one worshipping of the deity in the house, and but one Vais'vadeva; in a family of divided brethren these acts are performed in each house separately.'

"As for the text, however, of Âs'valâyana, as quoted in the Pârijâta, which says: 'Of members even of a divided family, if they live (together and) cook (their food) in common, one, the master (of the household), should perform the four (daily) sacraments, which (in the order of the five) are preceded by the sacrament of speech; but men of the twice-born classes whether members of an undivided or a divided family, if they cook (their food) separately, should, previous to taking it, each separately perform these sacraments day by day';*—this text has reference to members of a re-united family; for that such is its import, follows from the words 'of members even of a divided family, if they live (together and) cook (their food) in common,' and from the words 'whether members of an undivided or a divided family.'

"Therefore if there be a separate cooking of food, as is sometimes the case, amongst members of a re-united family, their great (daily) sacraments are separate. 'Sacrament of speech' is 'the sacrament (*i.e.* the reading) of the Veda.' The phrase 'those (sacraments) which are preceded by the sacrament of speech' is represented (in Sanskrit) by (one word which is) a Bahuvrîhi (or possessive) compound of the class where the quality expressed by it (as the predicate of something else) is not intended for *the* (*i.e.* the essential) quality (of the latter); for were this compound meant to convey such an (essential) quality, the words 'preceded by the sacrament of speech' would yield no sense, since there would then be no cause for excluding the first (sacrament); whereas it logically follows that the four (sacraments only) are

* See p. 201, ll. 27 ff.

here meant.* Hence the sacrament of the Veda should be performed separately (by each member of the family). But (after all) these two texts are not much respected by the learned.

"As regards, however, the following sentences in the *Dharma-pravr'itti:*

'Sons unseparated must (conjointly) celebrate one anniversary S'râddha for both parents; if they be in different countries they must

* The grammatical observation in this passage, relating to Bahuvr'îhi compounds, is an allusion to a *paribhâshâ* or interpretation-rule which occurs in *Patanjali's Mahâbhâshya* on *Pân'ini*, I., 1, 27 (viz. the par. *bahuvr'îhau tadgun'asam'vijnânam api;* on which Nâgojibhat't'a in the *Paribhâshendus'ekhara* observes that, on account of the word *api*, it also implies *atadgun'asam'vijnânam*). The drift of this *paribhâshâ*, as Patanjali explains it, is to show that Bahuvr'îhi compounds (in English comparable to adjective compounds like lightfoot—*i. e.* one who possesses light feet,—or blue eye-d, &c.) are of two kinds, the one expressing a quality or an attribute which is essential, and the other expressing a quality or an attribute which is not essential, to the subject so predicated by the compound. Thus, as Patanjali illustrates, if you say: 'there march the priests having red turbans on, the Bahuvr'îhi *lohitoshn'îshâh*' 'having red turbans on' implies here an essential quality of the priests, since this quality cannot be disconnected from their appearance as they march. But if you say: 'bring hither the man who possesses brindled cows (*chitragu*),' you want the man to be brought, but not his cows; hence the quality of 'possessing brindled cows' would in this case be disconnected from the appearance of the man, and therefore would not be essential to it. In the first instance the quality expressed by the compound was the characteristic feature, in the second it is merely the descriptive mark, of the subject predicated by it; and this, as *Nâgoji* in his commentary observes, depends on the sense. The application, then, regarding the compound *vâgyajnapûrvaka*, 'preceded by the sacrament of speech,' which our text makes of this paribhâshâ is that if this predicate of the 'four sacraments' spoken of had been considered by the writer as *essential* to them, the four sacraments would have been represented by him as accompanied and headed by 'the sacrament of speech'—which would be nonsense. If, however, this predicate was understood by him as being merely a descriptive one, the sense would be, as it should be, that the four sacraments are those which in their usual order come after the sacrament of speech, but are not accompanied by it.

(each of them) separately perform the S'râddha on the day of new moon and the monthly S'râddhas. If they go to (reside in) different villages, unseparated brethren should always (each of them) separately perform the S'râddha on the day of new moon and the monthly S'râddhas of both parents. When unseparated, but residing in different villages, each living upon the wealth acquired by himself, these brothers should celebrate the Pârvan'a-S'râddha separately;'

"And as regards the following passage in the *Smr'itisamuchchaya*;

'The Vais'vadeva, the anniversary S'râddha, as well as the Mahâlaya rite, in case the members of a family reside in different countries, are to be celebrated separately (by each of them), and in like manner the S'râddha on the day of new moon,'—

"These (two) texts, some say, have reference to members of a re-united family residing in different countries. But the fact is that they have no authority.

"Or, to sum up: if there be sameness of place, time, agency and so on, conjointness (in the performance of the act) follows as a matter of logical reasoning. If the agency is not the same, such conjointness (only exists if it) is established by an express text. If the place is not the same, some base (the rule concerning) the separate performance of S'râddhas and other ceremonies on circumstantial reasoning, since in such a case there is neither a logical necessity nor an express text (which would establish conjointness)."

Even from these few extracts it will be seen that commensality or the reverse of it has not been regarded as a proof of either union or division of a family; for without any restriction whatever, as we find, members of a *united* family are spoken of as residing and 'cooking' apart from one another, and members of a *divided* family as living and messing together.

And I may add at once that I know of no Hindu law-authority which

distinctly declares that 'living or dining apart' is a legal *test* of partition. *Manu*, *Vyâsa*, and other lawgivers, it is true, sometimes say that sons and parents should 'live together,' but, in the first place, the words they use to this effect, do not imply an obligation; they merely convey a recommendation or permission; and secondly, their expression 'living together' does not intimate a particular mode of life which would be a *test* of union, but is used synonymously with 'union' in general.

Hence, when *Manu* says:* "Either let them thus live together, or let them live apart (*Kullûka: i.e.* let them separate), if they have a desire of performing religious duties, &c."—his words merely express the lawfulness of both union and separation, but not a criterion of either. Or, when *Vyâsa* writes, "It is lawful that brothers and their parents, if the latter are alive, should live together," the *Smriti-chandrikâ*, after quoting these words, adds: "even after the demise of the father brothers live together for the sake of increasing mutually their property; for *S'ankha* and *Likhita* have said, 'Let them willingly live together, for being in harmony and united they will become prosperous.'"† Here again, therefore, 'living together' does not imply a particular mode of domestic life, without which union could not exist, but simply a state of union in general as contrasted with a state of separation in general. And consequently, passages of this kind are not alleged by the Digests under the head of "*evidence of partition*," but in the chapter treating of the *periods* of partition;—a distinction which, from a Hindu point of view, is very material.

There is indeed one text which might seem to imply that "*cooking apart*" (not living apart) *was* considered by a native authority as a sign

* IX., 111; in the Vyavahâra-Mâdhavîya quoted as a verse of *Prajâpati*. Compare also Jîmûtav. Dâyabh., I., 37.

† Ed. Calc., p. 8.

of partition, viz., a passage in Nârada's Dharmas'âstra,* for it occurs there under the head of "ascertainment of a contested partition," and being quoted in Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga under the same head, has been translated by Colebrooke thus:

"Gift and acceptance of gift, cattle, grain, house, land and attendants must be considered as distinct among separated brethren, as also *diet*, religious duties, income and expenditure."†

But, in consulting the explanation given by the best commentators of this passage, and in comparing it with the sense put upon it in other Digests, it will be found that instead of "as also diet, religious duties, income and expenditure," the translation should most probably run: "as also *the religious duties connected with the cooking* (of food), income and expenditure"—when the very omission of 'cooking apart' in this passage would strongly confirm the opinion just expressed.‡

* I. (India) O. MS. No. 1300, fol. 38, *b*: dânagrahan'apas'vannagr'ihakshetra-parigrahâh' vibhaktânâm pr'ithag jneyâh' pâkadharmâgamavyayâh'. [xiii., 38.

† XIV., § 7.—The italics of *diet* are mine.—In Colebrooke's "Digest of Hindu Law," vol. iii., p. 407 and p. 417, this passage is translated thus: "When co-heirs have made a partition (distribution) the acts of giving and receiving cattle, grain, houses, land, household establishments, dressing victuals, religious duties, income and expenses are to be considered as separate, and (conversely) as proofs of a partition;" whereupon Jagannâtha observes (p. 407): "'dressing victuals' [here means] for the service of guests and the like, and for the food of the family; 'religious duties' the aggregate of constant and occasional acts of religion." It will be seen, however, from the next note, that his interpretation of *pâkadharma* is not borne out by the principal commentators of Jîm. Dâyabh. and the other Digests.

‡ On the first part of the compound *pâkadharmâgamavyayâh'*, Achyutânanda, in Bharatachandras'iroman'i's edition of Jîmûtav. Dâyabh. (p. 357) comments: *pâkadharmâ vais'vadevadharmâdayah'*, when pâkadharma, therefore, would not be a Dvandva, but a Tatpurusha compound; and similarly *S'rîkr'ishn'at.*: (as also in the previous Calc. editions) *pâkadharmo vais'vadevâdikarma*, i.e., "religious duties connected with cooking, that is, the Vais'vadeva duties (or ceremonies), and similar ones;" *Râmabhadra* in the edition named merely comments on *dharma* (not on

It is to be presumed that on the strength of this passage,—as translated by Colebrooke,—Strange, Macnaghten, and other modern authors, even though rejecting non-commensality as a 'sign' of separation, allowed it a place amongst the different kinds of 'evidence of partition;'*

pâkadharma), viz., *dharmo daivapitrâdikarma;* but *daiva* is as frequently used synonymously with *vais'vadeva*, the meaning of his words would be: "the Vais'vadeva, the sacrament of the manes, and similar ceremonies;" when it becomes probable that the proper reading should be *pâkadharmo daiva*°, or that *dharma* is abbreviated by the commentator for *pâkadharma;* in the *Viramitrodaya* also, (p. 223, *a*, l. 12) where the same passage of Nârada is quoted, *Mitramis'ra* explains (l. 14) *dharmo vais'vadevâdih'*, *ekapâkena vasatâm iti prâguktavachanât, i.e.*, "religious duty means the Vais'vadeva, and so on, on account of the previous quotation (from Nârada) which says: 'of those who live (together and) cook (in common) (the worship of the manes, gods and twice-born should be single, &c.);'" where *dharma* is therefore used in the sense of *pâkadharma*, and the 'sign' in question is not the 'cooking,' but the religious rites connected with the cooking. —Again, in the *Vivâdachintâman'i*, where the same passage occurs (p. 162) *Vâchaspatimis'ra* likewise takes pâkadharma for a Tatpurusha; viz., *pâkadharmah' pârvan'âdih'*, "the religious duties connected with cooking, *i.e.*, the Pârvan'a and other ceremonies." In the *Dâyakaumudî*, too (p. 278) *S'rîkr'ishn'at's* commentary on this passage, as already mentioned, is quoted and adopted by Râmajayatarkâlankâra. On the other hand, in the *Vyavahâramâdhavîya* and *Vyavahâramayûkha* (IV.. 7, § 34), instead of *pâkadharmâgama*,° the text reads *dânadharmâgama*,° when *Nîlakan't'ha* explains *dânadharmo lekhyâdih'*, "the duties connected with *gifts, i.e.* written deeds, and the like."—The word *grain*, which occurs in Colebrooke's translation, represents the Sanskrit *anna;* and lest any inference be drawn from it regarding 'diet,' or lest it be doubted that this is the proper sense of the word as here used, I may mention that the *Dâyakaumudî*, on the authority of the *Vivâdabhangârn'ava*, says: "*anna* here means 'the getting of grain,'" and adds: "but some say *anna* here means 'buying corn, grain, &c., for the sake of food (*annârtham*).'" But even for *anna*, the Vivâdach. has the v. l. *artha* and explains it with *arthotpâdana*, 'producing wealth.'—Whatever view, therefore, we may take of this passage, it is clear that the balance of probability is in favour of S'rîkr'ishn'atarkâlankâra's, Achyutânanda's, and Vâchaspatimis'ra's gloss, and that *Nârada* if he really wrote *pâkadharma*° and not *dânadharma*, did not make 'cooking,' but the religious duties connected with it, 'a sign of partition.'

* Macnaghten, for instance, in his 'Principles of Hindu Law' (Madras, 1865, 53, says: "It (viz. partition) cannot always be inferred from the manner in

but, with the aid of the printed texts and commentaries we now possess, there can be no doubt that we should not be justified in stating for certain, as the Bombay Digest does, that *according to Hindu authors*, living and dining apart is a *sign* of separation.*

But, though the extracts already adduced merely confirm the negative inference derivable from the ancient law authorities, that commensality, taken by itself, affords no legal evidence regarding the state of a family, they show us that a different view must be entertained of the value which some ceremonies at least possess for testing doubtful cases of this kind.

Some religious acts, as we see, must, according to all authorities, be performed separately by each member of a family, and others in common, whether the members of such a family live in a state of union or separation. Thus, the reading of the Vedas, muttering prayers, and in general all religious acts which entail no expenditure, must be performed separately by each member even of a united family; on the other hand, the sixteen S'râddhas which occur during the first year after a father's death, must be performed in common,—that is, as a rule, by the eldest son on behalf of the whole family—even if the latter is a divided one. Hence the performance of acts or ceremonies like these is no criterion either way, whether of union or separation. Yet we find that if members of a united family 'cook' their food in common, they are bound to perform, conjointly, the four daily sacraments of the gods,

which the brethren live, as they may reside apparently in a state of union, and yet, in matters of property, each may be separate; while, on the other hand, they may reside apart, and yet may be in a state of union with respect to property: though it undoubtedly is one among the presumptive proofs to which recourse may be had, in a case of uncertainty, to determine whether a family be united or separate in regard to acquisitions and property."—Similarly, 'Strange, Hindu Law,' vol. i., p. 229.

* See p 187, ll. 13 f.

manes, created beings and men, the anniversary S'râddha, the S'râddha on the day of new moon, and the S'râ'ddhas of this category, the Tîrtha-, Gayâ-, and S'râddhas of this nature, whilst, if messing apart or if separated, they would be bound to perform these rites separately, each for himself. The *Vais'vadeva* also, members of a separated family *must*, and members of a united family, if not messing together, *may* perform separately; but members of a united family, if messing together, *must* perform it conjointly. Hence, if it can be shown that relatives *mess together*, and yet perform all or any of these ceremonies *separately*, each for himself, it is clear that, on the ground of all authoritative texts, a case of division is made out.

Again, it is expressly enjoined that a voluntary religious ceremony entailing expenditure can be performed by a single member of a united family only on the condition that the rest of the family allow him to do so; and to this clause no restriction is attached regarding commensality or living apart. Hence if it can be shown that a person performed such a ceremony without any protest on the part of his relatives, yet without having obtained their consent, such evidence would prove that he was divided from them; or, conversely, if it can be shown that he asked and obtained the consent of his family to perform such a ceremony, proof is afforded that at that time he was a member of a united family.*

Some statements, therefore, of Sir T. Strange on this subject are liable to objection. For, though he was right in dividing the religious duties of a Hindu into such as are "indispensable," and others which

* How great the amount of evidence available on this purely religious ground is, can be fully ascertained only from the ritual works; but an inference to this end may be obtained from Colebrooke's Essays 'On the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus,' and particularly from that relating to the S'râddha (Miscellaneous Essays, vol. i. pp. 123 ff.); also from H. H. Wilson's 'Religious Practices and Opinions of the Hindus' (Works, vol. ii.. pp. 40 ff.; edited by Dr. R. Rost).

"in their nature are voluntary,"* he was mistaken in assigning to the latter class "consecrations, the stated oblations at noon or evening with whatever else there may be of a similar kind, the performance or non-performance of which respects the individual merely." And he was likewise mistaken when he said that "the proof in question [viz. of partition] results from the separate solemnization of such [rites], the acquittal or neglect of which is attended with consequences beneficial, or otherwise, to the individual, in his capacity as housekeeper (gr'ihastha), or master of a family, the third and most important order among the Hindoos; of this kind are among others, the five great sacraments, in favour of "the divine sages, the manes, the gods, the spirits, and guests."† For we have seen that each member even of a united family must for himself perform several such ceremonies if the members of that family 'cook' apart from one another. And when he added, "Still such separate performance is not conclusive; it is a circumstance merely,"—we must point to the cases above mentioned, in which it *is* conclusive, provided the members of a family mess together. Again, exception must also be taken to the remark which the same learned author appended to a Pandit's answer touching the same question.‡ "Had the division been doubtful," he said, "then certainly the joint performance of the ceremonies would be a conclusion against it; a conclusion merely, however; or, as it has been appositely called in another case, 'a token' (*adyuharana*, I suppose, in the original) not a proof." For, one of the ceremonies here alluded to is "the annual ceremony for a father," and the joint performance of such a ceremony, as we have seen, can only take place in a united family. The usual words for 'token,' moreover, from which he inferred that it implied

* Hindu Law (1830), vol. i., pp. 227 ff.

† Those explained in note * of p. 191 are here meant.

‡ Hindu Law, vol. ii., p. 392.

a conclusion only, are in Sanskrit *chihna* and *lakshan'a*, and each is often used in the sense of "characteristic or essential mark," when it is tantamount to proof.

The Editors of the Digest, however, not merely repeat, as we have seen, the general and, on account of its generality, objectionable statement of Strange, but after the words above quoted* add: "In the present condition of Hindu society, the performance of all religious rites has become so lax and irregular as to afford no safe ground for inference." I do not know on what authority this sweeping assertion is made, for the Editors do not at all indicate the source whence it has been derived. Hitherto the most reliable accounts of the present religious condition of India seem to lead to the conclusion, supported also by the writings of Colebrooke, Wilson, Haug, and others, that there is still in the country a very large proportion of the community which very tenaciously clings to what it considers its orthodox faith, and that this community is extremely jealous of allowing any European to pry into its devotions and to become acquainted with the detail of them. Nor is it clear what the Editors call 'lax and irregular;' for compared to the vedic ritual, for instance, that taught by the Purân'as may be so qualified, and judged by the standard of the latter, doubtless more recent ceremonies may likewise be thus termed. A statement so vague and general is in reality therefore meaningless, for it neither specifies the ceremonies to which it relates, nor the period or the standard by which to obtain a medium of comparison between the present and past. Yet even if the Editors had afforded us the information required, and if their statement concerning the quality of the actual worship of the Hindus

* P. xiv. "The separate performance of the Vais'vadeva sacrifice, of S'râddhas and other religious rites, is still less conclusive. At Dig. chapter iv., Q. 4, infra, a passage of Bhat't' ojîdîkshita is quoted, according to which coparceners, living apart, may or may not perform the Vais'vadeva each for himself, and, in the present condition of Hindu society, &c." See p. 187, ll. 8 ff.

were in some sense correct, it still appears that the conclusion would not be borne out by it. For in so far as the Hindu law of inheritance appeals to evidence based on religious grounds, it is quite immaterial whether the detail in the performance of this or any other ceremony concerned by it, agrees with the teaching of the ancient or mediæval, or even modern ritual—provided such a performance is held, rightly or wrongly, to be in the spirit of the orthodox faith. Whether, therefore, the S'râddhas or Vais'vadeva, for instance, are now performed in strict accordance with the ritual relied upon by Colebrooke in his 'Essay on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus,' or not, is for *legal* purposes absolutely irrelevant, so long as the popular mind still believes that the S'râddha benefits the soul of the deceased relative, or that the Vais'vadeva removes the sins which a man may have committed in preparing his daily meals. And that this belief no longer exists, the Editors would still have to prove. It is certain, moreover, that the Law Courts of the Bombay Presidency and the Pandits can entertain no doubts in this respect, for otherwise it would be unintelligible why in suits relating to inheritance, the judges should address questions to the Pandits about the performance of S'râddha and other rites, and that the Pandits should strengthen their replies by a reference to their doctrinal works; and even the Bombay Digest reports three instances, at least, of such interrogatories, at pp. 48, 57, and 58. It would be a mistake, therefore, on the part of an Indian judge were he to adopt the inference suggested to him by the Bombay Digest that no performance of any religious ceremony whatever can afford conclusive evidence regarding the union or division of a Hindu family, and in consequence, that henceforth he may dispense with a study of the native authoritative works concerned in this matter. Even the few data here collected, by way of illustration, will sufficiently show that in doubtful cases these works will still be his safest guide.

ARTICLE VI.

OPINIONS ON PRIVY COUNCIL LAW CASES.

A.

ON THE CASE BETWEEN NEELKISTO DEB BURMONO AND BEERCHUNDER THAKOOR.

1. It is a maxim of Hindu law, admitted by all the schools, that there are four sources of Hindu law, viz., *'Sruti* (*i.e.* the Vedas), *Smr'iti* (*i.e.* the Dharma-'Sâstras, or the codes of law by Manu, Yâjnavalkya, and other *ancient* law-givers), *custom*, and (in all indifferent cases) "*self-satisfaction*" (*i.e.* one's own pleasure); but where these are at variance with one another, that weight and authority attaches to them according to their precedence; *i.e.* that where they clash, *'Sruti* would supersede *Smr'iti*, either of these *custom*, and either of the former "self-satisfaction."*

* *Manu* II., 6.—"The roots of law are the whole Veda, the Smr'iti and moral practices of such as perfectly understand it, the (immemorial) customs of good men, and (in cases quite indifferent) self-satisfaction."

Manu II., 12.—"The scripture (*i.e.* S'ruti or Vedas), the codes of law (Smr'iti), approved usage, and (in all indifferent cases) self-satisfaction, the wise have openly declared to be the quadruple description of the juridical system."

Yâjnavalkya, I., 7.—"The S'ruti, the Smr'iti, the practice of good men, what seems good to one's self, and a desire maturely considered, these are declared to be the root of law." [The Sanskrit words for the first three sources in Yâjnavalkya are the same as in Manu. The difference in translation is therefore merely

2. Hence if the *kulâchâr* or custom which prevailed or prevails in the family of the Mahârâjas of Tipperah regarding the succession of an heir to the throne and possessions of Tipperah, is at variance with the Hindu law as current in Bengal, either this custom is devoid of authority, or the law as current in Bengal is not the law by which the succession in the royal family of Tipperah has to be regulated. And that the latter contingency is possible, again results from the fact that the law regarding succession as current in Bengal, is not in itself *Smr'iti*, but only a commentary on Smr'iti (viz. the Dâyabhâga of Jîmûtavâhana), and that there are other commentaries on the same Smr'iti, which in essential points differ from that commentary, and actually are the law prevailing in other parts of India (*e.g.* the Mitâksharâ, the Vyavahâra-Mayûkha, the Smr'itichandrikâ, &c.)

3. That the Tipperah Kulâchâr or custom *is* materially at variance with the Hindu law of succession as current in Bengal, follows from the fact that the former *excludes* from succession the *widow*, and that it can give preference to a brother or other member of the family before the son of a deceased king.*

4. Since, however, the exclusion of the widow from the Tipperah succession, and the precedence of a brother or other relative before a

accidental, that of Manu belonging to Sir W. Jones, and that of Yâjnavalkya to Röer.]

The Mitâksharâ on this passage from Yâjnavalkya explains that, where they clash they have a right and authority according to the order in which they are enumerated.

* Exclusion of the widow: Record, p. 406, line 22; p. 139, line 48.
„ of sons in favour of brothers: Record, p. 407, line 47.
„ of sons in favour of a nephew: Record, p. 135, line 30.
„ of a son in favour of the eldest member of the family: Record, p. 134, lines 54, 55.
„ of a son in favour of a brother: Record, p. 290, line 36.
„ of a son in favour of a nephew; Record, p. 31, line 13.

son, have been declared *legal* and *valid* by former decisions of the Courts,* it results that the law of Bengal cannot be invoked in the present case to settle the respective claims of the Respondent and Appellant.

5. It remains, therefore, to be seen whether the Tipperah Kulâchâr, and if so to what extent, is in conformity with a higher authority than the law of Bengal, and what that authority is.

6. The highest law authority of India, that from which no other law-code is supposed to differ, is the code of *Manu*. That portion of this code which relates to inheritance, treats of inheritance under a twofold aspect, viz, inheritance as succession to an *undivided* estate, and inheritance as succession to family property when *division* had taken place. The law relating to the former category of inheritance is extremely simple, and scarcely admitting of litigation: that relating to the latter is complex.

Hence other law-codes, all of which admit the supreme authority of Manu, *e.g. Yâjnavalkya*, who is the primary source of the present law of succession in India, passes entirely over in silence the first category of succession,† and merely deals with the second category, which is a fruitful ground for litigation.

And it is only the digests or commentaries, as that of Jîmûtavâhana or the Mitâkshará of Vijnânes'wara, which here and there endeavour to bring in the question of non-division,† though they properly only have to

* The same as above; especially in the case of the widow: *Record*, p. 406, line 22.

† See the beginning of Colebrooke's translation of the Mitâkshará, p. 241 (2nd ed., p. 364):—"The partition of heritage is now propounded by the sage of holiness," &c. (which words belong to the author ot the Mitâkshará), and the beginning of *Yâjnavalkya's* chapter on inheritance: *ib.*, p. 258, last line but one (2nd ed., p. 377):—"When the father makes a partition," &c.

‡ Thus the quotations from Manu given in the next notes occur in Jîmûta-

deal with questions of division. And on that ground, too, they in consequence arrive at sometimes opposite conclusions. Thus, since the chapter of Yâjnavalkya—as translated by Colebrooke—strictly speaking, only relates to *division* ("Dâya-vibhâga," or "Dâya-Bhâga," meaning division of inheritance), the Mitâkshará concludes, that the *widow* where mentioned by Yâjnavalkya, can only mean the *widow* of a *divided* husband. whereas the Dâya-Bhâga of Jîmûtavâhana obviously striving to fill up what may appear as a defect in Yâjnavalkya, concludes that *widow* also means the widow of an *undivided* husband. But the very possibility of such a fundamental difference in the interpretation of the same text, proves that Yâjnavalkya's text did not deal with the succession to an *undivided* estate as a separate topic, and that those—like the Mahârâjas of Tipperah—who do not consider the *widow* as entitled to succeed, resort for the law regulating the succession to an *undivided* estate, not to Yâjnavalkya and the Dâya Bhâga of Jîmûtavâhana, as current in Bengal, but to the code of *Manu*.

7. Regarding the succession to an *undivided* estate (and it is admitted on all hands that the throne and the possessions of a Mahârâja of Tipperah are in the nature of an undivided and indivisible property), the code of *Manu** rules that after the death of a father "the *eldest*

vâhana (Colebrooke's "Two Treatises," pp, 16, 17, 2nd ed., p. 193), and the "Mitâkshará" (Colebrooke, p. 263, 2nd ed., p. 381), not to explain the law of succession to *undivided* property, but merely to prove the *period* at which, according to Manu, *division* could take place.

* Manu IX., 104 (quoted in *Colebrooke*, p. 8, 2nd ed., p. 186:)—

"After the death of the father and mother, the brethren being assembled "must divide equally the paternal estate, for they have not power over it while "their parents live."

IX., 105 (quoted in *Colebrooke*, p. 16, 2nd ed., p. 193:)—

"But the eldest ['brother' is not in the text] may take the patrimony "entire, and the rest may live under him as under their father."

IX., 185 (quoted in Colebrooke, pp. 199 and 346, 2nd ed., pp. 334 and 443 *does not apply* here:—

[brother] takes the entire patrimony," and that the "rest of the family depend on him for their maintenance, as on a father."

8. The word for "*eldest*" in Manu is *jyesht'ha;* but as "*jyesht'ha*" has a double meaning, viz., that of "*eldest*" and "*best,*" all the commentators —also borne out by another passage of Manu—agree in deciding, that the "*eldest*" must also imply the "*best;*" hence, if the "eldest" is an unworthy person, or otherwise unfit to manage the family property, even the "*youngest*" may be declared "jyesht'ha," that is, any other member of the family, if considered worthier than the eldest. But in such a case they also stipulate that the *consent of all the members of the family* is required to exclude the eldest, and to invest another member of the family with the right of succession and the privileges pertaining to it.*

"Of him who leaves no son, the father shall take the inheritance, or the "brothers."

For this last paragraph can only refer to a divided family where each member has property of his own, as *brothers* occur in the plural, and as the son could never be in possession of the *ancestral* estate if the father were still alive.

* Jîmûtavâhana, where showing that non-division can only take place if ALL the members of the family consent, quotes Manu, IX., 105, and comments on it as follows (Colebrooke, p. 16; 2nd ed., p. 193:)—

"Is not the eldest son alone entitled to the estate on the demise of the "co-heirs, and not the rest of the brethren? for Manu says:— 'The eldest "'brother may take the patrimony entire, and the rest may live under him, as "'under their father.' And here 'eldest' intends him who rescues his father "from the hell called Put, and not the *senior survivor.* 'By the eldest, as soon "'as born, a man becomes father of male issue, and is exonerated from debt to "'his ancestors; such a son, therefore, is entitled to take the heritage. That "'son alone on whom he devolves his debt, and through whom he tasted "'immortality, was begotten from a sense of duty; others are considered as "'begotten from love or pleasure.'"

"Not so; for the right of the eldest [to take charge of the whole] is pronounced "dependent on the will of the rest. Thus Nârada says:—'Let the eldest brother, "like a father, support all the others who are willing to live together without

They also rule—likewise on the authority of another passage from Manu—that if there are sons by different mothers, seniority belongs to birth, if the mothers are of the same caste; but that it belongs not to birth, but to rank, if the mothers are of different castes. Thus, if all the mothers are of the Kshattriya caste, the first-born son would be the eldest, even if he were the son of the youngest wife; but if there are three wives of the Vais'ya, or third caste, and one wife of the Kshattriya, or second caste, the son of the latter would be the "eldest (best)," though he may be younger than the sons by the Vais'yâ mothers.

9. It follows, therefore, that the right of succession to an *undivided* estate is in the first place a right by seniority—seniority also implying rank; that this right is forfeited only in consequence of unworthiness

"partition; or even the youngest brother, *if all assent*, and if he be capable of "business: capacity for business is the best rule in a family.' [Colebrooke, p. 17, 2nd ed., p. 194, translates this passage from Nârada thus:—'Let the eldest brother 'by consent support the rest, like a father, or let a younger brother who is capable 'do so; the prosperity of the family depends on ability.' This translation, however, is *not so correct* as that in Prasannakumâr Tagore's Vivâdachintâman'i, p. 227, from which the former is taken.] "By consent of all" (Jîmûtavâhana continues) "even the youngest brother being capable, may support the rest. Primogeniture is 'not a positive rule' [*i.e.* is not absolutely meant in the quoted passage from Manu]".

Manu, IX., 213 (quoted in Colebrooke, p. 294, 2nd ed., p. 404):—

> "An eldest brother who from avarice shall defraud his younger brother, shall forfeit the honour of his primogeniture, be deprived of his additional share, and be chastised by the king."

This passage, though relating to division, shows that an "eldest" son can forfeit his primogeniture through unworthy conduct.

Kullûka, the celebrated commentator of Manu, also, where explaining Manu IX., 105 (quoted before) says:—"If the eldest is virtuous, then he is the eldest," and where commenting on Manu, IX., 109—": The eldest exalts the family or destroys it; the eldest is in this world the most respected, and the good never treat him with disdain," says:"The eldest in an undivided family, if he is virtuous, then he is the eldest, for on account of his virtuous conduct the younger brothers follow him; he exalts then the family, but if he is vicious he destroys it," &c.

or unfitness on the part of the person entitled to succeed; but that this forfeit must be the result of a unanimous decision taken by all the members of the family interested in the preservation of the estate.

10. The so-called custom of the royal family of Tipperah, as results from the Record, consisted in the following particulars:—

(*a*) The reigning Mahârâja designated, while alive, or could designate, his successor to the throne and the estates.

(*b*) The person so designated was called *Yuvarâja*, and his installation was performed with great solemnity.

(*c*) The person so installed was always a *male*, never a female or an infant, these being excluded on account of their "unfitness," and as is contended by the appellant, always the *eldest* member of the family; but the Respondent asserts that he was not always the eldest member, though he admits that such a *person* was never a female or an infant.

11. This custom agrees in all its particulars with the law of Manu as explained before. For, though Manu does not speak of the installation of a Yuvarâja, such a "*custom*"—the third source of Hindu law—would not be at variance with Manu or any other "*Smr'iti* or *S'ruti*." It is on the contrary borne out by precedents recorded in the *Mahâbhârata*, the *Râmâyaṅa* and the *Purâṅas*, and therefore legal.* And even if the assertion of the Respondent were correct, the inference to be drawn from it would only be that the predecessors of the deceased Mahârâja chose a junior member of their family as their successor in preference to the eldest member, because the latter was deemed by them unworthy or unfit to succeed, and because their decision met with the unanimous consent of the rest of the family.

12. But the unanimous consent of the whole family is implied by the fact that the installation of a Yuvarâja is not a private, but a public

* See Goldstücker's "Sanskrit Dictionary" (vol. I.) pp. 275—285.

act; that it must take place in the presence of the whole family; and that its validity is subject to the performance of a number of ceremonies which are laid down with great detail by the Purân'as—the fundamental source of the present religion of the Hindus—and by works on astrology. The Record, moreover, shows that the installation of former Yuvarâjas of Tipperah conformed to this public and solemn character of the ceremony.

13. It has been asserted by the late Mahârâja, and the Respondent asserts, that the Mahârâjas of Tipperah chose, at their own pleasure and without any restriction, the Yuvarâja from amongst the members of their family. But, in the first place, their assertion is unproved; secondly, it could be proved only if they showed that the choice made by a previous Mahârâja did not meet with the unanimous consent of the rest of the family, but nevertheless was upheld; thirdly, even if they proved that such consent was wanting, the conclusion could only be, that such a choice was then illegal, since *custom* cannot supersede *Smr'iti*.

14. But it results, on the contrary, from the Record, that the late Mahârâja Essanchunder himself must not have looked upon his right of choosing a Yuvarâja as absolutely vested in his pleasure. For, when it appears that the Appellant was charged by the witnesses with having made a hostile and criminal attack on the possessions of the Tipperah family, it would seem that this charge, otherwise utterly irrelevant to the question of succession, was merely raised in order to establish his unworthiness to succeed. Had the witnesses been able to substantiate it, it would doubtless have gone far to show that the Mahârâja had grounds for declaring the "seniority" of the Appellant as forfeited. But the charge entirely failed; and it has not been shown that the Mahârâja, with the consent of his whole family, proclaimed the Appellant's unworthiness or unfitness to succeed.

15. It is not denied by the Respondent that the installation of a Yuvarâja required for its validity the performance in public of certain ceremonies, as laid down by the sacred books of the Hindus. But the evidence afforded by his witnesses shows, in the first place, that there is the strongest probability of his pretended Yuvarâjaship never having been solemnly celebrated at all; and, secondly, even if the late Mahârâja performed some ceremony in order to install him as Yuvarâja, that such a ceremony was devoid of the essential characteristics by which alone the title and rights of a Yuvarâja could be conferred on a non-senior member of the royal family.

16. This results from the following facts, as proved by the depositions of the Respondent's witnesses:—

(*a*) This pretended installation, as is stated by all his witnesses, took place on the same day when the late Mahârâja consecrated a new building. It is extremely unlikely, however, that two such ceremonies, so utterly different in their character, should be performed by any Hindu simultaneously, and the much more important ceremony actually as a mere appendage to the far inferior one.

(*b*) It is stated by all the witnesses of the Respondent that the late Mahârâja consecrated the new building which he was going to inhabit, on the 16*th S'râvana*, this being a lucky day for the performance of such a ceremony. And unquestionably the late Mahârâja, as every Hindu would, took care that, according to the astrological works, the day for the performance of such a ceremony *should* be a lucky one. These works also bear out the fact that the month of S'râvana would be a lucky time for the consecration of a new house. But the same works likewise say that the month of S'râvana is *not* one of those in which a Yuvarâja-ceremony should be performed. It becomes, therefore,

extremely improbable that a king so particular in conforming to the astrological rules, where the consecration of a new building was concerned, should have been quite indifferent to these rules when the proper time for the performance of a much more important ceremony, that of the installation of a Yuvarâja, nad to be chosen.

(*c*) It is stated by all the witnesses of the Respondent that the Yuvarâja-ceremony, which, as they assert, had been performed, did not come to the cognizance of all the members of the Mahârâja's family, and much less to that of the public at large. It was consequently deficient in that very characteristic which is its essential feature, in that publicity, which is also to imply the consent of the whole family to the choice made by the king.

(*d*) It is further stated by all the witnesses of the Respondent that the late Mahârâja for the first time designated the name of his successor on the very day when the installation of the latter, as is asserted, took place. But, according to all authorities, it is an essential feature of this ceremony that the person whose appointment as Yuvarâja was intended, should on the day preceding the public ceremony, hold a fast and undergo purification so as to make himself fit for the solemnity of the succeeding day. According to Hindu notions, it is therefore impossible that a proceeding as that described by the witnesses should be a valid ceremony of the installation of a Yuvarâja.

17. Hence: Since the law of the Dâyabhâga as current in Bengal does *not* apply to the Tipperah succession;

Since the latter is regulated by the highest law authority of the Hindus, the Code of Manu;

Since the custom of the Mahârâjas of Tipperah is in conformity with the law of Manu;

Since the Appellant is acknowledged by all the parties as the eldest *claiming* member of the present Tipperah family;

Since it has not been shown that by the late Mahârâja and the rest of his family he has been unanimously declared to be unworthy or unfit to succeed;

Since it is highly improbable that the Respondent ever was installed Juvarâja by the late Mahârâja;

And since the ceremony of his installation, if it ever took place, was, according to the deposition of the Respondent's witnesses, devoid of the essential characteristics which are required to make the Yuvarâja ceremony a legally valid ceremony,

my opinion is that the Appellant has a valid claim to succeed to the possessions of the late Mahârâja of Tipperah.

B.

ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE LAW OF BENGAL FAVOURS OR DISCOUNTENANCES THE PRINCIPLE OF PERPETUITY AS APPLICABLE TO THE RIGHT OF INHERITANCE.

In the law of Bengal there occurs no distinct statement relating to the theory of perpetuity as applicable to the right of inheritance. But from the philosophical basis on which the law of Bengal rests, it must be inferred that it discountenances such a theory.

For, this basis is the Nyâya, and more especially that division of it called the Vais'eshika philosophy, and some discussions raised by the chief authorities of the Bengal school must therefore be understood in the light of that system of philosophy. This also results from the sameness of the philosophical terms used by both.*

* "The written law, whether it be *s'ruti* or *smr'iti*, direct revelation or tradition, is subject to the same rules of interpretation. Those rules are collected in the Mîmânsâ, which is a disquisition on proof and authority of precepts. It is considered as a branch of philosophy; and is properly the logic of the law."

"In the eastern part of India, viz. Bengal and Bahar, where the Vedas are less read, and the Mîmânsâ less studied than in the south, the dialectic philosophy, or Nyâya, is more consulted, and is there relied on for rules of reasoning and interpretation upon questions of law, as well as upon metaphysical topics."—Account by H. T. Colebrooke of the Hindu Schools of Law, in Strange's Hindu Law, vol. i., p. 316.

Now the Vais'eshika lays down the proposition that there are seven *padârthas*, or categories, under which all material objects (such as earth, water, &c.,) and all ideal existences (such as cause, effect, &c.) are comprised. Beside these, it maintains, there are none; and it rejects therefore any explanation, for instance, of cause and effect, which, instead of being evolved from any of these seven categories, would resort to the assumption of another principle not contained in them.

The following passage from the *Bhâshâ-Parichchheda*, one of the fundamental works of the Vais'eshika, together with its commentary as given in the *Siddhânta-Muktâvalî*, will corroborate this statement.*

TEXT.—"Substance, Quality, and in like manner Action, Genus, with Difference, and Concretion, and in like manner Non-existence, these seven are called the categories (*padârtha.*)"

COMMENTARY.—"Thereupon [*i.e.* on its being laid down that the Categories are seven] the author of the *Upamâna-Chintâman'i* raises the doubt whether a right to be treated as separate categories does not belong to *Power* and *Resemblance*, seeing that these differ from all the seven Categories. 'How is it [he asks] that these [seven] alone are Categories when there is a separate categoric nature in Power, Resemblance, &c.?'—To explain:—A burn is not produced by fire when attended by a gem [of the kind which is regarded as possessing the power to neutralize the operation of fire] or the like; but, by that devoid thereof, it is produced. In this case I infer that a cauterizing Power in the fire is destroyed by the gem or the like, and is reproduced by the removal of the gem, or the like, which acted as a neutralizer. So, too, Resemblance is a separate Category—for it is not included under any one of the [first] six Categories, seeing that [unlike any of these] it exists even in Genus—for we recognise Resemblance in the

* The translation is that by Dr. Ballantyne, in "the Bhâshâ-Parichchheda, and its commentary the Siddhânta-Muktâvalî," Calcutta, 1851, page 8, ff.

instance that, *as the generic nature of cows is eternal, so in like manner is that of horses also.* Further, it cannot fall within the Category of Non-existence:—because, that such a thing [as Resemblance] exists, is believed [by everyone.]

"But, if all this be asserted, it is not so—for, as regards the burning effect of the fire, &c., in the absence of the gem, &c., it is improper to postulate an endless (*ananta*) set of Powers, together with the previous Non-existence (*prâgabhâva*) and also the Annihilation thereof, when the result may be properly accounted for, either by the independent action [of the fire], or by assuming as the cause the absence of the [neutralizing] gem, &c. And you need not say, 'How then does burning take place when both the neutralizer is present and also a neutralizer of the [fire-neutralizing] gem?'—for, what I regard as the cause is the absence of the genus gem [or of all gems whatsoever], which implies the absence of [those gems that are] neutralizers.—Resemblance also is not another Category, but it consists in the possession of various characters belonging to any given thing, whilst being at the same time something other than the thing; as, for example, there is a resemblance to the Moon in a face, which being something not the Moon, yet possesses the pleasing character, &c., which the Moon possesses."

In other words, as regards the rejection of a category (*padârtha*) Power: since the independent action of fire is sufficient to account for the producing of a burn—according to the Vais'eshika, it would not be allowed in a special case to resort to an assumption of the non-existence of the action of fire and the subsequent annihilation of that non-existence, since this would be assuming causes which are remote, and arbitrarily creating "*endless*" (*ananta*) categories.

This reasoning, and in the very terms of the Vais'eshika, is applied by S'rîkr'ishn'a Tarkâlankâra, the great authority of the Bengal school, to the following passage of Jîmûtavâhana's Dâyabhâga (ch. 1, § 7) which says:—

"Nor can it be affirmed, that partition is the distribution to particular chattels, of a right vested in all the coheirs, through the sameness of their relation, over all the goods. For, relation, opposed by the co-existent claim of another relative, produces a right, figuratively implied by [the term] 'partition' (*vibhâgavyangya*),* to portions only of the estate: since it would be burdensome to infer the vestings and divestings† of rights to the whole of the paternal estate; and it would be useless, as there would not result a power of aliening at pleasure."

For, in regard to this passage, *S'rîkr'ishn'a Tarkâlankâra* argues as follows:—

"Now, if [you say]—'the co-existence of one relative, on account of the sameness [of the rights of all the relatives] being a bar to the proprietary right of another relative, none of them has a right to any portion [of the inheritance], since this bar exists—my answer is:

"Since property depending on relation and [the fact of] the right to such property having a previous Non-existence (*prâgabhâva*) are [notions] closely connected, the proprietary right of one relative bars the right to property depending on relation, when belonging to another relative. [For,] since you must admit that after division there is a proprietary right in a special portion [of the property], and since [from your admission it would follow that] this right had a previous Non-existence *prâgabhâva*), there is no incongruity [in my reply].

* Colebrooke's rendering of *vibhâgavyangya*, "determinable by partition," is less literal than that given above: "figuratively implied by [the term] partition."

† Vestings and divestings is in Sanskrit: *utpâda-vinâs'a*; lit., producings and annihilatings. In the Sanskrit text these words are part of the compound *utpâda-vinâs'a-kalpanâ-gauravât*, when it may be doubtful whether they are to be understood in the singular or plural number. Colebrooke rendered them in the singular, "*vesting and divesting*;" but it results from the context, the discussion of the commentator, and his *express* statement that they must be understood in the plural; on account of the objection to "endlessness."

"He [viz. Jîmûtavâhana] shows that the coexistence of one relative sufficiently accounts for opposing [the claim of another relative] in the words 'Since it would be burdensome to infer the vestings, &c.' Their sense is this:—The collective sum of the proprietary rights is equal to the number of all the relatives concerned in the property left by a father, or other [relative]. [There would be] vestings and divestings of these [rights]. [But such an assumption would be burdensome, for considering that it would then be necessary to assume such "endless" (*ananta*) categories, [as a series of vestings and divestings] the assumption of opposition [of one right by another co-existent right] is more easy [*i. e.* less remote, and therefore the only one consistent with the notions of the Vais'eshika.]."

On the theory of perpetuity the right of an heir would not be derived from his relationship to the owner of the property who immediately predeceased him, but from the title conferred on him by the testamentary or other disposition of a remote ancestor. In such a case, then, the effect of inheritance, instead of being accounted for from an immediate cause, would depend on a remote cause, or a series of remote causes, and these the Vais'eshika would reject as belonging to the category of "endless powers."

In my opinion, therefore, it results from the alleged words of Jîmûtavâhana and S'rîkr'ishn'a-Tarkâlankâra that these authorities not only do not admit a mode of inheritance which would prevent the alienation on the part of the inheritor of the property inherited; but also do not recognise a title to inheritance which would be derived from a remote cause—such as the principle of perpetuity—the latter being contrary to the spirit and a proper construction of the Bengal law.

NOTE.

The Heritable right of Bundhoos, according to the Western School, by the late Honourable P. C. Tagore. See Preface, pages ii, iii., iv., and v.

"Hence these institutes of the sages, such as Menu, Yagnyavalkya, Ushana, Gautama, and others, confirmed as they are by the revealed authority, are held in high veneration by the general consent of the Hindu community of all ages. Ancient and modern commentators, compilers and other writers, could never presume to alter or amend them. But to provide for the wants and necessities of society in its progressive state, and to suit the constitution of the provinces, where their works were intended to be in operation, *the commentators have recorded constructions, made logical inferences*, and attempted explanations to make passages more intelligible, and reconcile the differences of opinion among the sages, preserving in essence the object and intent of the original texts.

Such are the restricted functions of the commentators and compilers from ancient times down to the present day, unlike the nations of Europe, governed by Parliaments and other national Assemblies, These alter, amend, or add to their ancient canons of inheritance. By the 22nd and 23rd Vic., Ch. 35, Sec. 90, the English Parliament made further alterations in the enactment of the 3rd and 4th William IV., Ch. 106, Sec. 20. As long as such a remedy exists, the nation can never suffer any inconvenience from omissions and obscurities of the old canons of inheritance. In the absence of this privilege, the compilers, commentators, and other writers of modern days, meet the wants and necessities of society, which is always progressive, *by supplying omissions by logical inference*, or by explaining the inconsistency of

any part of the law, but not without preserving the spirit and reason of the old law. The propriety of adopting so rational a method, after the examples of the commentators, &c., cannot be questioned. The wants and necessities of society are daily increasing, undergoing alterations, and developing new points for solution. If the privilege of supplying omissions, by the reason of the law, be not allowed, while the restriction on the enactment of new laws for altering, amending, or adding to the old law, remains in full force, society will remain unprovided with adequate rules."

ON THE ETYMOLOGY OF JECUR, STERCUS, ETC.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE PHILOLOGICAL SOCIETY FOR 1854.

There are few words the affinity of which is less doubtful, while the etymology is more obscure, than the words *jecur*, ἧπαρ, Sanskrit यकृत् (*yakr'it*), and the words *stercus*, σκώρ, Sanskrit शकृत् (*s'akr'it.*) The peculiar interest they convey, as an instance of the different products, borne by the same linguistic stem in its various branches, and the light they throw on some other words of a kindred formation, induce me to offer the following remarks as to their etymological meaning, and the apparent irregularity of their declension.

I do not dwell upon the linguistic identity which exists between the first letters of *jecur* and यकृत् (*yakr'it*) on the one side, and ἧπαρ on the other, since the mutual correspondence of the Sanskrit य् (*y*) with the Greek *spiritus asper* in the beginning of words, (for instance in यस् (*yas*), and ὅς), and that of the Sanskrit or Latin gutturals with the Greek labials, and *vice versâ*, (for instance in अश्व (*as'wa*), *equus*, ἵππος; पञ्चन् (*panchan*), *quinque*, πέντε), is so well established, that I need

merely remind you of the fact, and of the instances given by Bopp, Pott, Kuhn, and others, to be relieved from the necessity of further proof.

The phonetic diversities, however, between *stercus*, σκώρ, and शकृत् (*s'akr'it*), are of a more complicated kind, as the *t* in *stercus* cannot be explained as the result of any inter-linguistic law, nor the *s* in the same word and the σ in σκώρ, be held to be the regular representatives of the palatial श (*s'*) in शकृत् (*s'akr'it*), for the latter in Sanskrit almost invariably corresponds with a guttural sound in Latin and Greek; as, for instance, in श्वन् (*s'wan*), *can* (*-is*), κύ (*-ων*); शत (*s'ata*), *cent* (*-um*), (ἑ)κατ(*-όν*); विंशति (*vins'ati*), *viginti*, εἴκοσι, &c.

But even supposing that there were no phonetic difficulty in establishing the original identity of both sets of words, we should still be at a loss how to account for the diversity they show when their thematic form becomes a real word, in assuming the declension-suffixes of the genitive, dative, and other cases. *Jecur*, for instance, appears in the genitive, as *jecor*-is or *jecin*-or-is, ἧπαρ and σκώρ, as ἥπατ-ος, σκατ-ός, while यकृत् (*yakr'it*), and शकृत् (*s'akr'it*) become यकृतस् (*yakr'it-as*), or यक्नस् (*yak(a)n-as*) and शकृतस् (*s'akr'it-as*), or शक्नस् (*s'ak(a)n-as*). Or, in other words, *jecur* conceals the crude forms *jecor-* and *jecin-* (or, as a variety, *jocin-*); ἧπαρ, the crude form of ἥπαρτ-; यकृत् (*yakr'it*) the crude forms यकृत् (*yakr'it-*) and यकन् (*yakan-*); while those of *stercus*, σκώρ and शकृत् (*s'akr'it*) are *stercor-*, σκαρτ-, शकृत् (*s'akr'it-*) and शकन् (*s'akan-*).

If I attempt to give a solution of these irregularities, which, as we have seen, concern—1. the terminating letters of these words, *or*, *in*, *αρτ*, *r'it* and *an*; 2. the appearance of the *t* in *stercus*, and the *s* of that and σκώρ, as compared with the *s'* of शकृत् (*s'akr'it*); and 3. the diversity of crude forms represented by *jecur*, यकृत् (*yakr'it*) and शकृत् (*s'akr'it*)—I may consider it as conceded that the only way of dealing

with them is that of examining the etymological meaning of these words; and further, that the means we possess in Latin or Greek will not allow us to ascertain this meaning satisfactorily. I begin, therefore, with the Sanskrit words. And first, with शकृत् (*s'akr'it*), the general meaning of which is "*fæces*, excrements."

The native authorities derive it from the radical शक् (*s'ak*) "to be able," with the suffix कृत् (*r'it*), or technically कृतिन् (*r'itin*), of the *un'ádi* class. As this affix, however, occurs, so far as I know, only in this single instance, and as the meaning of the radical countenances neither literally nor metaphorically, the sense of its would be derivative, I do not hesitate to reject this explanation, as has been done already by Kuhn, and, after him, by Benfey. The former proposes to derive शकृत् (*s'akr'it*) from the radical कॄ (*kr'i*) "to scatter about," and believes that the palatal initial stands in the place of a dental *s* (स्), the vowel *a* being inserted for convenience' sake, as the combination स्क् (*sk*) would be one not particularly agreeable in Sanskrit pronunciation. The dental *s*, again, which would be the original one in this word, according to Kuhn, is explained by him as the letter originally inherent in कॄ (*kr'i*), and reappearing in its derivatives, as अपस्कर (*apaskara*) and अवस्कर (*avaskara*), so that the radical कॄ (*kr'i*) itself would have originally sounded स्कॄ (*skr'i*).

I apprehend that Kuhn, whose usual cautiousness and accuracy in etymological researches entitle his assertions to the fullest credit, has been betrayed, in this case, into a wrong theory. For, the change of the Sanskrit palatal *s'* to the dental *s* is, in general, of such infrequent occurrence, and in almost all instances where it is met with, so clearly traceable to some mistake, that I cannot accede to such an assumption, unless it be confirmed by other and indisputable cases; of which none, I confess, have as yet come under my own observation. Nor is the "insertion" of an *a* between this supposititious *s* and the *k* following it,

proved, in my opinion; since I cannot admit that the combination *sk* (which is not unusual in the middle of words, and though not frequent, yet not unheard-of in the beginning of them), is so unpalatable to the Hindu tongue as to cause in this word a disruption in *sak*, which does not occur in other words of a similar kind. Another exception must be taken to what Kuhn considers as the original form of the radical कृ (*kr'i*); because the स् (*s*) in अपस्कर (*apaskara*) and अवस्कर (*avaskara*) is more likely to belong to *apa* and *ava*, as undoubtedly it does not belong to कृ (*kr'i*) "to do," in संस्कृ (*sans-kr'i*), उपस्कृ (*upas-kr'i*), and as it does not appear in *cer-n-o*, κρι-ν-ω, κερ-αν-νυμι, the kindred forms of the Sanskrit radical कृ (*kr'i*). But last, not least, a theme like शकृत् (*s'akr'it*) could not be derived from a radical terminating in the *long* vowel ॠ (*r'i*), as no grammatical rule allows a similar formation, and the only word so derived by the native authorities, namely, ददृत (*dadr'it*), is better referred to another origin.

Before I offer my own explanation of this word, may I be allowed to state a principle, the application of which I have found useful in many instances? This is, whenever the etymon of a word cannot be laid open by a clear grammatical process, and the different modes of analysis which may suggest themselves rather enhance than remove the doubts as to what may be the true etymology,—then consult the synonyms of the word, and, if I may say so, the imaginative idea which is expressed by them. Applying this principle to the words meaning "excrements," in Sanskrit, you will find that some of them proceed from the idea of *filling*, others from that of *evacuating*, and others from the *aspect* of the matter to be extruded, while one word, namely शमल (*s'amala*) distinctly involves the meaning of "*calming, giving ease*," whether we derive it, with the native authorities, from शम् (*s'am*) "to calm," with the suffix *ala*; or whether we consider it as a compound of श (*s'a*), and मल (*mala*) "dirt;"—the former from the same radical

शम् (*s'am*), meaning "happy" or "happiness," and occurring usually in compounds, such as शंभु (*s'ambhu*), शंकर (*s'amkara*), शंपा (*sampá*), but probably being also the thematic form of शिव (*s'iva*), the euphemistic name of the Terrific God.

If then there existed the intention of combining this notion with words meaning "excrements,"—and I refer to those also the word mentioned before, viz. अवस्कर (*avaskara*), which I derive from अवस् (*avas*) and कर (*kara*),—I am led to suppose that शक्रत् (*s'akr'it*) is a compound, the former part of which is the word श (*s'a*), which we have seen in शमल (*s'amala*), and the latter कृत् (*kr'it*) "doing," "producing," from कृ (*kr'i*) "to do."

For those, however, who are not conversant with Sanskrit, a few remarks with respect to कृत् (*kr'it*), and formations of a similar kind, will be required on behalf of the conclusions I have to draw. Every Sanskrit radical is allowed, in general, to appear in its crude shape at the end of certain compounds, without assuming any visible suffix. वृत्र (*vr'itra*), "a demon," for instance, and हन् (*han*) "to kill," may form a word वृत्रहन् (*vr'itrahan*) "the killer of Vr'itra." But if the radical terminates in a short vowel, a त् (*t*) is added to it, as it were to protect the radical vowel against such changes as would arise from its meeting with other vowels, according to the phonetic laws of Sanskrit. *Vr'itra*, for instance, and *ji* "to conquer," would form *vr'itra-jit* "the conqueror of Vr'itra." This precaution belongs particularly to Sanskrit, and (as I conclude from other instances in which this language has proceeded in a different way) is one which must have originated in a time comparatively recent, as is generally the case with all additional elements, which are to prevent the collision of letters, and produce what we call *regular* conjugations, declensions, &c., though, from a logical point of view, they are the most *irregular* phænomena of language, because they introduce into its living organism dead

mechanical matter. Whether such additional elements, which agree with the predilections of one people, and which, though constituting the individuality of a language, are productions extraneous to the common stem, appear, or do not appear, in its kindred branches, is therefore merely a matter of chance, not one of necessity. The form शकृत् (*s'akr'it*), a compound of श (*s'a*) and कृ (*kr'i*), *may* therefore reappear with its extraneous *t* peculiar to Sanskrit, in Latin, in Greek, or in other kindred languages, but the organic elements of which this word is composed are complete in the form शकृ (*s'akr'i*), or, —according to the change to which the *r'i* vowel is subject in Sanskrit as soon as the thematic form becomes a real one,—in the form शकर् (*s'akar*).

If we return to the Greek and Latin forms of this word, it will now be seen why, in the declension of *stercus*, which represents a theme *stercor-*, the disappearance of the final *t* of *s'akr'it* has nothing irregular in itself; and why in σκώρ, which supposes a theme σκαρτ-, the *τ* has been retained in σκατ-ος, &c., while the presence of the radical *ρ* is still manifest in the nominative σκώρ. A real difficulty would seem to exist in the Greek and Latin forms beginning with a dental *s*, as a guttural sound would have been the legitimate representative of the palatal Sanskrit *s'*. Be it, however, that the beginning of two successive syllables with a guttural sound has been distasteful to these languages; be it that the elision of the vowel of *s'a* in the Greek word σκώρ, and the transposition of the *t* in the Latin *stercus* originates in another motive than that of avoiding the repetition of the gutturals; then, the latter expedient once adopted, it is clear that before *t* or *κ*, the palatal sibilant could not have a nearer representative than the dental *s*. With respect to the vowels of these words, it is obvious that in *stercus*, where the final *t* never existed in the thematic form, the terminating vowel has remained short, while the long vowel of the nominative σκώρ

must be considered as a compensation for the loss of the *r*, which was preserved in the theme of the Greek word.

It remains for us to inquire into one point, which concerns at first only the Sanskrit forms श्रृकृत् (*s'akr'it*), and यकृत् (*yakr'it*), but is essential also for the Latin *jecur*. I mean the fact, that श्रृकृत् (*s'akr'it*) shows in some of its cases another theme श्रृकन् (*s'akan*), and यकृत् (*yakr'it*) another theme यकन् (*yakan*). The locative and genitive, in the singular of these words, for instance, are of the following kind: श्रृकृति (*s'akr'iti*) or श्रृकनि (*s'akani*), श्रृकृतस् (*s'akr'itas*) or श्रृक्नस् (*s'aknas*); यकृति (*yakr'iti*) or यकनि (*yakani*), यकृतस् (*yakr'itas*) or यक्नस् (*yaknas*). The interchange of these forms may be explained in a different way. Benfey supposes that there existed an original form *s'akarnt* and *yakarnt*; an hypothesis warranted neither by etymology nor by the laws of grammar; and Kuhn, that in words of a similar formation there was an original form in *ant*, the offspring of which are the thematic forms in *an* and *ar*. Adjectives in त्वन् (*tvan*), for instance, and several words in वन् (*van*), with a feminine in री (*rí*), as अतीत्वन् (*atítvan*), fem. अतीत्वरी (*atítvarí*), यज्वन् (*yajvan*), fem. यज्वरी (*yajvarí*), पीवन् (*pívan*, πίων), fem. पीवरी (*pívarí*, πίειρα), &c., would; according to him, originate in themes, such as *atítvant yajvant*, *pívant*, &c. A natural consequence, in our case, would be, to suppose original themes, *s'akant* and *yakant*, to explain the forms *s'akan* and *s'akar*, *yakan*, and *yakar*. The derivation I have given above precludes this assumption. For, as the form कर् (*kar*) of श्रृकर् (*s'akar*), represents the *organic* elements of the radical कृ (*kr'i*), itself, *s'akan* could, if my view is correct, only result from *s'akar*, in consequence of a change which, in Sanskrit, must be considered irregular, but may be accounted for, if we suppose that श्रृकर् (*s'akar*) became श्रृकस् (*s'akas*), and then श्रृकः (*sakah'*), and that between this and श्रृकन् (*s'akan*), there was a form श्रृकं (*sakam'*), forming a transitory passage from श्रृकः

(*sakah'*), leading to शकन् (*s'akan*). Though this process is a hypothetical one, and not capable of strict proof, and may therefore be considered objectionable, it seems to me more congenial with the language itself to suppose in this case, as well as in those alleged from Kuhn, a change from *r* (or *s*) to *n*, than to imagine the existence of a theme in *ant*, no direct trace of which is left in either of these formations. This view seems confirmed by the existence of thematic forms, which Kuhn has himself pointed out, as यजुस् (*yajus*), and ऊधस् (*údhas*), together with यज्वन् (*yajvan*), fem. यज्वरी (*yajvarí*), and ऊधन् (*údhna*), ऊधर् (*údhar*); but still more by the themes ऋह्रज् (*asr'ij*) and ऋसन् (*asan*), the latter of which can only be explained by the elision of ज् (*j*) in a transitory form ऋसर्ज् (*asarj*), the corresponding intermediate form being safely preserved in the Latin *'sang-uis*. The theme शकन् (*s'akan*), is not represented in the declension of *stercus* or σκώρ, but it exists in two words, the close etymological affinity of which with *stercus* and σκώρ might scarcely be guessed without recourse being had to the kindred Sanskrit word.

शकन् (*s'akan*) admits, in Sanskrit, a regular denominative शकाय् (*s'akáy*), *stercus facere*, which is conjugated according to the tenth class of verbs, a class corresponding in its formation with the Greek contracted verbs in αω, εω, οω, and in Latin with those of the first, second and fourth conjugations. The Sanskrit palatal *s'* being regularly represented in Latin and Greek by *k*, शकाय् (*s'akáy*), has its Latin and Greek representatives in *cac-are* κακ-άω, which, therefore, are denominatives of *stercus* and σκώρ, though referable to the Sanskrit form *s'akr'it*.

In the words *jecur*, ἧπαρ and यकृत् (*yakr'it*), we perceive the same phænomena as in those we have been considering, and I have merely to refer to the preceding remarks to account for their apparent diversity. यकृत् (*yakr'it*) has been already correctly understood by the Hindu

grammarians as being a compound of य (*ya*) and कृत् (*kr'it*), though, strange to say, they have mistaken the original bearing of the form यकृत् (*s'akr'it*). The theme यकन् (*yakan*), of which I have spoken before, is preserved in *jecin-or* of *jecur*, which has affirmed the suffix *or* (not to be confounded with the radical *or* in *jecor-*); ἦπαρ shows its radical ρ only in the nominative of the singular, like σκώρ, while it has the *-t* of *yakr'it* in the other cases. But less clear is the etymological meaning of these words, for which we must again have recourse to the Sanskrit form यकृत् (*yakr'it*), as composed of य (*ya*),—which, amongst other things, means "union,"—and कृत् (*krit*), "doing, producing," and which is explained in native dictionaries as "that which makes the union (sc. of the parts of the body.)" To understand what they may mean by this, it would be necessary to know the function ascribed to the liver by the old Hindu medical works. As yet, however, I have not been able to ascertain their theory on this point, as neither Sus'ruta, nor Charaka and A'treya, their most renowned authors on Medicine, contain any hint as to their notions on it. Nor do the other four synonymes of this word in Sanskrit afford any aid, as they merely refer to the black and fleshy substance of the liver. It may be considered, however, as a curious coincidence, that the German word *Leber* (which, like the whole Germanic branch of this word, presents the only instance perhaps in which the semi-vowel *y* of the Sanskrit idiom corresponds with the semi-vowel *l*) does originally mean, not the part of the body we call "liver," but every substance which is "prominent and firmly united in its parts," as opposed to substances which are low and soft. The notion of joining or uniting is still prevalent in the word *Leber* or *Leberstein* (liver or liver-stone), which in an Austrian dialect means a *boundary stone*, i.e. a stone put where two fields join. It would seem, therefore, that this meaning of "joining or making union," as expressed by the component parts of

यकृत (*yakr'it*), was also the primitive meaning of this word in Sanskrit, but became lost, and has only been preserved in some German dialects.

Before I conclude I may be allowed to point out two other words, which, from what I have said above, will derive a more correct explanation than they have hitherto obtained. I mean the Latin word *secus*, and the Greek word ἑκάς. These I connect with the Sanskrit word सकृत् (*sakr'it*), (written with a dental *s* in the beginning, and therefore not to be mistaken for the word *s'akr'it*, *stercus*). सकृत् (*sakr'it*), is composed of *sa*, an abbreviated form of सम् (*sam*), which in composition with verbs either means "with," "together," or "thoroughly," and *kr'it* "doing;" the original meaning of *sakr'it* is, therefore, "doing thoroughly," "doing so as not to require doing again:" this got lost, however, and was superseded by the meaning "once," "always." The meanings of *secus* and ἑκάς do not correspond with those of सकृत् (*sakr'it*), but the notion of exclusiveness which is implied by "once," and "always" is logically connected with the notion of "distance" and "separation," expressed by *secus* and ἑκάς; and if we consider that in the Sanskrit word, the etymon of which has remained clear, the literal meaning had already made room for the figurative one, a further step in this direction will much less appear strange in languages where the consciousness of the original value of the word was entirely lost. Having shown how कृत् (*kr'it*), which is originally कृ (*kr'i*), or कर् (*kar*), becomes *cor* and κωρ or κατ, I have only to observe that, in my opinion, *secus* and ἑκάς represent the nominatives of the themes *secor-* and ἑκατ-, and that these nominatives have become indeclinable. *Se* in *secus* and ἑ in ἑκάς are interesting forms, moreover, in as far as they exactly represent the Sanskrit स (*sa*), which in its full form सम् (*sam*), is the Greek σύν, but appears more changed in the Latin *cum*. Whether ἅπαξ may be safely referred to सकृत् (*sakr'it*), with which it corresponds in meaning "once," I do not

attempt to say; though I do not consider it unlikely that the form *sakar* (the organic form of *sakr'it*), changed to *sakah'*, might appear with π instead of κ, and with a full guttural sound in the Greek ἀπακ; ἄπαξ representing, if this assumption be correct, the nominative of this theme, which then became indeclinable, just as the themes *secor* and ἑκατ have become indeclinable nominatives, *secus* and ἑκάς.

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